David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Philosophy of Science 68 (2):203-217 (2001)
The aim of this paper is to analyze a philosophical question (neutrality vs. theory-ladenness of observation) taking into consideration the empirical results of Cognitive Psychology (theories of perception). This is an important debate because the objectivity of science is at stake. In the Philosophy of Science there are two main positions with regard to observation, those of C. Hempel and N. R. Hanson. In the Philosophy of Mind there are also two important contrasting positions, those of J. Fodor and Paul M. Churchland. I will analyze the consequences of recent theories of perception and vision developed within Cognitive Science for classical epistemological theses about observation
|Keywords||Cognitive Psychology Epistemology Observation Perception Psychology Churchland, P Hanson, N Hempel|
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Dustin Stokes (2009). Aesthetics and Cognitive Science. Philosophy Compass 4 (5):715-733.
Athanassios Raftopoulos (2006). Defending Realism on the Proper Ground. Philosophical Psychology 19 (1):47-77.
Eric Arnau, Anna Estany, Rafael González del Solar & Thomas Sturm (2014). The Extended Cognition Thesis: Its Significance for the Philosophy of (Cognitive) Science. Philosophical Psychology 27 (1):1-18.
Eric Arnau, Anna Estany, Rafael González del Solar & Thomas Sturm (2013). The Extended Cognition Thesis: Its Significance for the Philosophy of (Cognitive) Science. Philosophical Psychology 27 (1):1-18.
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