The thesis of theory-Laden observation in the light of cognitive psychology

Philosophy of Science 68 (2):203-217 (2001)
Abstract
The aim of this paper is to analyze a philosophical question (neutrality vs. theory-ladenness of observation) taking into consideration the empirical results of Cognitive Psychology (theories of perception). This is an important debate because the objectivity of science is at stake. In the Philosophy of Science there are two main positions with regard to observation, those of C. Hempel and N. R. Hanson. In the Philosophy of Mind there are also two important contrasting positions, those of J. Fodor and Paul M. Churchland. I will analyze the consequences of recent theories of perception and vision developed within Cognitive Science for classical epistemological theses about observation
Keywords Cognitive Psychology  Epistemology  Observation  Perception  Psychology  Churchland, P  Hanson, N  Hempel
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