The non-factive turn in epistemology: some hypotheses

In Veli Mitova (ed.), The factive turn in epistemology. Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press. pp. 219-228 (2018)
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Abstract

I evaluate non-factive or truth-insensitive accounts of the ordinary concepts used to evaluate beliefs, evidence, assertions, and decisions. Recent findings show that these accounts are mistaken. I propose three hypotheses regarding how philosophers defending these accounts got things so wrong. I also consider one potential consequence for the discipline.

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John Turri
University of Waterloo

Citations of this work

Knowledge from Falsehood: An Experimental Study.John Turri - 2019 - Thought: A Journal of Philosophy 8 (3):167-178.

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References found in this work

Thinking, Fast and Slow.Daniel Kahneman - 2011 - New York: New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux.
Philosophical explanations.Robert Nozick - 1981 - Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press.
The structure of empirical knowledge.Laurence BonJour - 1985 - Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press.
Theory of knowledge.Roderick M. Chisholm - 1966 - Englewood Cliffs, N.J.,: Prentice-Hall.

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