Joining voluntary thematic initiatives can be a means for firms to legitimate their business activities. However, a lack of review mechanisms could create incentives for free-riding. This might lead to a lower commitment to the initiative’s principles, and endanger its credibility and its members’ legitimacy benefits. Whether members of voluntary initiatives take advantage of the opportunity to free-ride has not been analyzed empirically so far. To fill this research gap, we investigate from an institutional theory perspective the actual implementation behavior (...) of publicly listed signatories of the United Nations Principles for Responsible Investment (UN PRI) in a difference-in-differences and an event study setting. Our empirical results show that, after signing, UN PRI signatories integrate environmental, social, and governance (ESG) criteria in their business activities significantly more than matched non-signatories from the financial sector, indicating the commitment of the signatories to the UN PRI in general. However, while the initial members show a high commitment to the initiative’s principles by increasing their ESG integration performance substantially, new members signing at a later stage of the initiative perform considerably less, and thus undermine the UN PRI’s credibility. We derive implications for voluntary thematic initiatives to avoid such a development. (shrink)

Kant did not explain the method of his foundation of ethics expressly. However, we can comprehend it as the demonstration of the originality of morality. For morality cannot be derived from anything non-moral – such a relation of derivation would destroy it. Therefore, there cannot be a justification or proof of morality in the strong sense, there can only be a “groundwork”, as the term “Grundlegung” is normally translated in English. This groundwork or grounding consists in disclosing the place or (...) topos and the turn or trope of its originating. According to Kant, the first is the will as practical reason; the latter is the turn of the will towards itself as autonomy. The result of such groundwork is, first, the evidence of the authenticity of morality and, hence, its unconditional validity – since such original validity is not conditioned on anything extra-moral. Second, we get a normative criterion for the contents of morality, which in Kant takes the form of the Categorical Imperative. The article seeks to defend the view that there is no alternative to Kant’s method of the foundation of ethics. However, by describing this method in a purely formal way, the author aims to open up thepossibility to implement it in another way and with other results than Kant does. (shrink)

„Ein jedes Ding in der Natur wirkt nach Gesetzen. Nur ein vernünftiges Wesen hat das Vermögen, nach der Vorstellung der Gesetze, i.e. nach Prinzipien zu handeln oder einen Willen.“ So definiert Kant in der Grundlegung zur Metaphysik der Sitten den Willen oder, was für ihn dasselbe ist, die praktische Vernunft. Die Moral ergibt sich sowohl unter dem formalen Gesichtspunkt ihres Geltungsanspruchs wie unter dem materialen ihrer Grundnorm, nämlich des kategorischen Imperativs, aus der Selbstanwendung der apriorischen Grundstruktur der praktischen Vernunft. Damit (...) ist die Frage beantwortet, "von woher ein unbedingtes Sollen verbindet, was der Grund seiner Verbindlichkeit ist", wie sie beispielhaft Dirk Greimann formuliert. (shrink)

A questão “por quê ser moral”, que foi formulada expressamente no contexto do debate filosófico acadêmico por Francis Herbert Bradley, divide os leitores quando buscam sua resposta em Kant. Uns acham, como Gerold Prauss, que Kant negue a possibilidade de tal resposta e diga que a moral precisa ser aceita como um fato simplesmente dado, o “fato da razão”. Contudo, como tal imediatismo ou “decisionismo transcendental” parece insatisfatório, um outro grupo defende a assim chamada “interpretação do agente racional”, onde este (...) último apresenta o valor supremo, absoluto, que fundamenta a moral e, com isso, apresenta a razão em virtude da qual devemos agir moralmente. Mas tal valor absoluto ou já é moral, mas então a resposta dada à questão “por quê ser moral” entra num círculo vicioso. Ou tal valor faz a moral depender de algo fora da moral o que, conforme Kant, destruiria toda moral. A solução do problema é a seguinte: Kant não deriva a moral de um pressuposto extramoral nem pressupõe a própria moral como simplesmente dada, mas explica o originar da moral. Ela origina da razão prática pela volta dessa razão sobre si mesma que constitui sua autonomia. Por este seu originar, a moral não é uma mera derivação de algo pressuposto, mas algo radicalmente novo, original, autónomo. Pelo outro lado, existe, sim, uma fundamentação da moral, i.e., um processo compreensível de sua constituição. Com isso, Kant evita o imediatismo: a moral não precisa ser simplesmente aceita como um fato puro, mas pode ser compreendida pela razão. (shrink)

Some features of Hegel’s Philosophy of History make it hardly acceptable in the 21st century. It proposes a final destination (Endzweck) of history, together with a principle of rational, dialectic necessity to take it there. In fact, these conceptions are not as absurd as they may seem to contemporary eyes. Nevertheless, the article doesn’t pretend to defend them, but aims to show that there is, behind these two, a third principle which is well worth to be defended –and which, in (...) fact, can systematically maintained without support from the other two. This we can call the “Principle of ethical asymmetry in history”. However, we also can name it by the formula Hegel himself coined: the “progress in the consciousness of liberty”. To explain this idea, the article evidences that the fundamental characteristic of all normativity is practical knowledge de se. In morality or ethics, this turns reflexive and self-determining. Liberty in Hegel’s sense effectively realizes this knowledge de se not only in a formal and abstract way, as in Kant, but concretely in history and in specific communities. However, since liberty in this process always remains linked to that normative self-comprehension which constitutes our practical self-consciousness, the processes of historical realization of liberty are normatively irreversible. Precisely for this process has an element of objective and unconditional aspect. The article concludes with some remarks as to how this principle of ethical asymmetry in history can serve as a basis of e new ethical theory which is strongly normative and, at the same time, sensitive to historic context an human finitude. (shrink)

Le traite sur les vertus, a moins d'etre simplement un traite sur des valeurs differentes, n'a sa place que dans une ethique finaliste, c'est-a-dire dans une ethique quie considere l'action morale comme un phenomene interieur, destine a perfectionner l'homme. C'est a partir de la qu'on peut se demander comment l'homme prepare son action, en acquerant des forces "doublant" la nature. Quant a savoir quelles sont les capacites naturelles exigeant une vertu, cela depend principalement de la question de savoir dans quelles (...) puissances la spontaneite naturelle ne forme pas suffisamment la fermete de caractere, necessaire a la recherche du bien. Pour Thomas d'Aquin, comme pour Aristote, la raison pratique, la volonte et les appetits sensibles sont le siege des vertus. Pour ce qui est de la raison pratique et de la volonte. l'experience commune suffirait a verifier cette opinion. en ce qui concerne les appetits sensibles, il faut d'abord resoudre la question de savoir s'ils ont vraiment un caractere moral, ou s'ils sont simplement des phenomenes psychiques. Dans ce dernier cas ils ne font que suivre les directives de la volonte morale comme les forces motrices physiques. Nous avons essaye de montrer que les appetits sensibles (Passions) ont un caracter moral. (shrink)

O artigo tenciona explicar o conceito da subjetividade na Ciência da Lógica (CdL) a partir de sua forma inicial, diferentemente da maioria dos vários estudos sobre a temática, que discute as formas já mais desenvolvidas, que ocorrem dentro da Lógica do Conceito. Porém, como essa última, desde início, é “Lógica Subjetiva”, a subjetividade precisa ser constituída antes ou no ponto do começo dela. Essa subjetividade inicial e mínima explica-se por primeiro pela identificação de subjetividade e liberdade, por segundo, pela compreensão (...) da liberdade como autodeterminação. Essa autodeterminação ocorre, na CdL, pela primeira vez na “necessidade absoluta” e torna-se verdadeiramente autônoma na “relação absoluta” da “ação recíproca”. Essa, quando levada a suas últimas conseqüências, é autodeterminação conceitual ou conceito autodeterminante – e aí inicia-se o reino da liberdade. Mas isso quer dizer que liberdade, inicialmente, não é outra coisa que necessidade internalizada na determinação conceitual, isto é, autodeterminação necessária do conceito. Obviamente, o conhecer, destarte, não faz parte da forma inicial da liberdade e da subjetividade: subjetividade não é, originariamente, auto-consciente. Seu saber-de-si, a subjetividade adquire apenas, através de um desenvolvimento longo e complexo, na “Idéia”, mais especificamente na “Idéia do conhecer”, para plenificar-se na “Idéia absoluta”. O artigo conclui com uma crítica dessa transição à consciência no desenvolvimento imanente da subjetividade, mantendo que a consciência seja algo originário, não reduzível a estruturas conceituais. Palavras chaves: Hegel, Subjetividade, Liberdade, Consciência, Ciência da Lógica. (shrink)

Kant shows that a fundamental theory of normativity and morality can give neither an explanation nor an explication of normativity, but can only articulate and render explicit its origin. It can do so by indicating the place or topos and the turn or trope of its originating. According to Kant, the topos of normativity is the will qua practical reason and its trope is the general, typically instrumental use of this reason, i.e. reflection. The trope of the origin of morality (...) is autonomy, i.e. practical reason turning on itself and thus becoming pure practical reason, thereby establishing its own form as law: the categorical imperative. Consequently, fundamental ethics serves two functions : formally, it provides evidence for the originality or authenticity of morality; materially, it gives a criteriological principle for the content of morality. The article argues that Kant was right in his view of the foundation of ethics, but was wrong in the manner in which he met the requirements thus established. The topos of normativity and, consequently, of morality cannot be reason, but must be consciousness or, more precisely, knowledge de se; and its fundamental trope cannot be reflection, but must be what can be described as a conversion of consciousness. This conversion can be identified with philein in the sense of Aristotle. It has four different aspects: desire, cognition, benevolence, and recognition. When philein is reciprocal and lived, philia ensues. Friendship is then described as the topos of the origin of Normativity and Morality. (shrink)

As normas da moral são as regras sob as quais o indivíduo livre limita livremente sua liberdade em prol da liberdade geral. As normas da lei são regras sob as quais o indivíduo livre é forçado a limitar sua liberdade em prol da liberdade geral. Com isso quase todos os filósofos modernos concordam. A ideia genial e central da filosofia prática de Hegel é que as normas tanto da moral quanto da lei não são limitações da liberdade, mas o cumprimento (...) dela, porque nelas e somente nelas a liberdade se realiza. O conceito dessa realidade geral da liberdade nas normas éticas é a “eticidade”. Essa concepção Hegel desenvolve a partir da reflexão, necessariamente chega à compreensão de que o cumprimento pleno de sua liberdade consiste na eticidade. O presente artigo tenta expor esse nexo lógico-conceitual. Em seguida, oferece algumas indicações concretas para a situação política atual, para, por fim, apontar um defeito que inclusive o conceito hegeliano de liberdade tem. (shrink)

Since some time the metaphor of logical space has been used to open new approaches to Hegel’s “Science of Logic”. Frequently it is noticed that in such an interpretation logical space must be understood as dynamic. However, as far as I can see, nobody has done yet the step to introduce the concept of logical time into the discussion, even though this step seems to suggest itself. The following contribution seeks to develop this thought and arrives at some new conceptions, (...) such as the curvature of logical space, logical actuality and semantic present, which may seem strange at first sight, but which follow consistently from the explication of the fundamental idea. The first aim in doing this is to broaden our conceptual repertoire do deal with Hegel’s Logic. This may open new perspectives of interpretation which may prove inspiring. Secondarily, the article also defends a systematic thesis which stands on its own and lays claim to truth. This claim goes far beyond a mere interpretation of Hegel and implies a fundamental critique of his philosophy. The comprehension of logical time-space leads to the requirement of logical chance event – and not only real chance. This goes against Hegel claim to absolute necessity in the dialectical development of his Logic and leads to a new philosophic comprehension of logic as such. (shrink)

A questão do método na Ciência da Lógica (CL) é uma das mais controvertidas na discussão da filosofia de Hegel. O artigo defende a opinião de que o “método absoluto” de fato apresenta uma estrutura formal definida e distinta que seja o princípio geral de todo o desenvolvimento do sistema hegeliano (maduro). Defende essa interpretação contra mal-entendimentos, sobretudo contra aquele que um tal método geral tornaria a CL num formalismo vazio. O método hegeliano é apresentado como método do determinar, sendo (...) que a CL, fundamentalmente e originariamente, não e outra coisa que uma teoria de determinações aprióricas do pensar, i.é, de categorias, regras e formas lógicas. O artigo argumenta em favor da pretensão à universalidade e incondicionalidade que Hegel atribui a seu método. Quer mostrar que é exatamente essa incondicionalidade do método, e nada mas, que sustenta a necessidade e a imanência do proceder do pensar puro e, com isso, sustenta toda a pretensão à “ciência absoluta” e ao “idealismo absoluto” hegeliano. No final, porém, o texto oferece uma crítica interna a este método, que modifica decisivamente a pretensão de Hegel, embora não a destrua fundamentalmente. É que o próprio método contém um momento de indeterminação ou contingência. Essa crítica conduz ao conceito do “acaso” como princípio originário e intransponível de toda dialética e, com isso, de todo determinar-se. Determinação se realiza no acaso da dialética. O acaso dialético e o princípio de toda realidade. PALAVRAS-CHAVE – Hegel. Método. Ciência da Lógica. ABSTRACT The question of the Method in the Science of Logic (SL) is among the most controversially debated in the discussions on Hegel. This article defends the view that there actually is a definite and distinct formal structure underlying the whole development of Hegel’s (mature) system which he himself presents as the “Absolute Method”. This interpretation is defended against misunderstandings, especially against the opinion that such a method should turn the SL into a empty formalism. Hegel’s Method is explained as method of determining, the SL being primarily and fundamentally nothing else but a theory of the aprioric determinations of thinking, i.e. of categories, logical rules and forms. The article arguments in favor of the universality and unconditionality which Hegel claims for his Method. It tries to show that it is exactly this unconditionality of the Method, and nothing else, which supports the necessity and immanence of “pure thinking” and consequently supports Hegel’s claim to “absolute science” and “absolute idealism”. Finally, however, the article offers a critique of this Method, which modifies it fundamentally without destroying it totally. It is argued that there is a moment of indeterminacy or of contingency within the very Method of determining. This critique will lead to the concept of “accident” or “chance event” as original principle of all dialectics and, with this, of all determining. KEY WORDS – Hegel. Method. Science of Logic. (shrink)

Walker Percy’s unusual aspirations set his novels apart from most literary attempts to understand profound human problems. He gave meaning to the category of art as inquiry. In the novels, his characters’ eccentric quests treat everyday things as evidence for abstract and ultimately theological hypotheses. Outside the novels Percy shared their conviction, inspired by philosophical traditions that include Leibniz, Descartes, the British phenomena lists, C.S. Peirce, and Noam Chomsky. This article shows how well in tune he was with these traditions, (...) and especially with Chomsky’s and Peirce’s variants on the thesis that built-in biases picked up from our environment are relevant to everyday and scientific learning. In this respect, Percy too anticipated the significance of more recent developments in cognitive science and robotic learning. Like Peirce, he also believed that these empirical learning patterns have theological resonance. (shrink)

Abstract.Although the Hart/Dworkin debate has as much to do with Dworkin's affirmative theory of judicial discretion as with Hart's more comprehensive theory of law, the starting point was of course Dworkin's attempt to demolish the “model of rules,” Hart's alleged analysis of legal systems as collections of conclusive reasons for specified legal consequences. The continuing relevance of this attack for the prospects for any theory of law is the subject of the present essay.

1. T. Die Prinzipien der Gesellschaftslehre.--2. T. Rechtsphilosophie.--3. T. Die soziale Ordnung.--4. T. Wirtschaftsethik Galen -- 5. T. Politische Ethik.

Drei Arten der Freundschaft gibt es nach Aristoteles. In der ersten, der Freundschaft im vollen und eigentlichen Sinn, lieben sich die Freunde aufgrund ihrer charakterlichen Vortrefflichkeit, in der zweiten, weil sie sich Lust bereiten und in der dritten, weil sie sich nützlich sind. Alle drei Freundschaftsformen erfordern Gegenseitigkeit und Unverborgenheit der Gesinnung. Bezüglich eines weiteren Kriteriums scheint der Text auf den ersten Blick undeutlich zu sein : das Wohlwollen ist zunächst Bestandteil der allgemeinen Freundschaftsdefinition, wird dann aber nach Meinung der (...) meisten Interpretatoren auf die Tugendfreundschaft eingeschränkt. John M. Cooper hat dagegen bereits 1976 die These aufgestellt, alle drei Formen der Freundschaft bei Aristoteles implizierten das Wohlwollen im vollen Sinn seiner Aristotelischen Definition. Dagegen hat vor allem A. W. Price argumentiert, dass es Wohlwollen im vollen Sinn nach Aristoteles nur in der Tugendfreundschaft gebe. Diese Position ist inzwischen so selbstverständlich geworden, dass Coopers Interpretation z. T. gar nicht mehr erwähnt wird. Ich möchte mich für die These Coopers einsetzen und dabei seine Argumente präzisieren und verstärken. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Reviewed by:Ideas and Forms of Tragedy from Aristotle to the Middle AgesRichard J. UtzIdeas and Forms of Tragedy from Aristotle to the Middle Ages, by Henry Ansgar Kelly; xvii & 257 pp. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993, $59.95.If H. A. Kelly had wanted to sing the tune of Norman Cantor’s recent book on nineteenth- and twentieth-century medievalists, he could have called his study “Inventing Tragedy.” However, besides a certain (...) revisionistic attitude, there are no correspondences between the hasty, essayistic Inventing the Middle Ages (1991) and the scholarly, thoroughly philological Ideas and Forms of Tragedy. Where Cantor attempts to convince his readers that the various critical appropriations of the Middle Ages say more about the cultures of their modern reinventors than about the subject of their researches, Kelly is positive that sound source study and textual criticism can provide secure data for a more accurate application of perhaps the most famous of all genre terms to respective historical authors and individual plays. Thus, Kelly considers his book to be a necessary critical corrective of faulty and preconceived (modern) ideas about classical and medieval notions of tragedy. His methodological insistence on a purely philological investigation is responsible for some of the [End Page 253] outstanding virtues of this investigation such as authority, exactitude, and scholarliness; at the same time it is also the cause for the omission of questions essential to a study which purports to present an account not only of the forms but also the “ideas” of tragedy from classical antiquity through late medieval times.Chapters one and two examine various ideas and practices associated with tragedy in ancient Greece and Rome. This concise survey should become assigned reading for students of literary drama because it debunks the belief that the term tragedy conjures up a uniform idea, one that has been relatively constant throughout the ages and that can be attributed to Aristotle’s discussion of the best kind of tragedy in his Poetics. Kelly demonstrates how Aristotle’s broad definition of the term (any serious story, even with a happy ending) was transformed in late antiquity to mean a story ending in irremediable misfortune.Chapter three studies the semantic shifts the word tragedy underwent in the early Middle Ages. Kelly establishes convincingly that the various early medieval lexicographers and commentators (the most intriguing discussions include Isidore of Seville, Remigius of Auxerre, and Papias) knew much less about tragedy and had a much less unified idea of tragedy than is assumed by many modern-day scholars of drama. A vague knowledge of the genre also characterizes the twelfth century (chapter four), when—with the exception of John of Salisbury—creative mélanges of authentic classical traits and postclassical distortions dominated.The fifth chapter demonstrates that most commentators in the high Middle Ages, despite the reception of Aristotle directly from the Greek or through Arabic intermediaries, vary widely on the meanings they attach to the word “tragedy.” Most of them, such as John Garland, even consider it an empty, obsolete genre, one practiced only by very few poets of classical antiquity. Only Dante Aligheri believed that tragedy was a current genre and that he had made his contribution to it.The study concludes by surveying the developments in fourteenth- and fifteenth-century England, France, Italy, and Spain. Kelly argues that in spite of the greatly increased currency of ideas of tragedy in the later Middle Ages, other genres (vitae of famous men or saints, exempla, complaints) negotiated stories of disaster and death. It seems problematic, however, that Kelly does not further investigate any of the cultural ramifications for and the “ideas” behind the existence and nature of these other genres and the coeval absence of (Aristotelian) tragedy. While he rightly states that medieval vitae, exempla, and planctus all do without discussions of the empathic sorrow for the misfortune of others which characterizes Aristotle’s (and Chaucer’s) ideas of tragedy, his exclusively philological approach—one concerned with sources and textual traditions but not with society or mentalities—makes him circumnavigate essential deliberations about the causes for these conspicuous medieval notions. [End Page 254] Thus, Kelly’s book does not even attempt to answer the... (shrink)