Researchers are able to estimate what subjects attend to by using eye tracking systems. Existing approaches for analyzing eye movements are very useful to estimate attention to still objects. But they are inadequate to estimate attention to moving objects, although paying attention to moving objects is usual human behavior. Thus, we propose a novel approach and algorithm to estimate attention to moving objects more precisely. Our approach is to extract "eye tracking movements". We phrase both saccadic eye movements and smooth (...) pursuit eye movements as "eye tracking movements". Because previous works reveal that humans often track a moving object by the eye movements when they pay attention to the object, our approach seems to be appropriate. Our algorithm used for extracting eye tracking movements is called Path Stitching (PS) algorithm. The PS algorithm is a kind of Longest Common Subsequence (LCS) discovery algorithms using Dynamic Time Warping (DTW) as a similarity measurement procedure. Eye tracking movements can be regarded as a situation that a subsequence of eye movements' trajectory is similar to a subsequence of the target's trajectory with a small or no time-difference. Because humans track a moving object by the eye movements with locally fluctuated time difference, we think the use of DTW is very appropriate. In addition, to make outputs more comprehensible, we employ the LCS discovery approach for the PS algorithm. The experimental results show that the PS algorithm is more able to extract eye tracking movements than the fixation extracting approach. The fixation extracting approach is the most popular and the strongest approach to analyze eye movements. Therefore, we conclude that our novel approach will advance the analysis of human behavior by the eye movements and human-computer interaction systems they utilize user's eye movements. (shrink)

Business and Society Review, Volume 127, Issue S1, Page 223-251, Spring 2022.

Derivational robustness may increase the degree to which various pieces of evidence indirectly confirm a robust result. There are two ways in which this increase may come about. First, if one can show that a result is robust, and that the various individual models used to derive it also have other confirmed results, these other results may indirectly confirm the robust result. Confirmation derives from the fact that data not known to bear on a result are shown to be relevant (...) when it is shown to be robust. Second, robustness may increase the degree to which the robust result is indirectly confirmed if it increases the weight with which existing evidence indirectly confirms it. This may happen when it strengthens the connection between the core and the robust result by showing that auxiliaries are not responsible for the result. (shrink)

The most common argument against the use of rational choice models outside economics is that they make unrealistic assumptions about individual behavior. We argue that whether the falsity of assumptions matters in a given model depends on which factors are explanatorily relevant. Since the explanatory factors may vary from application to application, effective criticism of economic model building should be based on model-specific arguments showing how the result really depends on the false assumptions. However, some modeling results in imperialistic applications (...) are relatively robust with respect to unrealistic assumptions. Key Words: unrealistic assumptions • economics imperialism • rational choice • as if • robustness. (shrink)

This paper provides a conceptual framework that allows for distinguishing between different kinds of generalisation and applicability. It is argued that generalising models may bring epistemic benefits. They do so if they show that restrictive and unrealistic assumptions do not threaten the credibility of results derived from models. There are two different notions of applicability, generic and specific, which give rise to three different kinds of generalizations. Only generalising a result brings epistemic benefits concerning the truth of model components or (...) results. Abstracting the model and applying the model into new systems are not intrinsically epistemically beneficial in this way. The Dixit-Stiglitz model of monopolistic competition is used as an illustration. (shrink)

Robustness may increase the degree to which the robust result is indirectly confirmed if it is shown to depend on confirmed rather than disconfirmed assumptions. Although increasing the weight with which existing evidence indirectly confirms it in such a case, robustness may also be irrelevant for confirmation, or may even disconfirm. Whether or not it confirms depends on the available data and on what other results have already been established.

Like other mathematically intensive sciences, economics is becoming increasingly computerized. Despite the extent of the computation, however, there is very little true simulation. Simple computation is a form of theory articulation, whereas true simulation is analogous to an experimental procedure. Successful computation is faithful to an underlying mathematical model, whereas successful simulation directly mimics a process or a system. The computer is seen as a legitimate tool in economics only when traditional analytical solutions cannot be derived, i.e., only as a (...) purely computational aid. We argue that true simulation is seldom practiced because it does not fit the conception of understanding inherent in mainstream economics. According to this conception, understanding is constituted by analytical derivation from a set of fundamental economic axioms. We articulate this conception using the concept of economists' perfect model. Since the deductive links between the assumptions and the consequences are not transparent in ‘bottom‐up’ generative microsimulations, microsimulations cannot correspond to the perfect model and economists do not therefore consider them viable candidates for generating theories that enhance economic understanding. (shrink)

This paper studies the welfare consequences of strategic voting in two commonly used parliamentary agendas by comparing the average utilities obtained in simulated voting under two behavioural assumptions: expected utility maximising behaviour and sincere behaviour. The average utility obtained in simulations is higher with expected utility maximising behaviour than with sincere voting behaviour under a broad range of assumptions. Strategic voting increases welfare particularly if the distribution of preference intensities correlates with voter types.

This book provides the first comprehensive and critical examination of Mäki's realist philosophy of economics.

It is argued in this paper that amalgamating confirmation from various sources is relevantly different from social-choice contexts, and that proving an impossibility theorem for aggregating confirmation measures directs attention to irrelevant issues.

This paper provides a philosophical critique of social choice theory insofar as it deals with the normative evaluation of voting and voting rules. I will argue that the very method of evaluating voting rules in terms of whether they satisfy various conditions is deeply problematic because introducing strategic behaviour leads to a violation of any condition that makes a difference between voting rules. I also argue that it is legitimate to make interpersonal comparisons of utilities in voting theory. Combining a (...) realistic account of voters’ behaviour with a utilitarian evaluation of the outcomes then leads to the judgment that strategic voting is beneficial. If it is, then Arrow's theorem does not have far-reaching consequences for democracy because one of its conditions is not normatively acceptable. (shrink)

This paper provides the first systematic epistemological account of simulated data in empirical science. We focus on the epistemic issues modelers face when they generate simulated data to solve problems with empirical datasets, research tools, or experiments. We argue that for simulated data to count as epistemically reliable, a simulation model does not have to mimic its target. Instead, some models take empirical data as a target, and simulated data may successfully mimic such a target even if the model does (...) not. We show how to distinguish between simulated and empirical data, and we also offer a definition of simulation that can accommodate Monte Carlo models. We shed light on the epistemology of simulated data by providing a taxonomy of four different mimicking relations that differ concerning the nature of the relation or relata. We illustrate mimicking relations with examples from different sciences. Our main claim is that the epistemic evaluation of simulated data should start with recognizing the diversity of mimicking relations rather than presuming that only one relation existed. (shrink)

This paper explores Erich Fromm’s contribution to Deweyan democratic education by referring to his psychoanalytic interpretation of John Dewey’s pragmatic theory. First, it employs the work by Gert Biesta to secure a space between critical pedagogy and Deweyan democratic education, from which Fromm’s theory can be discussed. Furthermore, it argues that Biesta’s perspective offers a valuable theoretical ground to extend the emancipatory potential of Deweyan democratic education, while avoiding some pitfalls of critical pedagogy. Subsequently, the paper contrasts Marcuse’s and Fromm’s (...) views on Dewey to show how Fromm’s understanding of Dewey was more effective than that of Marcuse for developing the potential of Dewey’s philosophy. Next, the paper clarifies key similarities and differences between Fromm’s psychoanalysis and Dewey’s pragmatism, as it is applicable specifically to emancipatory education. Finally, the paper argues that despite the differences between these two thinkers, Fromm’s theory further radicalizes Deweyan democratic education by adding new elements to the list of preconditions on the role of the emancipatory teacher. (shrink)

Kirjasymposio Eerik Lagerspetzin Social Choice and Democratic Values – kirjasta. Kenneth Arrowia seuraten Lagerspetz pitää sosiaalisen valinnan teorian suurimpana vahvuutena sitä, että sen tuloksia voidaan käyttää monissa erilaisissa yhteyksissä. Minä taas pidän teorian suurimpana heikkoutena sen vaikeutta: tutkijat eivät ole päässeet yhteisymmärrykseen erityisesti ns. epärelevanttien vaihtoehtojen riippumattomuusehdon tulkinnasta ja muotoilusta. Lagerspetz hyväksyy kirjassaan nähdäkseni seuraavat väitteet: kaikki demokraattiset äänestyssäännöt rikkovat riippumattomuusehtoa, mutta että tuo ehto on silti normatiivisesti perusteltu. Arrow’n ehdot ovat intuitiivisesti ottaen hyväksyttävissä. Koska riippumattomuusehdon rikkoutumisesta seuraa strategista äänestämistä (...) ja strateginen äänestäminen on normatiivisesti katsottuna ei-toivottavaa tai jopa moraalisesti kyseenalaista, strategisen äänestämisen poissulkeminen olisi paras mahdollinen argumentti riippumattomuusehdon puolesta. Lisäksi säännöt jotka toteuttavat riippumattomuusehdon ovat immuuneja strategiselle käyttäytymiselle. Hyvin toimiva äänestyssääntö luo puhtaasti mekaanisen yhteyden yksilöiden mielipiteiden ja kollektiivisen valinnan välille. Tämän kirjoituksen ensisijainen tavoite on kumota jokainen edellisessä kappaleessa esitetty väite. (shrink)

Arrow's Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives (IIA) has been under criticism for decades for not taking account of preference intensities. Computer-simulation results by Aki Lehtinen concerning strategic voting under various voting rules show that this intensity argument does not need to rest on mere intuition. Voters may express intensities by voting strategically, and that this has beneficial aggregate-level consequences: utilitarian efficiency is higher if voters engage in strategic behaviour than if they always vote sincerely. Strategic voting is thus unambiguously beneficial under (...) a utilitarian evaluation of outcomes. What has been considered the main argument for IIA turns out to be one against it. This paper assesses the implications of these results for interpretations of Arrow's theorem and the Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorem in a discussion on the methodological and philosophical arguments concerning preference intensities and IIA. (shrink)

A review of Donald Katzner's book on economic modelling is provided. In addition to characterising the book, I give critical comments on the distinction between primary and secondary assumptions.

Following an established tradition, the current special issue collects five articles that originate from papers presented at the IX Conference of the International Network for Economic Method. The conference took place in Helsinki on 1–3 September 2011 and was hosted by TINT (Trends and Tensions in Intellectual Integration), University of Helsinki. The conference was successful both in terms of the number of participants and the quality of the presentations. Although the sample of papers that made it to this special issue (...) is relatively small, we think that it is representative of some of the major contemporary currents in the wider field of the philosophy and methodology of economics. The papers examine both long-debated and more recent issues. (shrink)

This paper contributes to the philosophical accounts of generalisation in formal modelling by introducing a conceptual framework that allows for recognising generalisations that are epistemically beneficial in the sense of contributing to the truth of a model result or component. The framework is useful for modellers themselves because it is shown how to recognise different kinds of generalisation on the basis of changes in model descriptions. Since epistemically beneficial generalisations usually de-idealise the model, the paper proposes a reformulation of the (...) well-known distinction between abstraction and idealisation. A reformulated notion of abstraction is needed because the extant accounts yield wrong judgments when model-modifications introduce implicit assumptions. (shrink)

Background:Moral distress has various adverse effects on nurses working in critical care. Differences in personal values, and between values and self-perception of behaviour are factors that may cause moral distress.Research aims:The aims of this study were (1) to identify ethical values and self-perception of behaviour of critical care nurses in Japan and (2) to determine the items with a large difference between value and behaviour and the items with a large difference in value from others.Research design:A nationwide, cross-sectional study was (...) conducted.Participants and research context:We developed a self-administered questionnaire with 28 items, which was completed by 1014 critical care nurses in Japan. The difference between value and self-perception of behaviour was calculated from the score of each value item minus the score of each self-perception of behaviour item. The size of the difference in value from the others was judged by the standard deviation of each item.Ethical considerations:The study was approved by the Ethics Committee of the Tokyo Medical and Dental University (approval nos. M2018-214, M2019-045).Results:The items with a large difference between value and behaviour sources were related to the working environment and decision-making support. The items with a large difference in value from others were related to hospital management and disclosure of information to patients.Discussion:Improving the working environment for nurses is important for reducing moral distress. Nurses are faced with a variety of choices, including advocating for patients and protecting the fair distribution of medical resources, and each nurse’s priorities might diverge from those of other team members, which can lead to conflict within the team.Conclusion:This study revealed items with particularly high risks of moral distress for nurses. The results provide foundational information that can guide the development of strategies to mitigate moral distress. (shrink)

We claim that the process of theoretical model refinement in economics is best characterised as robustness analysis: the systematic examination of the robustness of modelling results with respect to particular modelling assumptions. We argue that this practise has epistemic value by extending William Wimsatt's account of robustness analysis as triangulation via independent means of determination. For economists robustness analysis is a crucial methodological strategy because their models are often based on idealisations and abstractions, and it is usually difficult to tell (...) which idealisations are truly harmful. (shrink)

This article is an attempt by Japanese physicians to introduce the practice patterns and moral justification of Japanese critical care to the world. Japanese health care is characterized by the fact that the fee schedule does not reward high technology medicine, such as surgery and critical care. In spite of the low reimbursement, our critical care practice pattern is characterized by continuing futile treatment for terminal patients in the intensive care unit (ICU). This apparently wasteful practice can be explained by (...) fundamental Japanese cultural values, social factors in Japan, the availability of extensive insurance coverage, physicians' psychological factors, lack of cost-benefit considerations and the pragmatic approach the Japanese take to situations. We attempt to make some brief suggestions regarding the improvement of our critical care practices. Although we can not fully present quantitative data to support our argument, this article represents our real-world approaches to the ethical issues in the ICU in Japan. (shrink)

This study posits that Bohr failed to defend the completeness of the quantum mechanical description of physical reality against Einstein–Podolsky–Rosen’s paper. Although there are many papers in the literature that focus on Bohr’s argument in his reply to the EPR paper, the purpose of the current paper is not to clarify Bohr’s argument. Instead, I contend that regardless of which interpretation of Bohr’s argument is correct, his defense of the quantum mechanical description of physical reality remained incomplete. For example, a (...) recent trend in studies of Bohr’s work is to suggest he considered the wave-function description to be epistemic. However, such an interpretation cannot be used to defend the completeness of the quantum mechanical description. (shrink)

Articles on Jaina philosophy and Jaina literature.

Aggressive behavior is instinctively driven behavior that helps animals to survive and reproduce and is closely related to multiple behavioral and physiological processes. The dorsal raphe nucleus (DRN) is an evolutionarily conserved midbrain structure that regulates aggressive behavior by integrating diverse brain inputs. The DRN consists predominantly of serotonergic (5‐HT:5‐hydroxytryptamine) neurons and decreased 5‐HT activity was classically thought to increase aggression. However, recent studies challenge this 5‐HT deficiency model, revealing a more complex role for the DRN 5‐HT system in aggression. (...) Furthermore, emerging evidence has shown that non‐5‐HT populations in the DRN and specific neural circuits contribute to the escalation of aggressive behavior. This review argues that the DRN serves as a multifaceted modulator of aggression, acting not only via 5‐HT but also via other neurotransmitters and neural pathways, as well as different subsets of 5‐HT neurons. In addition, we discuss the contribution of DRN neurons in the behavioral and physiological aspects implicated in aggressive behavior, such as arousal, reward, and impulsivity, to further our understanding of DRN‐mediated aggression modulation. (shrink)

Robert Sugden argues that robustness analysis cannot play an epistemic role in grounding model-world relationships because the procedure is only a matter of comparing models with each other. We posit that this argument is based on a view of models as being surrogate systems in too literal a sense. In contrast, the epistemic importance of robustness analysis is easy to explicate if modelling is viewed as extended cognition, as inference from assumptions to conclusions. Robustness analysis is about assessing the reliability (...) of our extended inferences, and when our confidence in these inferences changes, so does our confidence in the results. Furthermore, we argue that Sugden’s inductive account relies tacitly on robustness considerations. (shrink)

This paper offers a novel argument for fatalism: if one accepts the logical possibility of fatalism, one must accept that fatalism is true. This argument has a similar structure to the ‘knowability paradox’, which proves that if every truth can be known by someone, then every truth is known by someone. In this paper, what I mean by ‘fatalism’ is that whatever happens now was determined to happen now in the past. Existing arguments for fatalism assume that the principle of (...) bivalence holds even for future propositions, that past truths are necessarily true, and/or that possible propositions never change into impossible propositions. However, my argument does not assume such premises. It assumes only the logical possibility of fatalism. Here, what I mean by ‘fatalism is logically possible’ is that there is at least one possible world where whatever happens now was determined to happen now in the past. Since this assumption is weak (thus is plausible), I believe it to be much stronger than the existing arguments for fatalism. In addition, I also show that what will happen in the future is determined now. (shrink)