En este breve comentario discuto algunos aspectos de la interpretación de la epistemología de Davidson que sugiere Willian Duica en su reciente libro. Luego de una presentación somera del libro me centro en tres asuntos centrales de la interpretación de Duica. En primer lugar, argumento que su lectura de la crítica de Davidson al dualismo esquema/contenido es muy restrictiva y deja abierta la posibilidad de un realismo directo empirista. En segundo lugar, argumento que en su lectura el propio Duica se (...) compromete inadvertidamente con un empirismo de este tipo y, de este modo, su interpretación entra en tensión con el coherentismo de Davidson. Finalmente, discuto algunos aspectos de la interpretación que hace Duica de la tesis davidsoniana de la triangulación. (shrink)

Este artigo tenta mostrar que o nascimento do empirismo como orientação filosófica se deu, não na modernidade, mas na filosofia helenística grega, no pirronismo dos médicos-filósofos dessa época. A combinação de empirismo e Metodismo médico ensejou ao velho pirronismo a possibilidade de formular uma postura epistemológica consistente com seu fenomenismo originário, ao mesmo tempo que integrava no seu iniverso filosófico as práticas "cognitivas" das tékhnai gregas.

La presente investigación se propone mostrar la génesis y desarrollo de la tentativa matriz de la filosofía de Gilles Deleuze, el empirismo trascendental. Para ello, se realizará una revisión de las problemáticas por las que atraviesa dicha tentativa a lo largo de la obra de este pensador. Cuidadosa atención recibirán a propósito de la génesis del empirismo trascendental el problema del hábito y el de la constitución de la subjetividad, que Deleuze reconoce en Hume (Empirisme et subjectivité, 1953). (...) A partir de ellos, se establecerán los caracteres principales del que se identifica como problema de los principios, en cuyo seno se define una relación particular entre principio y génesis. Gracias al establecimiento riguroso de dicha relación, Deleuze integra los aportes del empirismo y los de la filosofía trascendental bajo una misma propuesta filosófica. Esta propuesta tendrá a la vista el desarrollo de una crítica sistemática hacia lo dado, con lo cual tanto el objeto como el sujeto del pensar precisarán ser sometidos a una indagación acerca de su génesis. Definido el empirismo trascendental como la tentativa filosófica que apunta a pensar la génesis trascendental o actualización de lo dado, esta investigación espera dar cuenta del ámbito de dicha génesis así como de los principios de determinación que la rigen. Para ello se estudiarán las nociones de campo trascendental, plan de inmanencia y continuo ideal (Différence et répétition, 1968; Logique du sens, 1969). Al abordar esta última noción, se pondrá especial interés en dilucidar la reformulación que efectúa Deleuze de los princip ios de razón suficiente, de indiscernibilidad y de continuidad de Leibniz (Le Pli, 1988). (shrink)

"Empirismo e filosofia della mente", di Wilfrid Sellars, è un testo classico della filosofia analitica. A più di mezzo secolo dalla sua comparsa, molte delle tesi che Sellars vi sostiene (sulla natura dei concetti psicologici, sul ruolo epistemico della percezione, sulla distinzione tra descrittivo e normativo) sono ancora al centro del dibattito e filosofi come Robert Brandom e John McDowell hanno riconosciuto il loro debito nei confronti del lavoro di Sellars. Le lezioni raccolte in questo volume, pensate per essere (...) una guida allo studio, ricostruiscono l'argomentazione di Sellars cercando di chiarirne la struttura, di illuminarne i passaggi più oscuri e di fornirne una chiave di lettura. (shrink)

The present essay inserts itself in a more ambitious project, wich aim is to elucidate the empiricist commitments of the more influential twentieth century philosophers of science, including those, like Popper, who presented themselves as critics of empiricism. Such an elucidation might contribut..

El empirismo puede ser caracterizado, por un lado, como una teoría acerca de los orígenes del conocimiento empírico; por otro, como una concepción epistémica acerca de la justificación de las creencias empíricas. Actualmente, esta última dimensión del empirismo ha sido criticada por diversos filósofos. Paradigmáticamente, Rorty ha sostenido que la experiencia es únicamente la causa de las creencias, pero no su justificación. La tesis de Rorty es que las creencias se relacionan con el mundo sólo causalmente. Este artículo (...) posee dos partes. En la primera, se argumenta, en contra de Rorty, que la experiencia debe ser una instancia de justificación si las creencias han de tener algún contenido. En la segunda, se propone una concepción pragmatista alternativa, que i) atribuye un papel epistémico a la experiencia sin recaer en "el mito de lo dado"; y ii) reintroduce el concepto de "representación" sin comprometerse con el representacionismo. Empiricism can be characterized, on the one hand, as a theory about the sources of empirical knowledge; on the other hand, as an epistemic outlook about justification of empirical beliefs. This last dimension of empiricism has been criticized by many philosophers nowadays. Paradigmatically, Rorty has said that experience is only the cause of beliefs, but not its justification. Rorty's thesis is that beliefs relate to the world only causally. This paper has two parts. In the first it is argued, against Rorty, that experience must be an epistemic instance of justification if beliefs are to have any objective content at all. In the second, it is proposed an alternative pragmatist conception of knowledge which i) attributes an epistemic role to experience without falling into "the myth of the given" and ii) reintroduces the concept of "representation" without compromising with representationalism. (shrink)

In the last few decades, the historiographical categories rationalism and empiricism have been criticized for their limitations to explain the complex positions and the links held by the philosophers tradiotnally attached to them. This narrative was firstly conceived by Kantian German historians and began to become standard at the turn of the twentieh century. Nonetheless, nineteenth-century French historiography developed other narratives by which early modern philosophers were classified according to alternative criteria. In the first edition of Histoire comparée des systémes (...) de philosophie (1804), Joseph-Marie Degérando distinguishes three first-order early modern schools founded by Bacon, Descartes and Leibniz, respectively. Degérando introduces the empiricism and rationalism distinction as one among others, and not as the fundamental one. In addition, he separates empiricism from experimental philosophy. The last one, along with speculative philosophy, is said to conciliate senses and reason. As a result, this account offers philosophical groupings different from those constructed by the standard narrative. Furthermore, it draws on labels and classification criteria which were part of the early modern philosophical discourse. (shrink)

Es muy habitual que se presenten los grandes lineamientos de la filosofía moderna en el marco del paradigma epistemológico y apelando a la distinción de dos corrientes filosóficas fundamentales, el empirismo y el racionalismo. Se trata de categorías analíticas construidas para interpretar y caracterizar retrospectivamente a ciertos filósofos de la modernidad. Pero no fueron términos ni conceptos utilizados por los actores mismos6. John Locke, George Berkeley y David Hume no se llamaban a sí mismos empiristas, ni René Descartes, Baruch (...) Spinoza y Gottfried W. Leibniz se autodenominaban racionalistas. En este capítulo, profundizaremos algunos puntos esbozados en el capítulo anterior. En primer lugar, expondremos las definiciones que han recibido el empirismo y el racionalismo dentro del paradigma epistemológico, que si bien ha sido criticado y redefinido en las últimas décadas, sigue siendo sostenido en la actualidad. En esa misma sección, analizaremos en qué medida las figuras del canon moderno establecido por el paradigma sostienen o no las tesis racionalistas y empiristas que les atribuyen esas definiciones tradicionales. Finalmente, resumiremos algunas críticas que ha recibido la narrativa tradicional y presentaremos una propuesta de resignificación de ambas categorías que nos parece más atinada. (shrink)

RESUMENLa tesis es, más bien, que la discusión del empirismo, la solución de ese reto empirista que separa el pensar del ser, forma parte de la altura histórica de la filosofía en el momento presente, es una exigencia suya. Si la filosofía comenzó buscando la unidad del ser, ha proseguido resquebrajándola; en particular distinguiendo el ser creado del increado, y luego distinguiendo el ser natural del personal, las cosas de las personas. Estas distinciones afectan de una manera muy particular (...) a las relaciones entre el ser y el pensar, y a su eventual unidad; éste es, por eso, el tema del empirismo, y de nuestro tiempo.PALABRAS CLAVESEMPIRISMO, SER, PENSARABSTRACTThe argument is that the discussion of empiricism is a requirement of philosophy at the present time, solving that challenge that separates thinking of being. If philosophy began seeking the unity of being, has continued dividing this unity; in particular distinguishing the uncreated and created being, and then distinguishing the natural and the personal being. These distinctions affect a particular the relationship between being and thinking, and his eventual drive way; it is, therefore, the issue of empiricism, and our time.KEY WORDSEMPIRICISM, BEING, THINK. (shrink)

La tesis principal que aquí se defiende es que, para Popper, la validez del conocimiento estuvo vinculada siempre a la dimensión pragmática del contexto de descubrimiento (e incluso dependía de ella). Constituye, pues, un error afirmar que, para él, 1) dicha validez estaba ligada a un "empirismo encubierto" (opuesto a la tesis sobre la carga teórica de toda observación), según lo ha planteado Ana Rosa Pérez Ransanz, y que 2) en sus ideas, los factores pragmáticos carecían de importancia epistemológica, (...) como lo ha afirmado Ambrosio Velasco. Para justificar esta tesis, se examinan tres argumentos expuestos en The Logic of Scientific Discovery, enfatizando el que se refiere al carácter disposicional de los términos con los que, para Popper, se formulan los enunciados descriptivos. The main thesis I assert here is that for Popper validity of knowledge was always linked to (and even supported by) the pragmatic dimension of the context of discovery. I hold it's wrong to claim that for this author 1) validity of knowledge was linked to a "hidden empiricism" (opposed to the theory-laden character of observation), such as Ana Rosa Pérez Ransanz had propounded, and 2) pragmatic issues were epistemologically irrelevant in his philosophy, such as Ambrosio Velasco has argued. To justify my thesis I examine three arguments exposed in The Logic of Scientific Discovery, emphasizing especially Popper's argument about the dispositional character of the concepts in which descriptive statements are formulated. (shrink)

O presente trabalho tem por objetivo apresentar os principais aspectos do Empirismo Construtivo de Bas C. van Fraassen, particularmente no que diz respeito ao problema do sucesso científico. Nesse contexto, serão examinadas as noções de observável e inobservável e suas relações com o ‘argumento do milagre’ e da ‘coincidência cósmica’, ambos criticados por van Fraassen. As respostas de autores que defendem o Realismo Científico serão então apresentadas, contrapondo-se aos argumentos do Empirismo Construtivo. Finalmente, possíveis dificuldades do Empirismo (...) Construtivo serão ainda examinadas e uma proposta para superá-las será apresentada. (shrink)

I reconstruct Aristotle's epistemology and scientific methodology avoiding some problems which, in my opinion, are attributed to them from inadequate interpretations in terms of foundationalism or coherentism. On the contrary, I credit Aristotle with a hybrid concept of empiricism in which our knowledge is made possible through the integration of two different but cooperative factors: observations and beliefs. By clarifying the implications of Aristotle's concept of experience and the basis for the elaboration of scientific knowledge, I try to give an (...) alternative account of Aristotle's vindication of a positive use of dialectic in science, as well as to show that an integration between dialectical examination of beliefs and scientific analysis of facts is possible and it also gives a plausible methodological image of Aristotle's theory. According to my proposal, some opinions play a conceptual role in the empirical basis of knowledge. But, for Aristotle, this does not amount to any more than a kind of knowledge of the facts, not being equivalent to a scientific knowledge of the causes. Finally, I try to show that within this complex epistemological framework Aristotle's use of induction could also be given an adequate explanation. (shrink)

I reconstruct Aristotle's epistemology and scientific methodology avoiding some problems which, in my opinion, are attributed to them from inadequate interpretations in terms of foundationalism or coherentism. On the contrary, I credit Aristotle with a hybrid concept of empiricism in which our knowledge is made possible through the integration of two different but cooperative factors: observations and beliefs. By clarifying the implications of Aristotle's concept of experience and the basis for the elaboration of scientific knowledge, I try to give an (...) alternative account of Aristotle's vindication of a positive use of dialectic in science, as well as to show that an integration between dialectical examination of beliefs and scientific analysis of facts is possible and it also gives a plausible methodological image of Aristotle's theory. According to my proposal, some opinions play a conceptual role in the empirical basis of knowledge. But, for Aristotle, this does not amount to any more than a kind of knowledge of the facts, not being equivalent to a scientific knowledge of the causes. Finally, I try to show that within this complex epistemological framework Aristotle's use of induction could also be given an adequate explanation. (shrink)

This paper concerns the question whether the rational reconstruction of science provided by the philosophy of science is partly descriptive and partly normative task. To this respect we offer a general characterization of the concept of science and observe then briefly the relations between the history and the philosophy of science. The widely extended view that there cannot be a history of science without an underIying philosophy suggests the problem whether it can exist a rational reconstruction of science independently from (...) any theory about the science. On the answer to this question depends that we could conceive the philosophy of science as a discipline which combines descriptive (or empirical) with normative eIements. (shrink)

This paper concerns the question whether the rational reconstruction of science provided by the philosophy of science is partly descriptive and partly normative task. To this respect we offer a general characterization of the concept of science and observe then briefly the relations between the history and the philosophy of science. The widely extended view that there cannot be a history of science without an underIying philosophy suggests the problem whether it can exist a rational reconstruction of science independently from (...) any theory about the science. On the answer to this question depends that we could conceive the philosophy of science as a discipline which combines descriptive with normative eIements. (shrink)

O presente artigo disserta sobre duas características centrais ao holismo epistemológico de Willard Quine: a sustentação de critérios empíricos de avaliação por meio das sentenças observacionais e a defesa de que a ontologia fisicalista é decisiva para a avaliação de teorias.

In questo articolo, tratterò di come l’empirismo radicale, pensato insieme al pragmatismo di James e al metodo speculativo di Whitehead, operi un decentramento del ruolo della coscienza umana nel processo di costruzione del reale. Questa operazione, concentrandosi sulla primarietà delle relazioni nella co-costituzione delle entità tutte con gli ambienti, può essere uno strumento utile per ripensare pragmatiche eco-politiche all’interno di un’epoca precaria come quella della crisi socio-climatica. Il metodo speculativo di W. e il pragmatismo di J, assumendo un’esperienza assoluta (...) che è il prodotto immanente di un insieme di relazioni/flussi e materia, pongono il pensiero, gli oggetti, gli immaginari e i viventi, tra cui l’umano, in un processo di costituzione costante e reciproco della realtà. L’esperienza dell’empirismo radicale, accompagnata dal pragmatismo e dal metodo speculativo, può divenire in questa direzione uno strumento pratico per comporre nuove idee capaci di ingaggiarsi nel reale per creare nuovi ambienti insieme ai viventi e non con cui l’umano condivide la vita sulla terra. (shrink)

The act of observing is crucial for constructive empiricism, Bas van Fraassen's celebrated position on the aim of science. As Buekens and Muller noted in 2012, the Dutch philosopher should have characterized observation as an intentional act, because observation in science has a purpose. In the present article, which will also address the distinction between observing and observing that, introduced by Hanson and Dretske, it will be shown that considerations about the intentionality of the act of observing are, on the (...) contrary, unnecessary for drawing the distinction between observable and unobservable entities on which constructive empiricism depends. (shrink)

En 1953 Deleuze publica su primer libro, llamado Empirisme et subjetivité. Essai sur la nature humain selon Hume. Deleuze señala en primer lugar una afirmación distinta con respecto al empirismo de Hume, es decir, señalar que el empirismo es definible a partir de una relación intrínseca con los sentidos, y que el conocimiento, en primera instancia, proviene de ellos. Lo que advertirá Deleuze es que el empirismo debe ser definido, antes que todo, en relación con el problema (...) de la subjetividad. El empirismo constituirá una doctrina que plantea que la subjetividad no está dada, sino que, más bien, debe ser producida o constituida (a esto le llamaremos una génesis de la subjetividad). ¿De qué manera se produce la génesis? A través de la acción de ciertos principios que son extensivos a la naturaleza humana: la pasión y la asociación. El Hume de Deleuze versará sobre dicho movimiento, y le permitirá al autor francés elaborar un primer índice de su metafísica, o lo que llamará, unos años después, empirismo trascendental. (shrink)

http://dx.doi.org/10.5007/1808-1711.2008v12n1p87 In the last decades there was a structural turn in the classic debate between scientific realists and antirealists with empiricist orientation. Two main arguments support the realist conception: the ‘No Miracle Argument’ and the thesis of continuity. The thesis of continuity states that some parts of a theory are retained when a scientific change takes place. In a current famous article, J. Worrall (1989) defends the continuity argument by stating that what is preserved in the succession of two empirically (...) successful theories are the relations among the postulated entities and not the nature of the relata (structural or syntactical realism). Based on this perspective, van Fraassen introduces his position named Empiricist Structuralism , which claims that only the structures of phenomena are retained. This conception tries to explain the success of science and at the same time defend the continuity of structures. I will demonstrate in this paper that the accomplishment of the two mentioned requirements imply a capitulation in favor of realistic intuitions. (shrink)

In the last decades there was a structural turn in the classic debate between scientific realists and antirealists with empiricist orientation. Two main arguments support the realist conception: the ‘No Miracle Argument’ and the thesis of continuity. The thesis of continuity states that some parts of a theory are retained when a scientific change takes place. In a current famous article, J. Worrall defends the continuity argument by stating that what is preserved in the succession of two empirically successful theories (...) are the relations among the postulated entities and not the nature of the relata. Based on this perspective, van Fraassen introduces his position named Empiricist Structuralism, which claims that only the structures of phenomena are retained. This conception tries to explain the success of science and at the same time defend the continuity of structures. I will demonstrate in this paper that the accomplishment of the two mentioned requirements imply a capitulation in favor of realistic intuitions. (shrink)

Este trabajo analiza las diferencias entre las teorías de Lorentz y Poincaré (quienes aceptaban el éter) y de Einstein, cuestionando las explicaciones comunes de los motivos por los cuales la teoría de la relatividad es preferible a la anterior. La principal diferencia entre los puntos de vista de Einstein y de Lorentz y Poincaré era de naturaleza epistemológica y no teórica. Cada uno de los enfoques tenía aspectos epistémicos positivos, pero de la misma manera les hacía falta a los dos (...) puntos de vista determinados aspectos que estaban presentes en la otra propuesta. Por lo tanto, una de ellas no era superior a la otra. De ese modo, no había argumentos conclusivos que permitieron elegir una de ellas y rechazar a la otra. (shrink)

Esse artigo defende que as ressonâncias da filosofia de Bergson no século xx francês ultrapassam a divisão estabelecida por Foucault entre as filosofias do cogito e as filosofias de sistema. O impacto de sua obra tem como razão principal a capacidade de articular o retorno à experiência e a incorporação do trabalho de sistematização de dados realizado pelas ciências do século XIX. Tal articulação delimita o teor empirista da filosofia de Bergson, que pode ser analisado em comparação com os empiristas (...) do XVIII. Examinamos nesse contexto como o trabalho crítico dirigido às ideias abstratas que conduzem a filosofia a perder de vista o concreto é o fator de convergência entre Bergson e Merleau-Ponty. Por outro lado, mostramos que a análise filosófica sobre a biologia evolutiva relaciona o bergsonismo ao projeto epistemológico de Canguilhem. (shrink)

In this work, I discuss the role of Husserl’s phenomenology in Paolo Parrini’s philosophical view. In the first section, I highlight the presence of both empiricist and constructivist elements in Parrini’s anti-foundationalist and anti-absolutist conception of knowledge. In the second section, I stress Parrini’s acknowledgement of the crucial role of phenomenology in investigating the empirical basis of knowledge, thanks to its analysis of the relationship between form and matter of cognition. In the third section, I point at some lines of (...) development of phenomenology that are revealed by Parrini’s reflection, through the comparison between Husserl’s genetic phenomenology, Mary Hesse’s network model, and the tradition of neutral monism. (shrink)