Life distinguishes itself from non-life in taking advantage of the cohesion of temporal origin which non-life cannot afford. The temporal cohesion letting the local participants adhere to each other in a contemporaneous manner refers to an instance of the precedent product being pulled into the subsequent production. Setting the precedent is equivalent to preparing the conditions for the subsequent to follow. A concrete implementation of the cohesion of temporal origin, compared with the spatial cohesion common in physics, is found in (...) the natural construction of a reaction cycle with use of the temporal affinity exerted from the immediate local environment. That construction is a temporally local phenomenon in the experiential domain, rather than in the theoretical. The cohesion originating in the local environment is due to the local act of measurement by the environment. A major component of the local environment to each reactant in the reaction cycle is the cycle itself. The cohesion specific to the reaction cycle rests upon the fact that every reaction product from the upstream production in the cycle comes to be fed upon by the immediate downstream production. Every production constituting the reaction cycle is temporally adjacent to and contemporaneous with the similar others residing in the whole cycle, in sharp contrast to the case of the open-ended linear chain of reaction. One externalist scheme of appreciating the internalist enterprise of constructing a durable reaction cycle in a contemporaneous manner may become possible as referring to the Bayesian probability. The durable reaction cycle may be made actual with probability unity under the condition that the products from the preceding production come with the protocol for the similar production to come subsequently. (shrink)

Comment comprendre la nyctophobie? Les uns pensent, comme John Locke, que la nuit n’a rien qui fasse peur, et cherchent la cause de cette angoisse ailleurs que dans l’obscurité. Les autres, à commencer par Edmund Burke, affirment que l’obscurité est la source par excellence de la peur : pour Emmanuel Levinas comme pour Maurice Merleau-Ponty, qui s’appuient tous deux sur la description de l’« espace noir » par Eugène Minkowski, la nuit noire menace de déposséder le sujet de sa souveraineté (...) pour le submerger dans une unité sans articulation. Mais, une dizaine d’années plus tôt, Roger Caillois se réfère aussi à Minkowski pour voir dans la nyctophobie l’effet de la « tentation de l’espace » : pour lui, la peur de la nuit est la peur d’être la nuit – de ne faire qu’un avec elle. (shrink)

Les stratégies de Bayle et de Hume devant la question de l’athéisme sont bien plus proches qu'on ne le croit généralement. Cet accord découle de l’influence constante que Bayle exerça sur Hume. Pour Bayle et pour Hume, l’athéisme et le scepticisme sont très étroitement liés – celui-là n’est qu’une forme du celui-ci. La force des Dialogues sur la religion naturelle de Hume ressort précisément de cette alliance entre athéisme et scepticisme qui, puisant la plupart de ses arguments chez Bayle, aboutit (...) à une critique de la théologie fondée sur une analyse sans concession des fondements épistémologiques de la croyance, tout en se gardant, comme le Straton de Bayle, de réduire l’athéisme à un dogmatisme métaphysique abstrait. (shrink)

We construct an ab initio generic structure for a predimension function with a positive rational coefficient less than or equal to 1 which is unsaturated and has a superstable non-ω-stable theory.

Koichiro Kokubun focuses on Deleuze's method of 'free indirect discourse' to locate and explicate Deleuze's philosophy of transcendental empiricism and its constitutive limits. He works through Deleuze's confrontations with Hume, Kant, Bergson, Freud, Lacan, Foucault and Guattari, and the influence of structuralism and psychoanalysis.

In lowland South America, breath animates human and non-human bodies, pulsating through the materialities of organisms. Humans, however, should manage their bodies to recast and reconfigure breath in its most life-enhancing manifestations: singing and smoking. These are the specialized domains of those able to manage their vitalities in such a way as to produce potent effects in themselves and in the world around them, including influencing atmospheric conditions, the lives of animals and plants and the harming and healing of others. (...) In these relational onto-epistemologies, intersubjectivity, intercorporality and states of non-cognitive interaffection find new depths. Breath, properly managed, can make and unmake worldly forms, including bodies and the societies they come together in. Focusing on two Amerindian communities, the Warekena of northwestern Rio Negro, Brazil and the Shipibo-Konibo of the Ucayali valley in Eastern Peru, this article examines the interface between human and non-human subjectivities, and how resonant interaffective atmospheric conditions are induced to promote health. (shrink)

Martin Heidegger’s understanding of art and Paul Ricoeur’s reading of the poetics of existence, developed through his hermeneutics of symbols, metaphor and narrative, open an immense vista to a theological thinking that desires to place primacy on the hearing of the symbolic language of poetry and literature. Beginning a few decades ago, various theologians have ventured along this trajectory, but theology still remains under the dominion of “theoria” and “praxis” and is not very open to “poiesis”. The study presented here (...) revisits the book of J.-P. Manigne on the Poetics of Faith from the 1970s, and the doctoral thesis of A. Thomasset on the Poetics of Morality, from the 1990s, showing how poetic reason provoked theological discourse in the second half of the 20th century. It is part of a research still in progress, devoted to other contributions of the beginning of the 21st century. (shrink)

Hrushovski constructed an -categorical stable pseudoplane which refuted Lachlan's conjecture. In this note, we show that an -categorical projective plane cannot be constructed by "the Hrushovski method.".

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Bayle, Saint-Evremond, and Fideism:A Reply to Thomas M. LennonGianluca MoriIn a recent article published in this journal Thomas M. Lennon returns to the controversial question of Bayle's attitude towards religion. The point he debates is the particular use that, in expounding his conception of the relationship between faith and reason, Bayle makes of a passage from Saint-Evremond. In Lennon's view the correct interpretation of this point would show that (...) Bayle's fideism is to be "taken at face value" without any hint of irony and with no suspicion of dissimulation or insincerity.1 This would cast doubt on and greatly weaken the interpretation I proposed in my Bayle philosophe.2 My aim here is to respond briefly to Lennon's arguments and to clarify even more briefly what in my opinion is the right perspective in which to consider Bayle's position on this topic.The context in which Bayle quotes Saint-Evremond is to be found in the Eclaircissements he added to the second edition of his Dictionnaire historique et critique (1702) to counter the Dutch religious authorities' harsh criticism of the first edition. In particular the Walloon Consistory accused Bayle of taking a skeptical position that undermined the most important dogmas of Christian faith. In response Bayle wrote the Eclaircissement sur les Pyrrhoniens, a clumsy mosaic of quotations from the Scriptures and from patristic and profane texts, with which he sought to show that his skeptical fideism was not in the least heterodox but indeed the position that most closely reflected true Christianity. The quotation from Saint-Evremond, almost at the end of this text, is taken [End Page 323] from the Conversation du Maréchal d'Hocquincourt et du Père Canaye (written in about 1654).3 The final passage gives a clear idea of the general tone: after having disputed with a churchman the need to subject one's intellect to the yoke of faith, the marshal concludes by saying that he is ready to be crucified "without knowing why." Father Canaye replies: "No reason! That is the true religion. No reason! God has granted you a fine grace, mylord." So, and here Lennon obviously agrees (229), Saint-Evremond's is a text with no shadow of mystical inspiration, indeed strongly tending in the libertine direction, as is clear from the blatant way it pours scorn on the fideist approach.In my interpretation Bayle's use of this quotation does not at all demonstrate his atheism or unbelief, for in my view that question is undecidable. However, the quotation from Saint-Evremond is sufficient—and this is the onlyreason I mentioned it4 —to show that Bayle's approach to fideism is in no way innocent and naive as is sometimes claimed. On the contrary, his texts on this subject contain what amounts to provocations aimed at orthodox readers (to which they immediately reacted). This, together with other more important reasons, leads me to believe that Bayle's professions of Christian faith, though frequent, are generally far from being above suspicion: indeed, almost every line of them raises questions about their actual significance.The provocation contained in the quotation from Saint-Evremond appears in all its rhetorical weight if we associate this text with three other passages from Bayle's works. The first is from the Nouvelles de la république des lettres of December 1686, in which Bayle stresses the unedifying nature of the religious maxims contained in Saint-Evremond's Conversation (which, incidentally, he himself had just had printed in the collection Le Retour des pièces choisies).5 The second is taken from a letter by Jean d'Oulès to Bayle, written in 1696, in which the author deals with exactly the same passage from the Conversation that was later to be reproduced in the Eclaircissement. In this letter d'Oulès quotes the full passage which he considers to be a "naughty text" deliberately written to throw ridicule on the fanatical fideism of Pierre Jurieu.6 The third passage is from Bayle's Continuation des pensées diverses of 1704 in which, shortly after the death of Saint-Evremond, he publicly reveals the poet... (shrink)

David Bakhurst's 2011 book ‘The Formation of Reason’ explores the philosophy of John McDowell in general and the Aristotelian notion of second nature more specifically, topics to which philosophers of education have not yet given adequate attention. The book's widespread appeal led to the symposium ‘Second Nature, Bildung and McDowell: David Bakhurst's The Formation of Reason’, which appeared in the first issue of the 50th anniversary volume of the Journal of Philosophy of Education in 2016. Despite its obvious educational relevance, (...) whether and how Bakhurst's McDowellian line of philosophical argument shapes the domain of educational enquiry or discourse remains up for debate. The rich contributions of Sebastian Rödl, Paul Standish and Jan Derry help us confront this issue. Proceeding with an analysis that is partly explanatory and partly critical of the central aspects of their respective views, I try to show that the basic attraction of the McDowellian/Bakhurstian line of argument concerning educational thinking is that it enables us to address education in the proper context of the natural and the social. In other words, their depiction of a human being as a natural animal in a normative world allows us not to be perturbed either by the natural-scientific conception of the natural or by the social constructivist thinking of the social, both of which have occasionally distorted how education is addressed and therefore impoverished our understanding of education itself. I conclude with a brief word on the significance of continuing and advancing the conversation initiated by the symposium by noting two viable examples of future work. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:A Short ReplyGianluca MoriWhile thanking Thomas Lennon for the interest he has shown in my work—and without going into details of interpretation which cannot bear discussion in this context—I would like to make a few remarks on factual questions raised by his response.1) Lennon's text (p. 338): "The text that Bayle and Mori erroneously take to be Saint-Evremond's is in fact from Jean-François Sarasin."While it is not certain (...) that Bayle and I "erroneously" take this text to be Saint-Evremond's, it is certain that Lennon erroneously takes it to be Sarasin's. In fact, the text quoted by Bayle is not taken from Sarasin's Discours sur Epicure, but, as Bayle explicitly points out ("Xénophanes," K, note 124), from a "Discours des ennuis et des déplaisirs." This "Discours" is chapter 5 of De l'usage de la vie, a text published in many editions of Saint-Evremond's works (see the Barbin 1692 in-4° ed., Seconde Partie, p. 326). The paternity of De l'usage de la vie is doubtful and controversial, but it possibly contains some passages taken from Saint-Evremond's unpublished manuscripts, especially in chapters 3-6, as reported by an important source quoted by Ternois in Saint-Evremond, Œuvres en prose, IV, 3-4, note 1.2) Lennon's text (pp. 338-39): "The significance of two of the other texts advanced by Mori is fully vitiated, for in them Bayle makes the same mistake."In my article, I did not fail to state that these texts (OD I, 158 and Dict., "Epicure," M) are taken from an apocryphal source. On page 329 I wrote: "[Bayle] mistakenly attributes to [Saint-Evremond] a text on Epicurus's morals [i.e., Sarasin's Discours] included in that volume." However, it was absolutely impossible, for seventeenth-century readers, to distinguish between Saint-Evremond's original and apocryphal texts: the author himself—as is widely known—did not want to clarify this point (with a few exceptions, including the Saint-Evremoniana, which, as we have seen, Bayle never attributed to Saint-Evremond). [End Page 343] And this is true for all editions: there is no significant difference between genuine and pirated editions, since no official edition, authorized and revised by the author, existed before Des Maizeaux's posthumous one. From this point of view, virtually nobody (before 1705) could "study" Saint-Evremond's texts. (On this connection it should be added that I never claimed that Bayle "studied" Saint-Evremond, but only that he read his available works and made up his mind on them, and particularly on the Conversation du Maréchal d'Hocquincourt—which should be at the core of the present debate—long before reading Cotolendi).3) Lennon's text (p. 336): "As Mori acknowledges elsewhere, Labrousse thinks Le Vassor was a left-wing Anglican who failed to understand Bayle's calvinist perspective."Concerning Le Vassor, I "acknowledge" Labrousse's opinion only to reject it with a detailed argument (Bayle philosophe, 262, note 341).Gianluca MoriUniversità del Piemonte OrientaleCopyright © 2004 The Journal of the History of Ideas, Inc.... (shrink)

One common denominator between biosemiotics and quantum physics is the participation of agents detecting their surroundings. In biosemiotics, any biological agents as the internal observers including the molecular and cellular ones are involved in detecting their surroundings. Likewise, the physicist as the external observer is also involved in detecting what should be all about the physical world with use of a wide variety of sophisticated measurement apparatuses. On the other hand, the difference between the two is in the nature of (...) the agents of detection involved there. One obvious difference is that although the physicist can report the results of measurement with use of the symbolic language, the biological beings take the indexical act of measurement to simply be a matter of experiencing. The internal observers are phenomenological in constructing something durable as participating in the construction of the phenomenon. In a similar vein, the external observer is also phenomenological in getting into interpreting the constructed durable class property of an object with use of the symbolic language. In particular, the potential use of phenomenology is not limited only to the phenomenologist as the external observer. A possible integration of both the internal and external observers may be sought within quantum phenomenology allowing for the external observer to descriptively make access to the durable objects the internal observers could eventually have constructed. The internal observers are ubiquitous in the environment that functions as the absorbers of whatever quantum particles available there. (shrink)

In philosophy, it is almost a platitude to argue that fact and value intertwine. However, in empirically oriented educational research, it is not. Hence, there is some affinity between logical positivism, which is no longer tenable in philosophy, and empirically based contemporary educational research in terms of assumptions each makes about “the given.” In this essay, Koichiro Misawa casts light on how fact and value intertwine by invoking the notion of “second nature” that John McDowell has reanimated. This will (...) in turn prompt us to see the relation between nature and nurture, as well as between mind and world, quite differently and to discern two senses of “the given”: one is illusory; the other educational. Misawa concludes that the philosophy of education should and can take the lead in forming rigorous interdisciplinary studies of the human future with a certain sensitivity to the tight and complex interweaving between the empirical and the conceptual, or between the factual and the normative. (shrink)

São muitas as abordagens do fenômeno religioso surgidas nos últimos dois séculos. Algumas recorrem aos métodos elaborados pelas ciências humanas, sobretudo a historiografia, a sociologia, a etnologia/antropologia, a psicologia e a fenomenologia. Outras tratam a religião numa perspectiva filosófica, como se pode ver nos grandes autores que, sobretudo a partir do século XIX, se consagraram à elaboração de uma filosofia da religião. Nas últimas décadas, com a renovação da filosofia hermenêutica, novas leituras da religião têm surgido, renovando profundamente esse campo (...) do saber. O texto aqui proposto apresenta alguns elementos da grande síntese do filósofo luxemburguês Jean Greisch, pouco conhecido no Brasil, mas cuja contribuição ao estudo da religião é original, privilegiando uma hermenêutica da passagem. Após uma breve apresentação de sua obra consagrada à filosofia da religião, serão apresentados os cinco “paradigmas” dos estudos da religião segundo ele: o especulativo, o crítico, o fenomenológico, o analítico e o hermenêutico, o último seguido pelo próprio autor. (shrink)

L'impianto didattico di questa 'Storia' consente di: conciliare l'esposizione piana dei concetti con il rigore del linguaggio filosofico; favorire la percezione delle strutture concettuali, con il duplice scopo di illustrare adeguatamente sia l'impianto filosofico dei singoli autori sia lo sviluppo storico dei diversi problemi; presentare la storia del pensiero moderno in una chiave di categorie filosofiche, oltre che storico-evolutiva; delineare i contesti storici in cui nascono le diverse espressioni del pensiero moderno; rimarcare la diversità dei generi letterari utilizzati dagli autori, (...) mostrandone la connessione con il loro modo di filosofare. (shrink)

Let L be a finite relational language and α=(αR:R ∈ L) a tuple with 0 < αR ≤1 for each R ∈ L. Consider a dimension function $ \delta _\alpha (A) = \left| A \right| - \sum\limits_{R \in L} {\alpha {\mathop{\rm Re}\nolimits} R(A)} $ where each eR(A) is the number of realizations of R in A. Let $K_\alpha $ be the class of finite structures A such that $\delta _\alpha (X) \ge 0$ 0 for any substructure X of A. We (...) show that the theory of the generic model of $K_\alpha $ is AE-axiomatizable for any α. (shrink)

A theory T is called almost [MATHEMATICAL SCRIPT CAPITAL N]0-categorical if for any pure types p1,…,pn there are only finitely many pure types which extend p1 ∪…∪pn. It is shown that if T is an almost [MATHEMATICAL SCRIPT CAPITAL N]0-categorical theory with I = 3, then a dense linear ordering is interpretable in T.

Approaches to studying the ‘social’ are prominent in educational research. Yet, because of their insufficient acknowledgement of the social nature of human beings and the reality we experience, such attempts often commit themselves to the dualism of scheme and content, which in turn is a by-product of the underlying dualism of reason and nature that has characterised modern thinking. Drawing largely on John McDowell’s argument, this paper attempts to illuminate the sense that nature, nurture and human nature are interconnected and (...) that the capacity to be responsive to reasons is a necessary prerequisite for the essential nature of human beings as social and natural animals at the same time. It ends by acknowledging the importance of philosophy in the study of education as a primary discipline that highlights distinctive features of human beings that make us the kind of beings we are, and by briefly mentioning how we could do more than draw obvious but trivial ‘educational implications’ from McDowell’s argument. (shrink)

An infinite structure is said to be minimal if each of its definable subset is finite or cofinite. Modifying Hrushovski's method we construct minimal, non strongly minimal structures with arbitrary finite dimensions. This answers negatively to a problem posed by B. I Zilber.

We are concerned with two modes of describing the dynamics of natural systems. Global descriptions require simultaneous global coordination of all dynamical operations. Global dynamics, including mechanics, remain invariant in the absence of external perturbation. But, failing impossible global coordination, dynamical operations could actually become coordinated only locally. In local records, as in global ones, the law of the excluded middle would be strictly observed, but without global coordination it could only be fullfilled sequentially by passing causative factors forward onto (...) subsequent contiguous operations.The local dynamics of sequential operations would be indefinite with regard to how commitments will be made which will avoid violating the law of the excluded middle, but any resulting record will be as definite as if there had been global coordination. While maintaining an agential capacity for making contingent choices internally, local dynamics could be cumulated into a global record of seemingly simultaneous operations. Natural selection within a framework of local dynamics would have a capacity for making opportunistic commitments, but its effects in a posterior record can be reduced to the mechanistic neodarwinian version as if there had been a global dynamics. However, the resulting global description falsifies the actual material nature of the dynamics. (shrink)

The Schrödinger equation for quantum mechanics, which is approachable in third-person description, takes for granted tenseless time that does not distinguish between different tenses such as past, present, and future. The time-reversal symmetry grounded upon tenseless time globally may, however, be broken once measurement in the form of exchanging indivisible quantum particles between the measured and the measuring intervenes. Measurement breaks tenseless time locally and distinguishes different tenses. Since measurement is about the material process of feeding and acting upon the (...) quantum resources already available from any material bodies to be measured internally, the agency of measurement is sought within the environment in the broadest sense. Most indicative of internal measurement of the environmental origin are chemical reactions in the reaction environment. Temporality naturalized in chemical reactions proceeding as being subjected to frequent interventions of internal measurement is approachable in second-person description because of the participation of multiple agents of measurement there. The use of second-person description is found in the appraisal of the material capacity of generating, distinguishing, and integrating different tenses. An essence of the temporality to be naturalized is within the genesis of different tenses. A most conspicuous exemplar of naturalized temporality is sought in the origins of life conceivable exclusively on the material ground. (shrink)

The central thesis of this article is that the notion of second nature that John McDowell has reanimated has something of ethical and educational importance, thereby possibly extending the borders of the philosophy of education. The argument to this conclusion is the subject of serious consideration and criticism. The aim of this article is therefore to clarify the educational implications of the conception of second nature by responding to the three likely objections: (1) the charge of idealism, (2) the charge (...) of anthropocentrism, and (3) the charge of triviality. Through critical discussions of these criticisms, it is made explicit that second nature, from the outset, illuminates every sphere of the lives of human beings. A lively appreciation of this leads to the conclusion that the issue of how we develop our world of meaning with the conception of second nature should come under the scope of serious philosophical discourse on education. (shrink)

ABSTRACT At the heart of our current environmental predicament lies the issue of our relationship with nature. Michael Bonnett’s educational rehabilitation of nature, which might be called a ‘metaphysical’ turn in nature-related issues, brings us back to the core question of educational-philosophical thinking: how we are to understand ourselves and our relation to the world. In this paper, by confronting his environmental philosophy of education with what John McDowell, in his debate with Hubert Dreyfus, terms the ‘pervasiveness thesis’ – that (...) conceptual rationality in a relevant sense pervades human lives – I try to offer an analytical supplement to the notion Bonnett entertains: that a phenomenological project to ‘retrieve’ nature and ‘ecologise’ education can have massive implications for the character of philosophy of education and the whole enterprise of education. I also argue a confluence of their nature-related ideas adds an educational nuance to the traditional picture of human beings as rational animals. (shrink)

H. Putnam has been considered the most Peircean philosopher among the neopragmatists. This note sugests that Putnam pays great atention to the problems Peirce tackled, but he does not share Peirce's thesis on the relation between "practical interests" and science. Therefore, Putnam's realism is more Deweyan and Jamesian than Peircean.

Michael Bonnett has long attempted to rehabilitate the concept of nature, thereby challenging us to reconsider its profound implications for diverse educational issues. Castigating both ‘postmodern’ and ‘scientistic’ accounts of nature for failing to appreciate that nature is at once transcendent and normative, Bonnett proposes his phenomenology-inspired view of nature as the ‘self-arising’, which is bound up with the notion of ‘our experience of nature’. Despite its enormous strengths, however, Bonnett’s argument might obscure the ways in which the real issue (...) involved in nature is addressed: the issue of our nature, which enables our experience of nature in the first place. In this paper, after reviewing Bonnett’s view of nature and considering his criticism of Richard Rorty’s assault on the reality of nature, I will try to show how the Aristotelian notion of second nature that John McDowell has reanimated can supplement Bonnett’s project and render plausible the idea that the naturalness of our sensibility is unique to human beings; through this approach, the issue of human nature can be located in discussions of nature at large and, connectedly, brought again within the scope of the philosophical study of education in the present-day intellectual climate that increasingly marginalises non-scientific, intellectual endeavours. I will also briefly reflect on the relevance of the notion of second nature to Stephen Boulter’s recently proposed idea of ‘education from a biological point of view’. (shrink)

Let L be a countable relational language. Baldwin asked whether there is an ab initio generic L-structure which is superstable but not ω-stable. We give a positive answer to his question, and prove that there is no ab initio generic L-structure which is superstable but not ω-stable, if L is finite and the generic is saturated.