This work has been selected by scholars as being culturally important and is part of the knowledge base of civilization as we know it. This work is in the public domain in the United States of America, and possibly other nations. Within the United States, you may freely copy and distribute this work, as no entity (individual or corporate) has a copyright on the body of the work. Scholars believe, and we concur, that this work is important enough to be (...) preserved, reproduced, and made generally available to the public. To ensure a quality reading experience, this work has been proofread and republished using a format that seamlessly blends the original graphical elements with text in an easy-to-read typeface. We appreciate your support of the preservation process, and thank you for being an important part of keeping this knowledge alive and relevant. (shrink)

Why is it that the study of Ethics is so unpopular? It is because there are so many systems of Ethics, and they are all in such hopeless contradiction. Why are there so many systems? Because each writer starts with his theory and then attempts to get the facts to agree with it. What is the remedy? The remedy, says Professor Levy-Bruhl, is to start with the practice. And what then? Then, he says, you find that the practice is (...) everything, that you need no theory, and that every ethical writer is in harmony with every other. 'Every ethical doctrine,' says Professor Levy-Bruhl, 'jealously defends the originality of its ethical principle against the objections of others, but it formulates the guiding rules of conduct, the concrete precepts of justice and charity, in the same terms as its rivals, whether its adherent is a disciple of Kant, a critical philosopher, a pessimist, a positivist, an evolutionist, a spiritualist, or a theologian.' The way out of the chaos of theoretical Ethics, then, is to deny its existence. There is no such science. The only science of Ethics is the practical. Its object of study is the conscience of man. Its rules and obligations are what the conscience reveals to experience. It takes Professor Levy-Bruhl half his book to get rid of theoretical ethics. Then, however, he is free, and he moves more rapidly in the discussion of Natural Ethics and Ethical Feeling. He ends with a chapter of Practical Results. -The Expository Times, Vol. 17. (shrink)

Dire que la pensée des primitifs est peu conceptuelle équivaut, en fait, à dire qu'elle n'est pas attachée à l'inviolabilité des lois des phénomènes ni à la permanence et constance des formes des organismes, ou, en d'autres termes, n'est jamais gênée par ce que nous appellerions les miracles ou des ruptures de l'ordre de la nature.

Le sens commun vise-t-il la connaissance? Le sens commun et la quantité.--Hegel, Hamilton, Hamelin et le concept de cause.--Philosophie de la nature et philosophie de l'intellect.--De l'analyse des produits de la pensée.--Les mathématiques et le divers.--Le savoir et l'univers de la perception immédiate.--La notion de l'identique.--Jean Rey et la loi de la conservation de la matière.--Théodore Turquet de Mayerne et la découverte de l'hydrogène.--La coupellation chez les anciens Juifs.--Y a-t-il un rhythme dans le progrès intellectuel?

This work has been selected by scholars as being culturally important, and is part of the knowledge base of civilization as we know it. This work is in the "public domain in the United States of America, and possibly other nations. Within the United States, you may freely copy and distribute this work, as no entity (individual or corporate) has a copyright on the body of the work. Scholars believe, and we concur, that this work is important enough to be (...) preserved, reproduced, and made generally available to the public. We appreciate your support of the preservation process, and thank you for being an important part of keeping this knowledge alive and relevant. (shrink)

I am quite prepared to admit that modern western thought is shot through with contradictions. For example, it is not coherent to think both that the idea of human nature is an illusion and that eugenics is an out-and-out evil; or to claim to be a democrat and exclude a priori the topic of eugenics from political debate. However, I personally very much doubt that the notions of nature and democracy are themselves in crisis. In my view they simply give (...) rise to semantic confusion and false problems that certain basic twentieth-century discoveries - in the field of physics, anthropology and political science - ought to be able to clear up, if they were better known. We shall just touch on a few thinkers whose work may give us some pointers to a clearer, calmer view of things. First a philosopher, Raymond Ruyer (1902-1987), and an economist, Joseph Schumpeter (1883-1950), two of whose key ideas this paper will combine: a neo-Aristotelian conception of nature, implying the existence of regulating principles and norms, to which humans and their societies, like everything else, are subject; a procedural conception of democracy that says it is not an end in itself but, under certain conditions, an appropriate means of making political decisions and settling disputes. And in addition some anthropologists, who helped either to put human beings back into a neo-Aristotelian world, or to define more accurately the essence of the political: Claude Lévi-Strauss, whose structuralism gave back its full importance to the notion of formal cause and even to the idea of final cause, and André Leroi-Gourhan, who confirmed that ‘art imitates nature’ by demonstrating that technical skill is a natural extension of life, whose processes and results it mimics; Arthur Maurice Hocart, who demonstrated the ritual origin of all institutions, particularly political ones. (shrink)

The ArgumentAlexandre Koyré is one of the most important historians of philosophic and scientific though since the thirties. Research on the Scientific Revolution, on Galileo, Descartes, Newton, as well as on Paracelsus and Boehme has deeply changed under his influential method: it has been a model for Kuhn's methodology of paradigms and revolutions in the histroy of science. Whereas Koyré used to be considered opposed in his ideology and method to sociological approaches, he has recently been characterized by Yehuda Elkana (...) as a sociologist of knowledge. In fact, until now one of the main sources of his method had not been identified: it is only by acknowledging the influence of Lucien Lévy-Bruhl on Koyré that it is possible to explain how the latter wrote his thesis on Boehme's mystical thought just before his Etudes galiléennes. Lucien Lévy-Bruhl was teaching history of philosophy at the Sorbonne, and Koyré was strongly influenced by his idea of “prelogical thinking” as a universel phenomenon and in a general way by the sociological school of Durkheim. Conceptual analysis deriving from Husserl, collective representations and attitude mentale, came together in Alexandre Koyrè's method. (shrink)

Découvert et transcrit par Francesco Saverio Nisio qui en a complété les références bibliographiques, ce texte, proposé en 1880 par le jeune Lucien Lévy à la Revue des études juives qui venait de se créer, et resté inédit depuis, met l’accent sur « l’exactitude et la profondeur des observations » psychologiques de Spinoza, « grand métaphysicien », c’est-à-dire « grand artiste », dans l’ Éthique.

This volume, one of the Explorations in Interpretive Sociology series, provides a brief introduction to the sociological work of the French philosopher and sociologist, Lucien Levy-Bruhl. The book includes a short biography of Levy-Bruhl, a chronological list of his principal works, a short essay outlining the development of his sociological theories, 63 pages of extracts from his works, and a short annotated bibliography. The biography notes the wide range of Levy-Bruhl’s interests, which included philosophy, sociology, literature, (...) and politics. The list of his principal works reveals, in addition to the many more well known books on the primitive mind, several works on ethics and the history of philosophy, and volumes on the philosophies of Jacobi and of Comte. (shrink)

Résumé Lucien Lévy-Bruhl effectue un voyage autour du monde en 1920 qui le conduit à prendre part aux controverses coloniales sur la vaccination aux Philippines. Cet article interroge la signification d’une telle controverse dans le cadre d’une anthropologie positiviste qui prétend totaliser les modes de penser « primitifs » et « civilisé » pour un sociologue typique. En mobilisant les figures de Jules Verne et d’Alfred Dreyfus, il montre que le tour du monde social peut être effectué à partir (...) des accidents qui en interrompent son accomplissement. Le projet philosophique d’une « logique des sentiments » qui a motivé l’anthropologie française depuis Auguste Comte peut alors être reformulé à partir d’une enquête sur les sentinelles qui anticipent les accidents à partir d’une expérience passée. Un tel projet permet de suivre les significations de l’Affaire Dreyfus jusqu’à l’anthropologie de Claude Lévi-Strauss. (shrink)