18 found
Sort by:
See also:
Profile: Paul Sheldon Davies (College of William and Mary)
  1. Paul Sheldon Davies (2009). Conceptual Conservatism : The Case of Normative Functions. In Ulrich Krohs & Peter Kroes (eds.), Functions in Biological and Artificial Worlds: Comparative Philosophical Perspectives. Mit Press.
    No categories
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  2. Paul Sheldon Davies (2009). Some Evolutionary Model or Other: Aspirations and Evidence in Evolutionary Psychology. Philosophical Psychology 22 (1):83 – 97.
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  3. Paul Sheldon Davies (2009). Subjects of the World: Darwin's Rhetoric and the Study of Agency in Nature. The University of Chicago Press.
    Part one: A progressive orientation: naturalism as exploration -- The vividness of truth: Darwin's romantic rhetoric and the evolutionary framework -- Our most vexing problem: conceptual conservatism and conceptual imperialism -- Naturalism as exploration: the elements of reform -- Part two: The allure of agency: "purpose" in biology -- The real heart of Darwinian evolutionary biology -- A formative power of a self-propagating kind: natural purposes and the concept location project -- A persistent mode of understanding: the psychological power of (...)
    Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  4. Paul Sheldon Davies (2006). The Physics of Downward Causation. In Philip Clayton & Paul Sheldon Davies (eds.), The Re-Emergence of Emergence. Oxford University Press.
  5. Paul Sheldon Davies (2005). Unmasking Self-Deception. Philosophia 32 (1-4):413-417.
    No categories
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  6. Paul Sheldon Davies (2002). Does Past Selective Efficacy Matter to Psychology? Behavioral and Brain Sciences 25 (4):513-514.
    Andrews et al. subscribe to the view that distinguishing selectionist from nonselectionist hypotheses – or, distinguishing adaptations from mere spandrels or exaptations – is important to the study of psychology. I offer three reasons for thinking that this view is false; that considerations of past selective efficacy have little to contribute to inquiry in psychology.
    Direct download (7 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  7. Paul Sheldon Davies (2000). Malfunctions. Biology and Philosophy 15 (1):19-38.
    A persistent boast of the historical approach to functions is that functional properties are normative. The claim is that a token trait retains its functional status even when it is defective, diseased, or damaged and consequently unable to perform the relevant task. This is because historical functional categories are defined in terms of some sort of historical success -- success in natural selection, typically -- which imposes a norm upon the performance of descendent tokens. Descendents thus are supposed to perform (...)
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  8. Paul Sheldon Davies (2000). The Nature of Natural Norms: Why Selected Functions Are Systemic Capacity Functions. Noûs 34 (1):85–107.
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  9. Paul Sheldon Davies (1999). The Conflict of Evolutionary Psychology. In Valerie Gray Hardcastle (ed.), Where Biology Meets Psychology. MIT Press.
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  10. Paul Sheldon Davies (1997). Deflating Consciousness: A Critical Review of Fred Dretske's Naturalizing the Mind. Philosophical Psychology 10 (4):541-550.
    Fred Dretske asserts that the conscious or phenomenal experiences associated with our perceptual states—e.g. the qualitative or subjective features involved in visual or auditory states—are identical to properties that things have according to our representations of them. This is Dretske's version of the currently popular representational theory of consciousness . After explicating the core of Dretske's representational thesis, I offer two criticisms. I suggest that Dretske's view fails to apply to a broad range of mental phenomena that have rather distinctive (...)
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  11. Paul Sheldon Davies (1996). Discovering the Functional Mesh: On the Methods of Evolutionary Psychology. [REVIEW] Minds and Machines 6 (4):559-585.
    The aim of this paper is to clarify and critically assess the methods of evolutionary psychology, and offer a sketch of an alternative methodology. My thesis is threefold. (1) The methods of inquiry unique to evolutionary psychology rest upon the claim that the discovery of theadaptive functions of ancestral psychological capacities leads to the discovery of thepsychological functions of those ancestral capacities. (2) But this claim is false; in fact, just the opposite is true. We first must discover the psychological (...)
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  12. Paul Sheldon Davies (1996). Preface: Evolutionary Theory in Cognitive Psychology. [REVIEW] Minds and Machines 6 (4):445-462.
  13. Paul Sheldon Davies (1995). 'Defending' Direct Proper Functions. Analysis 55 (4):299 - 306.
    No categories
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  14. Paul Sheldon Davies, James H. Fetzer & Thomas R. Foster (1995). Logical Reasoning and Domain Specificity. Biology and Philosophy 10 (1):1-37.
    The social exchange theory of reasoning, which is championed by Leda Cosmides and John Tooby, falls under the general rubric evolutionary psychology and asserts that human reasoning is governed by content-dependent, domain-specific, evolutionarily-derived algorithms. According to Cosmides and Tooby, the presumptive existence of what they call cheater-detection algorithms disconfirms the claim that we reason via general-purpose mechanisms or via inductively acquired principles. We contend that the Cosmides/Tooby arguments in favor of domain-specific algorithms or evolutionarily-derived mechanisms fail and that the notion (...)
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  15. Paul Sheldon Davies, David C. Graves, Justin Leiber & Anat Matar (1995). Book Reviews. [REVIEW] Philosophia 24 (3-4):531-558.
    No categories
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  16. Joseph Agassi, Dorit Bar-on, D. S. Clarke, Paul Sheldon Davies, Anthony J. Graybosch, Lila Luce, Paul K. Moser, Saul Smilansky, Roger Smook, William Sweet, John J. Tilley & Ruth Weintraub (1994). Book Reviews. [REVIEW] Philosophy of the Social Sciences 23 (1-4):359-362.
    No categories
    Direct download (8 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  17. Robert N. Brandon, Janis Antonovics, Richard Burian, Scott Carson, Greg Cooper, Paul Sheldon Davies, Christopher Horvath, Brent D. Mishler, Robert C. Richardson, Kelly Smith & Peter Thrall (1994). Sober on Brandon on Screening-Off and the Levels of Selection. Philosophy of Science 61 (3):475-486.
    Sober (1992) has recently evaluated Brandon's (1982, 1990; see also 1985, 1988) use of Salmon's (1971) concept of screening-off in the philosophy of biology. He critiques three particular issues, each of which will be considered in this discussion.
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  18. Paul Sheldon Davies (1994). Troubles for Direct Proper Functions. Noûs 28 (3):363-381.
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation