001. 王陽明의 철학사상 002. 현대의 시대적 상황 003. 양명학의 형성 배경 004. 기존 학설과 양명학 005. 왕양명의 심즉이론 006. 왕양명의 지행합일체 007. 왕양명의 치량지론 008. 왕양명의 이상사회 사상 009. 왕양명의 군사사상 010. 왕양명의 영향과 전개 011. 동, 서의 양명학 012. 한국의 양명학 013. 양명학의 조선 전래 014. 양명학에 대한 비판 015. 전래 초기의 양명학 수용 016. 조선조 양명학의 태두 정제두 017. 하곡 이후의 양명학 018. 겸곡 박은식의 양명학 019. 애당 정인보의 양명학.

Collected writings chiefly on Buddhist philosophy; includes Buddhist doctrines.

Algorithms can now identify patterns and correlations in the (big) datasets, and predict outcomes based on those identified patterns and correlations with the use of machine learning techniques and big data, decisions can then be made by algorithms themselves in accordance with the predicted outcomes. Yet, algorithms can inherit questionable values from the datasets and acquire biases in the course of (machine) learning, and automated algorithmic decision-making makes it more difficult for people to see algorithms as biased. While researchers have (...) taken the problem of algorithmic bias seriously, but the current discussion on algorithmic fairness tends to conceptualize ‘fairness’ in algorithmic fairness primarily as a technical issue and attempts to implement pre-existing ideas of ‘fairness’ into algorithms. In this paper, I show that such a view of algorithmic fairness as technical issue is unsatisfactory for the type of problem algorithmic fairness presents. Since decisions on fairness measure and the related techniques for algorithms essentially involve choices between competing values, ‘fairness’ in algorithmic fairness should be conceptualized first and foremost as a political issue, and it should be (re)solved by democratic communication. The aim of this paper, therefore, is to explicitly reconceptualize algorithmic fairness as a political question and suggest the current discussion of algorithmic fairness can be strengthened by adopting the accountability for reasonableness framework. (shrink)

In this paper, we present a (propositionaI) modal-Iogic approximation to Quantum Mechanics from a reduced and characteristic number of “crucial experiments” and so independently of the lattice of subspaces of Hilbert space. Kripke’s semantics, which determinates this system, allows to define, from a new point of view, the notions of “measurement process” and “virtual world” and admits a natural interpretation which in turn can help us to understand the measurement problem. In this way, we can attempt a “many-worlds” interpretation of (...) Quantum Mechanics, in the way of Everett. (shrink)

Cultural differences pose a serious challenge to the ethics and governance of artificial intelligence from a global perspective. Cultural differences may enable malignant actors to disregard the demand of important ethical values or even to justify the violation of them through deference to the local culture, either by affirming the local culture lacks specific ethical values, e.g., privacy, or by asserting the local culture upholds conflicting values, e.g., state intervention is good. One response to this challenge is the human rights (...) approach to AI governance, which is intended to be a universal and globally enforceable framework. The proponents of the approach, however, have so far neglected the challenge from cultural differences or left out the implications of cultural diversity in their works. This is surprising because human rights theorists have long recognized the significance of cultural pluralism for human rights. Accordingly, the approach may not be straightforwardly applicable in “non-Western” contexts because of cultural differences, and it may also be critiqued as philosophically incomplete insofar as the approach does not account for the role of culture. This commentary examines the human rights approach to AI governance with an emphasis on cultural values and the role of culture. Particularly, I show that the consideration of cultural values is essential to the human rights approach for both philosophical and instrumental reasons. (shrink)

A closer look at the theories and questions in philosophy of technology and ethics of technology shows the absence and marginality of non-Western philosophical traditions in the discussions. Although, increasingly, some philosophers have sought to introduce non-Western philosophical traditions into the debates, there are few systematic attempts to construct and articulate general accounts of ethics and technology based on other philosophical traditions. This situation is understandable, for the questions of modern sciences and technologies appear to be originated from the West; (...) at the same time, the situation is undesirable. The overall aim of this paper, therefore, is to introduce an alternative account of ethics of technology based on the Confucian tradition. In doing so, it is hoped that the current paper can initiate a relatively uncharted field in philosophy of technology and ethics of technology. (shrink)