ABSTRACTThis article provides a Global South perspective on marginalised migrant youth and higher educational aspirations, with a specific focus on South Africa. We use data from a case study in Johannesburg to illustrate how marginalised migrant youth experience particular forms of disadvantage in their endeavours to realise their educational aspirations. Yet, educational opportunities and the achievement of educational aspirations may enhance dimensions important for individual wellbeing. Through education, marginalised migrant youth become better positioned to pursue what they have reason (...) to value, including escaping poverty in both their home and host countries. Using the human development and capability lens, the paper also presents what the disadvantages experienced by marginalised migrant youth may mean for human development. We argue that constrained educational aspirations can result in corrosive disadvantage and ultimately systemic poverty. We conclude the paper by highlighting how the capability approach could be used to inform social and educational policies in contexts of marginalisation. (shrink)

Several factors related to fetal risk render it more or less acceptable in justifying constraints on the behavior of pregnant women. Risk is an unavoidable part of pregnancy and childbirth, one that women must balance against other vital personal and family interests. Two particular issues relate to the fairness of claims that pregnant women are never entitled to put their fetuses at risk: relative risks and relatives' risks. The former have been used—often spuriously—to advance arguments against activities, such as home (...) birth, that may incur risk; the latter implicate the nature of relationships in determining the acceptability of coercing or precluding activities. Motivated reasoning by clinicians and judges leads to inaccurate risk assessments, and judgments based on false claims to objectivity. Such judgments undermine the moral and legal standing of pregnant women and do not advance the interests of fetuses, pregnant women, families, or states. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Philosophy and Literature 25.2 (2001) 314-334 [Access article in PDF] The Epistemology of Cognitive Literary Studies F. Elizabeth Hart I Literary scholars have begun incorporating the insights of cognitive science into literary studies, bringing to bear on questions of literary experience the results of explorations within a wide range of fields that define today's cognitive science. The investigation of the human mind and its reasoning processes encompasses a rich (...) variety of empirical and speculative disciplines, including cognitive psychology, neuroscience, linguistics, evolutionary psychology, developmental psychology, computer science, philosophy, and anthropology. These disciplines are all related to one another by the questions they ask about the brain and mind and the ground they cover in staking out their research agendas; but each also contributes uniquely in terms of individual scope and focus. Literary critics, eavesdropping on this maturing coalition, are now producing critical works that apply cognitive research to a similarly impressive range of literary concerns, with results so far that seem to span the gap between traditional and more contemporary literary critical approaches.All such criticism is dependent on scientific studies of the brain and mind and so accepts axiomatically some degree of epistemological efficacy in scientific empiricism. But this acceptance has not been naive or uncritical and has, in fact, been at times carefully qualified by critics' sensitivity to debate--to the lack of consensus among cognitive scientists, and to the fact that cognitive science is itself in its infancy stage, with its own practitioners often openly tentative about their results and descriptive capabilities. As it happens, such debate, in recent years, has even proven beneficial for literary scholarship since an important [End Page 314] paradigm shift has taken place that now makes some aspects of cognitive science more compatible than ever with the interests of literary studies. This is because, whereas an earlier phase of cognitive science focused its energies on Artificial Intelligence and on theories of language and psychology that supported AI, grounding its theories implicitly in a metaphor of the mind as a computer, today's cognitive scientists tend to concentrate instead on the more organic metaphor of the "embodiment" of mind, that is, of the mind's substantive indebtedness to its bodily, social, and cultural contexts, and on the figurative phenomena of metaphor, metonymy, image schemata, "fields," "frames," other "integrative mental spaces" (as they are called), and the gradient structures and prototypical bases of semantic categories, all of which contribute to recasting human reason into a set of highly imaginative--not logical but figural--processes. 1 For literary theory and criticism, this shift in cognitive science toward "the body in the mind" 2 --tantamount to a wholesale rejection of philosophical rationalism--has given rise to a new kind of interdisciplinary practice, to the potential for a sincere engagement between diverse sciences and even between literature and science that stretches all the bounds of what literary scholars generally mean when they speak of being interdisciplinary (e.g., exchanges with history, art history, anthropology, film studies, sociology).In the discussion that follows, I would like to explore this new interdisciplinarity in literary studies by examining its epistemological implications. I begin with a description of the kinds of criticism now being produced under the rubric of cognitive literary criticism or--to reflect the field's scope more accurately--cognitive and cognitive-evolutionary criticism. This description is not intended as a comprehensive or evaluative survey, since in-depth review articles of extant works are available elsewhere. 3 Rather, I hope to familiarize my readers with the basic orientations of this theory and criticism so that they can grasp the epistemological relations that will become the essay's focus. To lay a further groundwork for this focus, I will review various uses of the term "cognitive" (or "cognitivism") in the scholarship and offer an analysis of its meanings, first in cognitive science and then in literary theory. Building, then, on what "cognitive" might signify for literary studies, I show how a literary approach based on today's cognitive science is uniquely situated among other approaches because of its underlying theory of human... (shrink)

Faith is a central attitude in Christian religious practice. The problem of faith and reason is the problem of reconciling religious faith with the standards for our belief-forming practices in general (‘ordinary epistemic standards’). In order to see whether and when faith can be reconciled with ordinary epistemic standards, we first need to know what faith is. This chapter examines and catalogues views of propositional faith: faith that p. It is concerned with (...) the epistemology of such faith: what cognitive attitudes does such faith require, what epistemic norms govern these attitudes, and whether Christian faith can ever adhere to them. (shrink)

Several factors related to fetal risk render it more or less acceptable in justifying constraints on the behavior of pregnant women. Risk is an unavoidable part of pregnancy and childbirth, one that women must balance against other vital personal and family interests. Two particular issues relate to the fairness of claims that pregnant women are never entitled to put their fetuses at risk: relative risks and relatives' risks. The former have been used—often spuriously—to advance arguments against activities, such as home (...) birth, that may incur risk; the latter implicate the nature of relationships in determining the acceptability of coercing or precluding activities. Motivated reasoning by clinicians and judges leads to inaccurate risk assessments, and judgments based on false claims to objectivity. Such judgments undermine the moral and legal standing of pregnant women and do not advance the interests of fetuses, pregnant women, families, or states. (shrink)

Reason and Faith: Themes from Richard Swinburne. Edited by Bergmann Michael and Brower Jeffrey E.

The topic of “reason and faith in God” has challenged philosophers and theologians since the beginning of their disciplines, and it has left many inquirers confused. The key notions of faith and reason are often left unclear, and this complicates inquiry about faith in God. Many inquirers end up puzzled about the significance of the distinction between reason and faith. This paper outlines an approach to reason and faith in God that (...) explains how faith in God can be well-grounded in reason as evidence, even if reason as an argument does not apply in a case. It identifies distinctive roles for experience and defense in an account of faith in God. (shrink)

The paper examines the relationship between reason and faith. It aims at the justification of faith not as the rival of reason, but rather as its constitutive element, which not only does not deny it, but is, on the contrary, its original foundation. This claim is seen as resulting from the dismissal of the naive realism through the examination of human subjektivity. In trying to define faith the author examines its role and functions in secular (...) as well as in religious reasons. In justifying the need and the sense of faith he formulates a spiritual law governing the human life, namely the law of assimilation. (shrink)

The categories of reason and faith are often contrasted. When reason gives out, we are told that we have to rely on faith. Such exhortations are made particularly in the context of religion. When for instance, we face some personal tragedy which may well seem inexplicable, we are told that faith can help us through it. Very often faith is referred to in a vacuum. Presumably faith in God is usually meant, but all (...) too often God drops out of the picture, and it seems that all we need is faith, not faith in anything or anyone, but just faith. We are thus encouraged to add what seems to be a magic ingredient to our lives, which can transform everything. Perhaps at the back of such thinking lies some Calvinist notion of the corrupt character of human reason. As a result it may seem that we cannot rely on our judgment, which is the product of the fallen and sinful nature of humanity. Instead we must depend on ‘faith’ which may, or may not, be given us by the grace of God. (shrink)

The categories of reason and faith are often contrasted. When reason gives out, we are told that we have to rely on faith. Such exhortations are made particularly in the context of religion. When for instance, we face some personal tragedy which may well seem inexplicable, we are told that faith can help us through it. Very often faith is referred to in a vacuum. Presumably faith in God is usually meant, but all (...) too often God drops out of the picture, and it seems that all we need is faith, not faith in anything or anyone, but just faith. We are thus encouraged to add what seems to be a magic ingredient to our lives, which can transform everything. Perhaps at the back of such thinking lies some Calvinist notion of the corrupt character of human reason. As a result it may seem that we cannot rely on our judgment, which is the product of the fallen and sinful nature of humanity. Instead we must depend on ‘faith’ which may, or may not, be given us by the grace of God. (shrink)

Charles Hodge engaged the leading thinkers of his day to defend the human ability to know God. This involved him in affirming the importance of both orthodoxy and piety in the life of a Christian. His work involved expanding on the insights of the Westminster Confession of Faith as it applied to the theory of salvation and the role of Christ.

The past fifty years have been an enormously fruitful period in the field of philosophy of religion, and few have done more to advance its development during this time than Richard Swinburne. His pioneering work has systematically developed a comprehensive set of positions within this field, and made major contributions to fields such as metaphysics, epistemology, and philosophy of science. This volume presents a collection of ten new essays in philosophy of religion that develop and critically engage themes from Swinburne's (...) work. Written by some of the leading figures in the field, these essays focus on issues in both natural theology and philosophical theology. (shrink)

This chapter contains sections titled: Liberal Modernism and Its Rivals Twelve Worldviews Faith and Reason Realigned.

This leaves commemorate the death of Mr. Lai drunk for one week of the year, the first highlight of Mr. Yip Lai drunk morality to moral life as a call for the worlds and inviting, rather than imposing a thing, and thus analysis this point in its philosophical basis. Lai drunk leaves care and moral life, and care management of prospects, and that "preaching Management" and the "reasonableness" distinction, and in this perspective, the exploration provision of rational structure, driving force (...) and hope, respectively, in The so-called form of science, experience in the form of scientific, interpretive discipline, analytical philosophy, contemplative philosophy諸level, there are in-depth research and published works, has always wanted to run through from the rational to believe, from the philosophical to the neural science of the road, play its intellectual generosity, to grand philosophical thinking索, to clarify the integrity of the Catholic University of psychiatric treatment, and from science, culture and faith development, pointing In order rational hope. This paper in memory of Prof. Jean Ladrière in the first anniversary of his passing away attempts to feature first his notion of moral life as "an invitation to perfection rather than imposing obligation on others," by referring to his philosophical analysis of moral life. Jean Ladrière concerned himself not only with moral life, but also with human reason and its hope. He made the distinction between reasonableness and rationality, based on which he explored the structure, dynamism and hope of human reason. He worked on the philosophical structure and dynamism of formal sciences, natural-formal sciences, hermeneutic disciplines, analytical philosophy and speculative philosophy as expressions of human reason. He penetrated the energetic development of spirit from science to faith, from philosophy to theology, showing thereby an admirable intellectual generosity and comprehensive power of philosophizing to exemplify the integral function of reason claimed by him as the "eschaton" of Catholic university and to explore the hope of reason through the development of science, culture and faith. (shrink)

First published in 2000. Routledge is an imprint of Taylor & Francis, an informa company.

What is the difference between reason and faith? The question is framed in what I would call ‘the treacherous singular’. The structure of the question implies a particular form of answer and makes other assumptions about notions that occur in the same region of our network of thoughts and understandings. If I were happy to play this game I might reply in kind by offering a simple formula purporting to sum up my own answers to the cluster of (...) questions that are implicit in the simple form given above. The form makes the question and the answer appear more straightforward than they are. Perhaps I might answer in the questioner's style by stating the conclusions of my paper in these words: A simple idea is at the heart of my paper, but one that is hard to absorb and to live by in one' s wider thoughts about reason and faith. The simple idea is that faith is itself a mode of reason. This means that there cannot be a sharp distinction between reason and faith, whether or not one tries to express such a distinction in the treacherous singular, or perhaps in the impoverished plural, a mode of expression in which a few separate but simple factors are identified as what faith is or what reason is. (shrink)

What is the difference between reason and faith? The question is framed in what I would call ‘the treacherous singular’. The structure of the question implies a particular form of answer and makes other assumptions about notions that occur in the same region of our network of thoughts and understandings. If I were happy to play this game I might reply in kind by offering a simple formula purporting to sum up my own answers to the cluster of (...) questions that are implicit in the simple form given above. The form makes the question and the answer appear more straightforward than they are. Perhaps I might answer in the questioner's style by stating the conclusions of my paper in these words:A simple idea is at the heart of my paper, but one that is hard to absorb and to live by in one' s wider thoughts about reason and faith. The simple idea is that faith is itself a mode of reason. This means that there cannot be a sharp distinction between reason and faith, whether or not one tries to express such a distinction in the treacherous singular, or perhaps in the impoverished plural, a mode of expression in which a few separate but simple factors are identified as what faith is or what reason is. (shrink)

The claim of this paper is that theism and atheism as beliefs about the nature of the universe are equally distant from any sort of proper justification by reasoning, but that faith cannot be reduced to any sort of belief. This claim is illustrated by a survey of several case-studies, including the case of moral sense, the so-called “God gene” and discoveries of Benjamin Libet on “free” movement. The illustrations attempt to show that only some imagerial associations connected with (...) these cases, and respectively with religious beliefs, would make an impression of incoherence, not their actual content. The conclusion of the paper would echo the statements of Cardinal John Henry Newman, who said in his Oxford University Sermons: “Faith is an instrument of knowledge and action, unknown to the world before, a principle sui generis, distinct from those which nature supplies, and independent of what is commonly understood by Reason”. Some implications of this conclusion, such as the notion of the rationality of faith, an account of the relation between science and theology, or the problem of agnosticism, are discussed, too. (shrink)

For Kierkegaard the leap to faith is an acceptance of the Unknown which is neither given by reason nor deducible from a previous content of consciousness.

The paper maintains and reinforces a viewpoint that science and religion are methodologically and epistemologically independent. However, it also suggests that this independence can be overcome if a “third party” is taken into account, that is – philosophy. Such a possibility seems to follow from the thesis of incommensurability and the thesis of underdetermination formulated and analysed in the current philosophy of science.