Linked bibliography for the SEP article "Mental Causation" by David Robb, John Heil and Sophie Gibb
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- ––––, 1992, “Mental Causation and Mental Reality”, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, 92: 185–202. (Scholar)
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- ––––, 1991, “Dretske’s
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- ––––, 1993, “Mental Events as Structuring Causes of Behavior”, in Heil and Mele 1993, pp. 121–36. (Scholar)
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- Ehring, D., 1996, “Mental Causation, Determinables and Property Instances”, Noûs, 30: 461–80. (Scholar)
- ––––, 1997, Causation and Persistence: A Theory of Causation, New York: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
- Enc, B., 1995, “Units of Behavior”, Philosophy of Science, 62: 523–42. (Scholar)
- Fodor, J. A., 1980, “Methodological Solipsism Considered as a Research Strategy in Cognitive Psychology”, Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 3: 63–73. Reprinted in J. A. Fodor, 1981, Representations: Philosophical Essays on the Foundations of Cognitive Science, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, pp. 225–53. (Scholar)
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- Foster, J., 1991, The Immaterial Self: A Defence of the Cartesian Dualist Conception of the Mind, London: Routledge. (Scholar)
- Funkhouser, E., 2002, “Three Varieties of Causal Overdetermination”, Pacific Philosophical Quarterly, 83: 335–51. (Scholar)
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- Garrett, B. J., 1998, “Pluralism, Causation and Overdetermination”, Synthese, 116: 355–78. (Scholar)
- ––––, 1999, “Davidson on Causal Relevance”, Ratio (new series), 12: 14–33. (Scholar)
- Gibb, S. C., 2004, “The Problem of Mental Causation and the Nature of Properties”, Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 82: 464–76. (Scholar)
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- Gibbons, J., 2006, “Mental Causation without Downward Causation”, Philosophical Review, 115: 79–103. (Scholar)
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- Gillett, C. and B. Rives, 2001, “Does the Argument from Realization Generalize? Responses to Kim”, Southern Journal of Philosophy, 39: 79–98. (Scholar)
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- Heil, J., 1992, The Nature of True Minds, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. (Scholar)
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- Heil, J. and A. Mele (eds.), 1993, Mental Causation, Oxford: Clarendon Press. (Scholar)
- Heil, J. and D. Robb, 2003, “Mental Properties”, American Philosophical Quarterly, 40: 175–96. (Scholar)
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- Horgan, T., 1989, “Mental Quausation”, Philosophical Perspectives, 3: 47–76. (Scholar)
- ––––, 1991, “Actions, Reasons, and the Explanatory Role of Content”, in McLaughlin 1991, pp. 73–101. (Scholar)
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- Jackson, F., 1995, “Essentialism, Mental Properties and Causation”, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, 95: 253–68. (Scholar)
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- Kim, J., 1973, “Causation, Nomic Subsumption, and the Concept of Event”, Journal of Philosophy, 70: 217–36. Reprinted in Kim 1993a, pp. 3–21. (Scholar)
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- ––––, 1984, “Epiphenomenal and Supervenient Causation”, Midwest Studies in Philosophy, 9: 257–70. Reprinted in Kim 1993a, pp. 92–108. (Scholar)
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- ––––, 1991, “Dretske on How Reasons Explain Behavior”, in McLaughlin 1991, pp. 52–72. Reprinted in Kim 1993a, pp. 285–308. (Scholar)
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