In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content: Reviewed by: The Singular Voice of Being: John Duns Scotus and Ultimate Difference by Andrew Lazella Christopher Cullen S.J. Andrew Lazella, The Singular Voice of Being: John Duns Scotus and Ultimate Difference. Medieval Philosophy: Texts and Studies. New York: Fordham University Press, 2019. Pp. x + 260. $72.00. ISBN: 9780823284573. John Duns Scotus (c. 1265–1308) is aptly called the Subtle Doctor. His thought is filled with (...) subtleties and distinctions that embody medieval Scholasticism's attempt to master the science of metaphysics, especially as it had been recast by the rediscovery of Aristotle's Metaphysics—a text that Scotus wrote about at length. Andrew Lazella's book, The Singular Voice of Being: John Duns Scotus and Ultimate Difference aims precisely at presenting the subtleties of Scotus' answer to Parmenides with the Eleatic's denial of the reality of the multiplicity of beings and of change. Lazella first illumines in detail Scotus's central metaphysical doctrine, namely, that the mind attains a univocal concept of being. But the problem then becomes, as Lazella rightly perceives, that this "univocity of being" might seem to be in danger of collapsing being into a Parmenidean monism. Hence, the urgency for Scotus "to divide being at its joints" (as Lazella refers to the task; 2). Scotus has to find the ultimate differences that demarcate the multiplicity and divisions of being, if his univocity of being is not to collapse being into a false unity. Lazella shows how Scotus attempts to escape the monism of Parmenides while also avoiding a Heraclitean flux and multitude that destroys the possibility of knowledge and science. For Scotus, only the univocal concept of being is adequate to this task. An analogy of being is inadequate, primarily because it is on the side of equivocation. The univocal concept is "the singular voice of being" that illumines the unity of the finite world, with its vast multitude of things, and that also grounds the concepts of a natural theology of the infinite God. Lazella insightfully begins the book by presenting Scotus's work as an answer to Parmenides and thus to the most basic of all metaphysical questions, as discussed above. Part 1 of the book includes three chapters: the first two discuss in detail the univocal concept that unites beings, and [End Page 237] chapter 3 outlines the concept of the ultimate difference that divides being. Lazella highlights a threefold taxonomy of ultimate differences that are found in the modes, species, and individuals of being. Part 2 of the book includes three chapters, one on each of the "regions" of ultimate difference: chapter 4 treats the intrinsic modes of being; chapter 5 the ultimate specific differences that account for the diversity of species; and chapter 6 presents the ultimate individual difference, i.e., "thisness" or haeceitas, which accounts for the reality of the individual substances. A helpful conclusion summarizes the argument of the book as a whole."In his early Quaestiones super Praedicamenta Aristotelis, Scotus says that things are univocally named when they share not only the same term (vox) or name (nomen) but also the same account (ratio)" (17). The opposite extreme from univocty is equivocity. Equivocity obtains when things only share a name but have different accounts. In between these two extremes is analogy: "Analogical names require that the name signify multiple rationes, which are unified according to some order or relation" (17). This account of these three terms is uncontroversial. Lazella thinks that Scotus's turn to univocity, as the ground of metaphysics, is driven largely by his epistemology. For Scotus, "cognition is rooted in sensible accidents and is unable to gain access to the real essences of substances themselves" (6). Hence the isomorphism between mind and reality cannot be secured without a univocal concept of being, contra the views of the majority of his fellow thirteenth-century Scholastics, such as Bonaventure and Aquinas. A key point is that, for Scotus, the intelligible species, or likeness, abstracted from the phantasm by the agent intellect, is not understood as a mirror that re-presents the form found in the concrete substances of the world. For Scotus, the intelligible species is no longer understood as a formal sign that... (shrink)

The great Franciscan theologian St. Bonaventure engaged in philosophy as well as theology, and the relation between the two in Bonaventure's work has long been debated. Yet, few studies have been devoted to Bonaventure's thought as a whole. In this survey, Christopher M. Cullen reveals Bonaventure as a great synthesizer, whose system of thought bridged the gap between theology and philosophy. The book is organized according to the categories of Bonaventure's own classic text, De reductione artium ad theologiam. (...) Cullen follows Bonaventure's own division of the branches of philosophy and theology, analyzing them as separate but related entities. He shows that Bonaventure was a scholastic, whose mysticism was grounded in systematic theological and philosophical reasoning. He presents a fresh and nuanced perspective on Bonaventure's debt to Augustine, while clarifying Aristotle's influence. Cullen also puts Bonaventure's ideas in context of his time and place, contributing significantly to our understanding of the medieval world. This accessible introduction provides a much-needed overview of Bonaventure's thought. Cullen offers a clear and rare reading of "Bonaventurianism" in and for itself, without the complications of critique and comparison. This book promises to become a standard text on Bonaventure, useful for students and scholars of philosophy, theology, medieval studies, and the history of Christianity. (shrink)

This is a brief and accessible introduction to the thought of the great Franciscan theologian St. Bonaventure. Cullen focuses on the long-debated relation between philosophy and theology in the work of this important but neglected thinker, revelaing Bonaventure as a great synthesizer. Cullen's exposition also shows in a new and more nuanced way Bonaventure's debt to Augustine, while making clear how he was influenced by Aristotle. The book is organized according to the categories of Bonaventure's own classic text. (...) De reductione artium ad theologiam. Part I is devoted to the definition of Christian Wisdom. In Part II, "The Light of Philosophical Knowledge," individual chapters are devoted to Bonaventure's physics, metaphysics, and moral philosophy. Part III, "The Light of Theological Knowledge," includes chapters on the Trinity, Creation, Sin, the Incarnation, Grace, the Sacraments, and the Last Things. (shrink)

This is a brief and accessible introduction to the thought of the great Franciscan theologian St. Bonaventure. Cullen focuses on the long-debated relation between philosophy and theology in the work of this important but neglected thinker, revelaing Bonaventure as a great synthesizer. Cullen's exposition also shows in a new and more nuanced way Bonaventure's debt to Augustine, while making clear how he was influenced by Aristotle. The book is organized according to the categories of Bonaventure's own classic text. (...) De reductione artium ad theologiam. Part I is devoted to the definition of Christian Wisdom. In Part II, "The Light of Philosophical Knowledge," individual chapters are devoted to Bonaventure's physics, metaphysics, and moral philosophy. Part III, "The Light of Theological Knowledge," includes chapters on the Trinity, Creation, Sin, the Incarnation, Grace, the Sacraments, and the Last Things. (shrink)

Contributions to this volume examine three main areas relating to the metaphysics of Thomas Aquinas: the foundation of metaphysics within Thomism; the use of metaphysics in fundamental philosophical issues within Thomism; and the use of metaphysics in central theological issues.

The untitled and anonymous text known by modern scholars under the name Wu xing zhan 'Prognostics of the Five Stars [sc. 'planets']', datable to before 168 bce, is the earliest known surviving Chinese document to give a substantive account of the apparent motions of the five visible planets, and to discuss the significance of those motions. The text includes tabulated predictions of the motions of three planets from 246 bce to 177 bce. In each case it is possible to reconstruct (...) simple rationales for the data given. It is however clear from the text that its primary purpose is to serve as an aid to celestial divination rather than as an attempt to discover laws of planetary motion for their own sake. The user of the text was not only expected to observe deviations from the rules underlying the tabulations given, but also actively to exploit such deviations as means of prognostication. (shrink)

The notion of “wisdom” is central in the thought of Bonaventure. This chapter explores the different senses in which Bonaventure uses the term “wisdom”, which reveals his understanding of both theology and philosophy, the relationship between the two, and the foundational unity of all knowledge. According to Bonaventure, “wisdom” is a person who calls us and beckons us to a journey of the mind to God.

Les neuf chapitres: Le classique mathématique de la Chine ancienne et ses commentaires, Karine Chemla & Guo Shuchun; Dunod, Paris, 2004, pp. 1140, Price €80 hardback, ISBN 2-100-495895.

Bonaventure distinguishes three meanings for grace. First, in a general sense, it is the assistance freely and liberally granted by God to creatures performing any of their acts. Second, in a more proper sense, grace is a term usually reserved for the gift from God by which the human soul is perfected and transformed. Third, is the concept of created sense as the means of justification and of this justification involving a change in being.

This introductory chapter discusses the life and times of Bonaventure, his writings, and influence. Bonaventure came to Paris as a young man, probably in 1234 or 1235, a time when the city was undergoing extraordinary rebirth. Three historic movements had recently converged on the banks of the Seine when Bonaventure began his new life in Paris: the rediscovery of Aristotle, the turn to “universities” for education, and the emergence of the Franciscans. Bonaventure became the eighth minister of the Franciscan order (...) in October 1257. (shrink)

This chapter explores Bonaventure's account of moral philosophy. Bonaventure unambiguously presents moral philosophy as a distinct branch of study in On the Reduction of the Arts to Theology. He divides moral philosophy into three branches: personal, domestic, and political. According to Bonaventure, moral philosophy investigates the truth of morals and the right order of living, specifically, the right order in man's actions as an individual, as a member of a household, and as a member of the city. Human beings are (...) able to know the right order of living through the natural law, which consists of both the dictates of right reason and God's eternal law impressed on the human soul. (shrink)

During the 12th century, certain questions came into focus and inspired speculation about the heavens and the earth, namely, “mobile being”. In other words, nature was “discovered” in the 12th century. It is in the wake of this discovery that, in the 1250s, Bonaventure developed his view of the created world while commenting on the interpretation of the Genesis account of creation found in the church fathers, as these had been anthologized in Peter the Lombard's Sentences.

According to Bonaventure, metaphysics, as a branch of natural philosophy, is concerned with the truth of “things”. But unlike physics, which investigates things insofar as they change, metaphysics goes beyond motion and quantity to investigate things simply insofar as they exist or are “beings”. This investigation involves reducing things back to the most fundamental concept, namely, being. It has three main parts: how things came to be from the First Principle, that is, why there is something rather than nothing; how (...) things reflect ideas or “exemplars” in the divine mind, in other words, how things are what they are and are intelligible; and finally, how things “return” to their source, or, the ultimate meaning of things. These three aspects constitute the three parts of metaphysics: emanation, exemplarism, and consummation. (shrink)

This chapter explores why Bonaventure explicitly includes creation as a distinct subject area in his division of theology and what theology adds to the understanding of creation. Bonaventure believes that theology reinforces our awareness of the nothingness of creation. Recalling this means that Bonaventure's doctrine of creation can be understood. In considering this doctrine, however, it is also important to keep in mind that Bonaventure believes creation ex nihilo can be known by reason alone.

Bonaventure rejects any sort of fundamental dualism between good and evil. He argues that, “a first and absolute evil does not and could not exist because the very notion of First Principle implies supreme plenitude”. Bonaventure follows Augustine in distinguishing between natural and moral evil, or, to use the terminology from Augustine's On Free Choice, the evil of penalty and the evil of guilt. The former is an evil we suffer, while the latter is a privation of righteousness that we (...) cause. The evil of penalty is just and comes from divine providence. (shrink)

Bonaventure holds that God does all things with power, wisdom, and goodness; such as in the case of the restoration. If Incarnation is examined as a work of God in the light of power, wisdom, and goodness, we can see why it is the most perfect of all God's works, for there cannot be any greater act of power than to combine within a single person two natures: the human and divine. While Bonaventure stresses the gratuity of the redemption — (...) that is, God was in no way obliged to save us — he is very clear that man could not have been saved by any healer other than God. (shrink)

The question of time and history, took on tremendous urgency in Bonaventure's day. Bonaventure found himself enmeshed in debates about time and history both in the university and in the Franciscan order. Bonaventure believed that creation necessarily involves having a beginning in time, i.e., having being at some point after not having being. Time is thus necessarily lineal, not cyclical. So as Bonaventure considers the question in the light of philosophy he concludes that creation has a beginning in time, and (...) in the light of scripture he concludes that it will have an end. (shrink)

Bonaventure uses “sacrament” to refer to all signs of faith in the Redeemer, even those that are not explicitly focused on Jesus of Nazareth. He refers to this as the “diversity” of the sacraments. “Sacraments” in this sense were instituted from the very beginning, but they have enjoyed diversity through three different ages and their concomitant laws: the law of nature, the law of scripture, and the law of grace.

Bonaventure frequently identifies theology with sacred scripture, using the term “scripture” as a synonym for theology to the extent that he refers to the whole of what God has revealed for the salvation of the human race. The best place to begin to understand Bonaventure's view of sacred scripture is with the conviction that he held with other medieval believers, that God has written three books: one within, one without, and one for sinners to return home. In Bonaventure's eyes, scripture (...) is not merely the literal meaning of the text. When he speaks of scripture, he means scripture as revealed in the fullness of its meanings, above all, in its allegorical interpretation. (shrink)

The book is divided into eight chapters, covering various branches of philosophy, beginning with epistemology and proceeding through metaphysics to psychology and ethics. The book’s first chapter prepares the reader for this philosophical overview by sketching the historical and intellectual context in which Duns Scotus lived and worked. In this chapter the authors walk their reader through the maze of the Scotistic corpus acting as skilled guides. Scotus, they explain, has three different commentaries on the Sentences of Peter Lombard: his (...) earliest commentary, referred to as the Lectura; a later, revised commentary, the Ordinatio; and a third, final commentary done in Paris, the Reportatio Parisiensis. Chapter 2 explains Scotus’s foundational doctrine about the univocity of being. Chapter 3 then shows how this univocal concept works in the science of being, that is, metaphysics. The authors next take up the problem of contingency as Scotus conceives of it in the light of necessitarian views of reality. Scotus argues for a radically contingent universe that is dependent on the divine will, yet has a deep basis for the necessity found in its natures in nothing less than divine knowledge. Ingham and Dreyer carefully discuss how Scotus attempts to remain firmly within the realm of metaphysical realism by his teaching that each common nature possesses a real unity that serves as the basis for the mind’s universal concept, even if this unity is less than the numerical unity of the individual. In itself “horseness” is just “horseness” and thus indifferent to being either universalized in the mind or individuated in the concrete horse. In chapters 5 through 7, Ingham and Dreyer provide a balanced reading of the Scotistic ethics by explicating in some detail his notion of the will as the rational potency within the human soul. The final chapter of the book provides a general appreciation of the significance and enduring value of Scotus’s thought. (shrink)

While the nature-grace debate rages in Thomistic circles, St. Bonaventure's theological anthropology and his theology of grace is paid much less attention, with the exception of his argument that Adam was created apart from gratia gratum faciens, or in modern terms habitual or sanctifying grace.1 For this position he has come under some scrutiny. John Milbank connects Adam's short time without habitual grace to Bonaventure's deficient understanding of illumination as proof of an incipient voluntarism and a suspect pure nature theology.2 (...) Turning Milbank upon his head, Fr. Christopher Cullen, S.J. defends the "suspended middle" in Bonaventure by appealing to Adam's creation without grace; human nature has a... (shrink)

This collection’s basic theme and thesis, explained by Curtis L. Hancock, “A Critique of Social Construct Theory” and “A Counterfeit Choice,” is that the seeds of contemporary relativism were sown by modern philosophy, primarily Descartes himself, its founder. Following a lead from Gilson, these authors pursue the benefits of classical realism and existential Thomism compared with the Cartesian legacy of subjectivism in modern philosophy. Indeed, Peter Redpath, “Why Descartes was not a Philosopher,” explains why Descartes may not be a philosopher (...) at all, if the significance of the term be properly considered as a love of wisdom and a search for true being. As Maritain coined the phrase, he is an “ideosopher,” in pursuit of the effective idea and rhetorical success, not the contemplation of being. Christopher Cullen, “Transcendental Thomism: Realism Rejected,” argues that the attempt by Karl Rahner, Joseph Donceel, and others to absorb the Cartesian and Kantian approach into Thomism has not proved successful. Robert Geis, “Descartes’s Res: An Interactionist Difficulty,” explains how the objectifying of mind as a thing sets up insoluble difficulties; he argues that a more adequate account is found in Aristotle. Donald DeMarco, “Descartes, Mathematics and Music,” traces out the effect in music when the physical is reduced to the mathematical. The imposition of a uniform method leads to a distortion of what musicians do. William J. Fossati, “Maximum Influence from Minimum Abilities: La Mettrie and Radical Materialism,” traces the Cartesian heritage of reductionism through Julien Offroy de Le Mettrie to the most contemporary attempts to explain human beings as mere biological organisms. (shrink)

In Rights Forfeiture and Punishment, Christopher Heath Wellman argues that those who seek to defend the moral permissibility of punishment should shift their focus from general justifying aims to moral side constraints. On Wellman's view, punishment is permissible just in case the wrongdoer has forfeited her right against punishment.

First published in 2005, A Theory of Secession: The Case for Political Self-Determination offers an unapologetic defense of the right to secede. Christopher Heath Wellman argues that any group has a moral right to secede as long as its political divorce will leave it and the remainder state in a position to perform the requisite political functions. He explains that there is nothing contradictory about valuing legitimate states, while permitting their division. Once political states are recognized as valuable because (...) of the functions that they are uniquely suited to perform, it becomes apparent that the territorial boundaries of existing states might permissably be redrawn as long as neither the process, nor the result of this reconfiguration, interrupts the production of the crucial political benefits. Thus, if one values self-determination, then one has good reason to conclude that people have a right to determine their political boundaries. (shrink)