The Oparin hypothesis from 1936 was a milestone in the origin of life research, making a model that was at least in part empirically testable, and changing the course of life studies from a long tradition of metaphysics to a scientific domain of investigation. His hypothesis is based on the idea of the prebiotic synthesis of macromolecules as a fundamental step on the road to first life. Although the Oparin hypothesis brought fresh ideas and concepts, in its description of the (...) steps in the hypothesized transition from the inorganic to the organic world in detail, today some premises are considered unconfirmed, uncertain, or even rejected. With high respect to its metatheoretical reach and scientific impact on prebiotic chemistry, pushing the origin of first life research into an empirical context, from a contemporary viewpoint, its contribution is highly limited in the area of history of science and history of philosophy (of science). Keywords: biology, history of science, Oparin, origin of life, philosophy of science. (shrink)

The history of the idea of biological progress shows that it is not a selfexplanatory category, so a clear definition is required. Biological progress exists if: “more progressive” is defined as “more complex” – in that case evolution is synonymous with progress, i.e. development from simple to complex, from homogeneous to heterogeneous; we perceive the expression “more progressive” as more successful in relation to the environment, in these terms some groups in the history of life were more progressive because/so that (...) they survived, while others were retrogressive or less progressive because/so that they died out; on the other hand, within their ecological niches, certain forms of life are perfectly adapted to their environment as long as it is stable ; we take the span or reach of a potential adaptation of populations as a measure. However, there is no active, innovative problem solving in relation to the environment either with plants or animals – only the variability mechanism / selection is in place, automatism, instinct. In the light of the above-mentioned biological criteria, man is the most complex living creature by his constitution, he is the least dependent on the environment and can be innovative in relation to the environment. Man is the only living creature capable of establishing an active relationship with the environment through his special tool – culture. Considering the level of organization and quantity of information, the mammal genome is more progressive than the bacterium genome, while the human genome comprises most information which makes man the most progressive living thing. We can talk about biological progress if we define progressiveness as advancement toward complexity of organisation, but sometimes the simplification of structure enables survival. It seems that we can talk about progressivenessin biology only if we accept the anthropic principle – that is why only cultural progress is possible. Information is the link between biological and cultural-anthropological successfulness. Biological information is a “complete” piece of information to an animal. To a human being, it is only a condicio sine qua non for the reality of human spirit which receives, keeps and generates information. Progress can be measured according to the capability of establishing an active and innovative relationship with the environment, but only within some sort of anthropocentric outlook which is a criterion of value. It is not possible to talk about progressiveness of life if man is not the measure of all things. (shrink)

Brojne definicije vrste živog svijeta tvore suprotstavljene filozofske stavove oko pitanja postoji li samo jedna kategorija vrste ili više njih . Monisti vjeruju u načelnu mogućnost jedne kategorije vrste koja zrcali zbiljnost istovrsnog živog svijeta. Suprotno tome, pluralisti vjeruju da postoje različite kategorije vrste jer je ljudska spoznaja ograničena ili jer je vrstu moguće definirati na mnogo različitih načina. Proučavanje primjera poznatijih monističkih i pluralističkih definicija vrste upućuje na značajno udaljavanje u određivanju kategorije vrste i u prepoznavanju taksonomijskih vrsta. Divergentnost (...) određenja vrste implicira manje epistemološke, a više ontološke sudove o mogućnostima ljudske spoznaje vrsnosti živog svijeta i naravi vrsnosti tog svijeta. Pri tome, postoji konsenzus tek u tvrdnji o evolucijskom nastanku taksonskih vrsta i jedinstvenom drvetu života, ali s različitim klasifikacijama živog svijeta. Rasprava upućuje na suvremene ideje svojevrsne sinteze prema kojoj je narav vrsnosti živog svijeta sofisticirani monizam satkan od pluralističkih određenja vrste.Numerous definitions of living world species form opposite philosophical attitudes on question whether there is a single category of species or a number of categories . Monists believe in a general possibility of single category of species that reflect reality of the homogeneous living world. In opposite, pluralists believe that there are different categories of species due to the epistemological limitations of the human or is it possible to define species in numerous ways. Study of examples of well known monistic and pluralistic definitions of species suggest that there is a significant alienation in determination of category of species and recognition of species taxa. Divergent definitions of species implicates less of epistemological, and more of ontological propositions on aptitude of human cognition on living world genus and nature of genus. There is a consensus on statement on evolution formation of species taxa and single and unique tree of life, but with the diverse classifications of living world. Discussion leads towards contemporary ideas of synthesis according to which the nature of living world genus is a sophisticated monism based on the pluralistic classification of species. (shrink)

Znanstveno proučavanje postanka prvog života unutar zasebnog područja teorijske biologije počinje pedesetih godina 20. stoljeća. To područje do danas nema stabilan oblik niti vladajuću teoriju, nego je predstavljeno brojnim teorijama koje proučavaju zasebne dijelove velike slagalice koja objašnjava podrijetlo prvog života. Ovaj rad: 1) daje kratak pregled i problematiku područja; 2) predstavlja najvažnije teorije postanka prvog života; 3) izdvaja odgovore na pitanje kada je nastao prvi život; 4) pita se kakvog je bio oblika; te 5) tumači empirijske podatke iz filozofske (...) perspektive. Razmatranje postojećih teorija i tumačenje empirijskih podataka ukazuje na jalovost dosadašnjih pokušaja kojima nedostaje teorijska konzistentnost ili empirijska potpora, iz čega se mogu interpretirati divergentne tvrdnje o naravi živog svijeta.The foundation of the scientific study of the first life within a separate field of theoretical biology begins in the nineteen fifties. This area has not yet reached a stable shape neither a dominant theory, but a number of theories that examine the separate parts of a large puzzle which explains the origin of the first life. This paper: 1) offers brief overview of the problem areas; 2) presents the most important theories on foundation of the first life; 3) emphasizes certain answers to the question of the first emergence; 4) asks what the first life was like; and 5) interpret the empirical data from philosophical perspective. Consideration of existing theories and interpretations of empirical data points to the futility of past attempts which lack theoretical consistency or empirical support, from which divergent arguments about the nature or the origin of the first life can be interpreted. (shrink)

Znanstveno proučavanje postanka prvog života unutar zasebnog područja teorijske biologije počinje pedesetih godina 20. stoljeća. To područje do danas nema stabilan oblik niti vladajuću teoriju, nego je predstavljeno brojnim teorijama koje proučavaju zasebne dijelove velike slagalice koja objašnjava podrijetlo prvog života. Ovaj rad: 1) daje kratak pregled i problematiku područja; 2) predstavlja najvažnije teorije postanka prvog života; 3) izdvaja odgovore na pitanje kada je nastao prvi život; 4) pita se kakvog je bio oblika; te 5) tumači empirijske podatke iz filozofske (...) perspektive. Razmatranje postojećih teorija i tumačenje empirijskih podataka ukazuje na jalovost dosadašnjih pokušaja kojima nedostaje teorijska konzistentnost ili empirijska potpora, iz čega se mogu interpretirati divergentne tvrdnje o naravi živog svijeta.The foundation of the scientific study of the first life within a separate field of theoretical biology begins in the nineteen fifties. This area has not yet reached a stable shape neither a dominant theory, but a number of theories that examine the separate parts of a large puzzle which explains the origin of the first life. This paper: 1) offers brief overview of the problem areas; 2) presents the most important theories on foundation of the first life; 3) emphasizes certain answers to the question of the first emergence; 4) asks what the first life was like; and 5) interpret the empirical data from philosophical perspective. Consideration of existing theories and interpretations of empirical data points to the futility of past attempts which lack theoretical consistency or empirical support, from which divergent arguments about the nature or the origin of the first life can be interpreted. (shrink)

The history of the idea of biological progress shows that it is not a selfexplanatory category, so a clear definition is required. Biological progress exists if: “more progressive” is defined as “more complex” – in that case evolution is synonymous with progress, i.e. development from simple to complex, from homogeneous to heterogeneous; we perceive the expression “more progressive” as more successful in relation to the environment, in these terms some groups in the history of life were more progressive because/so that (...) they survived, while others were retrogressive or less progressive because/so that they died out; on the other hand, within their ecological niches, certain forms of life are perfectly adapted to their environment as long as it is stable ; we take the span or reach of a potential adaptation of populations as a measure . However, there is no active, innovative problem solving in relation to the environment either with plants or animals – only the variability mechanism / selection is in place, automatism, instinct. In the light of the above-mentioned biological criteria, man is the most complex living creature by his constitution , he is the least dependent on the environment and can be innovative in relation to the environment. Man is the only living creature capable of establishing an active relationship with the environment through his special tool – culture. Considering the level of organization and quantity of information, the mammal genome is more progressive than the bacterium genome, while the human genome comprises most information which makes man the most progressive living thing. We can talk about biological progress if we define progressiveness as advancement toward complexity of organisation, but sometimes thesimplification of structure enables survival. It seems that we can talk about progressivenessin biology only if we accept the anthropic principle – that is why only cultural progress is possible. Information is the link between biological and cultural-anthropological successfulness . Biological information is a “complete” piece of information to an animal . To a human being, it is only a condicio sine qua non for the reality of human spirit which receives, keeps and generates information. Progress can be measured according to the capability ofestablishing an active and innovative relationship with the environment, but only within some sort of anthropocentric outlook which is a criterion of value. It is not possible to talk about progressiveness of life if man is not the measure of all things.Povijest ideje biološkog napretka pokazuje kako to nije samorazumljiva kategorija, pa se traži jasna definicija. Biološki progres postoji ukoliko: “naprednije” definiramo kao “složenije” – evolucija je tada sinonim napretka, tj. prelaženja iz jednostavnijeg u složenije, iz homogenog u heterogeno; “naprednije” shvatimo kao “uspješnije” s obzirom na okoliš; u tom smislu neke skupine u povijesti života bile su naprednije jer/pa su opstale, dok su druge bile nazadnije ili manje napredne pa/jer su izumrle; s druge strane unutar svojih ekoloških niša pojedini oblici života savršeno su prilagođeni svojem okolišu dokle god je on stabilan ; kao mjerilo uzmemo raspon ili širinu moguće prilagodbe populacija jer tada postoje razlike; ipak ni u biljaka ni u životinja tu nema aktivnog inovatorskog rješavanja problema okoliša, nego djeluje samo mehanizam varijabilnost/selekcija, automatizam, nagon. U svjetlu gore navedenih bioloških mjerila čovjek je svojim ustrojstvom najsloženije biće , najmanje je ovisan u odnosu na okolinu, može se novativno nositi spram okoline. Čovjek je jedini kadar za pravi aktivni odnos prema svom okolišu putem specifičnog oruđa kulture. S obzirom na stupanj organizacije i količinu informacija, genom sisavca je napredniji od genoma bakterije, a genom čovjeka raspolažes najviše informacija, pa je on po tome najprogresivnije biće u prirodi. O biološkom progresu možemo govoriti ako progresivnost definiramo kao porast složenosti organizacije, no ponekad pojednostavljenje građe omogućava preživljavanje. Čini se da o progresivnosti u biologiji možemo govoriti samo usvajajući princip antropičnosti, zato je u svijetu moguć samo kulturni progres. Posjedovanje informacije je veza između biološke i kulturno-antropološke uspješnosti . Posjedovanje biologijske informacije za životinju je “potpuna informacija” , dok je za Čovjeka samo condicio sine qua non za zbiljnost ljudskog duha koji dobiva, posjeduje i stvara informaciju. Progres je moguće mjeriti prema sposobnosti aktivnog i inovativnog odnosa spram okoliša jedino u nekoj vrsti antropocentričnog obzora koji u središtu ima mjerilo vrijednosti. Nemoguće je govoriti o progresivnosti života ako svemu nije mjera sam čovjek. (shrink)

Proturječnost stavova o položaju biologije unutar ili izvan područja znanosti može se podijeliti na nekoliko osnovnih pristupa. Prvi pristup smješta biologiju izvan znanstvenog područja zbog nedostatka univerzalnosti, nedostatka strogih generalizacija i nedostatka stroge kvantitativne strukture. Drugi pristup smatra biologiju znanošću koju treba svesti na fiziku. Treći pristup vidi značajne razlike između biologije s jedne, i fizike i kemije s druge strane, ali ipak tvrdi da je biologija prava znanost, no samostalna i s vlastitim pojmovnikom i metodologijom. Poredba načela prirodne znanosti (...) s obilježjima biologije ukazuje na nedostatak determinizma, neprikladnost esencijalizma i manjkavosti redukcionističkog pristupa u području biološkog. S druge strane, biologija ima neka posebna obilježja. Biologija je znanost samostalna u određenju svoga područja i biranju prikladnog pojmovnika i metoda proučavanja. Njezino područje, pojmovnik, logika i metodologija ne podudaraju se potpuno s onima ostalih znanosti, ali se u potpunosti ni ne razilaze.Ambiguities of attitudes on the position of biology within or outside of science domain can be divided into few basic approaches. The first approach places biology outside the scientific domain due to its lack of universality, the lack of strong generalizations and the lack of strong quantitative structure. The second approach claims that science of biology should be reduced to physics. The third approach accepts significant differences between biology on one side, and physics and chemistry on the other side, but it still claims that biology is a hard science, autonomous and with its own terminology and methodology. Comparison of principles of natural science with features of biology demonstrates a lack of determinism, inappropriateness of essentialism and pitfalls of reductionist approach in biological sphere. On the other hand, biology has some specific features. Biology is a science that has autonomy in determining its domain and choice of appropriate terminology and inquiry methods. Its domain, terminology, logic and methodology are not entirely in accordance with other sciences, but also are not completely diverse. (shrink)

Okosnica ovog doprinosa jest odgovor na neke opaske i predrasude Darka Polšeka iz Zagreba, iznesene u kritičkom osvrtu na moju kritičku procjenu njegova viđenja eugeničkog nasljeđa u biotehnološkom dobu. Za tu je svrhu doprinos podijeljen u devet paragrafa, koji donose filozofsku kritiku nekih Polšekovih prigovora. U doprinosu se rasvjetljavaju još neki novi problematični aspekti glavne Polšekove teze o takozvanoj ‘novoj eugenici’. Autor u ovom doprinosu iznosi argumente koji pokazuju i epistemološke i etičke slabosti takozvane nove eugenike, ali ne na način (...) isticanja ničim dokazanih pretpostavki i predrasuda, nego na način filozofske analize i prosudbe. Stoga iznesena argumentacija u ovom kritičkom odgovoru ostaje u okvirima diskutirane teme i pokušava čuvati dostojanstvo argumentirane rasprave. Jer, niti uz najbolju volju argument snage ne može zamijeniti snagu argumenta. Sve se ostalo prepušta kritičkoj prosudbi čitatelja.The framework of this contribution is an answer to some of the comments and prejudices madeby Darko Polšek from Zagreb, published in a critical analysis of the author’s critical judgementof his view of eugenic heredity in the biotechnological era. To this end, the article prints nineparagraphs philosophically criticizing some of Polšek’s objections. It also sheds light on a num­ber of other new problematic aspects of Polšek’s main thesis on the so-called »new eugenics«.The author of this contribution presents arguments that illustrate both the epistemological andethical weaknesses of the so-called new eugenics – not in the manner of accentuating unprovedpresuppositions and prejudices, but in the manner of philosophical analyses and judgements.Accordingly, the arguments set out in this critical reply remain within the framework of thetopic discussed and attempt to preserve the dignity of the argued discourse. For, the argumentof power can never replace the power of argument. All else is left to the critical judgement of the readers. (shrink)