Politicians, preachers, and ordinary people speak often of character; psychologists study `personality', used as a term of art with meanings close to `character'. Most ethical philosophers in the last two hundred years, on the other hand, have not had much to say about character. This book attempts to understand character and to refocus ethical philosophy so that character is central.

In an attempt to bridge the vast divide between classical Asian thought and contemporary Western philosophy, Joel J. Kupperman finds that the two traditions do not, by and large, supply different answers to the same questions. Rather, each tradition is searching for answers to their own set of questions--mapping out distinct philosophical investigations. In this groundbreaking book, Kupperman argues that the foundational Indian and Chinese texts include lines of thought that can enrich current philosophical practice, and in (...) some cases provide uniquely sophisticated insights. Special attention is given to the ethical issues of formation and fluidity of self, the nature and possibilities of choice, the compartmentalization of life implicit in some ethical systems, the variations of ethical demands from person to person, and the nature of philosophy itself as a communicative activity. This study will provide a wealth of information for philosophers seeking a closer knowledge of Asian philosophy and general readers with an interest in Eastern thought. (shrink)

We often speak of a person's character--good or bad, strong or weak--and think of it as a guide to how that person will behave in a given situation. Oddly, however, philosophers writing about ethics have had virtually nothing to say about the role of character in ethical behavior. What is character? How does it relate to having a self, or to the process of moral decision? Are we responsible for our characters? Character answers these questions, and goes on to examine (...) the place of character in ethical philosophy. Both the Kantian and utilitarian traditions, Kupperman argues, have largely ignored the ways in which decisions are integrated over time, and instead provide a "snapshot" model of moral decision. Kupperman demonstrates the deficiencies of a number of classic and contemporary ethical theories that do not take account of the idea of character, and offers his own character-based theory. Along the way he touches on such subjects as personal identity, the importance of happiness, moral education, and the definition of a valuable life. (shrink)

This is a second, revised edition of Kupperman's introduction to Asian philosophy via its canonical texts. Kupperman ranges from the Upanishads to the Bhagavad Gita through Confucius to Zen Buddhism, walking students through the texts, conveying the vitality and appeal of the works, and explaining their philosophical roots. Kupperman has made revisions throughout the text, clarifying where necessary, and added a new chapter on al-Arabi's The Bezels of Wisdom, a classic of Islamic Sufism.

Gilbert Harman has argued that it does not make sense to ascribe character traits to people. The notion of morally virtuous character becomes particularly suspect. How plausible this is depends on how broad character traits would have to be. Views of character as entirely invariant behavioural tendencies offer a soft target. This paper explores a view that is a less easy target: character traits as specific to kinds of situation, and as involving probabilities or real possibilities. Such ascriptions are not (...) undermined by Harman's arguments, and it remains plausible that the agent's character often is indispensable in explanation of behaviour. Character is indispensable also as processes of control that impose reliability where it really matters. (shrink)

In an attempt to bridge the vast divide between classical Asian thought and contemporary Western philosophy, Joel J. Kupperman finds that the two traditions do not, by and large, supply different answers to the same questions. Rather, each tradition is searching for answers to their own set of questions--mapping out distinct philosophical investigations. In this groundbreaking book, Kupperman argues that the foundational Indian and Chinese texts include lines of thought that can enrich current philosophical practice, and in (...) some cases provide uniquely sophisticated insights. Special attention is given to the ethical issues of formation and fluidity of self, the nature and possibilities of choice, the compartmentalization of life implicit in some ethical systems, the variations of ethical demands from person to person, and the nature of philosophy itself as a communicative activity. This study will provide a wealth of information for philosophers seeking a closer knowledge of Asian philosophy and general readers with an interest in Eastern thought. (shrink)

Might there be knowledge of non‐instrumental values? Arguments are give for two principal claims. One is that if there is such knowledge, it typically will have features that do not entirely match those of other kinds of knowledge. It will have a closer relation to the kind of person one is or becomes, and in the way it combines features of knowing‐how with knowing‐that. There also are problems of indeterminacy of non‐instrumental value which are not commonly found in other things (...) that we can know about. The second claim is that there is a strong prima‐facie case for holding that there is such knowledge, and that the usual arguments against this are all faulty. (shrink)

This paper represents two polemics. One is against suggestions (made by Harman and others) that recent psychological research counts against any claim that there is such a thing as genuine virtue (Cf. Harman, in: Byrne, Stalnaker, Wedgwood (eds.) Fact and value, pp 117–127, 2001 ). The other is against the view that virtue ethics should be seen as competing against such theories as Kantian ethics or consequentialism, particularly in the specification of decision procedures.

Many would consider the lengthening debate between moral realists and anti-realists to be draw-ish. Plainly new approaches are needed. Or might the issue, which most broadly concerns realism in relation to normative judgments, be broken down into parts or sectors? Physicists have been saying, in relation to a similarly longstanding debate, that light in some respects behaves like waves and in some respects like particles. Might realism be more plausible in relation to some kinds of normative judgments than others?

This is a second, revised edition of Kupperman's introduction to Asian philosophy via its canonical texts. Kupperman ranges from the Upanishads to the Bhagavad Gita through Confucius to Zen Buddhism, walking students through the texts, conveying the vitality and appeal of the works, and explaining their philosophical roots. Kupperman has made revisions throughout the text, clarifying where necessary, and added a new chapter on al-Arabi's The Bezels of Wisdom, a classic of Islamic Sufism.

This fresh and engaging work examines the epistemology of value. Focusing on emotional states, Kupperman rejects the notion that there is one primary value, arguing instead for a pluralistic understanding of value. He contends that value is strongly contextual; the value of a particular set of experiences in one's life can depend heavily on how they fit in with or provide contrast to other elements. Kupperman argues both for a realistic account of value--some things really do have a (...) value about which we can have reasonable confidence--and for skepticism about how much we can actually know about value. (shrink)

In the 1950's some prominent philosophers suggested a logical relation weaker than entailment between primarily descriptive statements and ethical conclusions. The paper revisits this suggestion. It examines four ways in which ethical statemnts can be supported by descriptions and evaluations. This provides a similarity bteween some kinds of reason-giving in ethics and familiar cases of logical inference, making it plausible to speak of a logic. The similarity however is limited, and the strength in ethics of descriptive reasons is never precise (...) and always somewhat contestable. (shrink)

Are we responsible for our characters? This question is the heart of this chapter. People are responsible for their characters because they chose them. Holding people responsible for their characters, even if these are largely involuntary, is effective and functional in a way in which holding people responsible for involuntary actions is not. People should be responsible and liable both for their characters and for actions that flow from their characters. The fact of the matter is whether someone is responsible (...) for her or his character and this fact is independent both of how we actually talk in such matters and of whether it is advantageous that we continue to talk in such a way. (shrink)

This chapter describes character as a second self or, on the other hand, as a first self. To understand the importance of character in human life, we must appreciate who it is that has a character. Full understanding of what character is will have to include the background of a metaphysical account of the self. The self is a relation which relates itself to its own self, or it is that in the relation that the relation relates to its own (...) self; the self is not the relation but that the relation relates itself to its own self. Everyone is born with a self, which remains strictly self-identical throughout that person's life, in that, whatever character the person develops or however he or she changes, the self remains itself. (shrink)

This chapter explores ways in which an ethical theory can develop through time and, in particular, variations in Kantian ethical theories. The chapter argues that a Kantian could say that we have duties to particular people as part of ongoing commitments, but an adequate and sufficient account of good and poor decisions in personal relationships cannot be based entirely on the categorical imperative, nor can we do justice to seriously wrong decisions by regarding them as violations of duty. Any ethical (...) philosophy, which includes an adequate account of ongoing personal commitments, will have to recognize that our judgments of what is wrong are of more than one sort and are made, so to speak, in more than one kind of voice. (shrink)

This chapter investigates the idea of unity of virtues by analyzing justice. The nature of justice cannot be appreciated without a prior understanding of the limited scope of the word and of the concerns that are related to it. Justice is an artificial virtue that has to be qualified. To be a just person is to make appropriate decisions in some of the areas in which one deals with other people. Virtues can have important and visible links with other areas (...) of a person's character. Virtue-ethics would be immune from the criticisms and would have no more disadvantages than does character-ethics. However, it is likely to say that there are people who, by the highest standards, genuinely possess some virtues but lack others. Virtue requires that one have all virtues. Virtues cannot be treated as essentially separate from one another. (shrink)

This chapter attempts to examine the place of character in ethical philosophy. For the reason that of our ability to put ourselves in one another's places while taking most elements of our own characters as given, there is a strong tendency not to think of the relevance of character to the value in a life and to concentrate on how externals fall out. A person's character matters a great deal to the value within her or his life. Character is crucial (...) to the value of a life, but character is a personal matter in a number of senses. A large part of the place of character in ethics is in making possible a clearer and more realistic sense of the values of virtue. Ethical philosophy can provide adequate accounts of the moral choices and values in people's lives only if the crucial role of character is recognized and examined. (shrink)

This chapter explains the importance of happiness and the definition of a valuable life. John Stuart Mill ties happiness to satisfaction of desire, and equates it with pleasure toward which, he contends, all desires ultimately point. Kant discusses happiness as the common focus of goal-directed behavior. Aristotle illustrates that a person's degree of eudaemonia depended heavily on that person's possession and exercise of excellences, including intellectual abilities and moral virtues. Value of a life as simply its degree of happiness has (...) considerable plausibility. A very good life requires a strong and moderately good character. A happy life will have to contain some value within itself, in virtue of what happiness involves, this value need not be above the average of lives, so that the happy life need not count as a good one. (shrink)

This chapter illustrates character as the fundamental facet of ethics. This book explores, analyzes, and defines character in different ways. Character involves habits and tendencies of thought and action that are not, or at least need not have been, original to a person. It has a vital role in how we act. It can provide the threads that bind together the various episodes and commitments of a person's life. The word personality is sometimes treated as interchangeable with character. On the (...) other hand, the word character is less concerned with distinctiveness and individuality than the word personality. Nevertheless, how people take on and handle various kinds of responsibility best describe the role of character in ethical behavior. (shrink)

A major reason that Confucius should matter to Western ethical philosophers is that some of his concerns are markedly different from those most common in the West. A Western emphasis has been on major choices that are treated in a decontextualized way. Confucius’ emphasis is on paths of life, so that context matters. Further, the nuances of personal relations get more attention than is common (with the exception of feminist ethics) in Western philosophy. What Confucius provides is a valuable aid (...) in arriving at a more balanced sense of what ethics is concerned with. It also allows us to realize the importance of sensitivity to particulars. Finally, it highlights the importance of style (as well as the content of what is chosen) in behavior, and the ways in which relations with family and friends can connect with choices in a wider “public” sphere. (shrink)

Questions for Further Consideration and Recommended Further Reading, which follow each relevant chapter, encourage readers to think further and to craft their own perspectives.

This fresh and engaging work by noted philosopher Joel Kupperman centers on "value"--in the sense of what is worth having or worthy being in life. Kupperman looks first at how judgments of values manifest themselves, whether there can be evidence for them, and whether a realistic account is appropriate. Kupperman then goes on to examine the relations between judgments of value and those of what it is best to do, and whether value has any proper role (...) in social policy. Kupperman rejects the notion that there is any one primary value, and argues instead for a pluralistic understanding of value. He contends that value must be viewed as strongly contextual; the value of a particular set of experiences in one's life can depend heavily on how they fit in or provide contrast with other elements. (shrink)

_Six Myths about the Good Life_ focuses on the values that are worth aiming for in our lives, a topic central to what has been called Philosophy of Life. We all have ideas about the good life. We think that pleasure makes life better. We want to be happy. We think that achievements make a difference. There is something to all these ideas, but if taken simply and generally they all miss out on something. _Six Myths about the Good Life_ (...) explores what they miss and, in the process, gives a sense of what a good life can be. (shrink)

This volume is a comprehensive collection of critical essays on The Taming of the Shrew, and includes extensive discussions of the play's various printed versions and its theatrical productions. Aspinall has included only those essays that offer the most influential and controversial arguments surrounding the play. The issues discussed include gender, authority, female autonomy and unruliness, courtship and marriage, language and speech, and performance and theatricality.

Ethics and Qualities of Life looks at what enters into ethical judgment and choice. Interpretation of a case and of what the options are is always a factor, as is a sense of the possible values at stake. Intuitions also enter in, but often are unreliable. For a long time it seemed only fair that oldest sons inherited, and struck few people as unfair that women were not allowed to attend universities. A moral judgment is putatively part of a moral (...) order in a society that any reasonable person would accept. But what counts as "reasonable" is generally contestable. The unreliability of intuitions leads naturally to ethical theory. Kantian, contractualist, and consequentialist theories all have some important truth in them, but not the whole truth. Contractualism lacks the resources required for a fully determinate account of what counts as "reasonable". Broad general rules are important to Kant and are at the center of everyday morality. But can Kantian ethics explain why they have to have this central role? Our evolving social contract now contains elements that once would have seemed counter-intuitive to most people. But could consequentialists have predicted with entire confidence the consequences of social changes that we now think were desirable? The last part of this book contains a double argument. One is that ethical theory is employed by humans in a state of semi-ignorance of relevant factors, grasping at likely truths and evolved intuitions. The other is that consequentialist considerations have a major role at the fundamental level, but much more in justification or criticism than in ethical discovery. (shrink)

Principles can seem as entrenched in moral experience as Kant thinks space, time, and the categories are in human experience of the world. However not all cultures have such a view. Classical Indian and Chinese philosophies treat modification of the self as central to ethics. Decisions in particular cases and underlying principles are much less discussed.Ethics needs comparative philosophy in order not to be narrow in its concerns. A broader view can give weight to how people sometimes can change who (...) they are, in order to lead better lives. (shrink)

Joel Kupperman; XII*—Character and Self-Knowledge, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Volume 85, Issue 1, 1 June 1985, Pages 219–238, https://doi.org/10.1.

Principles can seem as entrenched in moral experience as Kant thinks space, time, and the categories are in human experience of the world. However not all cultures have such a view. Classical Indian and Chinese philosophies treat modification of the self as central to ethics. Decisions in particular cases and underlying principles are much less discussed. Ethics needs comparative philosophy in order not to be narrow in its concerns. A broader view can give weight to how people sometimes can change (...) who they are, in order to lead better lives. (shrink)

Might there be knowledge of non-instrumental values? Arguments are give for two principal claims. One is that if there is such knowledge, it typically will have features that do not entirely match those of other kinds of knowledge. It will have a closer relation to the kind of person one is or becomes, and in the way it combines features of knowing-how with knowing-that. There also are problems of indeterminacy of non-instrumental value which are not commonly found in other things (...) that we can know about. The second claim is that there is a strong prima-facie case for holding that there is such knowledge, and that the usual arguments against this are all faulty. (shrink)

Emotions normally include elements of feeling, motivation, and also intentionality; but the argument of this essay is that there can be emotion without feeling, emotion without corresponding motivation, and emotion without an intentional relation to an object such that the emotion is (among other things) a belief about or construal of it. Many recent writers have claimed that some form of intentionality is essential to emotion, and then have created lines of defence for this thesis. Thus, what look like troublesome (...) cases of emotions can be regarded as having a global intentionality or as being “mood-like”. Alternatively surges of non-intentional joy or ecstasy can be regarded as merely feelings rather than as emotions, and what people experience in response to absolute music can be treated similarly. A clear view of how we normally talk about moods, emotions, and feelings however undermines these defences; and in particular we can understand the role of emotions in relation to absolute music once we become clear about the way in which musical content stands in for intentional objects. (shrink)

The essay has two purposes. One is to point out connections and parallels between, On one hand, The debates of metaphysical realists and anti-Realists, And on the other hand, The debates surrounding moral realism. The second is to provide the outlines of a case for a kind of position that would generally be classified as moral realism. One feature of this position is that it emerges as parallel to, And compatible with, A metaphysical position that would generally be classified as (...) anti-Realism. (shrink)