In Phenomena of Power, one of the leading figures of postwar German sociology reflects on the nature, and many forms of, power. For Heinrich Popitz, power is rooted in the human condition and is therefore part of all social relations. Drawing on philosophical anthropology, he identifies the elementary forms of power to provide detailed insight into how individuals gain and perpetuate control over others. Instead of striving for a power-free society, Popitz argues, humanity should try to impose (...) limits on power where possible and establish counterpower where necessary. Phenomena of Power delves into the sociohistorical manifestations of power and breaks through to its general structures. Popitz distinguishes the forms of the enforcement of power as well as of its stabilization and institutionalization, clearly articulating how the mechanisms of power work and how to track them in the social world. Philosophically trained, historically informed, and endowed with keen observation, Popitz uses examples ranging from the way passengers on a ship organize deck chairs to how prisoners of war share property to illustrate his theory. Long influential in German sociology, Phenomena of Power offers a challenging reworking of one of the essential concepts of the social sciences. (shrink)

The publication of the Phenomena of power: Authority, domination, and violence into English allows for the English-speaking world to engage the work of Heinrich Popitz. Popitz provides a thorough and organized description of how power operates in social relations that should be valuable to any scholar of the human sciences. This essay is supportive of Popitz’s project, but seeks a critical engagement by extending the analysis on violence and technical power. I argue that reading Popitz (...) alongside the decolonial thinker, Franz Fanon and the media ecologist, Marshall McLuhan can provide important correctives. In particular, Fanon’s analysis that the colonial use of rhetorical power to dehumanize the oppressed and McLuhan’s comment on the importance of the control of medium are missing in an otherwise very thorough philosophical anthropology on the phenomena of power. (shrink)

This analysis places the English translation of Heinrich Popitz’s Phenomena of Power: Authority, Domination, and Violence in the broader tradition of philosophical anthropology. It is argued anthropological arguments such as that offered by Popitz give insights not otherwise available to strict disciplinary inquiries. Poptiz’s discussion of power also suggests an important tension in philosophical anthropology. While Popitz contends power relations are “humanly produced realities” not “imposed by nature,” he nevertheless provides some support that physical and biological (...) factors might contribute to an understanding of power. This discussion illustrates this tension using examples drawn from Popitz discussion of power, threats of violence, and the exercise of authority. (shrink)

Heinrich Popitz’s Phenomena of Power aims to uncover power as “a universal component in the genesis and operation of human societies”. In order to uncover this “universal” concept of power, Popitz employs Husserl’s method of the “imaginative variation” [Phantasievariation]. Yet, contrary to phenomenology’s traditionally descriptive posture, Phenomena of Power’s project is at once descriptive and normative—seeking not only to describe power, but to also describe the way in which power can be remade. In the present paper it (...) is argued that this normative component of Popitz’s project offers the burgeoning field of critical phenomenology an illustration of the way in which Husserl’s “imaginative variation” might be employed not only as a descriptive tool of pure essences, but also as an instrument in the refashioning of social reality. (shrink)

Despite Heinrich Popitz’s non-ideological, carefully descriptive account of how power is initiated and maintained, he too easily dismisses the Frankfurt School’s call for domination-free discourse as merely a subject for academic speculation. Because of his focus on the factual, Popitz neglects the possibility that ethical norms can challenge strategically-guided discourse even if only counterfactually. In addition, such norms are at work in the very discursive exchange represented by his writing his book for his readers and in that (...) book’s aspiration to universal validity claims that run counter to strategic interests that tend to be particularistic. Popitz’s own conviction that power does not completely suppress freedom provides at least a space in which claims can be advanced and evaluated independently of strategic imperatives. Perhaps because Popitz’s approach is limited to describing the functioning of power, the underlying philosophical anthropology of his work is Hobbesian insofar as agents seek to subject others to asymmetrical power relationships and insofar as even the recognition one gives to another aims at retrieving recognition for oneself. A counter-asymmetry is to be found in Emmanuel Levinas’s phenomenological descriptions of the ethical summons of the other which provide a philosophical backdrop against which power is exercised and in which the first event of the interpersonal encounter is peace, not war. (shrink)

La creatividad especialmente surge del poder de subjetivación y de trascenderse a sí mismo el ser humano. La capacidad de ser creativo resulta, desde la perspectiva de la antropología filosófica, de la “posicionalidad excéntrica” del ser humano, la cual explica su poder de reflexividad y su compulsión y necesidad de crear cultura. Según la teoría de la creatividad de orientación sociológico-antropológica de Heinrich Popitz, esta capacidad humana de desarrollar lo nuevo está basada en las formas de acción de (...) explorar, crear, generar sentido y jugar. Para explicar el poder de subjetivación del individuo, introducimos la sociología con orientación fenomenológica de Alfred Schütz, quien ofrece una teoría de las relevancias que permite analizar las motivaciones subjetivas que conducen el proceso creativo. (shrink)

In international social science’s debate on power and rulership, Max Weber occupies a dominant position. There is hardly a study on power or rulership that does not refer to him, be it critical or affirmative. The sustainable success of Weber’s concept of power is based not least on the fact that he took up contemporary Nietzschean voluntaristic ideas and combined them with an action-related perspective. In doing so, he revolutionized the theory of power. This goes particularly for his category of (...) “chance”, with which he indicated power as a gradual and quantifiable phenomenon. The effect of this approach was so striking that it is still the most influential concept of power, shaping theorists like Hannah Arendt, Raymond Aron, and Heinrich Popitz. Furthermore, Weber moved the concept of rulership, as an institutionalised and reinforced form of power, into the focus of social sciences, providing a large-scale sociology of rule, which exposes the various types and motives of obedience. At the same time, however, the reception of the conceptual pair of power and rulership reveals a paradoxical phenomenon, since the two concepts are received worldwide, while they are still often used arbitrarily and regularly mixed up. (shrink)

Einleitung.--Die begriffliche Erkenntniss der Körperwelt.--Natur und Geist.--Natur und Geschichte.--Die historische Begriffsbildung.--Naturphilosophie und Geschichts-Philosophie.

A fundamental notion in a large part of mathematics is the notion of equicardinality. The language with Hartig quantifier is, roughly speaking, a first-order language in which the notion of equicardinality is expressible. Thus this language, denoted by LI, is in some sense very natural and has in consequence special interest. Properties of LI are studied in many papers. In [BF, Chapter VI] there is a short survey of some known results about LI. We feel that a more extensive exposition (...) of these results is needed. The aim of this paper is to give an overview of the present knowledge about the language LI and list a selection of open problems concerning it. After the Introduction $(\S1)$ , in $\S\S2$ and 3 we give the fundamental results about LI. In $\S4$ the known model-theoretic properties are discussed. The next section is devoted to properties of mathematical theories in LI. In $\S6$ the spectra of sentences of LI are discussed, and $\S7$ is devoted to properties of LI which depend on set-theoretic assumptions. The paper finishes with a list of open problem and an extensive bibliography. The bibliography contains not only papers we refer to but also all papers known to us containing results about the language with Hartig quantifier. Contents. $\S1$ . Introduction. $\S2$ . Preliminaries. $\S3$ . Basic results. $\S4$ . Model-theoretic properties of $LI. \S5$ . Decidability of theories with $I. \S6$ . Spectra of LI- sentences. $\S7$ . Independence results. $\S8$ . What is not yet known about LI. Bibliography. (shrink)

In this paper we discuss Gabbay's idea of basing nonmonotonic deduction on semantic consequence in intuitionistic logic extended by a consistency operator and Turner's suggestion of replacing the intuitionistic base system by Kleene's three-valued logic. It is shown that a certain counterintuitive feature of these approaches can be avoided by using Nelson's constructive logic N instead of intuitionistic logic or Kleene's system. Moreover, in N a more general notion of consistency can be defined and nonmonotonic deduction can thus be based (...) on a logical system satisfying the Deduction Theorem. (shrink)

Text: Reproduktion nach Scan der Ausgabe von 1934, Verlag von J. C. B. Mohr (Paul Siebeck) in Tübingen. - Von dem kleinen Buch, das ich hier der Öffentlichkeit übergebe, bitte ich den Leser, nichts anderes zu erwarten, als das, was sein Titel ausdrücklich sagt. Es handelt sich in ihm nicht etwa um die Grundlinien eines Systems der Philosophie, sondern ausschließlich um dessen Probleme, und wenn diese sich auch nicht darlegen lassen, ohne die Richtung anzudeuten, in der das System bei der (...) Ausführung sich zu bewegen hätte, so sollen doch in dieser Schrift hauptsächlich Fragen gestellt, nicht Antworten gegeben werden. Oft brechen die Darlegungen dort ab, wo mancher Leser glauben kann, daß die größten Schwierigkeiten noch ungelöst sind. Ja mehr: nur die Grundprobleme der Philosophie werden erörtert, und das Eingehen auf Sonderfragen ist fast überall vermieden. Einzelheiten sind dann allein herangezogen worden, wenn es zur Verdeutlichung der Hauptbegriffe wünschenswert erschien. [Auszug aus dem Vorwort des Buches]. (shrink)

Die im Band vereinigten drei Schriften behandeln zentrale Themender Philosophie Rickerts: die Umgestaltung der traditionellenDefinitions- und Begriffslehre; das Verhältnis von Logik undMathematik, zu dem Rickert mit Bezug auf das alogische Wesender Zahl eine Theorie jenseits von Empirismus und Rationalismusvertritt; und das Zentralwort der Ontologie: Sein, zu dem eineGegentheorie zu Heidegger gegeben wird.