Jean Porter intends to develop a fresh construal of the natural law tradition which in its essentials corresponds to the thought of Aquinas. Despite her great learning and subtleness of argument, she seems to promote an agenda of her own which, rather than being Thomistic, points in the direction of a theologically warranted kind of moral relativism under the name of `moral pluralism'. Porter disregards the core of Aquinas's concept of natural law as a natural and truth-attaining intellectual light, enabling (...) human beings to distinguish good from evil, and thus continues the tradition of opposing in moral theory `reason' to `nature'. (shrink)

Rhonheimer applies moral theology to practical questions, such as, what does it mean to violate the natural law, or to be “unnatural”?

In this response to Steven Jensen’s ACPQ review essay of Martin Rhonheimer’s The Perspective of Morality, its author argues that Jensen failed to understand the proper subject matter, the inner logic, and the methodology of the book. As a result, he misread key passages while passing over others, with the result that his criticisms miss the mark. Correcting these misreadings provides the occasion to explain some key features of the book, namely its idea of integrating in a single ethical (...) theory eudaimonistic ethics and its theory of happiness with action theory, anthropology of action, a theory of practical reason, an account of the moral virtues, a doctrine of natural law, of prudence, of conscience, and of moral norms, disproving thereby Jensen’s misleading claim that the book rejects nature as a standard of ethics. (shrink)

In this response to Steven Jensen’s ACPQ review essay of Martin Rhonheimer’s The Perspective of Morality, its author argues that Jensen failed to understand the proper subject matter, the inner logic, and the methodology of the book. As a result, he misread key passages while passing over others, with the result that his criticisms miss the mark. Correcting these misreadings provides the occasion to explain some key features of the book, namely its idea of integrating in a single ethical (...) theory eudaimonistic ethics and its theory of happiness with action theory, anthropology of action, a theory of practical reason, an account of the moral virtues, a doctrine of natural law, of prudence, of conscience, and of moral norms, disproving thereby Jensen’s misleading claim that the book rejects nature as a standard of ethics. (shrink)

John Paul II broadly dealt with the topic of natural law, particularly in Veritatis splendor: natural law is a law proper of man created as a free and rational being, whose reason, participating in the divine and ordaining reason, is able to develop a normative function of discernment of good and evil. Already as a professor in Lublin, Pope John Paul II had proposed such a genuinely Thomistic, that is, non-naturalistic, concept of natural law which recognizes both human reason as (...) the measure of morality and the spiritual-bodily unity of the human person. John Paul II’s encyclicals Veritatis splendor and Evangelium vitae propose a coherent treatment which unites his teaching on natural law, a corresponding conception of the object of the human act, and their application within the ethics of life concerning three great themes: the direct killing of an innocent, abortion, and euthanasia. National Catholic Bioethics Quarterly 9.3 (Autumn 2009): 517–539. (shrink)

Responding to criticism of my Vital Conflicts in Medical Ethics, this article corrects misrepresentations and answers objections. The core of the debate is the moral category of “direct killing” as opposed to “indirect.” The article argues that critics beg the question by simply presupposing, instead of argumentatively defending, the very physicalist understanding of “directness” which the book has shown to be untenable. This article clarifies the intentional meaning of “direct” and what it means to choose something as a means; it (...) also argues that this does not imply a subjectivist conception of morality, and refutes objections to the view that the moral evil of killing is constituted by its opposition to justice. It finally shows why this is essentially an argument against proportionalism and in defense of the core teaching of Veritatis splendor. National Catholic Bioethics Quarterly 11.3 (Autumn 2011): 519–540. (shrink)