O artigo reexamina a questão dos xenotransplantes, tecendo várias obser-vações sobre as práticas de xenotransplantes com o intuito de determinar com precisão o que se entende por “xenotransplante” e de esclarecer em que medida um transplante de animais no organismo humano pode ser denominado uma “quimera”. Em seguida, os aspectos problemáticos do XTP, desde uma perspectiva ética, embora não sejam abordados no artigo, são nomeados em sua relevância teórica para o conceito de justificação, num sentido ético-normativo. Esclarecimentos conceituais e terminológicos (...) preliminares são oferecidos pelos Autores a fim de deixar claro o que se entende, afinal, por “natureza”, tanto num sentido restrito quanto em sua relevância para as discussões éticas. O atual debate em torno de questões normativas e naturalistas da natureza e da ética é revisado em vários aspectos, culminando numa alternativa sistemática a ser desenvolvida e proposta. (shrink)

Without doubt Richard Rorty is one of the most honored, famous and disputed philosophers of our days. All over the world interest in his inspiring and provoking thoughts goes beyond the circles of academic philosophy. The present volume includes "The Brain as Hardware, Culture as Software" and "Philosophy-Envy" of Richard Rorty, papers presented by students of the philosophy department at university of Munster and Rorty's responses to and comments on them. Rorty's lecture has been publicly presented at the 8. Munstersche (...) Vorlesungen zur Philosophie on may 26th 2004. The students presented their intensively prepared papers on the following day. The volume gives an overview of the main topics of his philosophy as well as a detailed analysis of central concepts. "The papers are of very high quality indeed, and the level of discussion during the day I spent with the students was equally high. I have never, in any university, encountered students who combined such detailed knowledge of my writings with such penetrating criticisms of my views." (Richard Rorty)". (shrink)

An essential part of particularism as a systematic option in philosophical ethics is the structure of perception. In this paper, we defend perception as a central feature against the meta-ethical and meta-epistemological prejudices of rationalism.The insurmountable border between perception and justification, which is central to rationalist ethics, rests on three premises that are rejected by particularism: ethical knowledge is not exclusively inferential or discursive, ethical reflection is not solely deductive reasoning, and the bases of justified actions do not have to (...) be universal laws.Against rationalist ethics, we defend perception as a central and primary source of ethical knowledge, as a way of non-discursive reflection and as a genuine form of ethical justification. Ethical experience is not only reason but the complex responsiveness of persons that develops biographically as a result of situations in social and culturally contingent contexts. (shrink)

After presenting the current version of principlism, in the process repudiating a widespread deductivist misinterpretation, a fundamental metaethical disagreement is developed by outlining the deductivistic critique of principlism. Once the grounds for this critique have been understood, the dispute between casuistry, deductivism and principlism can be restructured, and the model of "application" proven to be the central difference. In the concluding section it is argued that principlism is the most attractive position, if the perceptual model of weak intuitionism is made (...) more explicit. (shrink)

The problem of ethical consultations in the clinical setting should be reasonable, but it cannot be reduced to reason and philosophical theory alone. I will argue that emotions are constitutively and discursively relevant features of the evaluative experience of persons. Ethical consultations should include emotions. Emotions like shame and guilt are complex and learned reactions of persons, which form one basis of ethical reflection. I argue that ethical consultation can rely neither on a strict theory or method nor on a (...) philosophical theory that is external to the situational triggers of consultations in the clinical setting. Emotions are one essential trigger of the need for ethical consultations. I will show that methodologically consultation depends on understanding the evaluative experiences of persons who cooperate in the clinical setting. Moreover, such evaluative experiences includes emotive reactions as well as reason. My conclusion is that ethical consultation in the clinical setting needs a conceptual understanding of epistemic, justificatory and methodological inclusiveness. This circumstance can be summarized: ethical consultations need the ongoing development of a moral hermeneutics of clinical consultation. (shrink)

In der philosophischen Ethik ist "die gute Welt" außer Mode gekommen. Der vorliegende Diskussionsband setzt sich mit Ludwig Sieps "Konkreter Ethik" auseinander. Die "Konkrete Ethik" von Ludwig Siep öffnet sich bewusst hin auf eine Hermeneutik der religiösen und kulturellen Traditionen der Menschheit, sie sucht aber auch in der Auseinandersetzung mit Problemen der Kultur- und Naturethik den Dialog mit dem Forschungsstand der Naturwissenschaften. Methodisch geht die "Konkrete Ethik" von einem Verständnis von Ethik aus, das ihr Ziel nicht in der Ausarbeitung von (...) abstrakten Prinzipien sieht, die es dann nachträglich auf konkrete Probleme zu applizieren gälte. Aus dem hermeneutischen Selbstverständnis seines Ansatzes heraus ergibt sich eine beeindruckende Vielfalt von Fragestellungen. Sie reichen von der Frage nach der Bedeutung von Objektivität und Realität in der Ethik bis hin zu Problemen des reproduktiven Klonens und des Bevölkerungswachstums. Entsprechend vielfältige Ansatzpunkte ergeben sich für eine systematische philosophische Auseinandersetzung mit der "Konkreten Ethik". Im vorliegenden Band diskutieren namhafte Forscher Sieps Thesen, Konzepte, sein Begründungsmodell und seine Auseinandersetzung mit zentralen Themen der Medizin-, Bio- und angewandten Ethik. (shrink)

According to the Strawsonian tradition, a person is responsible for an action just in case it is appropriate to hold them responsible for that action. One important way of holding people responsible for wrongdoing is by experiencing and expressing blaming emotions. This raises the questions of what blaming emotions are and in what sense they can be appropriate. In this chapter I will provide an overview of different answers to both these questions. A common thread in the chapter will be (...) a challenge for the Strawsonian tradition. Given that this tradition understands moral responsibility in terms of the appropriateness of blaming emotions, it must provide a realistic picture of these emotions and the practices in which they take part. On the other hand, it also aims to develop a normatively plausible account of the conditions of responsibility. I will try to show that it is often difficult to strike a satisfactory balance between these two aspirations. (shrink)

This paper considers the argument according to which, because we should regard it as a priori very unlikely that we are among the most important people who will ever exist, we should increase our confidence that the human species will not persist beyond the current historical era, which seems to represent a crucial juncture in human history and perhaps even the history of life on earth. The argument is a descendant of the Carter-Leslie Doomsday Argument, but I show that it (...) does not inherit the crucial flaw in its immediate ancestor. Nonetheless, we are not forced to follow the argument where it leads if we instead significantly decrease our confidence that we can affect the long-run future of humanity. GPI Working Paper No. 1-2019. (shrink)

I argue that moral philosophers have either misunderstood the problem of moral demandingness or at least failed to recognize important dimensions of the problem that undermine many standard assumptions. It has been assumed that utilitarianism concretely directs us to maximize welfare within a generation by transferring resources to people currently living in extreme poverty. In fact, utilitarianism seems to imply that any obligation to help people who are currently badly off is trumped by obligations to undertake actions targeted at improving (...) the value of the long-term future. Reflecting on the demands of beneficence in respect of the value of the far future forces us to view key aspects of the problem of moral demandingness in a very different light. GPI Working Paper No. 1-2020. (shrink)

I argue that many of the priority rankings that have been proposed by effective altruists seem to be in tension with apparently reasonable assumptions about the rational pursuit of our aims in the face of uncertainty. The particular issue on which I focus arises from recognition of the overwhelming importance and inscrutability of the indirect effects of our actions, conjoined with the plausibility of a permissive decision principle governing cases of deep uncertainty, known as the maximality rule. I conclude that (...) we lack a compelling decision theory that is consistent with a long-termist perspective and does not downplay the depth of our uncertainty while supporting orthodox effective altruist conclusions about cause prioritization. GPI Working Paper No. 2-2019. (shrink)

This paper discusses some remarks Kaplan made in ‘Bob and Carol and Ted and Alice’ concerning empty names. I show how his objections to a particular view involving descriptions derived from Ramsification can be avoided by a nearby alternative framed in terms of discourse reference. I offer a treatment of empty names as variables carrying presuppositions concerning unique occupants of roles, or sets of properties, determined by the originating discourse.