The concept of dharmamegha-samādhi that occurs in Patañjali's Yogasutras, in the path to kaivalya, has not been easy to comprehend. Scholars working in the field of Yoga have explained the concept in many different ways. This essay tries to reach an understanding of dharmamegha-samādhi based on a careful reading of the Yogastitras along with Vyāsa's commentary on it and the later well-known commentaries on Vyāsa's own commentary such as the Tattvavaisāradī, the Yogavārttika, and so on. Whether dharmamegha-samādhi is in any (...) way connected with the concept of jīvanmukti or liberation while embodied, and whether jīvanmukti can be reasonably understood as being part of Yoga philosophy also comes in for discussion toward the end of this essay. (shrink)

The Siddhāntaleśasaṅgraha written by Appayyadīkshitar in the seventeenth century is one of the rare texts where the author brings together the different views of Advaita present at his time. The book itself starts with the controversy surrounding whether the sentence “śrotavyaḥ…” is a vidhi-vākya or not. This paper attempts to summarize the various approaches to this question in the SLS and gives us a glimpse as to how the debate was conducted. Even though the SLS was translated by Suryanarayana Sastri (...) in 1933 the vocabulary and the style is so out-dated that it was not of much use. I then decided to do a fresh translation of the SLS and have succeeded only in translating the first uddeśa. I have condensed the arguments presented in the SLS under some broad headings and thus tried to recreate the arguments presented in the text. (shrink)

On the life of Śaṅkaracārya, a Hindu philosopher.

Contributed papers presented at a seminar organized by the Indian Institute of Advanced Study, Shimla, in May 1987.

Memoirs and papers presented at a conference held on the occasion of the 90th birthday of the Mongolian philosopher Ts. Balkhaajav.

T. S. Champlin; VII*—Tendencies, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Volume 91, Issue 1, 1 June 1991, Pages 119–134, https://doi.org/10.1093/aristotelian/9.

Logical Forms explains both the detailed problems involved in finding logical forms and also the theoretical underpinnings of philosophical logic. In this revised edition, exercises are integrated throughout the book. The result is a genuinely interactive introduction which engages the reader in developing the argument. Each chapter concludes with updated notes to guide further reading.

The fourth choral ode in Seneca's tragedyTroadesends thus :tum puer matri genetrixque natoTroia qua iaceat regione monstransdicet et longe digito notabit:‘Ilium est illic, ubi fumus alteserpit in caelum nebulaeque turpes.’Troes hoc signo patriam uidebunt.This ending provides a powerful conclusion to the Chorus’ Epicurean-inspired philosophizing in the ode. The image of the Trojan women ‘seeing’ the ‘smoke and squalid clouds creep[ing] high into the heavens’ recalls the Lucretian description of the soul, atomic in nature, leaving the dead body: compare especiallyet nebula (...) ac fumus quoniam discedit in auras,|crede animam quoque diffundi … andergo dissolui quoque conuenit omnem animai|naturam, ceu fumus, in altas aeris auras. The image and the Lucretian resonance also create an intratextual link with the second ode ofTroades. In that ode, the Chorus set out to develop a philosophical position about the question of death and the possibility of an afterlife. Their philosophizing is aided by Lucretian language and imagery, and the clear verbal echoes of Lucretius include the soul escaping into air like vapour: ‘the spirit, with fleeing breath, has mingled with the clouds and passed away into air’, which recalls the Lucretian lines above. At the end of the fourth ode, the Lucretian intertext of the smoke image is linked to another startling element that may point to philosophizing: Seneca's use ofsignum. (shrink)

The fourth choral ode in Seneca's tragedyTroadesends thus :tum puer matri genetrixque natoTroia qua iaceat regione monstransdicet et longe digito notabit:‘Ilium est illic, ubi fumus alteserpit in caelum nebulaeque turpes.’Troes hoc signo patriam uidebunt.This ending provides a powerful conclusion to the Chorus’ Epicurean-inspired philosophizing in the ode. The image of the Trojan women ‘seeing’ the ‘smoke and squalid clouds creep[ing] high into the heavens’ recalls the Lucretian description of the soul, atomic in nature, leaving the dead body: compare especiallyet nebula (...) ac fumus quoniam discedit in auras,|crede animam quoque diffundi … andergo dissolui quoque conuenit omnem animai|naturam, ceu fumus, in altas aeris auras. The image and the Lucretian resonance also create an intratextual link with the second ode ofTroades. In that ode, the Chorus set out to develop a philosophical position about the question of death and the possibility of an afterlife. Their philosophizing is aided by Lucretian language and imagery, and the clear verbal echoes of Lucretius include the soul escaping into air like vapour: ‘the spirit, with fleeing breath, has mingled with the clouds and passed away into air’, which recalls the Lucretian lines above. At the end of the fourth ode, the Lucretian intertext of the smoke image is linked to another startling element that may point to philosophizing: Seneca's use ofsignum. (shrink)

Introduction At some point in your life you will have told a lie and have been believed. You will have deceived the person to whom you lied. ...

It is not easy to see how self-deception is possible because the man who deceives himself seems to be required to play two incompatible roles, that of deceiver and that of deceived. This makes self-deception sound about as difficult as presiding at one's own funeral. Many attempts have been made to remove the air of paradox from self-deception. These attempts are all unsuccessful, and they are best seen as expressions of philosophical puzzlement rather than as actual solutions. In particular, the (...) whole of the literature on self-deception is vitiated by two serious confusions. First, deception is confused with deceit; secondly, it is wrongly assumed that every case of deceiving oneself is automatically a case of self-deception and so self-deception proper becomes confused with other things. (shrink)

Can a rule be followed by one person who has lived all his life in as complete isolation from other human beings as is consistent with his mere physical survival?This question divides philosophers as sharply today as it did over thirty years ago when, prompted by their reading of Wittgenstein, they first asked it. My aim here is to suggest a way of reconciling the two opposing sides in the current debate. I also hope to explain why it was that (...) Wittgenstein did not concern himself with the complexities I am about to discuss, which none the less are, I believe, at the root of the difficulties we experience when we try to understand what Wittgenstein said about following a rule and to think clearly about this question. (shrink)