The Knowledge Intuition and the Ability Hypothesis

Dialogue 51 (2):313-326 (2012)
Abstract
ABSTRACT: I argue that the Ability Hypothesis cannot really accommodate the knowledge intuition that drives the knowledge argument and therefore fails to defend physicalism. When the thought experiment is run with, instead of Mary, an advanced robot Rosemary, for whom there presumably is no distinction between knowledge-how and knowledge-that, proponents of the Ability Hypothesis would have to give a far-fetched and counterintuitive explanation of why Rosemary wouldn’t learn anything new upon release. RÉSUMÉ : Je soutiens que l’hypothèse de la capacité est incompatible avec l’intuition de connaissance qui sous-tend l’argument de la connaissance, et par suite échoue à valider le physicalisme. Si on opère l’expérience de pensée en remplaçant Mary par Rosemary, un robot perfectionné, dont on présume qu’elle ne peut distinguer le «savoir-comment» et le «savoir-que», les avocats de l’hypothèse de la capacité devraient élaborer une explication contre-intuitive et exagérément complexe des raisons pour lesquelles Rosemary n’apprendrait rien de nouveau après sa sortie de la chambre.
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DOI 10.1017/S0012217312000467
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References found in this work BETA
There Are No Phenomenal Concepts.Derek Ball - 2009 - Mind 118 (472):935-962.
Phenomenal Knowledge.Earl Conee - 1994 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 72 (2):136-150.
A Connectionist Theory of Phenomenal Experience.Jonathan Opie & Gerard O'Brien - 1999 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 22 (1):127-148.

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