A comparison between the Prolegomena of Chapter II of De iure praedae and the Prolegomena of De iure belli ac pacis leads to the conclusion that the ideas of Grotius on legal systematization have changed considerably between 1604 and 1625. Whereas Grotius starts in IPC with general principles with a rather unclear distinction between leges and regulae, in IBP he gives first the philosophical and theological basis of international law, intertwined by a concise set of general (...) legal rules, mostly derived from Roman law after its reception in Western Europe. The general outlines of legal systematization in the early-modern period are expounded. In the attempts of legal systematization the concept of subjective rights is essential. These subjective rights are not, as is sometimes assumed, a medieval renewal of legal technique, but can be found essentially already in classical Roman law of the first centuries AD.The institutional system is not yet visible in De iure praedae, it might be different for De iure belli ac pacis. Significant here are possibly the expressions ius ad bellum and ius in bello. (shrink)

This note studies the 1650 edition of Hugo Grotius’s De iure belli ac pacis. Using online and card catalogues, we have located eighty-nine copies, thirty-seven of which we examined in person, with an additional six fully digitised copies online. We hope that this research note on the preliminary results will generate greater interest in this unduly neglected edition. The note shows how, despite the connection established in the history of seventeenth-century politics that emphasized the ties between Grotius (...) and the Peace of Westphalia, the reception of Grotius’s 1650 edition bore no relation to the debates at Osnabrück and Münster. However, this is an influential edition, cherished by collectors and authors. According to our findings, it would be reproduced in a number of later reprints. (shrink)

This article provides new information on the publication history of the first edition of the text that, according to many scholars, laid the ground for the growth of international law: Hugo Grotius’s De iure belli ac pacis. Drawing on the preliminary findings of the Grotius Census Project at the Max Planck Institute for Comparative Public Law and International Law, funded by the German Research Foundation (Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft), the following pages shed light on the first three states of (...) the typescript, the sources that Grotius had access to in France while drafting the book, and the early circulation of the 1625 edition, published by Nicolas Buon in Paris. The goal of this publication is to disseminate updated information on the printing history of this key text in the history of legal and political thought, and to invite readers to come forward with more information about the location of the remaining copies of the text, in order to advance our understanding of the rise of international law around the world. (shrink)

The first edition of Hugo Grotius’s De iure belli ac pacis was published in Paris by Nicolas Buon in 1625. An unauthorised second edition appeared in Frankfurt a year later, from the reputable Wechel press. After Grotius made hundreds of changes to the first and second states of the first edition, and failed to convince the publisher Nicolas Buon of the merits of printing yet another edition of the book, the Wechels’s release of a new edition sought (...) to capitalise on the high demand for the text, as copies had sold out in Central Europe by the summer of 1625. In this preliminary report on the 1626 edition, using online and card catalogues, we have located 59 surviving copies. We examined thirteen copies in person, and another three fully digitised copies online, and on the basis of this small sample we have been able to draw a number of conclusions. We hope that this research note on preliminary results will generate interest in this unduly neglected edition, and that readers will kindly bring further copies to our attention. (shrink)

Hugo Grotius’s best-known work, De iure belli ac pacis, appeared in 1625 in Paris with the author’s approval. A second unauthorised version was published in 1626 in Frankfurt. In 1631 the Amsterdam publisher, Willem Janszoon Blaeu (1571–1638), issued the third edition, this one authorised by the author – and this edition featured nearly a thousand revisions by Grotius. The purpose of this report is to analyse the context behind the publication of this third edition and the copies’ (...) provenance records. Using online and card catalogues, we have located 154 copies. We examined 52 copies in person, and another three fully digitised copies online. We hope that this research note on preliminary results will generate greater interest in this unduly neglected edition, and that readers will kindly bring further copies to our attention. (shrink)

This is the fourth instalment of our census and study of the reception of the first nine editions of De iure belli ac pacis. Here we focus on the two versions that Johannes Janssonius issued in 1632, one with a copy of Mare liberum attached to it. This report outlines the place of the 1632 Janssonius edition in the context of his long-running rivalry with the printer Willem Blaeu and his firm. It then explores the typographical differences (...) between the two issues, their causes, and their significance for our understanding of the reception of the text. Finally, it provides the preliminary results of the census concerning the circulation and provenance of the fifty-three copies of this edition that we have found. We hope that this research note on the preliminary results will attract interest in this edition and that readers will kindly inform us of further copies. (shrink)

This article provides new information on the printing and readership history of the fifth edition of De iure belli ac pacis. Building on our earlier research on the way that the dispute between Willem Janszoon Blaeu and Johannes Janssonius influenced the publication of the 1631 edition of the text, this article studies how Blaeu harnessed his position to make the 1632 edition more reputable than the earlier version published by his rival. The article considers how, over four (...) centuries, readers have appreciated the quality of the production and three engaged with the text for radically different ends: Remigius Faesch, Baron von Boineburg, and Wendell Phillips. The article draws attention to the changes and continuities in reading and annotation patterns and offers preliminary insights into the themes that these influential readers focused on. We hope that it will inspire readers to bring further copies to our attention. (shrink)

This research note is the eighth instalment in our series of preliminary findings on the census and study of the reception of De iure belli ac pacis. The note presents a bibliographical description of Laurentius’ 1647 re-issue of the 1631 edition by Blaeu, considers Laurentius’ motivation and methods of production, lists and maps the currently known twenty-three surviving copies, and briefly describes two notable exemplars.

This research note offers a contextual overview of the printing history of Johann Blaeu’s 1646 octavo edition of Hugo Grotius’s De iure belli ac pacis (ibp). The note examines the printing process of the last edition that was prepared while Grotius was still alive, though it was published after his death. The note also sheds light on the theological dimension of some readers’ annotations, and concludes by discussing the impact this edition had on the modern versions of (...) the text. (shrink)

This article constitutes the sixth instalment in our series on the census and study of the reception of the first nine editions of De iure belli ac pacis. This edition has long held a prominent place in studies and editions of Grotius’s work since it was the last published during his lifetime. The report first outlines the genesis of the edition in the context of Grotius’s relationship with Johann Blaeu (1596–1673) and Cornelius Blaeu (1610–1642), who had recently (...) inherited the Blaeu print firm from their father Willem. It then elucidates a number of crucial ways in which the 1642 edition differed from the five previous editions, especially via the addition of an extensive new series of annotations to ibp and a separate set addressed to the Epistle of Philemon. Finally, it concludes by providing the preliminary results of the census concerning the one hundred and twenty-one copies we have found. (shrink)

A comparison between the Prolegomena of Chapter II of De iure praedae and the Prolegomena of De iure belli ac pacis leads to the conclusion that the ideas of Grotius on legal systematization have changed considerably between 1604 and 1625. Whereas Grotius starts in IPC with general principles with a rather unclear distinction between leges and regulae, in IBP he gives first the philosophical and theological basis of international law, intertwined by a concise set of general (...) legal rules , mostly derived from Roman law after its reception in Western Europe. The general outlines of legal systematization in the early-modern period are expounded. In the attempts of legal systematization the concept of subjective rights is essential. These subjective rights are not, as is sometimes assumed, a medieval renewal of legal technique, but can be found essentially already in classical Roman law of the first centuries AD. (shrink)

In November 2010, the Library of the Peace Palace in The Hague acquired a copy of Hugo Grotius’s seminal study on the law of war, De iure belli ac pacis (Paris: Nicolas Buon, 1625). The purchase represents the very rare first state (issue or printing) of the first edition, item no. 565-I in the well-known bibliography of Grotius’s works by Jacob Ter Meulen and P.J.J. Diermanse. This article is an adapted version of a speech held in the (...) Peace Palace on 21 February 2011, when the copy of De iure belli ac pacis was presented to the public. After a short survey of the genesis, printing history and early reception, the article goes into the differences between the three states of the first edition and their significance for the interpretation of Grotius’s work. A provisional checklist of copies in public libraries is added in an appendix. (shrink)

_ Source: _Volume 38, Issue 1, pp 71 - 105 Grotius’s theory of punishment provides a unique lens through which to view his evolving thought on sovereignty between _De Indis_ and _De iure belli ac pacis_ and the implications of that evolution for Grotius’s theory of the ius in bello. Throughout both works, Grotius attempted to leave open the possibility of private punishment and private warfare, a position not easily squared with prevailing views of sovereign authority. Initially, Grotius (...) was content with a theory marrying the private right of punishment with more traditional Scholastic views of sovereignty through a transfer of the private right from individuals into the hands of the sovereign. This theory also adopted traditional views of subject responsibility for sovereign acts—and, by extension, the exposure of subjects to punishment for the acts of their sovereign. By the time of his mature work, however, Grotius turned away from natural law justifications for collective responsibility and collective punishment, denying that subjects had to answer for the acts of their sovereign as a necessary incident of the compact creating civil society. This led Grotius to refer virtually all forms of collective responsibility, such as reprisal or punishment exacted through war, to the law of nations. This sharp reduction of the natural consequences of the creation of sovereign power also enabled Grotius’s argument that the private right of war, and in particular the private right of punishment, remained available after the creation of civil society. (shrink)

This research note announces and briefly describes a new five-year project to prepare a census bibliography of the first ten editions of Grotus’s De iure belli ac pacis. The resulting book will be published in 2025, the 400th anniversary of ibp’s first appearance. The project is sponsored by the Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft and hosted by the Max Planck Institute for Comparative Public Law and International Law in Heidelberg.

_ Source: _Volume 38, Issue 1, pp 229 - 233 This note announces a recent find in a private Swiss archive: Christian Wolff’s complete lecture course on Grotius’s _De iure belli ac pacis_ that he gave at the University of Marburg between June 1739 and May 1740.

Grotius’s ideas on proportionate and limited liability, as mentioned in the Inleidinge and De iure belli ac pacis, were novel in comparison to the civilian doctrine of his time. Grotius drew from sources of local law and statutes regarding maritime law but was nonetheless original in his interpretations. Grotius proposed to consider the liability of co-owners of ships (reders, exercitores), who acted as organizers of maritime expeditions, and of others that were participating in these expeditions, as broad. (...) At the same time, their liability was limited to the maximum of the value of the ship and cargo. In this regard, Grotius’s conceptions hinged on a view of a ship’s voyage as engendering a community of risk among all stakeholders. However, in spite of the underlying connections, Grotius did not eradicate all inconsistencies which the originality of his combinations brought forward. (shrink)

The following article discusses an edition of Hugo Grotius’s De jure belli ac pacis, issued without a place of publication or publisher in 1719. The article focuses on the claim first advanc...

This contribution aims at reconstructing the system of legal sources as it can be recognised in all its clarity in the De iure praedae. After pointing out that Grotius applied in this work the mathematical method, it is observed that the law has a clear voluntaristic character: 'voluntas universorum ad universos directa lex dicitur'. Even the 'first notion', quoted in Regula I, that is the lex aeterna, has this specific character: 'Quod Deus se velle significarit, id ius est'. Interesting (...) is also the way in which the issue of the ius naturae is developed. Actually, natural law is consistent with Regula I precisely because it is bound to God as a manifestation of his will: 'Dei voluntas non oraculis tantum et extraordinariis significationibus, sed vel maxime ex creantis intentione apparet'. Thus, the creation of the ius gentium primarium and ius gentium secundarium follows the same pattern: it is always a voluntas that splits into a cascade like a 'baroque fountain'. At the end of the same argument we find finally the ius civile: 'Quidquid respublica se velle significavit', as Regula V states. In conclusion, the system of legal sources in De iure praedae is based on premises that differ in many respects from the legal sources of De iure belli ac pacis. (shrink)

근대 도덕철학의 법적 개념들은 프로테스탄트 자연법 사상에 뿌리를 둔다는 점에서 가톨릭 전통의 스콜라적 개념들을 그대로 답습하지 않으며 도리어 본질적인 차이를 지닌다. 이 글은 종교개혁 이후 프로테스탄트 자연법 사상의 고유성과 근대성을 조명하고, 휴고 그로티우스의 『전쟁과 평화의 법』 서설의 주해를 통해 근대 도덕철학의 한 시작을 그로티우스의 자연법적 윤리학 기획에서 찾아볼 수 있다는 점을 밝힌다. 그로티우스에 따르면 자연법의 현존 근거는 신에게 귀속하지만 그럼에도 불구하고 신은 인간본성과 독립적으로 자연법을 창조한 것이 아니다. 자연법이 인간본성의 고유성인 이성에 따른 사회성으로부터 도출되는 개념인 한에서 자연법의 인식 근거는 인간 (...) 본성에 내재한다. 자연법을 신법의 파생태가 아니라 인간 이성에 내재적인 법으로 이해한다는 점에서 그로티우스는 프로테스탄트적 자연법과 근대 도덕철학의 고유성을 드러낸다. (shrink)

_ Source: _Volume 37, Issue 1, pp 1 - 15 A reconstruction is attempted of the printing process of the first edition of _De iure belli ac pacis_, and of the circumstances thereof, on the basis of a study of various copies still extant. It is argued that a distinction should be drawn between variations that resulted from a hurried printing process and those that were interventions by the author himself.

_ Source: _Volume 35, Issue 1, pp 75 - 94 Grotius always claimed that De veritate was not a controversial work, but it was not as innocuous nor as straightforward as Grotius would have his reader believe. It was the theological counterpart to his groundbreaking De iure belli ac pacis and it offered a distinctive version of Christianity which could complement his system of natural and international law. Both works were built upon a particular conception of human (...) nature and natural law, one which was not shared by many of Grotius’ contemporaries. In De veritate, Grotius emphasised that human beings could and should embrace Christianity voluntarily, in response to the revelation they found in the Scriptures. In this way, Grotius provided a way of understanding Christianity which did not appeal to any innate notion of God, and which removed the Christian religion from the sphere of nature and from the shared civic life which was built upon natural foundations. His aim was to shield civic life from the potentially destabilising effects of religious controversy and to promote Christian morality, but his ethical reading of Christianity brought with it important political and theological consequences. This article will show both the novelty, and the instability, of Grotius’ conception of Christianity. (shrink)

This article goes into the intentions and motives behind De Veritate (1627), famous apologetic work by the Dutch humanist and jurisconsult Hugo Grotius (1583-1645). De Veritate will be compared with two other seminal works written by Grotius, De iure belli ac pacis (1625) and the Annotationes in Novum Testamentum (1641-1650). The focus will be on one particular aspect that comes to the fore in all three works: the way Grotius reduced the Christian faith to a minimal religion (...) by singling out the essential tenets this faith had in common with other religions. The core of Grotius’s argumentation consists in the idea that believers and, in particular, civil authorities have to distinguish between a few essential religious tenets that could be made rationally acceptable, and a set of supernatural dogmas, derived from divine revelation, that did not pass a certain, albeit very high degree of probability. As far as the second category was concerned, civil tolerance was called for. As becomes clear from contemporary correspondences, Grotius did not develop these rather controversial ideas in an intellectual vacuum. During his exile in Paris, he fostered contacts with members of the circle that formed around the French monk Marin Mersenne (1588-1648). This circle functioned as a kind of hothouse for the development of a minimal Christian creed. Members of this group saw promotion of a minimal creed as a solution to current religious controversies and the ensuing political turmoil and (civil) war, which were abhorred for their detrimental effects on the advancement of learning in the first place. On the other hand, it is also apparent that overt adherence to such an ideal was considered to be dangerous, because it would at least evoke the embarrassing and even repressive attention of the authorities in Church and government. An additional problem was that by defending such a religious stance, members of Mersenne’s circle laid themselves open to accusations of endorsing ‘rational beliefs’ like Socinianism, generally considered to be the worst heresy among all Christian denominations. (shrink)

SummaryGrotius has a rudimentary theory of sociability. Only with hindsight has a remark about appetitus societatis been promoted to the starting point of a theory that flourished in the writings of later natural jurists. In this article, I address the issue of the appearance in Grotius's natural law of sociability [as the 1715/38 English translation of John Morrice renders appetitus societatis, following Barbeyrac's sociabilité]. Writing in the just war tradition, Grotius is first of all interested in finding out the conditions (...) for peace, and although injustice is a condition of war, it is not per se true that injustice is a perversion of society. Apparently, not all societies are perfect and the violence of war and the legal actions of peace are both instruments for achieving a greater modicum of justice in this world. Yet appetitus et custodia societatis is called the foundation of justice. Grotius achieved this context for sociability in phases, through a series of writings from c. 1600 until De iure belli ac pacis of 1625, and its revision of 1631. In this development the notion of fides plays an intriguing role, through which we can obtain a better understanding of the meaning of appetitus societatis in the later work. The present article is a sequel to a previous publication, on fides in De iure praedae. Analysing the genesis of appetitus societatis in De iure belli ac pacis, I argue that Grotius was changing his strategy over the years, without however arriving at a definitive solution to the question of what commits men to the pursuit of justice. (shrink)

Nella problematica generale dei rapporti tra Dio e l'uomo rientra il problema del diritto naturale. Tale problema si e manifestato in modo particolare nel secolo XVII come dimostra lo studio di Ugo Grozio (1583-1645). L'attualita delle sue idee e vivo anche oggi sia in Italia che all'estero; Grozio e ricordato soprattutto dai giuristi, nonostante la sua attivita si sia svolta anche in altri campi come dimostra l'opera bibliografica di Meulen J. Ter e Diermanse. Molti studiosi elogiano le sue impostazioni giuridiche (...) come per esempio G.B. Vico che lo chiama iurisconsultus generis humani. D'altra parte ci sono anche molti critici poco entusiasti del suo pensiero e che anzi lo accusano considerandolo l'iniziatore di una nuova corrente dottrinale che rompe la vera linea del diritto naturale iniziata dai greci, perfezionata dai romani e ripresa dalla scolastica. Da tutto questo appare chiaro che non e facile entrare nel pensiero del giurista di Delft. Questo lavoro vorrebbe dare una risposta al problema del diritto naturale e del suo rapporto con Dio. Si vuol vedere come si puo accordare la famosa affermazione una sola volta nel Prolegomena 11 del De iure belli ac pacis, che le norme del diritto naturale alocum aliquem haberent etiam daremusanon esse Deum, aut non curari a beo negotia humanaa la quale sembra separare il diritto dalla Divinita con la convinzione veramente religiosa di Grozio e con i suoi continui richiami all'autorita delle Sacre Scritture, dei Padri della Chiesa e dei teologi. (shrink)

_ Source: _Volume 37, Issue 1, pp 61 - 94 Interchanges between political, juridical and theological thought in the early modern period have been studied extensively during the past decades. Less light has been cast on the corresponding interrelations between politico-juridical thought and biblical hermeneutics. However, this issue deserves some attention, too, as the following case study on Hugo Grotius wants to show by pointing to the mutual adjustment of juridical, theological and biblical arguments in the progress of the core (...) semantics of Grotius’s natural law theory from _De iure praedae_ to _De iure belli ac pacis._. (shrink)

_ Source: _Volume 37, Issue 1, pp 61 - 94 Interchanges between political, juridical and theological thought in the early modern period have been studied extensively during the past decades. Less light has been cast on the corresponding interrelations between politico-juridical thought and biblical hermeneutics. However, this issue deserves some attention, too, as the following case study on Hugo Grotius wants to show by pointing to the mutual adjustment of juridical, theological and biblical arguments in the progress of the core (...) semantics of Grotius’s natural law theory from _De iure praedae_ to _De iure belli ac pacis._. (shrink)

This article explores the writings of Hugo Grotius on the law of civil war. First, the article takes a look at what Grotius wrote about the Dutch revolt, the civil war during which he himself lived and which he helped to legitimise. Second, the article notes how in legal practice the Dutch revolt also provided a valuable early precedent for the later scholars of the law of civil war, who were more concerned with questions of revolutionary prize jurisdiction and the (...) problem of recognition. Third, the article explores the elements relating to these questions of civil war in Grotius’s volitional law of nations as presented in De iure belli ac pacis. These provided Grotius’s most enduring legacy for the later scholars on the law of civil war. (shrink)

Willem Van der Muelen, jurist and member of the Dutch urban elite, was the author of a huge and widely read commentary on Hugo Grotius’s De iure belli ac pacis. Defined by the Neapolitan philosopher Giambattista Vico as a simple ‘embellisher’ of Grotius, but in recent times hailed as ‘the Dutch Locke’, Van der Muelen certainly deserves more attention. The essay will focus on the justification of political resistance to the sovereign, a particularly controversial issue both in (...) early-modern political thought and in Grotius himself. I argue that Van der Muelen, far from being a simple ‘embellisher’ of Grotius, adopts a more radical view based on a strong individualistic and utilitarian anthropology, bridging the Scholastic and monarchomach ideas of resistance – to which he is still indebted – with modern natural law jurisprudence. Thus he offers an interesting companion to Locke as well as a source of inspiration for later commentators such as Jean Barbeyrac. (shrink)

The account of punishment in De iure belli ac pacis develops most fully the relationship Grotius understands between strict rights and those claims arising from dignity or merit, which he associates with ‘expletive’ and ‘attributive’ standards of justice, respectively. The purpose of this article is to provide a philosophical reconstruction of two particular puzzles that arise out of the role Grotius assigns to the concepts of right and merit in the theory of punishment. How, in the first (...) place, can a right to punish be legitimated if not on the grounds that the offender merits punishment for the crime? And then, if merit does not provide the grounds for punishment, why must the penalty be strictly limited to what the offender merits? A reconstruction of Grotius’s arguments grounding the right to punish and justifying the role of penal merit brings out the underlying coherence in Grotius’s theory of punishment, while also revealing that the norms of expletive and attributive justice are inextricably linked in Grotius’s system of natural right. (shrink)

This paper explores the presence of late medieval ius commune in Grotius’s thought on the use of force in internal strife and war, based on De iure belli ac pacis. To this end, it examines Grotius’s use of ius commune sources, and considers some similar sources, which he does not actually cite, but which relate to his discussion. By clarifying Grotius’s selection and use of ius commune sources, the paper intends to contribute to the achievement of a (...) double aim: firstly, to determine the place of rebellion and civil war in De iure belli ac pacis, especially in relation to war; and, secondly, to assess Grotius’s approach to the two former issues, particularly with regard to the criteria by which a distinction between rebellion and civil war can be drawn, and to the effects of this distinction. (shrink)

In neither of his two major forays into the laws of war and peace – De iure praedae or De iure belli ac pacis – did Hugo Grotius discuss the legal institutions of reprisal – whether special or general – or privateering in their own right. His profoundly novel reading of the just war doctrine in the context of his theory of natural rights, however, gave powerful legitimisation to the practices of special reprisals, as well as (...) of privateering in times of war and of peace. (shrink)

Hugo Grotius und Thomas Hobbes stehen beide in unterschiedlicher Weise für einen Neubeginn in der Politischen Philosophie bzw. in der Rehtsphlosophie. Während bei Grotius die Anknüpfung an die vorangehende Tradition des Christlichen Naturrechts gleichwohl unübersehbar ist, ist Hobbes' Beziehung zum Naturrecht kontrovers. In der Konfrontation beider Autoren mit dem in der scholastischen Diskussion herausgearbeiteten Naturgesetzbegriff zeigt sich, wie die Auseinandersetzung zwischen den voluntaristischen und rationalistischen Positionen letztlich einer Rechts- und Moralphilosophie Bahn bricht, die sich von den theologischen Voraussetzungen des Christlichen (...) Naturrechts befreien kann, ohne dabei mit diesem in unmittelbaren Widerspruch zu geraten oder auch nur dessen Begriffsrahmen zu sprengen. Durch eine strikte Trennung von Evaluationsproblem und Obligationsproblem eröffnet Grotius' De iure belli ac pacis das Feld einer säkularen Moralwissenschaft, welche Hobbes im Leviathan dann auf ein neues methodisches Fundament stellt und zudem durch eine säkulare Verpflichtungstheorie ergänzt. In different respects, Hugo Grotius and Thomas Hobbes represent a new beginning in political and legal philosophy. Although Grotius' connection with the previous tradition of Christian natural law is obvious, Hobbes' relation to natural law is controversial. Both of them, however, confront the concept of natural law as developed in the scholastic discussion. The ensuing debate between voluntarism and rationalism finally paves the way for a new philosophy of law and morals. This new philosophy can extricate itself from the theological presumptions of Christian natural law without running into contradiction with it, or even dissolving its conceptual framework. Through its strict division between evaluation and obligation, Grotius' De iure belli ac pacis opens the door for a secular moral science, which Hobbes in Leviathan places on a new methodological foundation and also expands upon through a secular theory of obligation. (shrink)

_ Source: _Volume 37, Issue 1, pp 1 - 15 A reconstruction is attempted of the printing process of the first edition of _De iure belli ac pacis_, and of the circumstances thereof, on the basis of a study of various copies still extant. It is argued that a distinction should be drawn between variations that resulted from a hurried printing process and those that were interventions by the author himself.

An important aspect of any constitutional theory is the state's power to punish transgressions of the law, or the ius gladii. Although Grotius never formulated a complete, comprehensive constitutional theory, traces of such a theory can be found in many of his writings not explicitly devoted to constitutional law. Punishment even plays an important role in his books on war, since to punish transgressions of the law is ranked among the just causes of war.Given the fact that a state may (...) punish transgressions of the law – transgressions by individuals within and even outside the state, but also transgressions of the law by other states – the question may arise concerning the origin of such a right to punish. It will be shown that Grotius did not give the same answer to this question in his various works. As the right to punish is concerned, we find a theory that seems to be akin to the one of John Locke in the De iure praedae, one akin to the theories of the Spanish late-scholastics in De satisfactione and De imperio, and a theory coming close to what Thomas Hobbes had said on the ruler's right to punish in the De iure belli ac pacis.Of course, Grotius can only have been familiar with the theory of the Spanish late-scholastics, since those of Locke and Hobbes were still to be written by the time Grotius had passed away. (shrink)

An important aspect of any constitutional theory is the state's power to punish transgressions of the law, or the ius gladii. Although Grotius never formulated a complete, comprehensive constitutional theory, traces of such a theory can be found in many of his writings not explicitly devoted to constitutional law. Punishment even plays an important role in his books on war, since to punish transgressions of the law is ranked among the just causes of war.Given the fact that a state may (...) punish transgressions of the law – transgressions by individuals within and even outside the state, but also transgressions of the law by other states – the question may arise concerning the origin of such a right to punish. It will be shown that Grotius did not give the same answer to this question in his various works. As the right to punish is concerned, we find a theory that seems to be akin to the one of John Locke in the De iure praedae, one akin to the theories of the Spanish late-scholastics in De satisfactione and De imperio, and a theory coming close to what Thomas Hobbes had said on the ruler's right to punish in the De iure belli ac pacis.Of course, Grotius can only have been familiar with the theory of the Spanish late-scholastics, since those of Locke and Hobbes were still to be written by the time Grotius had passed away. (shrink)

An important aspect of any constitutional theory is the state's power to punish transgressions of the law, or the ius gladii. Although Grotius never formulated a complete, comprehensive constitutional theory, traces of such a theory can be found in many of his writings not explicitly devoted to constitutional law. Punishment even plays an important role in his books on war , since to punish transgressions of the law is ranked among the just causes of war.Given the fact that a state (...) may punish transgressions of the law – transgressions by individuals within and even outside the state, but also transgressions of the law by other states – the question may arise concerning the origin of such a right to punish. It will be shown that Grotius did not give the same answer to this question in his various works. As the right to punish is concerned, we find a theory that seems to be akin to the one of John Locke in the De iure praedae , one akin to the theories of the Spanish late-scholastics in De satisfactione and De imperio , and a theory coming close to what Thomas Hobbes had said on the ruler's right to punish in the De iure belli ac pacis .Of course, Grotius can only have been familiar with the theory of the Spanish late-scholastics, since those of Locke and Hobbes were still to be written by the time Grotius had passed away. (shrink)

Centuries before being included in Hugo Grotius’s De iure belli ac pacis and De iure praedae, the subject of reprisal was already being discussed in medieval literature. The aim of this paper is to examine the medieval and early modern practice and theory of reprisal as it developed before and during Grotius’s lifetime. Its first part investigates a number of important foundational elements, such as the issues of definition and terminology, and the common characteristics of a (...) reprisal case. In the second half, the author explores why reprisals were deemed to be a ‘perversus mos’ or ‘bad custom’ and how continued reliance on this practice was nonetheless justified by inserting it into the medieval just war doctrine. The paper does not provide a systematic study of Grotius’s own engagement with medieval reprisal sources. Rather, it should be read in conjunction with another publication in this same volume, ‘Grotius on Reprisal’ by Randall Lesaffer. (shrink)

The theory of justice that Hugo Grotius developed in De Jure Belli ac Pacis (The Law of War and Peace, 1625) set itself against a certain reading of Aristotle, according to which justice is conceived of as a mean between taking too much and taking too little. I argue that we can best understand the implications of Grotius' mature conception by considering the ends to which he had deployed this Aristotelian notion in his earlier work. Grotius came to (...) perceive that his earlier understanding of justice too easily ruled out the sorts of humanitarian concerns that could have a moderating effect. (shrink)

O uso de argumentos igualmente convincentes tanto em prol quanto contra a veracidade de uma proposição era conhecido na Renascença como in utramque partem. Céticos do início da Modernidade utilizaram argumentos in utramque partem visando demonstrar que não se pode fundamentar a moralidade em um terreno sólido, já que os argumentos apresentados em favor da ideia de Justiça poderiam ser neutralizados por argumentos igualmente convincentes contra a ideia de Justiça. Nesse artigo, eu argumento que Hugo Grotius tentou refutar esse tipo (...) de ceticismo moral em seus principais escritos filosóficos, De jure bellic ac pacis e De jure praedae commentarius. Contra os céticos, Grotius procura estabelecer que as razões apresentadas a favor e contra a ideia de Justiça não são incompatíveis entre si. (shrink)

O uso de argumentos igualmente convincentes tanto em prol quanto contra a veracidade de uma proposição era conhecido na Renascença como in utramque partem. Céticos do início da Modernidade utilizaram argumentos in utramque partem visando demonstrar que não se pode fundamentar a moralidade em um terreno sólido, já que os argumentos apresentados em favor da ideia de Justiça poderiam ser neutralizados por argumentos igualmente convincentes contra a ideia de Justiça. Nesse artigo, eu argumento que Hugo Grotius tentou refutar esse tipo (...) de ceticismo moral em seus principais escritos filosóficos, De jure bellic ac pacis e De jure praedae commentarius. Contra os céticos, Grotius procura estabelecer que as razões apresentadas a favor e contra a ideia de Justiça não são incompatíveis entre si. (shrink)

The purpose of the present study is the understanding of Gentili's position on the law of the sea as expressed in his classic De iure belli . The key constitutive elements turn out to be: 1) the idea of the sea as 'res communis' to all mankind, which amounts to the concept of 'freedom of the sea'; 2) 'jurisdiction' of the coastal state on the adjacent sea, even on the high seas, in order to police crime and prevent/punish (...) piracy. As such these two key elements, if taken in isolation, are rooted in the civil law tradition, but their true meaning can only be captured by placing them in the intellectual framework of which they constitute an integral part. Firstly, the epistemic structure of discourse hinges on the new science of natural jurisprudence, as applied to the subject of 'ius gentium bellicum'; secondly, the constituent theoretical languages emanate from a distinctive combination of civil law, scholastic-theological and humanist traditions. This procedure enables us to highlight the strikingly original and distinctly modern traits of Gentili's perspective on the law of the sea, which emerges as a corollary of his project of international/global order. A project that is based on the crucial notion of 'respublica magna' of mankind, a notion encompassing the two notions of 'freedom' and 'jurisdiction' that constitute and define the legal regime of the sea.The Stoic humanist notion of universal human society as 'corpus unum' implies, first of all, 'freedom of intercourse', or 'ius communicationis', to start from 'free passage' and 'freedom of commerce'. It is in the context of his argument about these basic freedoms that Gentili is finally led to discuss the subject of the 'law of the sea'. But, not only the concept of 'res communis', or 'freedom of use', but also the concept of 'jurisdiction', or 'protection', are strictly related to the same foundational concept of 'respublica magna'. This is a crucial characteristic of Gentili's approach to world order that is proved by reference to two cardinal points of his new 'cosmopolitan justice': 1) the 'international right to punish', as exemplified by the legitimacy of the wars of 'humanitarian intervention' and of the wars in support of the 'common law of mankind'; 2) the 'occupation of vacant land', which again underlines the relevance of the principle of 'jurisdiction' by striking a balance between the principle of 'free use' of nature and the 'jurisdiction' of the local ruler.Such a reconstruction definitely rejects the traditional image of Gentili as a supporter of 'maritime protectionism', on the ground of his Advocatio Hispanica published posthumously in 1613 and containing his pleadings as Spanish advocate before the Court of Admiralty. The guiding assumption here is that the book is strictly of a forensic character and as such devoid of any coherent theoretical substance. To the contrary, in his De iure belli, far from anticipating the English position in favour of 'mare clausum', Gentili tends to anticipate the essentials of Grotius' position, especially at the level of the ethic of the 'modern cosmopolis' and the related theme of colonial empire. On this very plane of discourse, Gentili's thinking transcends the so-called battle of the books and emerges as especially significant in illuminating the wider and deeper intellectual currents that contributed to the development of what were to become basic standard positions of modern international theory. (shrink)

O uso de argumentos igualmente convincentes tanto em prol quanto contra a veracidade de uma proposição era conhecido na Renascença como in utramque partem. Céticos do início da Modernidade utilizaram argumentos in utramque partem visando demonstrar que não se pode fundamentar a moralidade em um terreno sólido, já que os argumentos apresentados em favor da ideia de Justiça poderiam ser neutralizados por argumentos igualmente convincentes contra a ideia de Justiça. Nesse artigo, eu argumento que Hugo Grotius tentou refutar esse tipo (...) de ceticismo moral em seus principais escritos filosóficos, De jure bellic ac pacis e De jure praedae commentarius. Contra os céticos, Grotius procura estabelecer que as razões apresentadas a favor e contra a ideia de Justiça não são incompatíveis entre si. (shrink)