This paper surveys the meaning of aither in Empedocles. Since Aristotle, Empedoclean aither has been generally considered synonymous with air and understood anachronistically in terms of its Aristotelian conception as hot and wet. In critiquing this interpretation, the paper first examines the meaning of “air” in Empedocles, revealing scant and insignificant use of the term. Next, the ancient controversy of Empedocles’ “four roots” is recast from the perspective that aither, rather than air, designates the fourth root. Finally, (...) the nineteen instances of aither in Empedocles’ fragments are considered, revealing a bright and energetic root closely related to the force of life. (shrink)

In fragment 38 Diels–Kranz, Empedocles turns to describe the creation of ‘everything that we now see’: γαî τε κα πντος πςλυκμων δ' γρς ρ ιτν δ' αθρ σΦγγων περ κκλον παντα. Here, as so often with Empedocles, the influence of Zeller and Diels has proved decisive in determining later interpretations of the text. They understood the words ιτν δ' αθρ as meaning ‘and Titan aither’; ‘; the text has been mistranslated ever since. In fact the conjunction δ is never (...) postponed. This means that—as scholars earlier in the nineteenth century well understood—‘Titan” must be an item on its own, distinct from the aither: earth and wavy sea and moist aer, Titan and aither binding everything in its circular grip. (shrink)

The dominant interpretation ofMetaphysicsΘ.8 commits Aristotle to the claim that the heavenly bodies’ eternal movements are not the exercises of capacities. Against this, I argue that these movements are the result of necessarily exercised capacities. I clarify what it is for a heavenly body to possess a nature and argue that a body’s nature cannot be a final cause unless the natural body possesses capacities that are exercised for the sake of its naturequaform. This discussion yields a better understanding of (...) what capacities are, what explanatory work capacities do, and what it is to possess a nature. (shrink)

This chapter contains sections titled: Notes Bibliography.

The interpretation of human nature attributed by Aristotle to the natural slave remains a contentious issue. I challenge two prevalent interpretative approaches that fail to represent Aristotle’s view accurately. The first interpretation suggests that natural slaves share the same human nature as free men, with their deficiencies arising from their actions and habituation. The second view considers the natural slave as a degenerate subhuman with an innate and irremediable rational deformity. I reject both interpretations and propose instead that the natural (...) slave is seen as a legitimate human being with a rational deficiency. Furthermore, I argue that although slaves are considered human beings, their rational deficiency should be understood as more severe than some scholars suggest. This is particularly true for those who equate non-Greeks with natural slaves and evaluate the cognitive capabilities of slaves based on the intellectual achievements of non-Greeks. (shrink)

This paper opens by reviewing Aristotle’s conception of the natural slave and then familiar treatments of the internal conflict between the ruling and subject parts of the soul in Aristotle and Plato; I highlight especially the figurative uses of slavery and servitude when discussing such problems pertaining to incontinence and vice—viz., being a ‘slave’ to the passions. Turning to Campanella, features of the City of the Sun pertaining to slavery are examined: in sketching his ideal city, Campanella both rejects Aristotle’s (...) natural slave and is critical of the European institutions of slavery. The fact that slavery has no place in the City of the Sun takes on added significance when complemented with Campanella’s remarks on dominion and servitude in his Quaestiones de politiciis: I show that Campanella’s conception of slavery is intimately bound to sin, and consider whether his employment of the trope of slavery within the context of vice diverges from familiar usage. (shrink)

The main aim of my paper is to analyse Aristotle’s theory of language in the context of his Physics I.1 and via an analysis and an interpretation of this part of his Physics I try to show that (i) the study of human language (logos) significantly falls within the competence of Aristotle’s physics (i.e. natural philosophy), (ii) we can find the results of such (physical) inquiry in Aristotle’s zoological writings, stated in the forms of the first principles, causes and elements (...) of the human speech (logos) and (iii) the analogies (Phys. 184b13-14) made by Aristotle at the very end of the first chapter make better sense if we consider them in the broader context in which Aristotle recognizes language as a complex natural phenomenon we are born into and which has to be not only biologically, but also socially developed through our lives. Hence, I aim towards a more naturalistic reading of Aristotle’s views on language. (shrink)

The use of teleological language in biology is burdened with many difficulties. Speakers in everyday and scientific discourse confuse functions with purposes and misunderstand functionality, finality, and intentionality. The paper is structured into three sections. In the first part the difference between Platonic supranatural and Aristotelian quasi-natural account of teleology will be explained, with examples from the history of philosophy of biology. The second part will present the Darwinian approach to etiology that constitutes a more sound alternative to the teleological (...) explanation. In the last section I will briefly introduce the teleological bias that is studied by developmental and cognitive psychologists. I believe that this psychological inclination is the real source of intuitive worldviews that are incompatible with contemporary science. (shrink)