Gerek felsefede gerekse teolojide Tanrı’nın ilim sahibi bir varlık olup olmadığı tartışma konusu olmuştur. Eğer Tanrı ilim sahibi bir varlık ise, bu durumda O’nun tikelleri bilmesi mümkün müdür? Tanrı’nın tikellerini bildiğini iddia etiğimizde bu durum O’nun zatında bir değişimi gerektirir mi? Tesitik düşüncede Tanrı kâmil bir varlıktır ve O, mutlak manada âlimdir, kâdirdir ve iyilik sahibidir. Dolayısıyla O’nun zatına bir değişim söz konusu olamaz. Tanrı’nın ilmi konusunda tartışılan mesellerden birisi de bu ilmin tikelleri kapsayıp kapsamadığıdır. Pek çok teist düşünür Tanrı’nın (...) mutlak manada kâmil olduğunu iddia etmekte ve bu kemali temele alarak O’nun kemal niteliklere sahip olması gerektiğini belirtmektedir. Bilmek ve iyilik gibi nitelikler kemal niteliklerdir. Cehalet ve kötülük ise nakıs hallerdir. Şayet Tanrı kâmil bir varlık ise bu tür kemal niteliklere de sahip olmalı, nakıs niteliklerden de hâli olmalıdır. Tanrı’nın ilmine dair Gazzālī ve İbn Meymûn’un görüşleri arasında birtakım paralellikler olduğu kanaatindeyiz. Bu çalışmada, Gazzālī ve İbn Meymun’un konuya yaklaşımını ele aldık ve Griffel ve Stroumsa’nın iddiasını temele alarak Tanrı’nın ilmi konusunda Gazzālī ve İbn Meymun’un görüşleri arasında benzerlikler olduğunu göstermeye çalıştık. (shrink)

This article discusses the understanding of revelation and prophethood of Moses ben Maimonides (d.1204), one of the most important Jewish religious scholars who lived in the 12th century, and Spinoza (d.1677), who lived in the 17th century and was excommunicated at the age of twenty-four and expelled from the Jewish community to which he belonged due to the accusation that he was an atheist as a result of his thoughts. In his Theological-Political Treatise, Spinoza aims to show the necessity of (...) the separation of theology from philosophy. This desire of Spinoza brought him encounter with Maimonides and the tradition he represented. As a result, it is seen that Spinoza was influenced by Maimonide’s views on revelation and prophethood and entered into a dispute with him. In what ways he was influenced by Maimonides or disputes with him is the main issue of this article. Our treatise consists of three parts: introduction, main chapter, and conclusion. In the introduction, the concept of revelation and the views of Plato and Aristotle on prophecy and dreams are briefly introduced since they are the main sources of both Islamic thinkers and Maimonides. In addition, in the introduction, due to the fact that Spinoza's influence or confrontation with Maimonides is related to the tradition represented by the Islamic philosophers of which Maimonides is a member, it was necessary to outline the views of some Islamic philosophers. In doing so, a brief mention of the thoughts of al-Kindī (d.866?), al-Fārābī (d.950) and Ibn Sīnā (d.1037), who are considered to be among the first and most important Muslim philosophers was deemed sufficient. In the meantime, the ideas of another Jewish philosopher, Levi ben Gershom (d.1344), who historically stands somewhere between Maimonides and Spinoza, are briefly discussed. Based on the thoughts of these philosophers, an attempt was made to show the relation of revelation with the power of imagination, as well as with dreams and prophecy. In the main part of the study, Maimonides' understanding of revelation and prophethood is first analyzed and then compared with Spinoza's understanding of revelation and prophethood. While analyzing Maimonides' understanding of prophethood, the parts where he was influenced by Islamic philosophers were mentioned. In this comparison, Maimonides' Delālat al-Hāirīn and Spinoza's Theological-Political Treatise were considered as the main sources. This study aims both to better understand the theological approach of the two thinkers and to show the thought codes of Spinoza, who is considered one of the heralds of the Enlightenment, going back to Maimonides even if critically. It is also intended to emphasize that these codes dating back to Maimonides also extend to the world of Islamic thought. In this article, the scope of the subject is limited to the thoughts of the two thinkers about the prophet, revelation, and the internal and external factors that play a role in the formation of the revelation, and the language of the revelation. Differences or similarities in other theological views of the two thinkers, such as miracles, are beyond the scope of this article. (shrink)

Whether God has a knowledge is a controversial issue both philosophy and theology. Does God have a knowledge? If He has, does He know the particulars? When we assume that God knows particulars, is there any change in God’s essence? In the theistic tradition, it is accepted that God is wholly perfect, omniscience, omnipotent and wholly good. Therefore, it is not possible to say that there is a change in God. Because changing is a kind of imperfection. On God’s knowledge, (...) another controversial issue is whether God knows particulars or not. Most of theist thinkers argued that God is wholly perfect; because of perfectness, He must have perfect attributes. Knowing and goodness are a kind of perfect attributes. Ignoring and evil are a kind of imperfectness. If God is perfect being, He should have the perfect attributes and must know the particulars. For me in this subject, there are some similarities between al-Ghazālī and Maimonides. In this study I took into consideration the idea of al-Ghazālī and Maimonides on this subject. Based on Griffel and Stroumsa’s argument, I tried to show similarity between al-Ghazālī and Maimonides on God’s knowledge. Summary: Whether God has a knowledge is a controversial issue both philosophy and theology. Does God have a knowledge? If He has, does He know the particulars? When we assume that God knows particulars, is there any change in God’s essence? In this study I took into consideration the idea of al-Ghazālī and Maimonides on this subject. Based on Griffel’s and Stroumsa’s arguments, I tried to show similarity between al-Ghazālī and Maimonides on God’s knowledge.In the theistic tradition, it is accepted that God is wholly perfect, omniscience, omnipotent and wholly good. Therefore, it is not possible to say that there is a change in God because changing is a kind of imperfection. On God’s knowledge, another controversial issue is whether God knows particulars or not. Most of theist thinkers argued that God is wholly perfect; because of perfectness, He must have perfect attributes. Knowing and goodness are a kind of perfect attributes. Ignoring and evil are kinds of imperfectness. If God is perfect being, He should have the perfect attributes and must know the particulars. Based on God’s immutability, some thinkers argued that God does not knows particulars. Particulars occurs due to the matter. Matter and its functions are continually changing. Therefore, to know the particulars requires changing in God’s essence. If God is the most perfect being, it is impossible that He is subject to affection. Thus, God does not know the particulars. Other thinkers, like Avicenna, argued that God knows the particulars as a universal way. For example, God knows only humanity and He cannot know Zayd as a particular person. al-Ghazālī criticizes Avicenna’s idea in Tahafut al-Falasifa (The Incoherence of the Philosophers) and argues that God is a perfect being and He should know particulars as a particulars. For al-Ghazālī, God should know everything, and His knowledge is different from our knowledge. In order to explain this matter, he says in Ninety-Nine Names of God;“But this can be understood only through an example. Perhaps you have seen the clock which informs one of the hour of worship. If you have not seen it, then, generally speaking, (it is constructed in this manner). There must be a mechanism in the form of a cylinder which contains a known amount of water. There must also be another hollow mechanism which is placed within the cylinder (but) above the water, and a string which has one of its ends tied to this hollow mechanism. The other end is tied to the part of a small container which is placed above the hollow cylinder. In (this container) there is a ball. Under the ball there is another bowl (placed) in such a manner that if the ball drops will fall into the bowl, and its jingle will be heard. Then the bottom of the cylindrical mechanism must be pierced to a determined extent so that the water can escape through it little by little…. All of this can be determined by a determination of the extent of cause which neither increases nor decreases. It is possible to make the falling of the ball into the bowl a cause of another action and this other action a cause of a third action, and to continue this process indefinitely so that from it are generated remarkable and predetermined movements (actions) of circumscribed extent. The first cause was the falling of the water in a determined quantity…. All of that happens in a determined quantity and to a determined extent which causes the determination of all of it by (adding at this point) the determination of the first movement which is the movement of the water. When you understand that these mechanisms are the principles from which movements must result, and that the movement must be determined if the result is to be regulated, then certainly that which has been determined must proceed from them….Even as the movement of the mechanism, the string, and the ball are not external to the will of the inventor of the mechanism -on the contrary, that is what He willed when He invented the mechanism- so also all the events which occur in the world, both the evil and the good and the beneficial and harmful, are not external to the will of God Most High. Rather (all of) that is the intention of God Most High for the sake of which He has planned its causes.” For Maimonides, as in al-Ghazālī, God is a perfect being and He must have the perfect attributes. Because of knowing is a perfect attribute, He should know everything, and His knowledge is different from human knowledge. In order to explain the difference between God’s knowledge and human knowledge Maimonides gives a parable in The Guide of the Perplexed. “Suppose a thing is produced in accordance with the knowledge of the producer, the producer was then guided by his knowledge in the act of producing the thing. Other people, however, who examine this work and acquire a knowledge of the whole of it, depend for that knowledge on the work itself. An artisan makes a box in which weights move with the running of the water, and thus indicate how many hours have passed of the day and of the night. The whole quantity of the water that is to run out, the different ways in which it runs, every thread that is drawn, and every little ball that descends -all this is fully perceived by him who makes the clock; and his knowledge is not the result of observing the movements as they are actually going on; but, on the contrary, the movements are produced in accordance with his knowledge. But another person who looks at that instrument will receive fresh knowledge at every movement he perceives; the longer he looks on, the more knowledge does he acquire; he will gradually increase his knowledge till he fully understands the machinery…Our knowledge is acquired and increased in proportion to the things known by us. This is not the case with God. His knowledge of things is not derived from the things themselves; if this were the case, there would be change and plurality in His knowledge…” As can be seen from above, when Maimonides is explaining the difference of God’s and human knowledge, he uses the same example what al-Ghazālī used. Even though Maimonides does not mention al-Ghazālī’s name in his works, it could be seen that there are a lot of similarities between al-Ghazālī’s and Maimonides’s ideas. Based on Griffel and Stroumsa’s argument, in this paper, I tried to show that there is a similarity between al-Ghazālī’s and Maimonides’s ideas on God’s knowledge. In my opinion, therefore, in the formation of Maimonides’s thought, as he thanks to Muslim philosophers like al-Farābī, Avicenna and Averroes, he also thanks to al-Ghazālī. (shrink)

"(...) Felsefeye ilişkin Arapça ve Fransızca bazı eserleri mütalaa ettiğim sırada felsefi terimlerin bu iki dilde tesadüf ettiğim karşılıklarını bir mecmuaya kaydetmiştim. Bunların perişan bir halde kalmasına ve sarfettiğim emeğin bu şekilde heder olmasına gönlüm razı olmadı. Gerçekten de bu konuda sarfedilen mesai öyle pek kolay feda edilecek bir şey değildi. Çünkü bu işe en evvel, felsefeyi İbn Bâcce'nin en seçkin öğrencilerinden tahsil etmiş olan meşhur Musevi hakîm Ebû İmrân Musa bin Meymun'un Delâletü'l-Hâirîn başlıklı eserinden başlamış idim. Bu kitap İbrani (...) harfleriyle, Arap dili üzere yazılmış olduğundan felsefeye ait fasıllarının Fransızca tercümesiyle tatbikinde pek ziyade güçlük çekmiş idim. Bu eser Avrupaca Guide des Égarés başlığıyla tanınıp, mütekellimlerin mezhebi hakkında en önemli bilgi kaynağı sayılmıştır. Bunu müteakiben, bir taraftan Aristoteles'in bazı eserlerini ve diğer taraftan İbn Rüşd'ün bunlardan iktibâsen yazdığı Telhîsât'ı, Kütübhâne-i Hidivî'den istinsâh ettirerek mütalaa ettim. Sonra da Şehristânî'nin Kitâbü'l-Milel ve'n-Nihal'i, Zevzenî'nin Muhtasar Târîh-i Hukemâ'sı, Fârâbî ile İbn Sînâ'nın bazı eserleri, Ebû Abdullâh el-Kâtib'in Mefâtîhu'l-Ulûm'u, İbnu'n-Nedîm Bağdâdî'nin Kitâbü'l-Fihrist'i gibi Avrupa'da basılmış birtakım nadir kitapları ve diğer birçok mantık kitaplarını gözden geçirerek, bunlardan her ne buldumsa aldım. Bu şekilde cem ettiğim kelimeler ve tabirler büyücek bir mecmua teşkil etmiş ise de bunlar mantık ve eski felsefeye ait olduğundan yeni terimlerin de karşılıklarını bulmak lazım geldi. Bu noksanı da âcizâne kütüphanemde mevcut lûgat kitaplarından Fransız ve İngiliz ve Arap ve Fars dillerine ait olan kamuslara müracaat ederek ve bunlarla maksadın temini mümkün olamadığı halde kelimelerin etimolojik anlamlarına nazaran birer tabir bulmak suretiyle mümkün mertebe ikmal etmek üzere bu Lûgatçe'nin tertip ve tanzimine başladım. Ve Bulletin de la Société Française de Philosophie başlığıyla yayınlanmakta olan süreli yayının bazı numaralarında, 1904 senesinden beri yer almış ve bu kere son bulmuş ise de henüz ayrıca kitap şeklinde toplanmamış olan Yeni Felsefe Lûgatçesi'ni başlıca kaynak kabul ederek, buna dâhil edilmiş olan yeni terimlerin hemen hepsini aldım. E. Goblot'nun Felsefe Lûgatçesi'yle diğer lûgatçelerde mananın açıklık kazanmasına hizmet ediyor gördüğüm özet bilgileri de ait oldukları kelimelere ilave ettim. Kısacası bu naçiz eser, diğer lûgatlerin hiçbirine henüz geçmemiş olan yeni felsefe terimlerinden başka felsefeyle ilgili olan tıp bilimine ve sosyal ve ekonomik bilimlere ait bir hayli kelimeleri de içermektedir. Bununla beraber âcizâne eserimin pek noksan olduğunu ve ancak ilim ve irfan erbabının tashih kalemleri için hazırlanmış bir müsveddecik teşkil edebileceğini itiraf ederim. Yegâne emelim mütalaa erbabına naçizâne bir hizmette bulunarak hayır ile yâd olunmaya hak kazanmaktan ibaret olduğundan görülecek hataların iyi niyetime bağışlanacağı ümidindeyim". İsmail Fenni Ertuğrul. (shrink)

The Arabic philosophical fable _Hayy Ibn Yaqzan _is a classic of medieval Islamic philosophy. Ibn Tufayl, the Andalusian philosopher, tells of a child raised by a doe on an equatorial island who grows up to discover the truth about the world and his own place in it, unaided—but also unimpeded—by society, language, or tradition. Hayy’s discoveries about God, nature, and man challenge the values of the culture in which the tale was written as well as those of every contemporary society. (...) Goodman’s commentary places _Hayy Ibn Yaqzan _in its historical and philosophical context. The volume features a new preface and index, and an updated bibliography. “One of the most remarkable books of the Middle Ages.”—_Times Literary Supplement_ “An enchanting and puzzling story.... The book transcends all historical and cultural environments to settle upon the questions of human life that perpetually intrigue men.”—_Middle East__ Journal_ “Goodman has done a service to the modern English reader by providing a readable translation of a philosophically significant allegory.”—_Philosophy East and West_ “Add[s] bright new pieces to an Islamic mosaic whose general shape is already known.”—_American Historical Review_. (shrink)

صدر عن المركز العربي للأبحاث ودراسة السياسات كتاب المنطق الإسلامي: حضور المنطق الأرسطي لدى مفكري المشرق الإسلامي، وهو من تأليف محمد بن يعيش. يقع الكتاب في 272 صفحة، شاملةً ببليوغرافيا وفهرسًا عامًّا. أمام ما يعرِّفه مؤلفُ الكتاب بـ "حقيقتين تاريخيتين"؛ هما أوّلًا: كثرة من اشتغلوا بعلم المنطق في الحضارة العربية الإسلامية من أفذاذ العلماء، وانتشارهم في أصقاع البلاد الإسلامية، وتنوّع أديانهم، وأصناف تخصصاتهم العلمية ونتاجاتهم، تأليفًا وحواشيَ مسهبةً وترجماتٍ ومختصراتٍ وشروحًا وأرجوزات، وثانيًا: إقراره بما لقيه هؤلاء العلماء من مضايقات وتجريح (...) واتهامات وملاحقات. يطرح الكتاب إشكاليةَ البحث، المتمثلةَ بالحيثيات التي رافقت استقبال المسلمين علمًا دخيلًا على العلوم الإسلامية كالمنطق وتعاملهم معه، ومراحل تردده بين الرفض والقبول في البيئة الجديدة، وأوجه الجِدّة لدى العلماء الذي ساهموا في تكريسه لغويًّا (الفارابي وابن سينا) ودينيًّا (الغزالي). وقد دفع "الحضور" الأرسطي لدى مناطقة الشرق الإسلامي الكاتبَ إلى تبيان مساهمة أرسطو - ضمن عناصرَ مساهِمة كثيرة - في تكريس خطاب إسلامي عقلاني جديد، وتشكيل المعالم الكبرى والجزئية لفلسفة هؤلاء المناطقة، التي تعبّر برأيه عن "تواصل" بين الفكرين اليوناني والإسلامي بدلًا مما يُحكى عن الانفصال والقطيعة والطلاق البائن، متجنِّبًا الانحياز إلى أحد طرفي الأزمة، المشنِّعين الذين يقذفون المنطق بشتى التهم، كإثارة الشبهات والباطل والرجم بالغيب من جهة، والقائلين بمادية فيلسوف اليونان وعقلانيته في مقابل لاعقلانية المسلمين وظلامية فكرهم، مع تشديده على تميز خطاب مفكري المشرق ضمن تاريخ الفلسفة المرافِق لهذا التواصل. وقد أتاح الجهد البحثي المبذول الانفتاحَ على أفق منطقي غير مدرسي اتبعته مجموعة من مفكري العالم الإسلامي، في محاولة لتكريس نظرة جديدة إلى التراثين اليوناني والإسلامي، متوسِّلًا لبلوغها كثرة الاستشهاد بنصوص المناطقة المشرقيين التي يُستدعى فيها أرسطو وسيلةً لإثبات حقيقة العلاقة بين الخطابين بطريقة علمية أمينة. (shrink)

Muḥyī al-Dīn ibn ‘Arabī (d. 638/1240) is arguably the most influential philosophical mystic in Islam. He is also a presentist. This paper responds to the arguments of contemporary philosophers, Norman Kretzmann, William Lane Craig, Garrett DeWeese, and Alan Padgett, who argue that divine atemporality and temporal presentism are incompatible, through the temporal ontology of Ibn ‘Arabī. Ibn ‘Arabī asserts that all entities in the universe are loci of manifestation of God’s most beautiful Names. These divine Names constitute sensible reality. The (...) principal response of Ibn ‘Arabī to the arguments of contemporary scholars is that the divine Names as they are manifested in the cosmos cannot be conflated with the divine Names as they are in themselves, which, in turn, cannot be conflated with God in His numinous essence. This allows him to simultaneously maintain the atemporality of God and temporal presentism. (shrink)

_This mirror for princes sheds light on the relationship between spiritual and political authority in early modern Egypt_ This guide to political behavior and expediency offers advice to Sufi shaykhs, or spiritual guides, on how to interact and negotiate with powerful secular officials, judges, and treasurers, or emirs. Translated into English for the first time, it is a unique account of the relationship between spiritual and political authority in late medieval / early modern Islamic society.

Solomon Ibn Gabirol The Fountain of Life (Fons Vitae) TRANSLATED BY Harry E. Wedeck WITH AN INTRODUCTION BY Theodore ...

Solomon Ibn Gabirol The Fountain of Life (Fons Vitae) TRANSLATED BY Harry E. Wedeck WITH AN INTRODUCTION BY Theodore E. James L ...

Ibn Khaldûn is one of the outstanding thinkers about the nature of society and politics in the pre-modern Arab world. This volume presents the political writings of the 14th-century philosopher, stressing their enduring relevance and exploring how his theory fits our own times.