Plotinus

Paper draft on the concept of participation in the Late Antique thought of Plotinus and Dionysius the Areopagite.

In Plotinus' Philosophical system of the world we can see three hypostases which result from each other vertically. They include: the One, the intellect, and the soul.There are various views concerning the genesis of the world, such as the theory of creation, which is suggested by holy books, the theory of theophany and manifestation, which belongs to gnostics, and the theory of emanation, in which most philosophers believe.Concerning the genesis of the world, Plotinus believed in emanation. This word is derived (...) from the Latin word "emanatio", meaning eruption from somewhere. According to Plotinus, the One is not the creator of the world so that He could create voluntarily. The world is the overflow of Divine springing. The One cannot create the world according to His free will because creation is a kind of activity, and attributing an act to God disrupts His Stability and is, therefore, a mistake. Thus Plotinus resorted to the metaphor of "emanation". He believed that God does not decrease by being emanated. He tried to follow a middle way between monotheistic creation, on the one hand, and pantheism, on the other. (shrink)

The oneness of being is still one of the most exciting and, at the same time, critical and controversial issues in the field of religious sciences. However, a correct study of it can decrease the number of the involved controversies to some extent. The writer has chosen Plotinus for this study because the Neo-Platonic philosophy, which has Plotinus as its founder, has influenced the thoughts of Muslim thinkers in the fields of gnosis and philosophy. This influence has been exercised through (...) the books Uthulugiya and The Book of Causes. When dealing with the degree that Neo-Platonic philosophy has influenced Islamic philosophy and, particularly, gnosis, some historians in the areas of philosophy and gnosis have gone into such extremes that they have introduced this school as the origin of all the ideas of Islamic thinkers. In this paper, it has been tried to inquire into one of the most important gnostic issues, namely, the oneness of being, from the viewpoints of Plotinus and some Neo-Platonists. It is also intended to clarify whether prominent gnostics, such as Ibn Arabi, and believers in the oneness of being had been influenced by Plotinus, or whether this issue was among the innovations of Muslim gnostics. (shrink)

The paper follows the development of the concept of transcendence ‹e)pe/keina› from the time when it first entered philosophy in Plato’s The Republic up to Plotinus, who thought it through in all its essential dimensions. In common with some thinkers before him, Plotinus thought of the concept of transcendence in the light of the absolute one Plato analyzed in the first hypothesis of Parmenides. The paper also shows how Plotinus understood transcendence with regard to Being and to thinking. The paper (...) aims to show how Plotinus, by his criticism of the onto-theo-logical structure of philosophical thought, already announced the criticism of traditional philosophy for which Martin Heidegger and Ludwig Wittgenstein became known in the 20th century. (shrink)

After concluding in the introduction that different things are beautiful in different ways, the first section of the treatise focuses on sensory beauty or beauty of bodies. Rejecting symmetry as a sufficient criterion for beauty, Plotinus explains that things in this world are beautiful to the extent that they participate in form and to the extent that shapeless matter is dominated by shape and the formative principle. Sensory beauty stirs the soul and helps it to recognise and remember transcendental beauty.

According to the history of aesthetics, Plotinus restored the dignity of which Plato’s verdict on artists in The Republic, especially his notorious mirror analogy in the tenth book, had deprived them. The paper analyses the key topics in the first chapter of Plotinus’ treatise On Noetic Beauty : the meaning of arts and their function, the way Plotinus’ aesthetics is firmly embedded in his metaphysics, the defence of imitation/representation of nature and Phidias’ creation of his statue of Zeus at Olympia. (...) It also discusses other authors as possible models for Plotinus. An exploration of inspiration in Phidias opens up questions concerning the role of imagination and the possibilities for symbolism and idealism in art. A comparison of selected passages from Plotinus’ and Plato’s writings shows that there are unexpectedly many points of contact between the two authors and that both explore a range of possibilities from imitation/representation of objects belonging to the visible world, to creation independent of visible models. (shrink)

Augustine′s conversion to Christianity in A.D. 386 is a pivotal moment not only in his own life, but in Christian and world history, for the theology of Augustine set the course of theological and cultural development in the western Christian church. But to what exactly was Augustine converted? Scholars have long debated whether he really converted to Christianity in 386, whether he was a Platonist, and, if he adhered to both Platonism and Christianity, which dominated his thought. The debate of (...) the last thirteen decades spans an immense body of literature in multiple languages. In this literature, four major views on Augustine′s conversion may be discerned. The first view is associated with Gaston Boissier and Adolph von Harnack, and was famously championed by Prosper Alfaric: that Augustine in 386 converted to neo-Platonism but not to Christianity. Second, there is the view recently promoted by Catherine Conybeare: that Augustine in 386 converted to Christianity and rejected neo-Platonism. Third, there is the view that he converted to Christianity and was also a neo-Platonist; the most famous adherents of this view are Robert J. O′Connell and Pierre Courcelle. Finally, there is the view recently promoted by Carol Harrison: that Augustine committed to Christianity in 386, yet did not utterly reject neo-Platonism; rather, he aimed to develop a Christian faith that was informed by neo-Platonic insight. In this article, I first explain and distinguish these four general views, and then I explain why I prefer the fourth view. -/- More Info: This is the pre-peer reviewed version of Boone, Mark, "The Role of Platonism in Augustine's 386 Conversion to Christianity," Religion Compass 9.5 (May 2015), 151-61. This article has been published in final form at http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/rec3.12149/abstract. (shrink)

In one of the most famous but equally obscure passages in the Timaeus, Plato describes the generation of time and the heavens. The “moving image of eternity” (37d5) is commonly read as Plato’s most general characterisation of time. Rémi Brague famously challenged the traditional interpretation on linguistic grounds by claiming that Plato actually did not conceive of time as an image (εἰκών) but rather as a number (ἀριθμός). In this paper, I shall claim that this controversy is by no means (...) a modern one. The traditional interpretation is mostly owed to Plato’s most prominent reader, Plotinus, who famously conceives of time in relation to eternity (Enn. III.7.13.24-25). Brague’s alternative reading, however, is anticipated by Simplicius’ attempt to refute the Plotinian interpretation, as I shall show. According to my reconstruction, Simplicius’ reading of the Timaeus not only shows why the traditional interpretation falls short, but it also offers a systematic argument that bolsters Brague’s alternative reading. Finally, I shall show that this is consistent with Plato’s text. It shall become clear that current interpretative problems are essentially prefigured in the late ancient debate. (shrink)

In his Confessions, Augustine says that he achieved great intellectual insight from what he cryptically calls the “books of the Platonists.” Prior to reading these books, he was a corporealist and was unable to conceive of incorporeal beings. Because of the insurmountable philosophical problems corporealism caused for the Christian belief he was seeking, Augustine claims that this was the greatest intellectual barrier he faced in converting to Christianity. As such, the specific contents and effects of these Platonist books are of (...) great biographical and philosophical interest. Heretofore, the explanation of the contents and effects of these books has not been forthcoming. This essay aims to supply it. I argue that Augustine learned the mereological distinction between pertensive and entensive presence in the books of the Platonists. This distinction is required for properly conceiving of incorporeal beings. In support of this thesis, I show that Augustine himself says that he learned this very distinction, that the distinction is present in Platonist texts that scholars agree were among “the books of the Platonists,” that the distinction is present in one of Augustine’s earliest works, and that this distinction is uniquely capable of resolving the philosophical difficulties he faced as a corporealist. (shrink)

L'originalité de la philosophie de Platon et de Plotin est de situer l'origine de toutes choses dans un principe supérieur au monde physique et matériel. Cette décision philosophique, qui ne va pas de soi, visant à placer la cause de toutes choses dans un principe transcendant et immatériel, est concomitante d'un autre choix philosophique consistant à "séparer" la cause de son effet, le haut du bas, l'intelligible du sensible, l'invisible du visible, l'incorporel du corporel. De telles "séparations" poseront à Platon (...) et à Plotin le problème de l'unité du monde et des "relations" que ces deux niveaux différents peuvent ou doivent malgré tout entretenir afin d'éviter toute forme de dérive dualiste et de vision pessimiste du monde. Cet ouvrage propose d'affronter cette question épineuse et d'apprécier la pertinence de la solution qu'y apportent Platon et Plotin, en développant chacun une "philosophie de la relation" tout à fait originale et stimulante. (shrink)

Le système métaphysique du platonicien chrétien Marsile Ficin se caractérise par une ample utilisation des analogies et, plus particulièrement, de l’analogie de la lumière. Compte tenu de l’énorme éventail de ces applications, le présent article se concentre sur une question spécifique, à savoir celle de la relation entre lumière et ombre en relation avec sa notion de matière, et sur un texte spécifique : le Commentaire sur les «Ennéades» de Plotin, que Ficin a publié vers la fin de sa carrière. (...) L’article se divise en trois sections : 1) Enquête sur une gamme d’applications de l’analogie de la lumière chez Ficin ; 2) Résumé de l’interprétation de Ficin concernant la doctrine de la matière (supérieure et inférieure) de Plotin, en particulier dans Ennéades I. 8, II. 4, et III. 6 ; 3) Discussion de la manière dont Ficin applique l’analogie de la lumière et de l’ombre à la doctrine de la matière. Un thème important de l’article est la presénce d’une tension structurelle entre les notions de matière en tant que continuum et en tant que «barrière», indiquée par l’analogie de l’ombre. Ce thème est exploité par Ficin en vue de renforcer la doctrine (dérivée de certains passages de Plotin) selon laquelle Dieu exerce la causalité sans aucune médiation entre lui et ses effets. (shrink)

How does Plotinus interpret the chora in Plato’s Timaeus? For him, Timaeus 48e‑52d deals with matter (hyle). The identification of chora with hyle goes back to Aristotle’s Physics IV.2. Aristotle’s interpretation of Plato’s chora as matter was echoed by Theophrastus and the Stoics and prevailed in Middle‑Platonist, neo‑Pythagorean and early Christian authors. In addition to the identification of chora with hyle, the ancient interpreters of the Timaeus conflated hyle with Plato’s ananke (Tim. 47e‑48a). Plato himself distinguishes between chora and ananke. (...) The latter denotes everything that appears in the “receptacle” prior to the ordering of the world by the demiurge, while chora is another name for the receptacle itself. In Plato, the receptacle accounts for the fact both that there are transient images of intelligible beings and that these images appear to occupy a place, i.e. that they are spatially extended. This is why the receptacle is given its alternative name “ground” (chora) and why it is also called “place” (topos) and “seat” (hedra). Although the receptacle itself cannot be spatially extended in the same way as that which appears “in it”, it is the cause of spatial extension. For Plotinus, two characteristics of matter are of primary importance : lack of size and impassibility. In the treatise II.4.[12].2‑5, he highlights the former, and in III.6[26].7‑19 he elaborates on the latter, while commenting once again on the former. In III.6[26].7‑19, he argues that this conception of matter is in line with how Plato conceives of it in the Timaeus. The “receptacle” cannot be acted upon (paschein) nor can it possess any size (megethos). Only the images of true beings “in” it can. In doing so, however, they make matter appear to “stretch out” alongside themselves. But this is not actually the case, because matter itself has no extension. On one point, however, Plotinus’ account differs from Plato’s. According to Plotinus, not only does matter not possess size, but it is not the cause of size either. The size of the appearances derives from the formulas (logoi) of which these appearances are images. Each formula encompasses within itself the measure of the size that its image will assume : the formula of horse encompasses the size of a particular horse, the formula of human being the size of a particular human being. Plotinus describes in more detail how a formula, in unfolding out of the soul, “stretches out”, thus acquiring size. He also makes a comparison between this process and the way in which formulas in the human soul display images of themselves in our image‑making faculty. He characterises this process as a motion starting from the formula and resulting in its “division” (merismos). This is what makes the image of the formula extended, i.e. divided partes extra partes, when it appears against the invisible background of matter. Since matter neither possesses size nor is the cause of it, it can be called “ground” (chora), “place” (topos) or “seat” (hedra) only in an improper way. (shrink)

No tratado 10 (V 1), 8, ao examinar a questão da constituição das hipóstases inteligíveis, Plotino observa que tais teses não são novas, mas há muito enunciadas pelos filósofos anteriores e notadamente por Platão. De tal modo, sua investigação acerta de tais temas constitui-se como uma exegese dos antigos e dos diálogos platônicos. No início da interrogação acerca da eternidade e do tempo no tratado 45 (III 7), Plotino observa a necessidade de examinar o que os antigos filósofos disseram acerca (...) da temática investigada, propondo um exame doxográfico a fim de que se possa obter “por si mesmo” uma compreensão adequada sobre o tempo a partir de seu paradigma, a eternidade. Nesse sentido, nossa proposta é de elaborar uma breve investigação acerca da possibilidade de articulação desses dois textos plotinianos por meio de alguns elementos presentes no tratado 20 (I 3), Sobre a dialética. De tal modo, pretende-se obter uma aproximação de alguns procedimentos metodológicos do pensamento de Plotino. Palavras-chave: Exegese, Dialética, Método Filosófico, Leitura dos Antigos, Plotino. (shrink)

L’état actuel de nos recherches ne nous permet pas d’établir des liens très précis entre les gnostiques et Plotin avant que celui-ci ne quitte l’Égypte pour fonder son école à Rome – les informations biographiques des quarante années précédant cet événement demeurant effectivement très fragmentaires –, mais nous savons toutefois que le fondateur du néoplatonisme a assisté là-bas aux enseignements d’Ammonius Saccas.

This note aims to show that the text attested by the Medieval sources for Plotinus, Ennead IV, 6 (41) 2, 22-24 can be retained, notwithstanding the doubts of several scholars who tried to amend it. Retaining the manuscript tradition enables us to read in the passage three different kinds of vision of the soul : (1) the soul’s ordinary vision of itself, characterized by duality and otherness ; (2) the soul’s vision of intellect and (3) its vision of itself, when (...) she is within the intelligible : both these visions are characterized by the unified duality of the subject and the object of vision. (shrink)

Na tradução das Enéadas de MacKenna (1969), encontra-se uma rica introdução de Paul Henry ao pensamento de Plotino, especialmente no que se refere à recepção do neoplatônico pela posteridade. Nesse texto preambular, há uma afirmação de caráter controverso, que consiste em considerar que o homem em Plotino seria “isolado”, não sendo viável concebê-lo como animal político. Desta feita, a antropologia plotiniana se distinguiria do célebre entendimento de Aristóteles acerca do homem como animal político e de Platão, na medida em que (...) se aceite haver no filósofo da academia pressupostos teóricos semelhantes, isto é, relativos à natureza política do homem. O objetivo desse trabalho é realizar um breve exame sobre se seria possível pensar o homem como animal político em Plotino, o que se averiguará a partir das considerações do filósofo concernentes à antropologia e à virtude nos excertos pertinentes das Enéadas. (shrink)

Dans cette étude consacrée à Platon et Plotin, il s'agit de mettre au jour toute l'originalité de la pensée de Platon et de Plotin face au problème de la séparation à travers l'analyse précises de certains dialogues de Platon et de Traités significatifs de Plotin.

L’édition critique des œuvres de Plotin par Paul Henry et Hans-Rudolf Schwyzer, parue en 1951, 1959 et 1973 en trois volumes de l’editio maior (Leuven, Museum Lessianum) et en 1964, 1977 et 1982 en trois volumes de l’editio minor (Oxford, Oxford Classical Texts), était certes un événement majeur pour la recherche sur la philosophie antique en général et pour les études plotiniennes en particulier. De 1492 à 1835, sous la forme imprimée, on avait accès aux Ennéades de Plotin dans la (...) traduction... (shrink)

According to a straightforward reading of Enn. 6.2.21, all principles (logoi) in nature have their origin in corresponding features of a divine Intellect. But interpreters have often advocated more restricted readings of Intellect’s contents. Restricted readings are based in part on other textual evidence, and in part on the grounds that a more expansive reading would seem to require Intellect to think objects of trivial value (‘the value problem’) or whose purposes depend upon facts about sensible reality to which it (...) has no access (‘the teleology problem’). This paper argues that restricted readings are not well founded, and that Plotinus is committed to a more expansive conception of Intellect’s contents by his understanding of Plato’s paradeigmatism. (shrink)

Plotinus’ philosophical project includes an important Socratic element. Plotinus is namely interested in both self-knowledge and care of soul and self. In this study I examine how through his interpretation of three passages from Plato, Plotinus develops an account of the role of care in his ethics. Care in Plotinus’ ethical thought takes three forms. First of all, care is involved in maintaining the unity of the embodied self. Secondly, situated in a providential universe, our souls – as sisters to (...) the world soul - take part in the providential order by caring for ‘lower’ realities. Finally, Plotinus develops an ethics of going beyond virtue, a process which involves care for the higher, potentially divine, self. (shrink)

Plotinus’ philosophical project includes an important Socratic element. Plotinus is namely interested in both self-knowledge and care of soul and self. In this study I examine how through his interpretation of three passages from Plato, Plotinus develops an account of the role of care in his ethics. Care in Plotinus’ ethical thought takes three forms. First of all, care is involved in maintaining the unity of the embodied self. Secondly, situated in a providential universe, our souls – as sisters to (...) the world soul - take part in the providential order by caring for ‘lower’ realities. Finally, Plotinus develops an ethics of going beyond virtue, a process which involves care for the higher, potentially divine, self. (shrink)

In this paper, I argue that Plotinus’s critique of divine deliberation in Ennead 6.7 does not seek to banish teleology altogether from his philosophy of nature. Rather, his critique aims to situate teleology within his own metaphysical system so as to reconcile it with the basic principles governing the intelligible universe. In this sense, Plotinus does not propose that we expunge all reference to notions of utility and benefit from our natural explanations; he merely wishes to render those notions coherent (...) with an ontology in which the intelligible always takes precedence over sensible reality. To this end, Plotinus introduces, first, what I call a vertical teleology, where the different animal species create the necessary conditions for the maintenance of higher forms of intelligible life, such as genera. Second, Plotinus advances what I call a horizontal teleology, where the various animal organs serve to provide a minimal coefficient of noetic content to each species in its respective ontic level. Plotinus thus sketches the outlines of a properly ‘noetic’ teleology in Ennead 6.7. (shrink)

In this paper, I argue that Plotinus does not limit the sphere of free human agency simply to intellectual contemplation, but rather extends it all the way to human praxis. Plotinus’s goal in the first six chapters of Ennead 6.8 is, accordingly, to demarcate the space of freedom within human practical actions. He ultimately concludes that our external actions are free whenever they actualize, in unhindered fashion, the moral principles derived from intellectual contemplation. This raises the question of how the (...) freedom of practical actions might relate to the freedom of intellectual contemplation. After considering two previously offered models—a model of double activity, and an Aristotelian model of practical syllogism—I offer a third alternative, namely a model of moral attunement, according to which our rational desires assume a kind of ‘care of the soul’ through active supervision. Practical life is thus imbued with freedom to the extent that the soul supervises its actions to conform to its will and choice of the good. (shrink)

In _Plotinus on Love_, Alberto Bertozzi argues that love is the origin, culmination, and regulative force of the double movement that characterizes Plotinus' metaphysics: the derivation of all reality from the One and the return of the soul to it.

Augustine’s accounts of his so-called mystical experiences in conf. 7.10.16, 17.23, and 9.10.24 are puzzling. The primary problem is that, although in all three accounts he claims to have seen “that which is,” we have no satisfactory account of what “that which is” is supposed to be. I shall be arguing that, contrary to a common interpretation, Augustine’s intellectual “seeing” of “being” in Books 7 and 9 was not a vision of the Christian God as a whole, nor of one (...) of the divine persons, each of whom is equally God, according to Augustine. This becomes clear when we attend to the fact that Augustine is appropriating a specific meaning of “that which is” or “being” used by Plotinus in his account of the lover of Beauty. This resolution, however, leads to a second question. Is there anything distinctively Christian about any, or all, of Augustine’s ascents? On the one hand, it would be odd if there were not, given that the Confessions are addressed to the Christian God. On the other hand, upon close inspection we find that the allegedly specific “Christian” characteristics that modern commentators have identified in the ascents of conf. 7 and 9 also occur in the Neoplatonists. I will argue that there is in fact one important difference between Augustine and the Neoplatonists here that has not been pointed out in these prior interpretations. (shrink)

This article analyses the Plotinian reconsideration of the link between the definition of happiness and the homonymy of life. To safeguard Platonism, Plotinus inverts the Aristotelian discussions of homonymy and its metaphysical implications, and presents the prior-posterior relationship in terms of progressive degradation. Happiness does not consist of “life” in general nor of the “rational life” ; rather, it consists of the life that is situated in the ontologically first and most perfect degree, which is the life that pertains to (...) intelligence and is consubstantial with it, and of which the other lives are progressively degraded derivations. The man who possesses the first and perfect life of the intelligible in actuality, like the gods, can be considered happy. (shrink)

Ursula Coope presents a ground-breaking study of the philosophy of the Neoplatonists. She explores their understanding of freedom and responsibility: an entity is free to the extent that it is wholly in control of itself, self-determining, self-constituting, and self-knowing - which only a non-bodily thing can be.

_The Plotinus Reader_ provides a generous selection of translations from the fifty-four treatises that together make up the _Enneads_ of Plotinus, a central work in the history of philosophy. They were prepared by a team of specialists in ancient philosophy and edited by Lloyd P. Gerson. Based on the definitive critical edition of the Greek along with decades of additional textual criticism by many scholars, these translations aim to provide a readable, accurate rendering of Plotinus’s often very difficult language. Included (...) are extensive references to Plotinus’s sources, scores of cross-references, and an extensive glossary of technical terms. (shrink)