11 found
Order:
See also
A. K. Flowerree
Texas Tech University
  1. When to Psychologize.A. K. Flowerree - 2023 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy (4):968-982.
    The central focus of this paper is to motivate and explore the question, when is it permissible to endorse a psychologizing explanation of a sincere interlocutor? I am interested in the moral question of when (if ever) we may permissibly dismiss the sincere reasons given to us by others, and instead endorse an alternative explanation of their beliefs and actions. I argue that there is a significant risk of wronging the other person, and so we should only psychologize when we (...)
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  2. Agency of belief and intention.A. K. Flowerree - 2017 - Synthese 194 (8):2763-2784.
    In this paper, I argue for a conditional parity thesis: if we are agents with respect to our intentions, we are agents with respect to our beliefs. In the final section, I motivate a categorical version of the parity thesis: we are agents with respect to belief and intention. My aim in this paper is to show that there is no unique challenge facing epistemic agency that is not also facing agency with respect to intention. My thesis is ambitious on (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   13 citations  
  3. Evidentialism in action.A. K. Flowerree - 2020 - Philosophical Studies 177 (11):3409-3426.
    Sometimes it is practically beneficial to believe what is epistemically unwarranted. Philosophers have taken these cases to raise the question are there practical reasons for belief? Evidentialists argue that there cannot be any such reasons. Putative practical reasons for belief are not reasons for belief, but reasons to manage our beliefs in a particular way. Pragmatists are not convinced. They accept that some reasons for belief are practical. The debate, it is widely thought, is at an impasse. But this debate (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   6 citations  
  4. Epistemic Partiality.A. K. Flowerree - forthcoming - In Kurt Sylvan, Matthias Steup, Ernest Sosa & Jonathan Dancy (eds.), The Blackwell Companion to Epistemology.
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  5. Epistemic Schmagency?A. K. Flowerree - 2018 - In Christos Kyriacou & Robin McKenna (eds.), Metaepistemology: Realism & Antirealism. Palgrave Macmillan. pp. 289-310.
    Constructivist approaches in epistemology and ethics offer a promising account of normativity. But constructivism faces a powerful Schmagency Objection, raised by David Enoch. While Enoch’s objection has been widely discussed in the context of practical norms, no one has yet explored how the Schmagency Objection might undermine epistemic constructivism. In this paper, I rectify that gap. First, I develop the objection against a prominent form of epistemic constructivism, Belief Constitutivism. Belief Constitutivism is susceptible to a Schmagency Objection, I argue, because (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   3 citations  
  6. Moral Grandstanding and Norms of Moral Discourse.A. K. Flowerree & Mark Satta - 2023 - Journal of the American Philosophical Association:1-28.
    Moral grandstanding is the use of moral talk for self-promotion. Recent philosophical work assumes that people can often accurately identify instances of grandstanding. In contrast, we argue that people are generally unable to reliably recognize instances of grandstanding, and that we are typically unjustified in judging that others are grandstanding as a result. From there we argue that, under most circumstances, to judge others as grandstanders is to fail to act with proper intellectual humility. We then examine the significance of (...)
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  7.  1
    Reasoning Through Narrative.A. K. Flowerree - forthcoming - Episteme:1-15.
    A peculiar feature of our species is that we settle what to believe, value, and do by reasoning through narratives. A narrative is adiachronic, information-rich story that contains persons, objects, and at least one event. When we reason through narrative, we usenarrative to settle what to do, to make predictions, to guide normative expectations, and to ground which reactive attitudes we think areappropriate in a situation. Narratives explain, justify, and provide understanding. Narratives play a ubiquitous role in human reasoning. Andyet, (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  8. Entitled to Attention? Cooperativity, Context, and Standing.A. K. Flowerree - 2022 - Journal of Philosophical Research 47:199-210.
    Attention is a finite, morally significant good. Attention is a precondition for healthy human relationships, and its absence can wrong others by cutting them off from vital human goods. At the same time, human persons have limited powers of attention. And so the question arises, when does someone legitimately command my attention? In Conversational Pressure, Sanford Goldberg argues that the competent speaker has a default entitlement to normatively expect the addressee to attend, even if only for a short while. If (...)
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  9. When in Doubt, Withhold: A Defense of Two Rational Grounds for Withholding.A. K. Flowerree - forthcoming - In Kevin McCain, Scott Stapleford & Matthias Steup (eds.), Epistemic Dilemmas: New Angles, New Arguments. Routledge.
    Recent work has argued that there may be cases where no attitude – including withholding – is rationally permissible. In this paper, I consider two such epistemic dilemmas, John Turri’s Dilemma from Testimony and David Alexander’s Dilemma from Doubt. Turri presents a case where one’s only evidence rules out withholding (without warranting belief or disbelief). Alexander presents a case where higher order doubt means one must withhold judgment over whether withholding judgment is rational. In both cases, the authors conclude that (...)
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  10. Infection and Directness in the Interventionist Account of the Basing Relation.A. K. Flowerree - 2017 - Syndicate Philosophy:1-7.
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  11. Towards an Expansive Epistemology: Norms, Action, and the Social Sphere.Baron Reed & A. K. Flowerree (eds.) - forthcoming - Routledge.
    No categories
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark