By asking how well theological views of human nature stand up to the discoveries of modern science, Alan Olding re-opens the question of whether the "design" argument for the existence of God is fatally undermined. A distinctive feature of the work is its emphasis on the metaphysical implications of biology and how these at times conflict with other, more plausible metaphysical positions. Another is its close critical examination of the "design" argument and of the relation God has to the world (...) he creates. "Modern Biology and Natural Theology" takes up issues currently of concern to many thinkers and will provide fascinating reading for anyone interested in philosophical problems, particularly the impact of Darwinism on natural theology. (shrink)

Professor Gill's recent defence of the notion of ‘reasons of the heart’ in religion 1 depends upon Polanyi's view that through ‘tacit knowledge’ of lower levels of reality we can come to know something of higher levels - even, I take it, of God, himself, as the highest level of all. Unfortunately, Polanyi's argument for such a hierarchy of being is confused and depends for its apparent strength on an illicit mixing together of ontological and what may be loosely called (...) methodological claims. Because of this and other confusions, the argument is difficult to state concisely. For convenience I will first use Marjorie Grene's formulation. (shrink)

Of all the arguments for the existence of God, the argument from design is in many respects the most impressive, as everyone remarks that Kant remarked. Certainly it is an argument which seems to have appealed to the popular imagination and even today does not lack philosophical proponents. The purpose of the present paper is to examine a recent formulation of the argument. In particular I shall be concerned to bring into the open its dualist assumptions and to show how (...) these militate against its general plausibility. (shrink)

If, as is now commonly believed, there are no impenetrable fences separating science from philosophy, there seems no good reason why scientists and philosophers should not cultivate each other's gardens. It is in this spirit, and not as a mere servant, that Senchuk works to bring down the theory of the instinctive in its various guises and replace it with his own account of conscious flexibility. His primary concern is, I think, with the explanation of human behavior, but frogs, geese, (...) and other beasts are also given their day. The result is a very good book which is densely packed with argument relieved by humor. (shrink)