In their paper 'After-birth abortion: why should the baby live?' Alberto Giubilini and Francesca Minerva argue that because there are no significant differences between a fetus and a neonate, in that neither possess sufficiently robust mental traits to qualify as persons, a neonate may be justifiably killed for any reason that also justifies abortion. To further emphasise their view that a newly born infant is more on a par with a fetus rather than a more developed baby, Giubilini and Minerva (...) elect to call this 'after-birth abortion' rather than infanticide. In this paper, I argue that their thesis is incorrect, and that the moral permissibility of abortion does not entail the moral permissibility of 'after-birth' abortion. (shrink)

In this paper, I appeal to two aspects of Immanuel Kant’s philosophy – his metaphysics and ethics – in defense of abortion rights. Many Kantian pro-life philosophers argue that Kant’s second principle formulation of the categorical imperative, which proscribes treating persons as mere means, applies to human embryos and fetuses. Kant is clear, however, that he means his imperatives to apply to persons, individuals of a rational nature. It is important to determine, therefore, whether there is anything in Kant’s philosophy (...) that permits regarding embryos and fetuses as persons, since they lack the capacity for sentience (at least until mid-gestation), let alone rational thought. In the first part of the paper, I will illustrate why there are difficulties maintaining, from a Kantian perspective, that conception marks the genesis of a new person. Even granting that embryos and fetuses are persons, however, this alone would not entail the moral impermissibility of abortion rights, mainly because prohibiting abortion, and compelling women to gestate, violates the formula of humanity against them. Developing this thesis encompasses the second part of my essay. Finally, although I argue that Kant’s philosophy lends strong support to abortion rights, this does not thereby entail that it allows for the complete dehumanization of the human fetus. By appealing to the writings of Kantian scholar Allen Wood, I will argue that a fetus’ status as a potential person does render it worthy of some degree of respect and moral value. (shrink)

This paper has a double purpose: firstly, to assess the importance of seiðr magic rituals and of its practitioners within the social and mythological framework of Old norse-icelandic Literature. Secondly, by means of the analysis of certain scenes in The Saga of Gísli Súrsson, i aim to demonstrate that the inclusion of magic-religious motifs in the Sagas of icelanders has a triple objective: to provide a model to help understand apparently inexplicable phenomena, to intensify the tragic tone of the plot (...) and finally to depict those involved in the performance of seiðr in a very negative light. (shrink)

By emphasizing the parallels between both racial vilification and the vilification that takes place when we discuss abortion in our society, I hope to provide a new perspective on the way the United States converses about this divisive issue. This perspective, in turn, can help us see how we can move forward from the stagnate polemics that have permeated the abortion debate in the United States for the past 40 years.

In this essay, I provide evidence that a new generation of prochoice advocates wishes to move away from defending abortion rights via the view that fetal life has little or no value and toward a more complex view of abortion rights. This newer view simultaneously grants that fetuses are more than simply “clumps of cells,” that they are, to some extent, entities that possess some degree of value, and also that women still have the right to decide whether they wish (...) to continue a pregnancy. Prima facie, this may sound like an impossible task—an instance of “having your cake and eating it too”—but I will show throughout my paper that, and how, such a task can indeed be accomplished. (shrink)

This chapter explores the phenomenon of dehumanization, and how it facilitates violence, in the episode “Men Against Fire.” After exploring the nature, and consequences, of the MASS Implant as a tool to see human beings as literal monsters, we consider some historical and contemporary examples of dehumanization, such as language and propaganda, that functions similarly by stripping away the humanity of marginalized groups. “Men Against Fire” simultaneously serves the function of a historical lesson on the relationship between dehumanization and violence, (...) as well as a cautionary tale in a current society that is already repeating so many of the mistakes that have lead to genocide and mass human rights violations in the past. (shrink)

Arguments both in favor and against including undocumented immigrants in healthcare reform abound. However, many of these arguments, including ones that are favorable towards immigrants, are ethically problematic, and for the same reason; namely, that they either support or deny the inclusion of undocumented immigrants in healthcare reform based on their perceived level of desert, due to their alleged contribution to our social utility, or lack thereof. This encourages gauging the lives and worth of undocumented immigrants in terms of their (...) productivity or output, rather than viewing them as intrinsically valuable human beings. This, in turn, contributes to the instrumentalization of undocumented immigrants’ welfare; for even arguments in favor of including them in healthcare reform encourage viewing them as, in Kantian language, mere means instead of ends in themselves. In this paper, I will be critical of arguments that either seek to exclude or include undocumented immigrants from healthcare reform or access based on social utility and will, instead, champion arguments in favor of inclusion that rely on fostering a sense of solidarity and identification amongst citizens and migrants. (shrink)

This chapter focuses on one of the common fallacies in Western philosophy called ' weak analogy'. As Patrick Hurley writes, the weak analogy fallacy “occurs when the conditions of an argument depend on an analogy (or similarity) that is not strong enough to support the conclusion”. Often, vegetarians and vegans will hear the following argument from analogy in defense of carnivorism: “Animals eat each other in nature, so it's permissible for us to eat them as well”. By focusing on the (...) similarities between animals and humans, and by arguing that these similarities are indeed relevant to the issue at hand, philosopher Peter Singer presents a strong argument from analogy in favor of the conclusion that animals are indeed sentient beings. (shrink)

"Medio euro por kilo recolectado de fresa o espárrago. Es lo que cobran unas 50 mujeres de Rumanía, Polonia y Ucrania empleadas en la localidad francesa de Brunath, a unos 20 kilómetros al oeste de Estrasburgo" (Francia, 2009) "las víctimas viajaban engañadas en cuanto a las condiciones de trabajo que tendrían que realizar y, sobre todo, en relación a las cantidades económicas que debían devolver a la organización n concepto de gastos de viaje" (España, 2010) "los jefes de la organización (...) disponían de pizarras colgadas de la pared donde, a modo de planning, aparecían los nombres de jóvenes y el lugar en el que se hallaban en cada momento" (España, 2011) "Seis mujeres, entre ellas, una menor de edad, realizaban actividades sexuales y convivencia con los clientes; el dinero lo entregaban al dueño del bar" (México, 2011). (shrink)

El artículo analiza algunos aspectos de la comunicación política tomando como referencia las elecciones generales españolas de 1996, a fin de reflexionar sobre la eficacia de la Comunicación Política aplicada y sus riesgos en una sociedad democrática. Retórica y democracia van juntas por cuanto la retórica es el arte de la palabra y la palabra es consustancial a la democracia. El problema es que la palabra ha de entenderse hoy como el resultado de un uso científicamente programado de la comunicación (...) que afecta profundamente el discurso clásico de la política. (shrink)

Das Buch untersucht die Bedeutung des Begriffs rationalitas bei Hildegard von Bingen. Zunachst wird die Herkunft des Begriffs von der griechischen Logoslehre uber die fruhchristliche Trinitatsspekulation bis hin zur ratio-Rezeption des Fruhmittelalters beleuchtet. Auf diesem Hintergrund entfaltet der zweite Teil die anthropologisch-theologische Bedeutung von rationalitas fur das Weltbild Hildegards.

In 1969 Harry Frankfurt published his hugely influential paper 'Alternate Possibilities and Moral Responsibility' in which he claimed to present a counterexample to the so-called 'Principle of Alternate Possibilities' ('a person is morally responsible for what he has done only if he could have done otherwise'). The success of Frankfurt-style cases as counterexamples to the Principle has been much debated since. I present an objection to these cases that, in questioning their conceptual cogency, undercuts many of those debates. Such cases (...) all require a counterfactual mechanism that could cause an agent to perform an action that he cannot avoid performing. I argue that, given our concept of what it is for someone to act, this requirement is inconsistent. Frankfurt-style alleged counterexamples are cases where an agent is morally responsible for an action he performs even though, the claim goes, he could not have avoided performing that action. However, it has recently been argued, e.g. by John Fischer, that a counterexample to the Principle could be a 'Fischer-style case', i.e. a case where the agent can either perform the action or do nothing else. I argue that, although Fischer-style cases do not share the conceptual flaw common to all Frankfurt-style cases, they also fail as counterexamples to the Principle. The paper finishes with a brief discussion of the significance of the Principle of Alternate Possibilities. (shrink)

Doctors Pratt and de Vries propose a well-structured and courageous approach to analyse and repair an insufficiently recognised discussion about epistemologies and knowledge production in bioethics.1 The authors invite researchers, scholars, public health experts and bioethicists from the global North to reflect about their lack of imagination regarding different sources of narratives produced by the global South. There is a critical analysis of injustices and an urgent call for global bioethicists to reorient their field and focus on the analysis and (...) development of ethical interventions to achieve a comprehensive epistemic justice for global health ethics. Feminist bioethicists from the global South already argued about the importance of the voices and biographies of the people and groups in the communities to reframe the bioethical reasoning regarding the meaning of individual’s needs during public health and humanitarian emergencies.2 Over a decade ago, Diniz and Guilhem described the role and goal of feminist bioethics in Latin America, shaped in an oppressive context promoted and created by …. (shrink)

Reasons can play a variety of roles in a variety of contexts. For instance, reasons can motivate and guide us in our actions (and omissions), in the sense that we often act in the light of reasons. And reasons can be grounds for beliefs, desires and emotions and can be used to evaluate, and sometimes to justify, all these. In addition, reasons are used in explanations: both in explanations of human actions, beliefs, desires, emotions, etc., and in explanations of a (...) wide range of phenomena involving all sorts of animate and inanimate substances. This diversity has encouraged the thought that the term 'reason' is ambiguous or has different senses in different contexts. Moreover, this view often goes hand in hand with the claim that reasons of these different kinds belong to different ontological categories: to facts (or something similar) in the case of normative/justifying reasons, and to mental states in the case of motivating/explanatory reasons. In this paper I shall explore some of the main roles that reasons play and, on that basis, I shall offer a classification of kinds of reasons. As will become clear, my classification of reasons is at odds with much of the literature in several respects: first, because of my views about how we should understand the claim that reasons are classified into different kinds; second, because of the kinds into which I think reasons should be classified; and, finally, because of the consequences I think this view has for the ontology of reasons. (shrink)

In Brazil, the epicenter of the Zika crisis, brown, black, and indigenous poor women living in municipalities with scarce resources were disproportionally affected. The gendered consequences of the epidemic exposed how intersectional lenses are central to understand the impact of public health emergencies in the lives of women and girls. The demand for Zika-affected children and women to be research participants is relevant for an ethical analysis of participant protection procedures during a crisis. We investigated how women experienced research participation (...) by analyzing their narratives. Two-year-long longitudinal qualitative study in Brazilian sites located in the epidemic's epicenter was performed using mixed methods: ethnography with women from two distinct states and individual semi-structured interviews with five women in different Zika-affected states, four of which were community leaders. All women in the study were mothers or grandmothers of Zika-affected children. Thematic analysis was used for data evaluation. Women perceived being pressured to participate in research and a lack of benefit sharing. Structural determinants of gender inequality, such as its effect on power distribution, were found to impact research participant protection. Formal procedures for research protocols approvals were insufficient in protecting participants because these instruments were unable to account for structural aspects. Communitarian mobilization, through WhatsApp groups, was found to be an important mechanism to create conditions to challenge oppressive structures. Strengthening public health, effective community-based participation in research planning and implantation of ethical strategies that promotes gender equality can have transformative effect on unequal power structures and promote participant protection. (shrink)