У статті оцінюється значення онтологічної та метафізичної проблематики у сучасному філософському дискурсі, критично аналізується концепція монографії Андрія Баумейстера «Буття і благо» та пропонується інтерпретація буття як ствердження реальності в соціально детермінованій дії.
During the 1930s, Aleksandr Promptov—a student of the founder of Russian population genetics Sergei Chetverikov—developed an elaborate concept of speciation in birds. He conducted field investigations aimed at giving a naturalistic content to the theoretical formulations and laboratory models of evolutionary processes advanced within the framework of population genetics, placing particular emphasis on the evolutionary role of bird behavior. Yet, although highly synthetic in combining biogeographical, taxonomic, genetic, ecological, and behavioral studies, Promptov's speciation concept was ignored by the architects (...) of the 1930s and 1940s evolutionary synthesis, including Theodosius Dobzhnasky, Ernst Mayr, and Julian Huxley. In this article, I argue that the story of Promptov's concept and its reception by other evolutionists challenges the traditional presentation of the synthesis as a singular, international process of the unification of biology, which led to the creation of a universal synthetic theory of evolution. It suggests that during the same time period, within largely the same theoretical framework, there were multiple, intrinsically local, attempts at creating synthetic evolutionary concepts. These concepts were often quite particular—in their taxonomic applicability, in their explanations of various evolutionary factors, and in the range of disciplines unified in the synthesis. Apparently, these concepts ran contrary to the universal aspirations of the synthesis architects, and as a result, they were disregarded, first by the architects and later by historians of the evolutionary synthesis. (shrink)
In Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn, Daniel Mahoney presents a philosophical perspective on the political condition of modern man through an exegesis and analysis of Solzhenitsyn's work. Mahoney demonstrates the tremendous, yet often unappreciated, impact of Sozhenitsyn's writing on twentieth century thinking through an examination of the writer's profoundly important critique of communist totalitarianism in a judicious and original mix of western and Russian, Christian and classical wisdom.
In the work of the Russian symbolist Andrej Belyj the question concerning the essence of personality [ličnost'] plays an important role throughout his life and is developed in both his literary and philosophical-theoretical writings. Although Belyj wrote no text specifically devoted to this notion, it is nonetheless possible to reconstruct genetically a more or less cohesive theory of personality. In the case of Aleksandr Blok, who left behind relatively few works of a theoretical nature, the situation is different. In (...) these works, moreover, the problems involved in the notion of personality are hardly touched upon and are not philosophically deepened. Nevertheless, a few disparate elements of a notion of personality can be pointed out for Blok. /// Im Schaffen des russischen Symbolisten Andrej Belyj nimmt die Frage nach dem Wesen von Persönlichkeit [ličnost'] zeit seines Lebens einen wichtigen Raum ein und ist sowohl in seinen literarischen wie philosophisch-theoretischen Schriften entwickelt. Wenngleich Belyj keinen Text verfasst hat, der sich diesem Begriff eigens widmet, können dennoch aus seinem Werk Grundzüge einer Theorie der Persönlichkeit genetisch rekonstruiert werden. Anders sieht dies im Fall von Aleksandr Blok aus, der verhältnismäßig wenige Arbeiten mit theoretischem Charakter hinterlassen hat. Auch wird in ihnen die Problematik des Persönlichkeitsbegriffs kaum berührt und nicht philosophisch vertieft. Dennoch können vereinzelte Elemente eines Persönlichkeitsbegriffs für Blok aufgezeigt werden. (shrink)
In the work of the Russian symbolist Andrej Belyj (1880-1934) the question concerning the essence of personality [ličnost'] plays an important role throughout his life and is developed in both his literary and philosophical-theoretical writings. Although Belyj wrote no text specifically devoted to this notion, it is nonetheless possible to reconstruct genetically a more or less cohesive theory of personality. In the case of Aleksandr Blok (1880-1921), who left behind relatively few works of a theoretical nature, the situation is (...) different. In these works, moreover, the problems involved in the notion of personality are hardly touched upon and are not philosophically deepened. Nevertheless, a few disparate elements of a notion of personality can be pointed out for Blok. /// Im Schaffen des russischen Symbolisten Andrej Belyj (1880-1934) nimmt die Frage nach dem Wesen von Persönlichkeit [ličnost'] zeit seines Lebens einen wichtigen Raum ein und ist sowohl in seinen literarischen wie philosophisch-theoretischen Schriften entwickelt. Wenngleich Belyj keinen Text verfasst hat, der sich diesem Begriff eigens widmet, können dennoch aus seinem Werk Grundzüge einer Theorie der Persönlichkeit genetisch rekonstruiert werden. Anders sieht dies im Fall von Aleksandr Blok (1880-1921) aus, der verhältnismäßig wenige Arbeiten mit theoretischem Charakter hinterlassen hat. Auch wird in ihnen die Problematik des Persönlichkeitsbegriffs kaum berührt und nicht philosophisch vertieft. Dennoch können vereinzelte Elemente eines Persönlichkeitsbegriffs für Blok aufgezeigt werden. (shrink)
The foundation of statistical mechanics and the explanation of the success of its methods rest on the fact that the theoretical values of physical quantities (phase averages) may be compared with the results of experimental measurements (infinite time averages). In the 1930s, this problem, called the ergodic problem, was dealt with by ergodic theory that tried to resolve the problem by making reference above all to considerations of a dynamic nature. In the present paper, this solution will be analyzed first, (...) highlighting the fact that its very general nature does not duly consider the specificities of the systems of statistical mechanics. Second, Khinchin’s approach will be presented, that starting with more specific assumptions about the nature of systems, achieves an asymptotic version of the result obtained with ergodic theory. Third, the statistical meaning of Khinchin’s approach will be analyzed and a comparison between this and the point of view of ergodic theory is proposed. It will be demonstrated that the difference consists principally of two different perspectives on the ergodic problem: that of ergodic theory puts the state of equilibrium at the center, while Khinchin’s attempts to generalize the result to non-equilibrium states. (shrink)
This essay analyzes the recent appearance in Russian letters of ultra-nationalist fantasies about the restoration of Russia’s imperial or totalitarian status. This new trend has its roots not only in the increasingly patriotic tone of Russian society and politics, but also in the dynamics of the literary field itself. ‘Imperialist writers’ such as Aleksandr Prokhanov and Pavel Krusanov have both revived and reacted against postmodern themes and motifs from earlier decades. Relying on the legacy of sots-art and stiob , (...) the ‘imperialists’ advance a new model in Russia’s postmodern tradition, one that is balanced on the very borderline between irony and ideological militancy. In playing the game of ambiguous fanaticism, these writers have been able to attract the attention of a broad and diverse public, and have moved from an intellectual periphery into the cultural mainstream. (shrink)
We examine the relationship between the logics of nonsense of Bochvar and Halldén and the containment logics in the neighborhood of William Parry’s A I. We detail two strategies for manufacturing containment logics from nonsense logics—taking either connexive and paraconsistent fragments of such systems—and show how systems determined by these techniques have appeared as Frederick Johnson’s R C and Carlos Oller’s A L. In particular, we prove that Johnson’s system is precisely the intersection of Bochvar’s B 3 and Graham Priest’s (...) non-symmetrized connexive logic and that Oller’s system lies just beneath the intersection of B 3 and Priest’s paraconsistent L P. We conclude by examining Oller’s system in more depth, giving it a characterization in terms of L P and showing that it plays the same role to Harry Deutsch’s paraconsistent containment logic S that Aleksandr Zinov'ev’s S 1 plays with respect to A I. (shrink)
Discussions of the foundations of Classical Equilibrium Statistical Mechanics (SM) typically focus on the problem of justifying the use of a certain probability measure (the microcanonical measure) to compute average values of certain functions. One would like to be able to explain why the equilibrium behavior of a wide variety of distinct systems (different sorts of molecules interacting with different potentials) can be described by the same averaging procedure. A standard approach is to appeal to ergodic theory to justify this (...) choice of measure. A different approach, eschewing ergodicity, was initiated by A. I. Khinchin. Both explanatory programs have been subjected to severe criticisms. This paper argues that the Khinchin type program deserves further attention in light of relatively recent results in understanding the physics of universal behavior. (shrink)
We propose an "explanation scheme" for why the Gibbs phase average technique in classical equilibrium statistical mechanics works. Our account emphasizes the importance of the Khinchin-Lanford dispersion theorems. We suggest that ergodicity does play a role, but not the one usually assigned to it.
Boltzmann’s approach to statistical mechanics is widely believed to be conceptually superior to Gibbs’ formulation. However, the microcanonical distribution often fails to behave as expected: The ergodicity of the motion relative to it can rarely be established for realistic systems; worse, it can often be proved to fail. Also, the approach involves idealizations that have little physical basis. Here we take Khinchin’s advice and propose a de…nition of equilibrium that is more realistic: The de…nition re‡ects the fact that the (...) system is made of a great number of particles, and implies that all measurable macroscopic observables have steady values. (shrink)
We show that the quantum mechanical rules for manipulating probabilities follow naturally from standard probability theory. We do this by generalizing a result of Khinchin regarding characteristic functions. From standard probability theory we obtain the methods usually associated with quantum theory; that is, the operator method, eigenvalues, the Born rule, and the fact that only the eigenvalues of the operator have nonzero probability. We discuss the general question as to why quantum mechanics seemingly necessitates different methods than standard probability (...) theory and argue that the quantum mechanical method is much richer in its ability to generate a wide variety of probability distributions which are inaccessibe by way of standard probability theory. (shrink)
The author shows how mathematics in ancient and early medieval Europe was constrained by deeply rooted metaphysical conceptions and how these constraints have been overcome since the late medieval period. As examples, he focuses on changing conceptions of chance, motion, and infinity.
In the summer of 1925, a debutant writer, Aleksandr Beliaev, published a ‘scientific-fantastic story’, which depicted the travails of a severed human head living in a laboratory, supported by special machinery. Just a few months later, a young medical researcher, Sergei Briukhonenko, succeeded in reviving the severed head of a dog, using a special apparatus he had devised to keep the head alive. This paper examines the relationship between the literary and the scientific experiments with severed heads in post-revolutionary (...) Russia, which reflected the anxieties about death, revival, and survival in the aftermath of the 1914–1923 ‘reign of death’ in that country. It contrasts the anguished ethical questions raised by the story with the public fascination for ‘science that conquers death’. (shrink)
Frankfurt-type cases with covered manipulation received a great attention in the debates about freedom of will and moral responsibility. They pretend to give the refutation of the Principle of Alternative Possibilities and to show that we can intuitively blame or praise an agent who was not able to do otherwise. In this paper, I will try to make explicit some basic intuitions underlying the agent’s responsibility in Frankfurt-type cases, which were surprisingly ignored in the contemporary debates. The key intuition is (...) that the responsibility of the agent in Frankfurt-type cases is always grounded at the point of overcoming the uncertainty preceding action. This overcoming is crucially important for agent’s responsibility and immune to any manipulation of counterfactual intervener. (shrink)