Geometrical intuitions spontaneously drive visuo-spatial reasoning in human adults, children and animals. Is their emergence intrinsically linked to visual experience, or does it reflect a core property of cognition shared across sensory modalities? To address this question, we tested the sensitivity of blind-from-birth adults to geometrical-invariants using a haptic deviant-figure detection task. Blind participants spontaneously used many geometric concepts such as parallelism, right angles and geometrical shapes to detect intruders in haptic displays, but experienced difficulties with symmetry and complex spatial (...) transformations. Across items, their performance was highly correlated with that of sighted adults performing the same task in touch (blindfolded) and in vision, as well as with the performances of uneducated preschoolers and Amazonian adults. Our results support the existence of an amodal core-system of geometry that arises independently of visual experience. However, performance at selecting geometric intruders was generally higher in the visual compared to the haptic modality, suggesting that sensory-specific spatial experience may play a role in refining the properties of this core-system of geometry. (shrink)

Philosophy & Social Criticism, Volume 48, Issue 9, Page 1226-1246, November 2022. In this study, we claim that political liberalism, despite harsh criticism, is still the best option available for providing a just and stable society. However, we maintain that political liberalism needs to be revised so as to be justifiable from the perspective of not only the “reasonable” in a Rawlsian sense but also the ones whom Rawls labels as “unreasonable.” To support our claim, going beyond Rawls’s original account, (...) we unpack the concept of unreasonableness and identify three different subsets that we label as the “partially reasonable,” the “non-reasonable,” and the “unreasonable.” We argue that both the “fully” reasonable and the “partially reasonable” would be included into the constituency of public justification; more specifically, we claim that the latter would support liberal institutions out of their reasons: we define these reasons as mutually intelligible reasons and claim that they allow to acknowledge the importance of a convergence approach to public justification. As for the “non-reasonable” and “unreasonable,” we claim that they cannot be included in the constituency of public justification, but they nonetheless could be compliant with liberal institutions if political liberalism offers them some reasons to comply: here, we claim that political liberalism should include them through engagement and propose reasoning from conjecture as an effecting way of offering reasons for compliance. In particular, we claim that through reasoning from conjecture, the “non-reasonable” could find conciliatory reasons to comply with liberal institutions on a stable base. With regard to the “unreasonable” in the strict sense, we claim that through reasoning from conjecture, their unreasonableness could be contained and they could find reasons—even if just self-interested—for complying with liberal institutions rather than defying them. In our discussion, we consider the different subsets not as “frozen” but as dynamic and open to change, and we aim to propose a more complex and multilayered approach to inclusion that would be able to include a wider set of people. To strengthen our argument, we show that the need for a wider public justification and for broader inclusion in liberal societies is grounded in respect for persons both as equal persons and as particular individuals. In particular, we claim that individuals’ values, ends, commitments, and affiliations activate demands of respect and can strengthen the commitment to the liberal–democratic order. Through a reformulation of the role of respect in liberal societies, we also show a kind of social and communitarian dimension that, we claim, is fully compatible with political liberalism and opens it up to “civic friendship” and “social solidarity,” which are constitutive elements for the development of a sense of justice and for the realization of a just and stable society. (shrink)

Philosophy & Social Criticism, Volume 48, Issue 9, Page 1226-1246, November 2022. In this study, we claim that political liberalism, despite harsh criticism, is still the best option available for providing a just and stable society. However, we maintain that political liberalism needs to be revised so as to be justifiable from the perspective of not only the “reasonable” in a Rawlsian sense but also the ones whom Rawls labels as “unreasonable.” To support our claim, going beyond Rawls’s original account, (...) we unpack the concept of unreasonableness and identify three different subsets that we label as the “partially reasonable,” the “non-reasonable,” and the “unreasonable.” We argue that both the “fully” reasonable and the “partially reasonable” would be included into the constituency of public justification; more specifically, we claim that the latter would support liberal institutions out of their reasons: we define these reasons as mutually intelligible reasons and claim that they allow to acknowledge the importance of a convergence approach to public justification. As for the “non-reasonable” and “unreasonable,” we claim that they cannot be included in the constituency of public justification, but they nonetheless could be compliant with liberal institutions if political liberalism offers them some reasons to comply: here, we claim that political liberalism should include them through engagement and propose reasoning from conjecture as an effecting way of offering reasons for compliance. In particular, we claim that through reasoning from conjecture, the “non-reasonable” could find conciliatory reasons to comply with liberal institutions on a stable base. With regard to the “unreasonable” in the strict sense, we claim that through reasoning from conjecture, their unreasonableness could be contained and they could find reasons—even if just self-interested—for complying with liberal institutions rather than defying them. In our discussion, we consider the different subsets not as “frozen” but as dynamic and open to change, and we aim to propose a more complex and multilayered approach to inclusion that would be able to include a wider set of people. To strengthen our argument, we show that the need for a wider public justification and for broader inclusion in liberal societies is grounded in respect for persons both as equal persons and as particular individuals. In particular, we claim that individuals’ values, ends, commitments, and affiliations activate demands of respect and can strengthen the commitment to the liberal–democratic order. Through a reformulation of the role of respect in liberal societies, we also show a kind of social and communitarian dimension that, we claim, is fully compatible with political liberalism and opens it up to “civic friendship” and “social solidarity,” which are constitutive elements for the development of a sense of justice and for the realization of a just and stable society. (shrink)

The increasing implementation of and reliance on machine-learning (ML) algorithms to perform tasks, deliver services and make decisions in health and healthcare have made the need for fairness in ML, and more specifically in healthcare ML algorithms (HMLA), a very important and urgent task. However, while the debate on fairness in the ethics of artificial intelligence (AI) and in HMLA has grown significantly over the last decade, the very concept of fairness as an ethical value has not yet been sufficiently (...) explored. Our paper aims to fill this gap and address the AI ethics principle of fairness from a conceptual standpoint, drawing insights from accounts of fairness elaborated in moral philosophy and using them to conceptualise fairness as an ethical value and to redefine fairness in HMLA accordingly. To achieve our goal, following a first section aimed at clarifying the background, methodology and structure of the paper, in the second section, we provide an overview of the discussion of the AI ethics principle of fairness in HMLA and show that the concept of fairness underlying this debate is framed in purely distributive terms and overlaps with non-discrimination, which is defined in turn as the absence of biases. After showing that this framing is inadequate, in the third section, we pursue an ethical inquiry into the concept of fairness and argue that fairness ought to be conceived of as an ethical value. Following a clarification of the relationship between fairness and non-discrimination, we show that the two do not overlap and that fairness requires much more than just non-discrimination. Moreover, we highlight that fairness not only has a distributive but also a socio-relational dimension. Finally, we pinpoint the constitutive components of fairness. In doing so, we base our arguments on a renewed reflection on the concept of respect, which goes beyond the idea of equal respect to include respect for individual persons. In the fourth section, we analyse the implications of our conceptual redefinition of fairness as an ethical value in the discussion of fairness in HMLA. Here, we claim that fairness requires more than non-discrimination and the absence of biases as well as more than just distribution; it needs to ensure that HMLA respects persons both as persons and as particular individuals. Finally, in the fifth section, we sketch some broader implications and show how our inquiry can contribute to making HMLA and, more generally, AI promote the social good and a fairer society. (shrink)

We are repeatedly told that AI will help us to solve some of the world's biggest challenges, from treating chronic diseases and reducing fatality rates in traffic accidents to fighting climate change and anticipating cybersecurity threats. However, the article contends that public discourse on AI systematically avoids considering AI’s environmental costs. Artificial Intelligence- Brevini argues- runs on technology, machines, and infrastructures that deplete scarce resources in their production, consumption, and disposal, thus increasing the amounts of energy in their use, and (...) exacerbate problems of waste and pollution. It also relies on data centers, that demands impressive amounts of energy to compute, analyse, categorize. If we want to stand a chance at tackling the Climate Emergency, then we have to stop avoiding addressing the environmental problems generated by AI. (shrink)

Sensibilité is in Valéry’s theory the name of a large grasp of functions, involving both perception and creation, and involved both in art and in experience. So far, this key word of Valéry’s aesthetics can be read as the bridge between his conceptions of art and his idea of the self in order to understand the way this author writes and conceives what philosophy can aim to.

Most theories of justice rest on the idea that emotions need to be contained or set aside and that rationality serves as the best, if not exclusive, criterion for identifying the principles of a fair distribution. In recent years, however, two important claims have been made. One is that rationality and emotions are not in conflict with one another, but should be conceived of as strictly interconnected; the other is that social justice is not just about distribution, but also – (...) or especially – about social relations. This paper aims to bridge these claims and argues that (a) the role of emotions should be recognised by theories of justice, as it is compatible with the importance such theories attribute to rationality, and (b) an inquiry into emotions is particularly important to investigate the socio-relational dimension of justice. Moreover, the paper claims that (c) in order to adequately investigate the role of emotions in social justice, it is important to acknowledge that emotions are structurally mediated and shaped by powerful transformative forces, among which technologies – especially so-called socially disruptive technologies (SDTs) – prove to be particularly relevant. The paper argues that SDTs have a fundamental role in shaping social relations, shared commitments, and the emotions that follow from them or enable them. (shrink)

This review article puts two recent publications —Existence and Heritage: Hermeneutic Explorations in African and Continental Philosophies by Tsenay Serequeberhan and What Fanon Said. A Philosophical Introduction to His Life and Thought by Lewis R. Gordon—in conversation with Achille Mbembe’s renowned On the Postcolony, first published in French in 2000, in English in 2001, and here reviewed in the 2015 Wits University Press edition. The opportunity for such a literary dialogue to take place across fifteen years is occasioned both by (...) the latest South African edition of On the Postcolony, which in itself invites a fresh reading of Mbembe’s manifesto on postcolonial authoritarianism in Africa, as well as by the different potential outcome of the postcolonial condition that Gordon and Serequeberhan envision and propose with respect to Mbembe. I argue that while Mbembe’s pessimistic portrayal of the postcolonial present is one whereby it is difficult to envision transformation, both Serequeberhan and Gordon’s books offer a rich philosophical terrain from which to imagine possible futures, grounded in notions of dialogue and solidarity, that, however, vary significantly for each author. (shrink)

This article aims at showing the need for a sound ethical and anthropological foundation of economics and business, and argues the importance of a correct understanding of human values and human nature for the sake of economics and of businesses themselves. It is suggested that the ethical-anthropological side of economics and business can be grasped by taking Aristotle’s virtue ethics and Amartya Sen’s capability approach (CA) as major reference points. We hold that an “Aristotelian economics of virtues”, connected with the (...) CA’s notion of human richness, can promote the shift to the concept of personhood, and can lead to a more “humanized” business, by fostering human flourishing, the enhancement of human capabilities, and the pursuit of a more humane development for each and every person. (shrink)

This article is a response to the new book by Bruce Janz, African Philosophy and Enactivist Cognition: The Space of Thought, published in 2023 in the Bloomsbury Studies in World Philosophies series. Enactivist Cognition opens up a new space of conversation in the field of African philosophy—and world philosophies more broadly—through an innovative approach that applies insights from the cognitive sciences to the humanities in order to highlight the relationship between thought and context, between theorization and experience. Through the interpretive (...) lens of enactivism, Janz ventures into new readings of well-known themes and personalities in African philosophy and also introduces interesting new themes and personalities to the African philosophical conversation. Janz also intentionally bridges African and Africana thought. While this article contests the application of enactivism to all the philosophers treated in Enactivist Cognition, it applauds Janz’s search for new, creative, and productive spaces for and of philosophy. (shrink)

Fairness is one of the most prominent values in the Ethics and Artificial Intelligence (AI) debate and, specifically, in the discussion on algorithmic decision-making (ADM). However, while the need for fairness in ADM is widely acknowledged, the very concept of fairness has not been sufficiently explored so far. Our paper aims to fill this gap and claims that an ethically informed re-definition of fairness is needed to adequately investigate fairness in ADM. To achieve our goal, after an introductory section aimed (...) at clarifying the aim and structure of the paper, in section “Fairness in algorithmic decision-making” we provide an overview of the state of the art of the discussion on fairness in ADM and show its shortcomings; in section “Fairness as an ethical value”, we pursue an ethical inquiry into the concept of fairness, drawing insights from accounts of fairness developed in moral philosophy, and define fairness as an ethical value. In particular, we argue that fairness is articulated in a distributive and socio-relational dimension; it comprises three main components: fair equality of opportunity, equal right to justification, and fair equality of relationship; these components are grounded in the need to respect persons both as persons and as particular individuals. In section “Fairness in algorithmic decision-making revised”, we analyze the implications of our redefinition of fairness as an ethical value on the discussion of fairness in ADM and show that each component of fairness has profound effects on the criteria that ADM ought to meet. Finally, in section “Concluding remarks”, we sketch some broader implications and conclude. (shrink)

Metaphorical meaning can be analyzed as triggered by an apparent communicative breach, an incongruity that leads to a default of the presumptive interpretation of a vehicle. This breach can be solved through contextual renegotiations of meaning guided by the communicative intention, or rather the presumed purpose of the metaphorical utterance. This paper addresses the problem of analyzing the complex process of reasoning underlying the reconstruction of metaphorical meaning. This process will be described as a type of abductive argument, aimed at (...) explaining how the vehicle can best contribute to the purpose of the utterance. This type of reasoning involves the analysis of the possible predicates that can be and usually are attributed to the vehicle, and the selection of the one that can support the implicit conclusion constituting the communicative goal of the metaphorical utterance. Metaphorical meaning, in this perspective, becomes the outcome of a complex process of meaning reconstruction aimed at providing the best explanation of the function of the vehicle within a discourse move. (shrink)

Jo-Anne McArthur est l’une des photojournalistes majeures de la condition animale dans le monde. Elle a documenté les conditions de vie et d’exploitation des animaux dans plus de soixante pays différents, et ses images sont utilisées par les mouvements animalistes dans le monde entier. Elle vit à Toronto et dirige l’agence multi-média We animals Media dont elle est la fondatrice. En vingt ans de travail, elle a accumulé une énorme documentation, et multiplié les projets de collaboration avec...

In this paper, I consider emotional reactions in response to political facts, and I investigate how they may provide relevant knowledge about those facts. I assess the value of such knowledge, both from an epistemic and a political perspective. Concerning the epistemic part, I argue that, although emotions are not in themselves sufficient to ground evaluative knowledge about political facts, they can do so within a network of further coherent epistemic attitudes about those facts. With regards to the political part, (...) I argue that the contribution of emotions to evaluative knowledge about political facts, is indeed politically valuable. To develop my argument, I show first that an evaluative kind of knowledge is relevant for reaching a sophisticated level of political cognition, and second that emotions contribute distinctively to this kind of knowledge. I conclude that, when emotional experiences towards political events are coupled with an adequate factual knowledge about those events, they can ground a distinctive evaluative knowledge about those events, and such knowledge is relevant both from an epistemic and a political perspective. (shrink)

A letter from Fénelon to the duke de Bourgogne, written in 1708, constitutes the highest point of the correspondence between the archbishop and the prince. We intend to use this text as a starting point to explore the linguistic and rhetorical richness of Fénelon’s discourse about trials. This letter – a true synthesis of an exquisitely fenelonian topic – can be the object of a close reading, but it is as well possible to broaden the inquiry to the vast inter-text (...) of the spiritual director’s correspondence: the absolute requirements of mystic love shine through the political advices, the maxims of humanistic wisdom or the nuances of a spiritual portrait, as well as they shine (elsewhere, in Les Aventures de Télémaque) through the veil of fiction. (shrink)

La pace non e un argomento ma un sogno evolutivo della coscienza umana. Un sogno timido che sopravvive al dramma della storia e alle sue smentite piu derisorie. Un sogno che e cruciale custodire, dunque, come gesto di resistenza a fronte del cinismo di ogni epoca e in particolar modo davanti alle derive piu subdole e inquietanti della contemporaneita. Un'esplorazione evocativa dei quattro modi in cui l'umanita, da sempre e non senza contraddizioni, prova a sognare la pace: attraverso la natura (...) (phusis), il pensiero (logos), la legge (nomos), l'amore (eros). Quattro dimensioni esistenziali che l'autrice sorvola in compagnia di alcune figure della filosofia, del mito, della letteratura, della poesia, della psicoanalisi e della storia che hanno rappresentato, nella sua esperienza autobiografica, una fonte generosa di fiducia e orientamento. Muovendo dall'intuizione comune a tante saggezze secondo cui la vera pace non elude la tragedia umana ma la denuncia e la interroga, il libro ci conduce in un viaggio meditativo che costeggia, senza negarlo, l'abisso della distruttivita, sia sul piano individuale sia su quello sociale e collettivo. L'abisso nel quale ripetutamente sprofonda il sogno di vivere insieme e amichevolmente su questa Terra. Ma proprio a partire da questa confidenza con la tragicita della vicenda umana si dipana quel filo sottile dell'etica che e risorsa elettiva della sensibilita femminile e che riconduce l'intelligenza all'intimita con la vita. E il sogno desto della pace, per desiderare ancora.". (shrink)

Sulla base degli studi di Mircea Eliade, l’Autore evidenzia, nel lai antico francese Yonec e in due racconti popolari riconducibili al tipo AT 432, «The Prince as bird», tracce di scenari iniziatici femminili e del viaggio oltremondano sciamanico. Sur la base des études de Mircea Eliade, l’auteur met en évidence, dans le Lai de Yonec de Marie de France et dans deux contes de fées liés au conte-type AT 432 « L’Oiseau bleu », des traces des rites initiatiques féminins et (...) du voyage chamanique vers l’Autre Monde. On the ground of Mircea Eliade studies, the author analyses the Ancient French Lay of Yonec and two folk tales, connected to the type AT 432 “The Prince as bird”, focusing on the presence of hints of ancient initiatory female rites and shamanic female otherworld voyages. (shrink)

ABSTRACT Nietzsche was an avid reader of Emerson's essays, and their influence is discernible from his earliest philosophical writings through to his final philosophical works. Nietzsche's copies of Emerson's books are covered with traces of his reading, from underlinings, exclamation marks, question marks, and dog-eared pages to numerous annotations and philosophical comments written in the margins. I use some of these to analyze the influence Emerson exerted on Nietzsche's conception of history and historiography. The two authors can be considered “twin (...) souls” in that they both praised the strengthening effects of past greatness and, at the same time, opposed psychological subjugation or fanaticism. Nevertheless, they were not twin minds: Nietzsche rejected Emerson's metaphysical concept of an Oversoul and turned it into the ideal of a Dionysian soul, which aims at reliving the history of humanity in order to increase its power. (shrink)

O artigo tem por objetivo central apresentar a leitura da pesquisadora Benedetta Bisol sobre a noção de corpo em Fichte, no sentido de mostra-lhe a pertinência e mesmo a atualidade, frente às pesquisas contemporâneas da neurociência.

La fin du xviiie siècle et le début du xixe coïncident en Italie non seulement avec de grandes mutations politiques et juridiques liées aux guerres napoléoniennes, mais aussi avec de profondes transformations des rôles familiaux. À travers l’analyse d’une série de correspondances épistolaires échangées dans cette période entre des frères et des sœurs membres de familles de l’aristocratie, l’article examine la manière dont l’interprétation du rôle des individus a pu se modifier et les attentes que ces derniers ont entretenues quand (...) au comportement des autres membres de leur fratrie. Les arguments des lettres, leur ton, les références à des épisodes de la vie familiale et les notices sur la gestion du patrimoine permettent de définir la substance de la relation entre frères et sœurs à la fin de l’Ancien Régime, et de saisir en quoi elle différait des rapports noués par leurs pères et leurs oncles ou de ceux entretenus par des frères et sœurs appartenant à d’autres familles aristocratiques d’Italie dans la seconde moitié du xviiie siècle. (shrink)

La fin du xviiie siècle et le début du xixe coïncident en Italie non seulement avec de grandes mutations politiques et juridiques liées aux guerres napoléoniennes, mais aussi avec de profondes transformations des rôles familiaux. À travers l’analyse d’une série de correspondances épistolaires échangées dans cette période entre des frères et des sœurs membres de familles de l’aristocratie, l’article examine la manière dont l’interprétation du rôle des individus a pu se modifier et les attentes que ces derniers ont entretenues quand (...) au comportement des autres membres de leur fratrie. Les arguments des lettres, leur ton, les références à des épisodes de la vie familiale et les notices sur la gestion du patrimoine permettent de définir la substance de la relation entre frères et sœurs à la fin de l’Ancien Régime, et de saisir en quoi elle différait des rapports noués par leurs pères et leurs oncles ou de ceux entretenus par des frères et sœurs appartenant à d’autres familles aristocratiques d’Italie dans la seconde moitié du xviiie siècle. (shrink)

Valéry’s conceptions of mind, literature and even philosophy often stress the importance of an effort against heterogeneity that should be led in the name of what the author himself calls pureté. On the other hand, the theories that Valéry develops about composition - which is intended both as an aesthetic and a theoretical concept - show the importance of complexity in his representation of the esprit and allows to compare Valéry’s descriptions of the self with the way he represents creative (...) process and even draws the structure of his own works. (shrink)

Nietzsche as German Philosopher is a collection of essays by German authors – all living or recently deceased – on various aspects of the philosophy of Nietzsche. These range from aesthetics throug...

Für Emerson ist die self-reliance die Haupteigenschaft des großen Menschen, sie ist das Ergebnis von Selbsterkenntnis und Selbsbeherrschung. In moralischer Hinicht ist die self-reliance der Ursprung für den Heroismus, auf intellektuellem Gebiet ist sie die Quelle des Genies. Das Thema der self-reliance ist der Hauptgrund für die Atraktivität, die die Werke des Amerikaners auf Nietzsche ausüben. Wie ein roter Faden zieht sich dieses Thema durch den sich über einen Zeitraum von fünfundzwanzig Jahren ersteckenden Dialog mid Emersons Texten. Es stellt in (...) Nietzsches Werk einen Zusammenhang zwischen Schopenhauer als Erzicher und Zarathustra her, die beide Nietzsches Ideal des Ausnahmeindividuums verköpern, das über und gegen seine Zeit lebt.For Emerson self-reliance is the fundamental characteristic of a great man, being the product of self-acquaintance and self-possession. From a moral point of view, self-reliance is the origin of heroism, in the intellectual field it is the source of genius. The theme of self-reliance is the primary reason for the attraction that the American author's works exercised on Nietzsche. Like a fil rouge this theme runs through the virtual dialogue that he held with Emerson's writings over a period of more than twenty-five years. It generates in Nietzsche's work a continuity between Schopenhauer the educator and Zarathustra, who both incarnate the Nietzschean ideal of an exceptional individual who lives above and against his own time. (shrink)