Meine Bemerkungen zum normativen Fundament der Ökonomie sollen daran erinnern, daß der klassische Rationalitäts- und Effizienzanspruch der "moral science" Ökonomie nur von einer gerechtfertigten Bedürfnisbasis her sinnvoll verstanden und entwickelt werden kann. Daher sind alle Grundunterscheidungen, welche in ökonomische Beurteilungskriterien eingehen, abhängig von einem vernünftigen Begreifen dessen, was ich mit der philosophischen Tradition das gute Leben nennen möchte. Das vernünftig begriffene gute Leben hinwiederum läßt sich nicht zum Gegenstand einer empirisch-quantitativen Empirie, z. B. von Nachfragedaten, machen. Es kann nur einer (...) vernünftigen Gemeinsamkeit unseres Handelns entspringen, die insbesondere das Redehandeln umschließt, auf das sie in Plan, Vereinbarung und praktischem Urteil angewiesen ist. (shrink)

In order to compare two forms of radical pragmatism, inferentialism (as developed by Robert Brandom) and constructivism (as developed by Paul Lorenzen), the paper shows how we can represent states of affairs in the world by corresponding symbols in a metaphysically harmless, though seemingly non-inferential way, why not all justifications are inferential transitions, for example those that make heavy use of constructions, and why a prosentential analysis of truth is helpful but not sufficient.

This article proposes that the mood or affective attitude of calmness consists in not striving to control things that are beyond our control, such as, first, inalterable conditions of our life; second, other people, at least when we regard them as autonomous agents who must not be manipulated or rhetorically persuaded but should be convinced by arguments; and third, ourselves. Focusing on the second phenomenon, argumentation or, more generally, rational action, it is argued that one’s rational conduct towards others is (...) unavoidably based on hope or, as Kant puts it, on rational faith. Hence, calmness is explained as the practical attitude of trusting that the course of events beyond our control does not affect the meaning of a rational life, but rather is definitive of it. (shrink)

In order to compare two forms of radical pragmatism, inferentialism and constructivism, the paper shows how we can represent states of affairs in the world by corresponding symbols in a metaphysically harmless, though seemingly non-inferential way, why not all justifications are inferential transitions, for example those that make heavy use of constructions, and why a prosentential analysis of truth is helpful but not sufficient.

En este artículo se realiza una crítica a la ética discursiva de Habermas, la cual afirma que una teoria del discurso entendida a partir del análisis del consenso racional no puede constituir una base adecuada para la comprensión de la filosofia moral. Kambartel propone otra perspectiva para definir el ámbito de la moralidad. Según ésta la moralidad tiene que ver con las condiciones básicas de la corporeidad y racionalidad de nuestra vida. En la moral se trata de la protección de (...) aquellas necesidades básicas imprescindibles para la realización de una vida humana digna. (shrink)