Thinking, Language, and Experience was first published in 1989.Hector-Neri Castañeda's intricate and provocative essays have been widely influential, especially his work in epistemology and ethics, and his theory on the relation of thought to action. The fourteen essays in Thinking, Language, and Experience -- half of them written expressly for this volume -- demonstrate the breadth and richness of his recent work on the unitary structure of human experience.A comprehensive, unified study of phenomena at the intersection between experience, thinking, language, (...) and reality, this book focuses on singular reference -- that is, reference to individuals insofar as they are thought of as individuals: indicators, quasi-indicators, proper names, singular descriptions. Castañeda establishes a large number of new facts -- linguistic, semantic, psychological, and sociological -- about the workings of language in human experience, and from them develops a network of new theories, all grounded in his comprehensive Guise Theory.These theories offer a systematic account for: the structure of human experience and the world at large; the mental powers required to think of the world and to undergo experiences; self-consciousness; the language for thinking of other minds; perception and the interaction between indexical reference and perceptual fields; and the role of subjectivity in perception and intentional action. (shrink)

"A book from the Park Ridge Center for the Study of Health, Faith, and Ethics." Includes bibliographical references (p. [141]-195) and index.

This book examines the human ability to participate in moments of joint feeling. It presents an answer to the question concerning the nature of our faculty to share in what might be called episodes of collective affective intentionality. The proposal develops the claim that our capacity to participate in such episodes is grounded in an ability central to our human condition: our capacity to care with one another about certain things. The author provides a phenomenologically adequate account of collective affective (...) intentionality that takes seriously the idea that feelings are at the core of our emotional relation to the world. He details a form of group emotional orientation that relies on the fact that the participating individuals have come to share a number of concerns. Readers will learn that at the heart of a collective affective intentional episode, one does not merely find a set of shared concerns, but also a particular mode of caring. In the end, the argument presented in this monograph makes plausible the idea that the emotions through which humans participate in moments of affective intentional community express our nature. In addition, it shows that the debate on collective affective intentionality also permits us to better understand the relationship between two conflicting philosophical pictures of ourselves: the idea that we are essentially social beings and the claim that we are creatures for whom our personal existence is an issue. Thus, aiming at an elucidation of the nature of our ability to feel together, the book offers a detailed account of what it is to situationally express our human nature by caring about something in a properly joint manner. (shrink)

Much work on intellectual humility has focused on its epistemic benefits. We suggest that displaying (or failing to display) intellectual humility also has effects on how others perceive us and that, as a result, intellectual humility can serve reputation management purposes, in at least four ways: (i) Intellectual humility can be used to signal we are a good source of information; (ii) Intellectual humility can be used to signal we are competent through countersignaling; (iii) Intellectual humility can be used to (...) make sure others do not believe we are overclaiming superiority; (iv) lack of intellectual humility (or intellectual arrogance) can be used to signal dominance. The evidence suggests that intellectual humility (or lack thereof) can have each of these effects. Seeing intellectual humility as (inter alia) a reputation management tool predicts that people will be more or less likely to display intellectual humility in some contexts. For instance, people in a position of power might stand to lose less if they fail to be intellectual humble; accordingly, evidence suggests that they tend to display less intellectual humility. In conclusion, we speculate that understanding intellectual humility as reputation management could help construct environments more conducive to displays of intellectual humility. (shrink)

This collection of essays, Global Bioethics: The Collapse of Consensus, deals with the issue of the repeated failure of attempts to derive a universal set of ...

Are we gullible? Can we be easily influenced by what others tell us, even if they do not deserve our trust? Many strands of research, from social psychology to cultural evolution suggest that humans are by nature conformist and eager to follow prestigious leaders. By contrast, an evolutionary perspective suggests that humans should be vigilant towards communicated information, so as not to be misled too often. Work in experimental psychology shows that humans are equipped with sophisticated mechanisms that allow them (...) to carefully evaluate communicated information. These open vigilance mechanisms lead us to reject messages that clash with our prior beliefs, unless the source of the message has earned our trust, or provides good arguments, in which case we can adaptively change our minds. These mechanisms make us largely immune to mass persuasion, explaining why propaganda, political campaigns, advertising, and other attempts at persuading large groups nearly always fall in deaf ears. However, some false beliefs manage to spread through communication. I argue that most popular false beliefs are held reflectively, which means that they have little effect on our thoughts and behaviors, and that many false beliefs can be socially beneficial. Accepting such beliefs thus reflects a much weaker failure in our evaluation of communicated information than might at first appear. (shrink)

The philosophy of history of 1804 and 1805 enables Fichte to place his natural right, developed previously at Jena, against a diachronic background. This means that Fichte does not reason merely synchronically from a timeless conception of society and state. From a synchronic viewpoint, Fichte cannot solve the problem of the control of political power because he has to draw on the assumption of a virtuous ephorate. This assumption is not consistent with the Fichtean ideal of a philosophy of right (...) completely independent from moral considerations. Thus, the control of government is possible only if at least a group of citizens can go beyond the mere rational egoism. This new temporal conception of the state leads Fichte to think that the problems of consistency of his theory of Jena are unavoidable, given that a society integrated by egoist individuals cannot be sustained. However, his later philosophy of history enables Fichte to state the inexorable annihilation of this type of community and gives place to an ensuing epoch, when citizens are not self-interested anymore. (shrink)

Resumen Este artículo analiza la construcción de la infancia en las novelas El mercurio (1968), El río de la luna (1981) y Esta pared de hielo (2005), de José María Guelbenzu, a la luz de los conceptos mítico-simbólicos de Bachelard y Durand para demostrar que funciona como un absoluto primigenio al que se busca volver constantemente, pues resguarda a los personajes hasta el inminente choque con la realidad adulta. Esto para concluir que desde la adultez los personajes observan la infancia (...) con el anhelo de volver allí, lo que tiene una función paliativa mediante la memoria y la palabra, por ello, la narrativa de Guelbenzu plantea regresar al ámbito infantil desde las imágenes literarias y así conservar ese mundo de fantasía. Abstract This article analyzes the construction of childhood in the novels El mercurio (1968), El río de la luna (1981) and Esta pared de hielo (2005), by José María Guelbenzu, in the light of the mythical-symbolic concepts of Bachelard and Durand to demonstrate that it functions as a primitive absolute to which it is sought to return constantly, since it protects the characters until the imminent clash with adult reality. This to conclude that in their adulthood the characters observe childhood with the desire to return there, this has a palliative function through memory and word, therefore, Guelbenzu’s narrative proposes the return to the child environment trough literary images to preserve that world of fantasy. (shrink)

En este trabajo se discute la interpretación de Isaiah Berlin de la filosofía política fichteana en términos de un organicismo. Esta interpretación muestra que las libertades individuales juegan un rol fundamental en la educación de los ciudadanos futuros en tanto que ésta es una tarea realizada por los padres y no por el Estado. Sin embargo, Fichte no defiende una idea de la libertad individual como no-interferencia, aun cuando las similitudes entre su teoría y la de Humboldt sugieran lo contrario. (...) Del mismo modo, Fichte no defendió tampoco la idea de la libertad como no-dominación, como revela la comparación con la teoría de Philip Pettit. Por el contrario, Fichte sostuvo que la educación de los futuros ciudadanos tiene sentido únicamente cuando las libertades individuales son consideradas como inextricablemente unidas con la propiedad. This paper discusses Isaiah Berlin’s interpretation of Fichtean political philosophy in terms of organicism. It shows that individual liberties play a fundamental role in the education of future citizens as a task performed by parents, not the state. However, Fichte did not defend an idea of individual liberty or non-interference, even if similarities between his theory and Humboldt’s suggest the contrary. At the same time, Fichte also did not espouse the idea of freedom as non-domination, as a comparison with Philip Pettit’s theory reveals. By contrast, Fichte posited that the education of future citizens makes sense only if individual liberties are considered inextricably linked to property. (shrink)

Die Fragestellungen der Metaphysik, so scheint es, sind nicht mehr zeitgemäß. Der Begriff erinnert an abgehobene Systeme ohne jeden Realitätssinn. Dabei gibt es kein Denken ohne Metaphysik. Unter Bezugnahme auf die Traditionen der Phänomenologie und der französischen Philosophie versteht Robert Hugo Ziegler Endlichkeit als eine positive Auszeichnung, während der Begriff der Zeitlichkeit die erste Dimension von Sein beschreibt. Sein grundlegender Beitrag zur Reflexion über Mensch und Welt zeigt, wie sich die Philosophie selbstbewusst einer Erneuerung der Metaphysik stellen kann.

The advancement of Artificial Intelligence (AI) poses challenges in the field of bioethics, especially concerning issues related to life and death. AI has permeated areas such as health and research, generating ethical dilemmas and questions about privacy, decision-making, and access to technology. Life and death have been recurring human concerns, particularly in connection with depression. AI has created systems like Thanabots or Deadbots, which digitally recreate deceased individuals and allow interactions with them. These systems rely on information generated by AI (...) users during their lifetime, raising ethical and emotional questions about the authenticity and purpose of these recreations. AI acts as a mediator between life, death, and the human being, enabling a new form of communication with the deceased. However, this raises ethical issues such as informed consent from users and the limits of digital recreation. Companies offer services like the Digital Resurrection of deceased individuals and the generation of hyper-realistic avatars. Still, concerns arise about the authenticity of these representations and their long-term emotional impact. Interaction with Thanabots may alter perceptions of death and finitude, leading to a potential “postmortal society” where death is no longer viewed as a definitive end. Nevertheless, this raises questions about the value of life and the authenticity of human experiences. AI becomes a bridge between the living and the dead, partially replacing rituals and mystical beliefs. As technology advances, there will be a need for greater transparency in interacting with AI systems and ethical reflections on the role of these technologies in shaping perceptions of life and death. Ultimately, the question arises of whether we should allow the dead to rest in peace and how to balance the pursuit of emotional relief with authenticity and respect for the memory of the deceased. A deeper ethical consideration is needed on how AI alters traditional notions of life, death, and communication in contemporary society. In this research, an interdisciplinary approach was utilized to conduct a comprehensive systematic review of the recent academic literature, followed by a detailed analysis of two key texts. Central ideas were extracted, and recurring themes were identified. Finally, a reflective analysis of the findings was conducted, yielding significant conclusions and recommendations for future research. (shrink)

In Ecce Homo's "Why I am a Destiny," Nietzsche declares that "the concept of politics" will merge entirely into a "Mind-war" and that "the earth will know Great politics." Through analyzing these two concepts, the aim of this article is to counter Bernard Williams's claim that "Nietzsche did not move to any view that offered a coherent politics." Nietzsche does so in calling for the founding of a "Party of Life," whose "concept of politics" is to breed a new "master (...) race," to fight a Mind-war, ignited by the "act" of the "Revaluation," The Antichrist, against the "Party of Christianity.". (shrink)

Here are crucial data for any theory of the self, self-consciousness or the structure of experience. We discuss the fundamental structure of both indexical reference, especially first-term reference, and quasi-indexical reference, used in attributing first-person reference to others. Chisholm's ingenious account of direct awareness of self is tested against the two sets of data. It satisfies neither. Chisholm's definitions raise serious questions both about philosophical methodology and about the underlying ontology of individuation, identity, and predication. Chisholm's adverbial account of non-physical (...) contents of consciousness is also examined; several questions are raised about the possible success of the linguistic technique of ontological reduction by hyphenation and creation of grammatical devices. (shrink)

Este artículo tiene como objetivo determinar cuál es el valor filosófico de la anaideia -ἀναίδεια- (desvergüenza) y su relación con la parresia -παρρησία- (franqueza, libertad de palabra) en Diógenes de Sinope. Se lleva a cabo una lectura, análisis e interpretación de fuentes clásicas sobre la escuela cínica, y particularmente del libro VI de Diógenes Laercio “Vidas y sentencias de los filósofos más ilustres”, texto clave en los estudios sobre el cinismo. El resultado de este análisis es que en esos textos, (...) se representa a un Diógenes de Sinope asumiendo gestos y réplicas de palabra en las que el aidós y la moderación no resultan propios de su actitud filosófica, razón por lo cual la anaideia es considerada como una afirmación de la libertad frente a la crítica que establece el filósofo respecto a la vida civilizada y artificial. Se concluye que para valorar de manera positiva el cinismo de Diógenes y vincularlo a toda la tradición griega que privilegia la razón y la virtud, es necesario valorar el estatuto ético y filosófico de la parresía: libertad de palabra, franqueza. (shrink)