Der Ausdruck Phänomenologie ist heute höchst vieldeutig geworden. Husserl hat seit 1905 eine immer stärkere Wendung zum Idealismus kantischer Prägung hin vollzogen, durch die er den Boden der Phänomenologie, wie er sie begründet hatte, verlassen hat. Eine ähnliche Abweichung von der ursprünglichen Idee der Phänomenologie findet sich bei vielen anderen "Phänomenologen." Die "realistische Phänomenologie", deren Vorläufer von Platon an und Klassiker von Husserl bis Schwarz in dieser ersten umfangreichen deutschsprachigen Anthologie zu Wort kommen, ist kein System, sondern eine Anwendung der (...) philosophischen Urmethoden, wie sie alle großen Philosophen tatsächlich anwandten, wenn sie ihre entscheidenden Entdeckungen machten. Mögen auch von Philosophen generell andere Methoden bewußt zugrunde gelegt werden, in dem Moment, in dem diese Einsichten gewonnen werden, liegt tatsächlich zu allen Zeiten jener letzte, fruchtbare Kontakt mit "den Sachen selbst" vor, der den Sinn der phänomenologischen Methode ausmacht, wie sie von den Meistern der realistischen Phänomenologie nur bewußter und systematischer angewandt wird als von vielen früheren Denkern. Nichts wäre darum irriger als in der phänomenologischen Betrachtungsweise eine Reduktion der Welt auf bloße "Phänomene" zu erblicken oder gar eine bloße Deskription der "Erscheinung" der Dinge. Zwischen phänomenologischer Betrachtungsweise und metaphysischer Wesensanalyse besteht kein Unterschied oder gar Gegensatz. (shrink)

In his Time and Narrative, Ricœur introduces the term of “third time” to designate the middle ground between human and natural time. This time is synonymous with historical time, which is the main source of historical discourse. The third time consists of inscribing human time onto the time of nature. While historiography must strictly follow this structure, works of fiction have the freedom to explore and even create imaginative variations of time. Despite the constraints this seems to impose on historical (...) writing, this article shows that even within the tight structure of historical time, a palette of various colors and shades, akin to imaginative variations, can be observed. Historical time possesses depth and speed; it can contract and relax, motivate or prevent action, or gain various dynamics in relation to the ending it offers. (shrink)

During the past fifty years, a dispute over the nature of historical discourse has taken place with the narrativist approach, arguing for the dominance of narration in history, on the one hand, and professional historians defending historiography's will to tell the truth, on the other. Paul Ricoeur entered the discussion with his work Time and Narrative where he offered an inventive response. According to him, both narration and scientific explication are essential to historical discourse. To support his statement, he introduces (...) terms such as ‘a third time,‘ ‘a quasi-narration’ or ‘a historical consciousness.’ Thus, he shifts attention from narration to time. These terms can prove their usefulness when interpreting historical works. In the rest of the article, we aim to carry out such an interpretation on the example of Landscape and Memory by Simon Schama. In a Ricœurian perspective, Schama's book reveals its deep time significance. (shrink)

At first trust plays a fundamental role within the social sphere. Accordingly, trust serves as philosophical term above all in Political, Social, and Moral Philosophy. But it is also central in recent Sociology and Psychology. Referring to these disciplines, the relationship of trust be- tween viewer and hero on the screen can be called ›parasocial‹, as-if-interaction. In contrast, ontological trust is of particular interest for recent philosophy of film. Instead of explaining it, following Deleuze, in terms of a metaphysics of (...) cinema it seems to be more adequate to com- bine the different subject-specific answers in Kant’s concept of play. Aesthetic experiences then are encouraging us in the attitude to act as if there could be trust in the world. (shrink)

In answer to jordan's "disputed questions" the reasons why gilsonianism has been chosen as interlocutor are clarified; the analogous character of the "transcendental sense" of essence and the "primary sense" (first analogate) of essence ((1) "essence of and in really existing beings," (2) ideal and immutable eide, (3) essence of the absolute, real and eternal being) are further elucidated. The main arguments in the essay for "ideal essences" are further explained and the main charges answered by the speculative attempt to (...) reconcile clearly given ideal "essences" with a divine being (subject of philosophical proof) which is not limited by "ideas" like plato's demiourg. Existential thomism (gilson) is credited with having referred to an unmistakably given important metaphysical "principle": existence, which is then wrongly "absolutized," while jordan's "absolutized" "esse" is suspected to refer to no single original datum; the limitation implied in "essence" seems to be held on the basis of a "concoction" of existence, being and essence. (shrink)

In an enlightening dialogue with Descartes, Kant, Husserl and Gadamer, Professor Seifert argues that the original inspiration of phenomenology was nothing other than the primordial insight of philosophy itself, the foundation of philosophia perennis. His radical rethinking of the phenomenological method results in a universal, objectivist philosophy in direct continuity with Plato, Aristotle and Augustine. In order to validate the classical claim to know autonomous being, the author defends Husserl's methodological principle "Back to things themselves" from empiricist and idealist critics, (...) including the later Husserl, and replies to the arguments of Kant which attempt to discredit the knowability of things in themselves. Originally published in 1982, this book culminates in a phenomenological and critical unfolding of the Augustinian cogito, as giving access to immutable truth about necessary essences and the real existence of personal being. (shrink)

La cuestión de cuántas categorías hay y cuáles son depende de otra más esencial, la de saber cuál es la naturaleza de las categorías. A su vez, la respuesta a esta cuestión exige distinguir con claridad las categorías ontológicas de los transcendentales, de los modos de ser y de las categorías lógicas y las lingüísticas. Solo tras haber trazado estas distinciones, el autor esboza una respuesta a la pregunta de cuál es el número de las categorías.

The term "method" of realist phenomenology and philosophy can refer to three kinds of things which are being explored extensively in this work: (1) Kinds of philosophical knowledge used to return to things themselves: intellectual "vision" of necessary intelligible essences, insights into necessary states of affairs, knowledge of less than necessary essences, knowledge of existence as such, of the ego cogitans and of a concretely existing world, other persons, and the absolute being, deductive forms of reasoning, and others. (2) Ways (...) to achieve such knowledge: such as various types of distinctions, asking proper questions, correct use of analogies, and replies to objections. (3) Finally, these methods include several "tricks" and devices such as methodic doubt and epoché; these are subordinated to the other methods, and neither necessary nor universal tools of all philosophical knowledge. (shrink)

Der Streit um die Wahrheit richtet sich vor allem gegen die Fassung der Urteilswahrheit als einer "Übereinstimmung mit den Sachen". Eine kritische Analyse der Einwände verschiedenster alternativer Wahrheitstheorien (Evidenztheorie, Kohärenztheorie, Konsens- und Diskurstheorie, pragmatische Wahrheitstheorien, existentialistisch-heideggerianische, Jasper'sche, wittgensteinianische und andere) überwindet die Einwände gegen die klassische Korrespondenztheorie durch einen vertieften Begriff des Sachverhalts. Auch in der Verteidigung der Korrespondenztheorie durch Tarski, Popper, Albert und andere neuere Verfechter müssen diverse Mängel überwunden werden, um zu erkennen, daß sich jene schlichte Urgegebenheit der (...) Urteilswahrheit aus keinem Teilbereich der nicht-formalisierten Sprache und des unermeßlichen Reiches des Seins, ja nicht einmal aus der Sphäre des Nichts verdrängen oder durch etwas von Korrespondenz (Adäquatio) Verschiedenes ersetzen läßt. (shrink)