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  1.  59
    Eliminating Group Agency.Lars J. K. Moen - forthcoming - Economics and Philosophy:1-24.
    Aggregating individuals’ consistent attitudes might produce inconsistent collective attitudes. Some groups therefore need the capacity to form attitudes that are irreducible to those of their members. Such groups, group-agent realists argue, are agents in control of their own attitude formation. In this paper, however, I show how group-agent realism overlooks the important fact that groups consist of strategically interacting agents. Only by eliminating group agency from our social explanations can we see how individuals vote strategically to gain control of their (...)
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  2.  27
    Redundant Group Agency.Lars J. K. Moen - 2019 - Philosophy of the Social Sciences 49 (5):364-384.
    According to group-agent realism, treating groups as agents with their own intentional states, irreducible to those of the group members, helps us explain and predict the groups’ behavior. This pap...
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  3.  4
    Making Sense of Full Compliance.Lars J. K. Moen - 2022 - Social Theory and Practice 48 (2):285-308.
    The full compliance assumption has been the focus of much recent criticism of ideal theory. Making this assumption, critics argue, is to ignore the important issue of how to actually make individuals compliant. In this article, I show why this criticism is misguided by identifying the key role full compliance plays in modelling fairness. But I then redirect the criticism by showing how it becomes appropriate when Rawls and other ideal theorists expect their model of fairness to guide real-world political (...)
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    Eliminating Terms of Confusion: Resolving the Liberal–Republican Dispute.Lars J. K. Moen - 2022 - The Journal of Ethics 26 (2):247-271.
    John Rawls thinks republicanism is compatible with his political liberalism. Philip Pettit insists that the two conflict in important ways. In this paper, I make sense of this dispute by employing David Chalmers’s method of elimination to reveal the meaning underlying key terms in Rawls’s political liberalism and Pettit’s republicanism. This procedure of disambiguating terms will show how the two theories defend the same institutional arrangement on the same grounds. The procedure thus vindicates Rawls’s view of the two theories being (...)
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