Political Legitimacy

In this paper, I identify an argument derived from the commitments of John Rawls’s liberalism for restricting the consumption of recreational drugs in a liberal society, but not because of a great passion for restriction at present. The argument can also be used to respond to Jonathan Quong’s example of an unresolvable disagreement between liberal citizens.

Christopher J. Finlay claims “that a principle of moral or legitimate authority is necessary in just war theory for evaluating properly the justifiability of violence by non-state entities when they claim to act on behalf of the victims of rights violations and political injustice.” In particular, he argues that states, unlike non-state actors, possess what he calls “Lesser Moral Authority.” This authority allegedly enables states to invoke “the War Convention,” which in turn entitles even individual soldiers on the aggressive side (...) to use military violence against soldiers defending the victim state. Non-state actors, in contrast, have to fulfill more stringent requirements. If they do not, then even their attacks on military personnel can properly be called "terrorist." In the following I will argue that Finlay’s attempt to show the importance of the legitimate authority criterion of just war theory and to demonstrate that non-state violence has to satisfy heavier burdens of justification than state violence fails for a number of reasons: his claim that defenders would wrong victims if they defended them against their will is mistaken, he overlooks the fact that non-state agents need not claim to fight on someone’s behalf, the full moral authority he mentions is redundant, the powers he ascribes to “Lesser Moral Authority” are, depending on interpretation, either morally irrelevant or nonexistent, and his claim that granting states “Lesser Moral Authority” is beneficial from a “moral pragmatic” point of view while granting the same authority to non-state actors is not, is unwarranted. (shrink)

(a chapter from my book Libertarianism:For and Against).

Dit werkstuk betrekt zich op de vraag of de de facto legitimiteit van Knoet de Grote als koning van Angelsaksisch Engeland, te verklaren is aan de hand van de theorieën over legitimiteit zoals gepostuleerd door Maximilian Carl Emil Weber (1864—1920). Bestaande literatuur over Knoet de Grote zijn troonsbestijging, zoals dat van vooraanstaand 19e-eeuws historicus Edward Augustus Freeman, zou een ‘geromantiseerd’ beeld hebben geschetst van de kwestie. Dit werkstuk zal kijken of dit beeld, aan de hand van Webers theorie over waar (...) legitimiteit in gegrond kan zijn, ten eerste terecht te noemen is en, ten tweede, of het Knoets status als legitiem vorst van het ‘Angelsaksische’ volk goed kan verklaren. (shrink)

This paper provides a realist analysis of the EU's legitimacy. We propose a modification of Bernard Williams' theory of legitimacy, which we term critical responsiveness. For Williams, 'Basic Legitimation Demand + Modernity = Liberalism'. Drawing on that model, we make three claims. (i) The right side of the equation is insufficiently sensitive to popular sovereignty; (ii) The left side of the equation is best thought of as a 'legitimation story': a non-moralised normative account of how to shore up belief in (...) legitimacy while steering clear of both raw domination and ideological distortions. (iii) The EU's current legitimation story draws on a tradition of popular sovereignty that sits badly with the supranational delegation and pooling of sovereign powers. We conclude by suggesting that the EU's legitimation deficit may be best addressed demoicratically, by recovering the value of popular sovereignty at the expense of a degree of state sovereignty. (shrink)

Liberal states ought to accommodate conscientious tax resistance for the same reasons they should accommodate conscientious objection to fighting in war. Conscientious objection to fighting is nothing special.

It is increasingly common in the philosophical literature to claim that political legitimacy, normatively understood, comes in degrees. However, most authors fail to specify what talk of degrees means, and the notion remains opaque. Using the Hohfeld schema as a guide, I survey possible accounts, distinguishing them into “width”, “depth”, and “weight” proposals. I argue that each fails to provide a convincing account of scalar legitimacy. Thus, talk of degrees of legitimacy, as currently used, is in serious need of explanation.

Abstract: In this article we introduce an input-oriented democratic innovation – that we term ‘TaxTrack’ – which offers individual taxpayers the means to engage with their political economies in three ways. After joining the TaxTrack program, an individual can: (1) see and understand how much, and what types, of taxes they have contributed, (2) see and understand how their tax contributions are, or have been, used, and (3) control what their tax contributions can, or cannot, be spent on. We explain (...) this democratic innovation in two ways. The first is through evocation to prefigure what the innovation could look like in future practise which raises the prospects for both good and problematic outcomes. The second is through formal theory to produce a detailed model of the innovation to assist theory building. We conclude by discussing three interactive outcomes of ‘TaxTrack’ through the democratic innovations literature to establish the beginnings of a theory for the model. This theory tells us that ‘TaxTrack’ can return benefits to its users and the democratic regimes in which they are located but it may also place restrictions on output-oriented innovations like Participatory Budgeting. (shrink)

Women continue to be in charge of most childrearing; men continue to be responsible for most breadwinning. There is no consensus on whether this state of affairs, and the informal norms that encourage it, are matters of justice to be tackled by state action. Feminists have criticized political liberalism for its alleged inability to embrace a full feminist agenda, inability explained by political liberals’ commitment to the ideal of state neutrality. The debate continues on whether neutral states can accommodate two (...) feminist demands: to enact policies aimed at dismantling the feminization of caregiving, especially childrearing, and to compensate women for some of the disadvantages they incur by being primary care-givers. I contribute to this debate with three arguments in support of policies meant to de-gender care-giving and compensate care-givers. The first appeals to equality of opportunity to positions of advantage and justifies policies that prevent or mitigate statistical discrimination and implicit biases. The second draws attention to a possible causal relationship between the specialization of women in early childcare and misogyny; since the latter is incompatible with political liberal justice, it yields the conclusion that political liberals ought to further investigate the causal hypothesis with the aim of establishing or refuting it. The third argument concludes that legitimate childrearing prohibits adults from socializing children or, at least girls, into gender norms; it justifies duties of justice on the side of parents, educators, and economic agents, and state policies meant to offset foreseeable breaches of some of these duties. (shrink)

This paper examines two major challenges to epistemic theories of democracy: the “authority dilemma” and the “epistemic gamble.” The first is a conceptual challenge, suggesting that epistemic democracy is inherently self-undermining. The second is a normative challenge, asserting that the case for democracy should not rely on precarious epistemic grounds. I argue that both challenges fail, demonstrating that epistemic theories of democracy withstand these two prominent objections.

This article argues that the relations of social and political power that obtain between humans and pets are illegitimate. We begin by showing that pets, a largely neglected population in political philosophy, are subject to socially and politically organised power, which stands in need of justification. We then argue that pets have three moral complaints against the relations of power to which they are subject. First, our power over pets disrespects their moral independence: the fact that they are not simply (...) available to be used to serve the interests or projects of others. Second, our power over pets systematically sets back their interests in exercising control over their own body, actions, and environment. Third, in subjecting pets to asymmetric relations of power in which they are heavily dependent on humans for the satisfaction of their interests, we subject them to objectionable risks of harm. Together, these complaints support our thesis that the power relations central to the institution of pet keeping are illegitimate. The practical upshot is that we have a strong moral reason to abolish this institution. (shrink)

Michael Huemer and Daniel Layman’s book is brilliant. It is enjoyable, highly readable, and tightly argued. Their arguments address both theory and practice. I cannot say enough good things about it. Despite its brilliance, Huemer’s and Layman’s arguments fail. Layman’s argument fails because he fails to show that a democratic government is accountable, a government respects the side-constraint feature of rights, or there is a content-independent duty to obey a government’s commands. Huemer’s argument fails because it lacks a plausible foundation. (...) It fits best with a classic libertarian theory, but such a theory lacks foundation. It fits poorly with a consequentialist theory because of the way in which Huemer frames the issue of political authority and because Huemer does not argue that anarcho-capitalism is better than government rule. (shrink)

Distributive justice and political legitimacy are different concepts with different roles. In John Rawls’s justice as fairness, the primary subject of justice is the basic structure of society. The primary subject of legitimacy, in contrast, is the exercise of political power. Rawls claims that legitimacy is weaker than justice—a law may be legitimate even though it is unjust. Rawls also claims that a conception of legitimacy would be selected in the original position and that the argument for its adoption "is (...) much the same as, and as strong as, the argument for the principles of justice themselves." But if the parties in the original position have much the same reason to adopt a conception of legitimacy as they have to adopt a conception of justice, why is legitimacy less demanding than justice? If principles of justice and legitimacy are selected in the same way and for the same reasons, their requirements should not diverge. I propose a solution to this conflation problem. I argue that principles of political legitimacy should be selected in a special session of the original position that differs in key respects from the general session in which the two principles of justice as fairness are selected. I also suggest that insofar as the principles of legitimacy selected in this session do allow for some latitude of injustice, as is likely, the demands of legitimacy should take lexical priority over any competing demands of justice. (shrink)

Is authoritarian power ever legitimate? The contemporary political theory literature—which largely conceptualizes legitimacy in terms of democracy or basic rights—would seem to suggest not. I argue, however, that there exists another, overlooked aspect of legitimacy concerning a government’s ability to ensure safety and security. While, under normal conditions, maintaining democracy and rights is typically compatible with guaranteeing safety, in emergency situations, conflicts between these two aspects of legitimacy can and often do arise. A salient example of this is the COVID-19 (...) pandemic, during which severe limitations on free movement and association have become legitimate techniques of government. Climate change poses an even graver threat to public safety. Consequently, I argue, legitimacy may require a similarly authoritarian approach. While unsettling, this suggests the political importance of climate action. For if we wish to avoid legitimating authoritarian power, we must act to prevent crises from arising that can only be resolved by such means. (shrink)

There is a growing consensus among philosophers that quantifying value-laden concepts can be epistemically successful and politically legitimate if all value-laden choices in the process of quantification are aligned with stakeholder values. I argue that proponents of this view have failed to argue for its basic premise: successful quantification is sufficiently unconstrained so that it can be achieved along multiple stakeholder-specific pathways. I then challenge this premise by considering a rare example of successful value-laden quantification in seismology. Seismologists quantified earthquake (...) size precisely by excluding stakeholder values from measure design and testing. (shrink)

According to epistemic ideology critics, a belief or set of beliefs is ideological when it: (a) empowers those responsible for disseminating these beliefs and (b) lacks compelling independent justification. In their view, beliefs satisfying these criteria are defective and ought to be debunked. I contest this claim by showing how, under conditions of political crisis, it is often both epistemically unwarranted and pragmatically inadvisable to debunk seemingly ideological beliefs. I examine the types of beliefs that constitute what are commonly called (...) “emergency frames.” An emergency frame is a system of beliefs concerning the nature of a severe collective threat and the best way to combat that threat. I argue that, due to the uncertainty inherent in many crisis situations, emergency frames often lack independent justification. Because this lack stems from unavoidable epistemic constraints, it should not be seen as a flaw warranting the debunking of any given emergency frame. I begin by outlining the notion of epistemic ideology critique (Section 1). In Section 2, I explore how, when this notion is applied to emergency frames, they often appear ideological and thus seem to warrant debunking. In Section 3, however, I show why it is sometimes epistemically unwarranted and pragmatically inadvisable to debunk such frames. I conclude that, in certain cases, when confronted with ostensibly ideological emergency frames, an attitude of political trust is more suitable than one of radical critique. (shrink)

Review of 'What is Political Philosophy?' by Charles Larmore, Princeton University Press 2020.

‘One person, one vote’ (OPOV) is an important slogan in democratic movements, a principle that undergirds a landmark series of cases in US constitutional law, and a widely accepted axiom of democratic theory in philosophy and political science. It is taken to be sacrosanct; some even state that OPOV “is, like the injustice of chattel slavery, a ‘fixed point’” (Kolodny 2023: 291). This is a rare distinction for an ideal. For all the ink spilt on Rawls’ Difference Principle, no one (...) printed it on the pamphlets and placards of trade unionist, decolonial, and anti-Apartheid protests; it never appears in US Supreme Court decisions; and none of its defenders would say that denying it is akin to accepting slavery. But despite this, OPOV has proved remarkably hard to pin down. It is not meant to be a mere slogan. It is meant to explain why practices of plural voting and vote dilution are inegalitarian. But there is no consensus and little debate about what it means. Many leave the principle undefined. Others say OPOV means anonymity, or equal voting weight, or equal representation, or equal voting power. These accounts differ significantly. But little is said about one should be preferred to its rival. -/- My goal is to convince you that the meaning of OPOV poses a deep, urgent problem, for which we have no adequate solution. I will argue that all current accounts of OPOV should be rejected. The key upshot will be that we need, but lack, a good explanation of the datum that practices of plural voting and vote dilution robustly fail a minimal condition for political equality. In closing, I’ll explain why my arguments also push us towards embracing what has often been considered a radical and overly demanding implication: namely, that all district-based systems—including those used in the US House of Representatives, Senate, and Electoral College—violate OPOV. (shrink)

If the legitimate exercise of political power requires justifiability to all citizens, as John Rawls’s influential Liberal Principle of Legitimacy states, then what should we say about the legitimacy of institutions and actions that have a significant impact on the interests of future citizens? Surprisingly, this question has been neglected in the literature. This paper questions the assumption that it is only justifiability to presently existing citizens that matters, and provides reasons for thinking that legitimacy requires justifiability to future citizens (...) as well. Further, it is argued that the presently dominant interpretation of Rawls’s principle is unable to take future citizens into account in an adequate way. Therefore, the inclusion of these citizens among those to whom justifiability is owed gives us good reasons to reject this interpretation, and to adopt a different understanding of the view. (shrink)

The police are required to establish probable cause before engaging in custodial interrogation. Much custodial interrogation relies on a fraudulent epistemic environment (FEE) in which the police knowingly use deception and dishonesty to gain an advantage over a suspect regarding a material issue, injuring the interests of the suspect. Probable cause, then, is a sort of evidentiary and epistemic standard that legally justifies the police’s use of deceptive and dishonest custodial interrogation tactics that are on par with fraud. However, there (...) are both deontological and consequentialist considerations that show why the police’s use of an FEE is often unjustified. Accordingly, the paper argues that even if the use of an FEE is based on probable cause, there are other (non-epistemic) reasons to think evidence with probative value (such as a confession) should be excluded when derived from an FEE and there is no acute threat of harm to others. (shrink)

Defenses of political obligation—the pro tanto obligation to obey the law because the state commands it—often operate at or near the level of ideal theory. Critics, though, increasingly question that approach’s relevance for the imperfect states that exist. This article develops a lesser evil framework to evaluate political obligation with several advantages over more ideal approaches: (1) avoids the questionable assumption that some actual states are reasonably just, (2) recognizes that context matters for political obligation, (3) captures the complicity involved (...) in obeying the state, and (4) identifies a basis—varying intuitions on lesser evil justifications—to distinguish philosophical anarchism from conceptions of political obligation without the former collapsing into the latter. We remain agnostic on whether this framework establishes political obligation to any state but argue that it offers a compelling account of the moral dilemma of obeying the state under nonideal conditions. (shrink)

What electoral system should a democracy choose? I argue for proportional representation (PR). My main empirical premise is Duverger’s law: Under PR there are more viable candidates in district-level elections than there are under single-member plurality (SMP) systems. My main normative premise is that democracy is valuable because it enables ordinary citizens to rule themselves. To enjoy the value of self-rule, citizens must be able to make an autonomous vote choice. Yet, how autonomous any choice is depends on the diversity (...) of one’s adequate options. The fewer adequate options one can choose between, the less autonomous is one’s choice. So PR augments self- rule by increasing the diversity of adequate options citizens have at election time. (shrink)

Would a political system where the governance was overseen by an algorithmic system be legitimate? The intuitive answer seems to be no. This paper considers the philosophical effort to justify this intuition that argue for algocracy, a rule by algorithms, being illegitimate. Taking as the paradigmatic example the anti-algocratic argument from Danaher that attempts to ground algocratic illegitimacy in the opacity of algocratic decision-making, it is argued that the argument oversimplfies the matters. Opacity can delegitimise—but not simpliciter. It delegitimises because (...) of the presence of certain downstream violations of obligations and rights of the public that result from the opaque governance. Algocratic decision-makers, however, seem not to be subjects to these normative constraints in the relevant sense. The paper therefore argues that the standards of legitimacy that have been deployed for or against different kinds of human governance do not apply to the algorithmic decision-making systems with quite the same force. New avenues for rooting the illegitimacy of algocratic decision-makers have to be developed. (shrink)

Constituent power is an idea with a long tradition in modern political thought but has been largely abandoned since the middle of the twentieth century. Here I offer a new account of constituent power that avoids problems of the classical account, including the paradox of constitutionalism, and clarifies how individuals contribute to creating their shared political order. I argue that constituent power should be understood as an individual power-with: the agential power to constitute a legal order with others. Our individual, (...) banal acts of law-abidingness each partially effect the collective outcome. We generally exercise constituent power unconsciously and automatically, guiding our actions to succeed as defined by law and relying on the legal system to take up our contributions and effectively combine them with others. (shrink)

Drawing on James Tully’s dialogical reconstruction of political theory as a critical activity, this chapter proposes to take the disconnect between theory and practice as an occasion to loosen the grip of a particular image of disobedience holding both liberals and their critics captive. Liberal political thought approaches civil disobedience as a problem of justification: namely, as a challenge of reconciling conflicting obligations to conscience and obligations to law where injustice causes the two to diverge. Recent criticisms of the liberal (...) paradigm seek to expand the boundaries of justifiable dissent, or propose new grounds of justification, but seldom question the very paradigm of political theory animating the hegemonic liberal approach itself. The project of resolving practical conflicts of democratic politics by handing down authoritative rules and procedures constitutes a “monological approach” to the study of politics. It figures the theorist as an authority standing over and above the problems of demos. Such an approach mystifies the ways political theory’s pronouncements are context bound and often serve as unreflective idealization of the status quo. Through a survey of the diverse ways the language of civil disobedience is used, and conscientious lawbreaking is practiced, this chapter seeks to disclose some of the ways a monological approach to dissent remains complicit in a racialized politics of law and order it often claims to challenge. (shrink)

What justifies political power? Most philosophers argue that consent or democracy are important, in other words, it matters how power is exercised. But this book argues that outcomes primarily matter to justifying power.

Realist thinkers in political philosophy often criticize ideal theorists for neglecting or eliminating the fact of politics in their work. This is supposed to be problematic because we should never expect to overcome politics. Any theory that attempts to do so is said to be unrealistic, naïve, and impractical. Although much has been said in the dispute between realists and ideal theorists in recent years, this particular line of criticism, which should be distinguished from other criticisms of ideal theory, has (...) not been clearly or explicitly addressed by ideal theorists in the literature. I deal with this issue by examining the ideal theory of John Rawls, which has been a prominent target of realist criticisms. My aim is to see where politics exists, or might exist, in Rawls’s theory, and whether this politics satisfactorily answers to the various aspects of the realist’s critique. My analysis suggests that there may be no inherent or necessary conflict between ideal theory and real politics, after all. (shrink)

This article sets out an argument from legitimacy for the proposed Indigenous Voice to Parliament in Australia. The article first sets out an understanding of political legitimacy and of legitimacy deficits and argues that the Australian Government faces a legitimacy deficit with respect to its exercise of political power and authority over Indigenous Australians. The deficit arises, it is argued, because Indigenous Australians face significant structural injustice and there is little hope of redressing this injustice within the prevailing governing conventions. (...) The article then argues that the proposed Indigenous Voice to Parliament ought to be seen as part of a package to address this legitimacy deficit by resetting the governing conventions of Australian society. The argument from legitimacy is then compared favorably with more familiar arguments from sovereignty and the right to self-determination. (shrink)

I pursue three interrelated goals. Firstly, through a Hohfeldian analysis of the concept of a right, I aim to clarify what we mean by attributing to political authority a general right to rule (through legal norms) and to the recipients of its decisions a general obligation to obey these norms, which is con¬tent-independent and preemptive. In this regard, careful differentiation between legal and moral rights and obligations appears crucial. Secondly, I argue that, in contrast to the standard approach in political (...) and legal theory interpreting the right to govern as a Hohfeldian claim and the obligation of obedience as a Hohfeldian duty, conceiving these positions as symmetrical and inseparable (“correlative”), it is more fitting to focus on the Hohfeldian power and the corresponding liability. This implies abandoning the assumption of the content-independence and preemptiveness of authority’s decisions. Thirdly, in contrast to the majority of con¬tributions, I emphasise that morality cannot remain a theoretical black box, the content and validity of which are simply assumed in discussions about legitimate authority, and I show how this can be circumvented. The paper seeks to find a stable theoretical position that does not slide either towards the acceptance of the “self-image of the state” as in the case of the standard approach, or towards the “nightmare” of philo¬sophical anarchism. (shrink)

Although the concept of “AI governance” is frequently used in the debate, it is still rather undertheorized. Often it seems to refer to the mechanisms and structures needed to avoid “bad” outcomes and achieve “good” outcomes with regard to the ethical problems artificial intelligence is thought to actualize. In this article we argue that, although this outcome-focused view captures one important aspect of “good governance,” its emphasis on effects runs the risk of overlooking important procedural aspects of good AI governance. (...) One of the most important properties of good AI governance is political legitimacy. Starting out from the assumptions that AI governance should be seen as global in scope and that political legitimacy requires at least a democratic minimum, this article has a twofold aim: to develop a theoretical framework for theorizing the political legitimacy of global AI governance, and to demonstrate how it can be used as a compass for critially assessing the legitimacy of actual instances of global AI governance. Elaborating on a distinction between “governance by AI” and “governance of AI” in relation to different kinds of authority and different kinds of decision-making leads us to the conclusions that much of the existing global AI governance lacks important properties necessary for political legitimacy, and that political legitimacy would be negatively impacted if we handed over certain forms of decision-making to artificial intelligence systems. (shrink)

The Global Financial Crisis of 2007–2009 exacerbated two distinct concerns about the independence of central banks: a concern about legitimacy and a concern about economic justice. This paper explores the legitimacy of independent central banks from the perspective of these two concerns, by presenting two distinct models of central banking and their different claims to political legitimacy and distributive justice. I argue primarily that we should avoid construing central bank independence in binary terms, such that central banks either are, or (...) are not, independent. I will argue that we should instead construe central bank independence in scalar terms, so that independence admits of degree, thus allowing us to develop an account of independence in which central banks can retain it to the extent necessary for economic efficiency, while meeting reasonable concerns regarding democratic legitimacy and economic justice. (shrink)

Two central questions concerning the role that persistent disagreements about philosophical, ethical, and religious issues in liberal societies are raised in this paper: (i) whether the state’s authority may be justified on the basis of controversial views and (ii) whether the state may rely on controversial views when exercising authority. Many assume whatever motivates philosophers to respect disagreement in justifying the state—answering “no” to (i)—seems to also require the state to respect disagreement when it acts—answering “no” to (ii). Here I (...) defend the consistency of answering “no” to (i) and “yes” to (ii), a position I call “political perfectionism.” I argue, first, that one prominent reason for answering “no” to (i)—that citizens should be able to endorse the authority of the state—is consistent with answering “yes” to (ii) and, second, that the intuitions underlying why political liberals want citizens to be able to endorse the authority of the state can motivate answering “yes” to (ii). (shrink)

As part of recent epistemic challenges to democracy, some have endorsed the implementation of epistemic constraints on voting, institutional mechanisms that bar incompetent voters from participating in public decision-making procedures. This proposal is often considered incompatible with a commitment to political equality. In this paper, I aim to dispute the strength of this latter claim by offering a theoretical justification for epistemic constraints on voting that does not rest on antiegalitarian commitments. Call this the civic accountability justification for epistemic constraints (...) on voting. On this view, voters stand to one another in a normative relation of reciprocal accountability that requires them to uphold an epistemically responsible conduct. Modest epistemic constraints on voting are justifiable because they secure that participation in voting is conforming to this normative requirement. Thanks to its distinctive features, the civic accountability justification can overcome two problems that egalitarians commonly associate with the idea of epistemic constraints on voting: the disrespect problem and the hierarchy problem. (shrink)

Cooperative relations steeped in honesty and good faith are a necessity for any viable society. This is especially relevant to the police institution because the police are entrusted to promote justice and security. Despite the necessity of societal honesty and good faith, the police institution has embraced deception, dishonesty, and bad faith as tools of the trade for providing security. In fact, it seems that providing security is impossible without using deception and dishonesty during interrogations, undercover operations, pretextual detentions, and (...) other common scenarios. This presents a paradox related to the erosion of public faith in the police institution and the weakening of the police's legitimacy. -/- The book seeks to solve this puzzle by showing that many of our assumptions about policing and security are unjustified. Specifically, they are unjustified in the way many of our assumptions about security were unjustified after the 9/11 terrorist attacks, when state institutions embraced a variety of brutal rules and tactics in pursuit of perceived security enhancements. The police are likewise unjustified in their pursuit of many supposed security enhancements that rely on proactive deception, dishonesty, and bad faith. -/- There are compelling reasons to think that the police's widespread use of proactive deception and dishonesty is inconsistent with fundamental norms of political morality regarding fraud and the rule of law. Although there are times and places for such tactics in policing, those times and places should be much more limited than current practices suggest. (shrink)

The police are routinely recognized for displaying heroic virtues associated with combat. I take a contrarian position in this paper. Part I begins with the claim that if bravery is to be prioritized in policing, then bravery should be part of the police’s routine roles and responsibilities. However, bravery is not central to what the police do every day, and, therefore, shouldn’t be prioritized (in recruiting, training, and so on). Conversely, Part II claims that if the virtue of honesty is (...) centrally connected to the police role, then it should be prioritized in policing. Because honesty is deeply connected to the police’s routine roles and responsibilities, it should be prioritized. By turning away from misconceptions about the police, the hope is that we will be in a better position to see both the practical and the moral importance of virtue in policing. (shrink)

Liberal democracies of the twenty-first century face the continuing economic tensions of globalization and the various populist political responses. In A Political Theology of the Bureaucratic State, Steven T. Lane argues that a deeper problem exists underneath the neoliberal system of contemporary democratic capitalism—the bureaucratic state and the ways it deploys its sovereignty. Yet these problems have received little attention from Christian political thinkers in the fields of ethics or political theology. By bringing thinkers from across the academic disciplines, from (...) political philosophy and economics to biblical interpretation and public policy, and using modern case-studies related to public health and welfare state, Lane address the foundational issues affecting liberal democracies and the claims to power they make against their citizens. (shrink)

Increasingly secret, complex, and inscrutable computational systems are being used to intensify existing power relations and to create new ones; in particular, they are being used to govern. To be all-things-considered morally permissible new, or newly intense, power relations must meet standards of procedural legitimacy and proper authority. This is necessary for them to protect and realise democratic values of individual liberty, relational equality, and collective self-determination. For governing power in particular to be legitimate and have proper authority, it must (...) meet a publicity requirement: reasonably competent members of the governed community must be able to determine that they are being governed legitimately and with proper authority. The publicity requirement can be satisfied only if the powerful can explain their decision-making to members of their political community. At least some duties of explanation are therefore democratic duties. This chapter first sets out the foregoing argument, then applies it to opaque computational systems, and clarifies precisely what kinds of explanations are necessary to fulfil these democratic values. (shrink)

Corruption is a ubiquitous problem. As Gillian Brock notes early on, it exists to one degree or another in all societies, no matter their stage of development, and is regularly identified by the public as one of the top problems in the world (2–3). Despite its importance and frequency, it hasn’t been a central topic for philoso- phers working on normative moral and political theory. This isn’t to say that it has been ignored, but it has mostly been seen as (...) a specialty topic in areas such as business ethics, criminal law theory focusing on white-collar crime, or certain sub- areas in democratic theory. However, as Brock points out, corruption has particular importance for questions of global justice, given that “corruption plays an enor- mous role in sustaining global injustice and hinders efforts aimed at remedying global deprivations” (17). This comes not only from the sort of large-scale corrup- tion by government officials that starves developing countries of funds needed to provide necessary services but also from more day-to-day corruption in the provi- sion of water, leaving many people without access to clean drinking water; in con- struction, where people must make do with substandard and unsafe buildings; in the provision of education and medical services; and so on. Despite the massive size of the global justice literature, Brock’s book is one of the first—perhaps the first— to focus specifically on corruption in relation to global justice. It would be an im- portant work for this reason alone, but it also has many other virtues which should make it the touchstone of the topic going forward. (shrink)

I develop an egalitarian account of what's objectionable about coercion. The account is rooted in the idea that certain relationships, like those of master to slave or lord to peasant, are relationships of subordination or domination. These relationships are morally objectionable. Such relationships are in part constituted by asymmetries of power. A master subordinates a slave because the master has more power over the slave than vice versa. Coercion is objectionable, I argue, because it creates such asymmetries of power and (...) so creates relationships of subordination. This account, moreover, illuminates what's wrong with blackmail, exploitation, withholding aid, and compulsion. (shrink)

This article conducts a philosophical analysis of the legitimacy of political power in Tanzania using John Locke’s political theory as a framework. It evolved from researcher’s observation and empirical studies that concerned political legitimacy in Tanzania. The lack of philosophical approach opened away for philosophical investigations and the necessity of involving philosophical views like that of the John Locke, in addressing of the shaking political legitimacy in Tanzania. The factors such as; allegations of corruption, restricted freedom of expression and limited (...) access to justice, stimulated the author into philosophical inquiring, in accordance to John Locke’s political philosophy on the theory of legitimacy of political power. The Article examines how Locke’s principles of consent, protection of individual rights, and limited government apply within Tanzania’s socio-political context. The study highlights significant challenges to political legitimacy, including allegations of electoral manipulation, constraints on political freedoms, and governance issues such as corruption and lack of transparency. Recommendations are proposed to enhance democratic governance and accountability in Tanzania, emphasizing the critical need to strengthen electoral integrity, protect fundamental rights such as freedom of expression and assembly, and bolster institutional frameworks for transparency and judicial independence. By applying Locke’s principles, this analysis aims to contribute insights into the dynamics of political authority in Tanzania and suggest pathways for fostering a more inclusive, accountable, and legitimate governance framework aligned with the aspirations of its citizens. (shrink)

"Legitimacy is lost when the police either fail to protect the public or rely on coercion rather than consent to achieve that protection. Recovering Police Legitimacy challenges conventional criminological, political, and public solutions to the problem by approaching it from the bottom up"--.

In this paper, I take issue with Arthur Isak Applbaum’s power-liability view of political legitimacy. In contrast to the traditional view that legitimate rule entails a moral duty to obey, here called the right-duty view, Applbaum argues that political legitimacy is a moral power that entails moral liability for the subjects of political rule. According to Applbaum, the power-liability view helps us explain how responsible citizens in some cases can act contrary to law while still recognizing the claims of law. (...) Against Applbaum’s attempt at establishing the power-liability view through conceptual analysis, I argue that we cannot specify the moral implications of de jure legitimacy without considering the moral argument that justifies the right to rule. I further argue that Applbaum’s normative account of political legitimacy implies commitment to a normative idea that forms the basis of a strong case in favor of the right-duty view. Finally, I argue that the present defense of the right-duty view has resources to account for the moral phenomena that prompt Applbaum’s advocacy of the power-liability view. (shrink)

Public reason liberals expect individuals to have justificatory reasons for their views of certain political issues. This paper considers how groups can, and whether they should, give collective public reasons for their political decisions. A problem is that aggregating individuals’ consistent judgments on reasons and a decision can produce inconsistent collective judgments. The group will then fail to give a reason for its decision. The paper considers various solutions to this problem and defends a deliberative procedure by showing how it (...) incentivizes information sharing and leads to outcomes most acceptable to the group members. (shrink)

Journal of Social Philosophy, EarlyView.

Policies are often justified to the public with reference to factual claims that most people cannot easily verify or scrutinise because they lack relevant knowledge or expertise. This poses a challenge for theories of public justification which require that laws are justified using reasons that all can accept. Further difficulties arise in cases such as the response to the ongoing COVID-19 pandemic where the factual base of knowledge used to justify policies is limited, subject to a high degree of disagreement (...) amongst experts, and marked by rapid changes. This paper reviews some strategies that public justification theorists might draw on to address the question of how to justify policies that depend on this kind of expert knowledge. Whilst such strategies cohere with existing theories of public justification, they do not yield intuitively attractive recommendations. Ideally, theories of public justification would provide criteria by which to evaluate expert testimony such that it guides and informs, but does not lead, policy making. However, in cases like the pandemic response, theories of public reason currently tend towards recommendations that are intuitively unattractive: either requiring citizens to defer to ‘experts’ in a fairly uncritical way or being overly permissive of most factual claims. (shrink)

Scientific hedges are communicative devices used to qualify and weaken scientific claims. Gregor Betz has argued—unconvincingly, we think—that hedging can rescue the value-free ideal for science. Nevertheless, Betz is onto something when he suggests there are political principles that recommend scientists hedge public-facing claims. In this article, we recast this suggestion using the notion of public justification. We formulate and reject a Rawlsian argument that locates the justification for hedging in its ability to forge consensus. On our alternative proposal, hedging (...) is often justified because it renders scientific claims as publicly accessible reasons. (shrink)

The article highlights the metaphysical approach that lies beneath Karl Jaspers' conception of history as an unstoppable flow of individual states into a world unity. The analysis is based on a reading of Jaspers' contribution to the Geneva conference of 1946 and his 1949 book "The Origin and Goal of History".

In contemporary democracies, global capitalism exerts a significant influence over how state power is exercised, raising questions about where political power resides in global politics. This question is important, since our specific considerations about justifiability of political power, i.e. political legitimacy, depend on how we characterize political power at the global level. As a partial answer to this question, I argue that our notion of global political legitimacy should be reoriented to include the structural power of the Transnational Capitalist Class (...) as its subject matter. Structural power is a social relation in which the institutional context makes some agents comply with others’ preferences regardless of actors’ intentional efforts to bring about such outcomes. Even when global business elites do not intentionally exercise power to obtain political control of global governance, their structural power has recognizable effects that partly enforce the world order. To advance my claim, I utilize the radical realists’ argument that the notion of legitimacy is applicable to a broader range of social practices that are beyond dyadic power relations, i.e. rulers intentionally exercising power over subjects. (shrink)