In this article I analyze the Peirce’s concepts of abduction, insight, logica utens and logica docens in order to propose, finally, a vision in which “genuine” abductions are generated only after an exercise in logica docens. These “genuine” abductions are characterized in contrast to those generated by means of logica utens.

In the first section, our anonymous author discusses sophistria as an art. Like other authors who wrote sophistria, the author first shows that sophistria is a demonstrative science, not indeed in the sense that one is taught how to make sophistical arguments, but a science in the sense that knowledge about sophistical arguments is taught through demonstrations. In the subsequent questions on this topic, he makes a number of distinctions, for example, between a new and an old division of sophistrie, (...) between sophistria utens and docens, and between scientia realis and scientia rationis, ultimately identifying the science in question as a scientia rationis. He ends this section by identifying the ways in which the four causes pertain to this science. Unfortunately, a number of lines are missing in these questions, making it impossible to identify some of the author’s arguments which lead him to some of his positions. For example, in question 5, which asks whether the division of sophistrie into an older part and a newer part is suitable, only two arguments to the opposite are given; in question 6, which asks about the distinction between utens and docens, nothing but the question has survived, while in question 7, which asks whether the new logic of sophistria is distinct from the other parts, only one opposing argument is given. (shrink)

The pragmatic conception of truth, anticipated by Henry David Thoreau and developed by C.S. Peirce and subsequent pragmatists, is proposed as a useful analogy for characterising 'sustainability.' Peirce's definitions of 'truth' provides an attractive approach to sustainability because (a) it re-focuses discussions of truth and objectivity from a search for 'correspondence' to an 'external world' (the 'conform' approach) to a more forward-looking ('transform') approach; and (b) it emphasises the crucial role of an evolving, questioning community in the conduct of inquiry. (...) Any successful definition of sustainability must share these characteristics with Peircean truth. While Peirce and John Dewey never reconciled their disagreements regarding the nature and task of 'inquiry', a pragmatist resolution of their differences is offered, arguing that we need both a logic of management sciences (logica utens) and a logic of pure science (logica docens), which (perhaps among other differences) respond very differently to uncertainty. It is shown that adaptive management – can be understood as a first approximation of a logica utens for social learning in pursuit of solutions to environmental problems, and it is suggested that a pragmatist, transform approach to inquiry such as Dewey's may provide a way around the 'fact-value' gulf. (shrink)

In medieval writers an important distinction was drawn between two applications of the term ‘logica’: there was logica utens, the practice of thinking logically about this or that subject-matter, and there was logica docens, the construction of logical theory. Of course the English word ‘logic’ and its derivative ‘logical’ have a corresponding twofold meaning, and we ignore the distinction at the risk of serious confusion. ‘Logical thought’ may mean thinking that is being commended as orderly, consistent, (...) and consequent, whatever its subject-matter; or it may mean the thinking of logicians about logic, which alas has not always exhibited these virtues. Similarly for ‘teaching logic’: there is trying to get people, by precept and example, to be orderly, consistent, and consequent in their thinking, and there is the endeavour to train logicians for the next generation. In any respectable philosophy department there will be someone teaching logic in the first sense; in my own university there are very many first-year undergraduates who do a course called Reason and Argument with this aim. But we hold that the teacher of such logica utens must himself have a sufficient skill in logica docens if he is to do his job properly; and we undertake the further task of training people in logical theory so that some of them, who have sufficient native ability and motivation, may take up the torch from their teachers. (shrink)

This paper considers Peirce's striking remarks about mathematics in a little-known review of Spinoza's Ethics within the larger context of his philosophy of mathematics. It argues that, for Peirce, true mathematical reasoning is always at the vanguard of thought, and resists logical demonstration. Through diagrammatic thought and her pre-theoretical innate faculty of logica utens, the great mathematician is able to see a theorem as true long before the logical apparatus necessary to demonstrate its truth exists. For Peirce, true (...) mathematical thought is in some sense pre-logical, and thus, the logical demonstration of this thought in the form of mathematical proofs is in fact "merely a veil over the living thought.". (shrink)

This paper considers Peirce's striking remarks about mathematics in a little-known review of Spinoza's Ethics within the larger context of his philosophy of mathematics. It argues that, for Peirce, true mathematical reasoning is always at the vanguard of thought, and resists logical demonstration. Through diagrammatic thought and her pre-theoretical innate faculty of logica utens, the great mathematician is able to see a theorem as true long before the logical apparatus necessary to demonstrate its truth exists. For Peirce, true (...) (theoremic) mathematical thought is in some sense pre-logical, and thus, the logical demonstration of this thought in the form of mathematical proofs is in fact "merely a veil over the living thought.". (shrink)

Responding to the paradox of inference and the related problems in philosophy of logic, this paper argues for the necessity of distinguishing between two different objects of justification: logica utens and logica docens. Then, equipped with Peirce’s critical common-sensist conception of logica utens and his classification of sciences, I propose a diagnosis of and a solution to the problem of justification of logic. I argue that this alternative approach successfully avoids circularity in which most attempts (...) in philosophy of logic have been inescapably trapped. I also anticipate and respond to possible objections to taking a Peircean turn in justifying logic. (shrink)

The abductive stage of logical investigation benefits from direct contact with objects of thought, especially material objects in aggregates. The ubiquity of collecting activity and collections of non-utilitarian material objects in ancient as well as contemporary settings, with increasingly deliberate attention to material objects as implements of thought, demonstrates these benefits. This essay focuses on the logica utens of collecting and the role of collections in detection and discovery.

El problema de la adopción (Padró, 2015), según el cual es imposible adoptar una lógica, sugiere la idea de que la práctica de inferir es conceptualmente prioritaria a la lógica entendida como teoría. Este problema representa un desafío para la concepción antiexcepcionalista de la lógica, que entiende a los principios lógicos como meras hipótesis o como creencias sujetas a revisión. Desde nuestra perspectiva, el principal problema de esta concepción ha sido dejar abierta la pregunta sobre la naturaleza de la práctica (...) de inferir. Sin embargo, nos parece completamente posible responder esta pregunta dentro del marco teórico antiexcepcionalista. En este trabajo desarrollamos una concepción naturalista de la práctica de inferir que viene a llenar el vacío dejado por el antiexcepcionalismo tradicional; y a su vez responde al desafío lanzado por el problema de la adopción. (shrink)

In medieval writers an important distinction was drawn between two applications of the term ‘logica’: there was logica utens, the practice of thinking logically about this or that subject-matter, and there was logica docens, the construction of logical theory. Of course the English word ‘logic’ and its derivative ‘logical’ have a corresponding twofold meaning, and we ignore the distinction at the risk of serious confusion. ‘Logical thought’ may mean thinking that is being commended as orderly, consistent, (...) and consequent, whatever its subject-matter; or it may mean the thinking of logicians about logic, which alas has not always exhibited these virtues. Similarly for ‘teaching logic’: there is trying to get people, by precept and example, to be orderly, consistent, and consequent in their thinking, and there is the endeavour to train logicians for the next generation. In any respectable philosophy department there will be someone teaching logic in the first sense; in my own university there are very many first-year undergraduates who do a course called Reason and Argument with this aim. But we hold that the teacher of such logica utens must himself have a sufficient skill in logica docens if he is to do his job properly; and we undertake the further task of training people in logical theory so that some of them, who have sufficient native ability and motivation, may take up the torch from their teachers. (shrink)

This article is focused on the concept of logic in Avicenna’s Isagoge, a text which had great impact both on Arabic and Western thought. Its main section is devoted to an investigation of Avicenna’s clarification of the nature of logic, its proper subject matter as well as its place within the canon of the philosophical sciences. In this connection, special attention is given to Avicenna’s use of the concepts ‘art’ and ‘science’. Significantly, he regards logic as both a science and (...) an art, and argues that in the latter sense, logic is an instrument for the philosophical sciences. Because Avicenna’s Isagoge was read in the Latin West for several centuries, his ideas on the nature of logic played a prominent role in the debates at medieval universities and hence were a likely source of the distinction between ‘logica utens’ and ‘logica docens’. (shrink)

Saul Kripke proposed a skeptical challenge that Romina Padró defended and popularized by the name of the Adoption Problem. The challenge is that, given a certain definition of adoption, there are some logical principles that cannot be adopted—paradigmatic cases being Universal Instantiation and Modus Ponens. Kripke has used the Adoption Problem to argue that there is an important sense in which logic is not revisable. In this essay, I defend two independent claims. First, that the Adoption Problem does not entail (...) that logic is never revisable in the sense that Kripke addresses. Second, that, to assess whether an agent can revise their logic in the sense that Kripke addresses, it is best to consider a different definition of adoption, according to which Universal Instantiation and Modus Ponens are sometimes adoptable. (shrink)

Migranter som fortsetter å oppholde seg i et land etter avslag på søknad om opphold, eller som unnlater å søke om oppholdstillatelse, utfordrer det juridiske rammeverket for nasjonalstater og statsborgerskap. I denne artikkelen diskuteres livssituasjonen til migranter uten lovlig opphold opp mot normativ kosmopolitisk teori om universelle rettigheter. Dette er belyst i internasjonal litteratur, men i mindre grad innenfor en norsk kontekst. Vi tar i denne artikkelen for oss tre empiriske eksempler: tilværelsen i såkalte ventemottak, tilværelsen utenfor ventemottakene og tilværelsen (...) for barn uten lovlig opphold. Gjennom eksemplene diskuterer vi rettighetsspørsmål i migrantenes liv. Vi viser hvordan menneskerettighetene ikke er tilstrekkelige for å ivareta migrantenes velvære, og hvordan rettigheter migrantene faktisk har, ikke fremstår som reelle fordi det oppleves som risikabelt å benytte seg av dem. Artikkelen setter normativ kosmopolitisk teori i perspektiv ved å diskutere den konkrete situasjonen til migrantene, og spør til slutt hva som kan være konsekvensene av at rettigheter blir ulikt fordelt?Nøkkelord: rettferdighet, rettigheter, migrasjon, ulovlig opphold, kosmopolitismeEnglish summary: Without legal residency = no rights? A discussion of the situation of migrants who have settled without official authorisation, in light of the normative theory of justiceMigrants who continue to reside in a country after having received a negative answer to their residence application, or who stay without registering themselves in the first place, challenge the legal framework of national states and citizenship. In this article, we illustrate the situation of migrants without legal residence in light of normative cosmopolitan theory focusing on the universality of rights. We discuss three empirical contexts: life in the so-called waiting reception centers, life outside the waiting reception centers, and the situation of children without legal residence. We illustrate how human rights are not sufficient to protect migrants' well-being and how actual rights do not appear to be so because it is perceived as risky to use them. The article puts normative cosmopolitan theory in perspective by discussing the specific situation of migrants without legal residence, and it closes with the question of what happens if rights are unevenly distributed. (shrink)

Suárez’s primary attempt to rethink angelology can be found in the De Angelis. This work is a mighty commentary on the prima pars of Aquinas’ Summa Theologiae (qq. 50-64) which Suárez left to his colleagues after his years in Coimbra (1597-1607), and which was published posthumously in Lyon in 1620. The composition of the text is somewhat stratified and it includes many references to the Disputationes Metaphysicae, but Suárez most likely already started writing it during his years of teaching in (...) Spain and Italy (1575-1597), before 1597. Because of its Thomistic inspiration, the De angelis is a fundamentally theological and doctrinal work, the metaphysical core of which is independently treated in the DM 35, entitled De immateriali substantia creata. In this passage, which is eminently theoretical, Suárez grapples with the most important quaestiones concerning angels under a metaphysical point of view, therein offering one of the most interesting overviews of early modern angelology. In this paper, I will refer especially to the DM 35, a more synthetic and peculiar work, with some reference to De Angelis as well. I will focus especially on sections 1-3 of DM 35, and try to reconstruct Suárez’s views on the following points: a) the cosmological necessity of angels, their rational demonstrability and the possibility of man’s knowing them (sections 1-2); b) the immaterial essence of angels (section 3). (shrink)

Det er muligens ikke lenger et spørsmål om, men når mennesker med Downs syndrom ikke lenger finnes blant oss. Moderne medisinsk teknologi brukt i masseundersøkelser av gravide, tilsier at det nesten ikke behøver å bli født mennesker med Downs syndrom i fremtiden. I den politiske debatten i flere av de nordiske landene er dette kontroversielt. Det handler om et samfunn der det er plass til alle, hevdes det. På samme tid tas moderne genteknologi i bruk for bl.a. å forhindre at (...) mennesker disponert for Huntingtons sykdom eller arvelig brystkreft blir født. Om noen generasjoner kan slike sykdommer være utryddet. Dette påkaller imidlertid ikke henvisninger til «sortering» og «seleksjon». I denne artikkelen undersøkes de viktigste forutsetningene for hvorfor fosterdiagnostikk på noen indikasjoner vekker etisk debatt, mens det ikke skjer i andre tilfeller. Det argumenteres for at den medisinske forståelsen av alvorlighetsgrad ved en sykdom/funksjonshemming ikke gir oss nøkkelen til å forstå den etiske bekymringen rundt seleksjon. Identitets- og anerkjennelsesproblematikk, hevdes det, er kjernen i kontroversene rundt fosterdiagnostikk i Norden. Derfor står det noe vesentlig på spill i fosterdiagnostikkdebatten. Men bare for noen grupper. (shrink)

Lógica, formação escolar e filosofia entre os jesuítas Resumo: O interesse mais direto deste artigo é a relação entre a Lógica e a formação filosófica na educação jesuíta. Para compor uma imagem da importância e da concreção da Lógica na formação proposta pelos inacianos, nós nos concentraremos na Ratio Studiorum e na obra do jesuíta português Pedro da Fonseca (1526-1599). A razão do recorte proposto é que as reflexões de Fonseca sobre o tema parecem, por um lado, orientar outros jesuítas, (...) como é o caso de Sebastião do Couto, que é o autor da dialética do Curso Conimbricense; por outro, elas são mais completas, sobretudo pela atenção dada por Fonseca ao método e às disputationes. De posse do conceito de Lógica de Fonseca, concluímos com a indicação de caminhos contemporâneos de revisitação de lógicas do passado. Palavras-chave: lógica; método; educação; jesuítas. Logic, school education and philosophy among the Jesuits Abstract: The most direct interest of this article is the relationship between Logic and philosophical formation in Jesuit education. In order to produce an image of the importance and concretion of Logic in the formation proposed by the Ignatians, we will focus on the Ratio Studiorum and on the work of the Portuguese Jesuit Pedro da Fonseca (1526-1599). The reason for the proposed approach is that Fonseca's reflections on the subject seem, on the one hand, to guide other Jesuits, such as Sebastião do Couto, who is the author of the dialectic of Curso Conimbricense; on the other hand, Fonseca’s conception of logic is more complete regarding the other Jesuits, especially due to the attention given by our author to the method and the disputationes. In possession of Fonseca's Logic concept, we conclude with an indication of contemporary paths for revisiting the logics of the past. Key-words: logic; method; education; Jesuits. Logica, educazione scolastica e filosofia tra i gesuiti Abstract: L’interesse più diretto di questo articolo è il rapporto tra Logica e la formazione filosofica nell’educazione dei gesuiti. Per produrre un’immagine dell’importanza e della concretezza della Logica nella formazione proposta dagli inaziani, ci concentreremo nella Ratio Studiorum e nell’opera del gesuita portoghese Pedro da Fonseca (1526-1599). Il motivo di questa scelta è che le riflessioni di Fonseca sull’argomento sembrano, da un lato, guidare gli altri gesuiti, come Sebastião do Couto, cioè, l’autore della dialettica del Curso Conimbricense; da l’altro, la concezione di logica di Fonseca è più completa riguardo ad’altri gesuiti, soprattutto per l’attenzione data dall’autore al metodo e alle disputationes. Possedendo il concetto di logica di Fonseca, concludiamo con l’indicazione di modi contemporanei di rivisitare le logiche del passato. Parole chiave: logica ; metodo ; educazione ; gesuiti. Data de registro: 16/09/2021 Data de aceite: 01/12/2021. (shrink)

La legitimidad del cultivo de la lógica aristotélica fue cuestionado en el siglo XX. Como resultado, actualmente la pregunta de si debe ser sustituida o restituida permanece sin respuesta, a pesar de que al mismo tiempo ha habido nuevos resultados que manifiestan que se trata de una teoría con perspectiva de desarrollo interno, con independencia de lo que establece la lógica matemática. En este artículo restauramos su unidad interna, perspectivas de desarrollo e independencia, a través del uso de tres axiomas (...) o reglas que permiten incorporar términos indefinidos en la silogística clásica, categórica e hipotética, lo cual le otorga una expresividad comparable a la lógica de primer orden de predicado monádico. (shrink)

Collective volume with papers by alumni and students from the Campinas Aristotle Group.