An Integrated Working Memory Model for Time‐Based Resource‐Sharing proposes a formalized a theory of working memory, time‐based resource sharing (TBRS), within the ACT‐R cognitive architecture. Instantiating the theory within ACT‐R allowed the authors to predict task accuracy and response times when an articulatory rehearsal mechanism was included with the TBRS mechanism. This paper was awarded the Allen Newell Award for the best student‐ led paper submitted to ICCM 2018 for their research efforts.

The integrative memory model combines five core memory systems with an attributional system. We agree with Bastin et al. that this melding is the most novel aspect of the model. But we await further evidence that the model's substantial complexity informs our understanding of false memories or of the development of recollection and familiarity.

Humans can recollect past events in details and/or know that an object, person, or place has been encountered before. During the last two decades, there has been intense debate about how recollection and familiarity are organized in the brain. Here, we propose an integrative memory model which describes the distributed and interactive neurocognitive architecture of representations and operations underlying recollection and familiarity. In this architecture, the subjective experience of recollection and familiarity arises from the interaction between core systems and (...) an attribution system. By integrating principles from current theoretical views about memory functioning, we provide a testable framework to refine the prediction of deficient versus preserved mechanisms in memory-impaired populations. The case of Alzheimer's disease is considered as an example because it entails progressive lesions starting with limited damage to core systems before invading step-by-step most parts of the model-related network. We suggest a chronological scheme of cognitive impairments along the course of AD, where the inaugurating deficit would relate early neurodegeneration of the perirhinal/anterolateral entorhinal cortex to impaired familiarity for items that need to be discriminated as viewpoint-invariant conjunctive entities. The integrative memory model can guide future neuropsychological and neuroimaging studies aiming to understand how such a network allows humans to remember past events, to project into the future, and possibly also to share experiences. (shrink)

Despite highlighting the role of the attribution system and proposing a coherent large-scale architecture of declarative memory, the integrative memory model would be more “integrative” if the temporal dynamics of the interactions between its components was clarified. This is necessary to make predictions in patients with brain injury and hypothesize dissociations.

This paper considers the ethical implications of applying three major ethical theories to the memory structure of an artificial companion that might have different embodiments such as a physical robot or a graphical character on a hand-held device. We start by proposing an ethical memory model and then make use of an action-centric framework to evaluate its ethical implications. The case that we discuss is that of digital artefacts that autonomously record and store user data, where this data (...) are used as a resource for future interaction with users. (shrink)

The integrative memory model formalizes a new conceptualization of memory in which interactions between representations and cognitive operations within large-scale cerebral networks generate subjective memory feelings. Such interactions allow to explain the complexity of memory expressions, such as the existence of multiples sources for familiarity and recollection feelings and the fact that expectations determine how one recognizes previously encountered information.

Recent evidence suggests that experienced events are often mapped to too many episodic states, including those that are logically or experimentally incompatible with one another. For example, episodic over-distribution patterns show that the probability of accepting an item under different mutually exclusive conditions violates the disjunction rule. A related example, called subadditivity, occurs when the probability of accepting an item under mutually exclusive and exhaustive instruction conditions sums to a number >1. Both the over-distribution effect and subadditivity have been widely (...) observed in item and source-memory paradigms. These phenomena are difficult to explain using standard memory frameworks, such as signal-detection theory. A dual-trace model called the over-distribution model can explain the episodic over-distribution effect, but not subadditivity. Our goal is to develop a model that can explain both effects. In this paper, we propose the Generalized Quantum Episodic Memory model, which extends the Quantum Episodic Memory model developed by Brainerd, Wang, and Reyna. We test GQEM by comparing it to the OD model using data from a novel item-memory experiment and a previously published source-memory experiment examining the over-distribution effect. Using the best-fit parameters from the over-distribution experiments, we conclude by showing that the GQEM model can also account for subadditivity. Overall these results add to a growing body of evidence suggesting that quantum probability theory is a valuable tool in modeling recognition memory. (shrink)

In this study bibliometric mapping method was employed to visualise the current research trends and the impact of the two most influential models of working memory, namely: A. D. Baddeley and G. J. Hitch’s multicomponent working memory model and N. Cowan’s embedded-processes model of working memory. Using VOSviewer software two maps were generated based on the index-term words extracted from the research papers citing Baddeley and Cowan, respectively. The maps represent networks of co-occurrences of index terms (...) and can be interpreted as an indication of the main research fields related to the examined models of WM. The results of the analysis revealed that the spheres of influence of the two main conceptualisations of WM are rather different than similar. Although the first two clusters, i.e. “brain mapping” and “higher-level cognition and development” are present in both maps, their relative importance varies. The remaining clusters are unique to each map. Baddeley’s theory seems to have a greater influence on “neuropsychology”, while Cowan’s theory - on basic research on “biological systems”, including the nervous system in humans and animals. The second difference between these theories concerns their relations to functions and dysfunctions associated with particular sensory modalities: in Baddelay’s theory with the “auditory modality” cluster, and in Cowan’s - with the “visual modality” one. (shrink)

Misidentification syndromes occur commonly in neuropsychiatric practice and can be explained through aberrant integration of recollection and familiarity, in keeping with a dysfunction at the level of the attributional system in the new integrative memory model. We examine neuroimaging findings associated with Fregoli and Capgras syndromes and compare these with the proposed neural substrate of the integrative memory model supporting the core and attribution functions.

We suggest that the inclusion of anxiety, as one relevant mood factor, could enhance the implementation of the integrative memory model in research and the clinic. The role of anxiety in Alzheimer's disease neuroanatomy, symptomology, and progression is used as an example. Customization of the integrative memory model can establish strong foundations for pathology-specific models of memory deficits, enhancing the development of precision medicine applications.

In this response to commentaries on our target article, we highlight and clarify a variety of issues and respond to several comments, challenges, and misconceptions. Topics covered include the mechanisms of enduring change, the nature of memory, the conditions in which memories are updated, the role of emotional arousal in change, and current limitations in our understanding of the neural basis of change in psychotherapy. It is our hope that through research stimulated by this exchange the latter may be (...) advanced. (shrink)

The integrative memory model contains multiple subsystems. In this commentary, the processes within these subsystems are questioned. First, the assumption that familiarity largely reflects perceptual fluency is examined. Next, the distinction between “process” and “representational” models of temporal lobe function is challenged. Finally, the “relational representation core system”, which is central to the model, is especially sketchy. Here, I highlight key questions to be addressed in order to understand this system's role in trace formation.

Goal‐directed cognition is often discussed in terms of specialized memory structures like the “goal stack.” The goal‐activation model presented here analyzes goal‐directed cognition in terms of the general memory constructs of activation and associative priming. The model embodies three predictive constraints: (1) the interference level, which arises from residual memory for old goals; (1) the strengthening constraint, which makes predictions about time to encode a new goal; and (3) the priming constraint, which makes predictions about the role (...) of cues in retrieving pending goals. These constraints are formulated algebraically and tested through simulation of latency and error data from the Tower of Hanoi, a means‐ends puzzle that depends heavily on suspension and resumption of goals. Implications of the model for understanding intention superiority, postcompletion error, and effects of task interruption are discussed. (shrink)

Johnson-Laird's mental models theory claims that reasoning is a semantic process of construction and manipulation of models in working memory of limited capacity. Accordingly, both a deduction and a given interpretation of a premise would be all the harder the higher the number of models they require. The purpose of the present experiment was twofold. First, it aimed to demonstrate that the interpretation of if...then conditional sentences in children (third, sixth, and ninth graders) evolves as a (...) function of the number of models the children can produce. We proposed a theory of conditional reasoning development that hypothesises a developmental trend of three successive levels of interpretations underlain by one, two, and then three models, i.e. conjunctive, biconditional, and conditional respectively. Second, we aimed to show that these different levels correlate with working memory capacities: the higher the working memory span, the higher the number of models underlying the conditional interpretation. These two hypotheses were verified, supporting the mental models theory. The results are compared with the rival theory of mental logic. (shrink)