Déjà vu and involuntary autobiographical memories (IAM) can be induced by intracranial electric brain stimulation in epileptic patients, sometimes in the same individual. We suggest that there may be different types of IAM which should be taken into account and provide several ideas to test the hypothesis of a continuity between IAM and déjà vu phenomena.

Despite highlighting the role of the attribution system and proposing a coherent large-scale architecture of declarative memory, the integrative memory model would be more “integrative” if the temporal dynamics of the interactions between its components was clarified. This is necessary to make predictions in patients with brain injury and hypothesize dissociations.

Jonathan Walkan challenges cognitive science's dominant model of mental representation and proposes a novel, well-devised alternative. The traditional view in the cognitive sciences uses a linguistic model of mental representation. That logic-based model of cognition informs and constrains both the classical tradition of artificial intelligence and modeling in the connectionist tradition. It falls short, however, when confronted by the frame problem---the lack of a principled way to determine which features of a representation must be updated when new information becomes (...) available. So far, proposed alternatives, including the imagistic model, have not resolved the problem. Waskan proposes the Intrinsic Cognitive Models hypothesis, according to which representational states can be concpetualized as the cognitive equivalent of scale models.Waskan argues further that the proposal that humans harbor and manipulate cognitive counterparts to scale models offers the only viable explanation for what most clearly differentiates humans from other creatures: the capacity to engage in truth-preserving manipulation of representations. The ICM hypothesis, he claims, can be distinguished from sentence-based accounts of truth preservation in a way that is fully compatible with what is known about the brain. (shrink)

This book is devoted to articulating the connections between the nature and value of faith and humility. The goal is to understand these two virtues in a way that does not discriminate between religious and secular. Jon Kvanvig claims that each provides a necessary, compensating balance to the potential downside of the other.

How do our engagements with fictions and other products of the imagination compare to our experiences of the real world? Are the feelings we have about a novel's characters modelled on our thoughts about actual people? If it is wrong to feel pleasure over certain situations in real life, can it nonetheless be right to take pleasure in analogous scenarios represented in a fantasy or film? Should the desires we have for what goes on in a make-believe story cohere with (...) what we want to happen in the actual world? In Apt Imaginings, Jonathan Gilmore develops a new framework to pursue these questions, marshalling a wide range of research in aesthetics, the science of the emotions, moral philosophy, neuroscience, cognitive psychology, and film and literary theory. Gilmore argues that, while there is a substantial empirical continuity in our feelings across art and life, the norms that govern the appropriateness of those responses across the divide are discontinuous. In this view, the evaluative criteria that determine the fit, correctness, or rationality of our emotions and desires for what is internal to a fiction can be contrary to those that govern our affective attitudes toward analogous things in the real world. In short, it can be right to embrace within a story what one would condemn in real life. The theory Gilmore defends in this volume helps to explain our complex and sometimes conflicted attitudes toward works of the imagination; challenges the popular view that fictions serve to refine our moral sensibilities; and exposes a kind of autonomy of the imagination that can render our responses to art immune to standard real-world epistemic, practical, and affective kinds of criticism. (shrink)

The last two decades have witnessed a crescendo of allegations that clinical translation is rife with waste and inefficiency. Patient advocates argue that excessively demanding regulations delay access to life‐saving drugs, research funders claim that too much basic science languishes in academic laboratories, journal editors allege that biased reporting squanders public investment in biomedical research, and drug companies (and their critics) argue that far too much is expended in pharmaceutical development.But how should stakeholders evaluate the efficiency of translation and proposed (...) reforms to drug development? Effective reforms require an accurate model of the systems they aspire to improve—their components, their proper functions, and their pathologies. However, there is currently no explicit and well‐developed model of translation for evaluating such criticisms.In what follows, we offer an explicit model of clinical translation. Many discussions of clinical translation and its pathologies presume that its main output is tangible: new drugs, vaccines, devices, and diagnostics. We disagree. We argue that the principal output of clinical translation is information—in particular, information about the coordinated set of materials, practices, and constraints needed to safely unlock the therapeutic or preventive activities of drugs, biologics, and diagnostics. To develop this information calls for a process far different from a simple linear progression of clinical trials; it requires exploratory sampling of many different elements in this set. Our model points to some limitations and liabilities of influential proposals for reforming research. It also reveals some underrecognized opportunities for improving the efficiency of clinical translation. (shrink)

The Indian Buddhist philosopher Vasubandhu is known for his critical contribution to Buddhist Abhidharma thought, his turn to the Mahayana tradition, and his concise, influential Yogacara-Vijñanavada texts. _Paving the Great Way_ reveals another dimension of his legacy: his integration of several seemingly incompatible intellectual and scriptural traditions, with far-ranging consequences for the development of Buddhist epistemology and the theorization of tantra. Most scholars read Vasubandhu's texts in isolation and separate his intellectual development into distinct phases. Featuring close studies of Vasubandhu's (...) _Abhidharmakosabhasya_, _Vyakhyayukti_, _Vimsatika_, and _Trisvabhavanirdesa_, among other works, this book identifies recurrent treatments of causality and scriptural interpretation that unify distinct strands of thought under a single, coherent Buddhist philosophy. In Vasubandhu's hands, the Buddha's rejection of the self as a false construction provides a framework through which to clarify problematic philosophical issues, such as the nature of moral agency and subjectivity under a broadly causal worldview. Recognizing this continuity of purpose across Vasubandhu's diverse corpus recasts the interests of the philosopher and his truly innovative vision, which influenced Buddhist thought for a millennium and continues to resonate with today's philosophical issues. An appendix includes extensive English-language translations of the major texts discussed. (shrink)

Causal judgments are widely known to be sensitive to violations of both prescriptive norms (e.g., immoral events) and statistical norms (e.g., improbable events). There is ongoing discussion as to whether both effects are best explained in a unified way through changes in the relevance of counterfactual possibilities, or whether these two effects arise from unrelated cognitive mechanisms. Recent work has shown that moral norm violations affect causal judgments of agents, but not inanimate artifacts used by those agents. These results have (...) been interpreted as showing that prescriptive norm violations only affect causal reasoning about intentional agents, but not the use of inanimate artifacts, thereby providing evidence that the effect of prescriptive norm violations arises from mechanisms specific to reasoning about intentional agents, and thus casting doubt on a unified counterfactual analysis of causal reasoning. Four experiments explore this recent finding and provide clear support for a unified counterfactual analysis. Experiment 1 demonstrates that these newly observed patterns in causal judgments are closely mirrored by judgments of counterfactual relevance. Experiment 2 shows that the relationship between causal and counterfactual judgments is moderated by causal structure, as uniquely predicted by counterfactual accounts. Experiment 3 directly manipulates the relevance of counterfactual alternatives and finds that causal judgments of intentional agents and inanimate artifacts are similarly affected. Finally, Experiment 4 shows that prescriptive norm violations (in which artifacts malfunction) affect causal judgments of inanimate artifacts in much the same way that prescriptive norm violations (in which agents act immorally) affect causal judgments of intentional agents. (shrink)

Experimental manipulations are a key means to establish causal relationships in microbiology. However, challenges remain to establish the applicability of such experiments beyond the precise conditions in which they were conducted. Ecological information can help address these challenges by describing the extent to which an experimentally-determined mechanism can explain the natural phenomenon that it is purported to cause.

I start with a brief look at what the classic British intuitionists (Ewing, Broad, Ross) had to say about the relation between judgment and emotion. I then look at some more recent work in the intuitionist tradition and try to develop a conception of moral emotion as a form of practical seeming, suggesting that some moral intuitions are exactly that sort of emotion. My general theme is that the standard contrast between intuition and emotion is a mistake and that intuitionism (...) can happily accommodate the results of recent work in empirical moral psychology. (shrink)

abstract The most well‐known liberal‐egalitarian defence of cultural rights, provided by Will Kymlicka, presents culture as a primary good, and thus a resource that ought to be distributed according to some fair egalitarian criteria. Kymlicka relies on the intuition that inequalities between persons that are the result of brute luck rather than personal choice are unjust in making the case for various multicultural rights. This article makes two main claims. First, the standard luck egalitarian intuition on which Kymlicka's argument relies (...) cannot justify what he calls ‘polyethnic rights,’ in particular cultural and religious exemptions from generally applicable laws. Second, I argue that such exemptions are justifiable by appealing to the public value of fair equality of opportunity, properly construed. (shrink)

Jonathan Bennett's analysis of the second half of Kant's Critique of Pure Reason, in which Kant concerns himself with topics such as substance, the nature of the self, the cosmos, freedom and the existence of God, continues to be an engaging and accessible exploration of Kant's major work. Presented in a fresh twenty-first-century series livery, and including a specially commissioned preface written by Karl Ameriks, illuminating its enduring importance and relevance to philosophical enquiry, this influential work has been revived (...) for a new generation of readers. (shrink)

This article makes four claims. First, that the analytic/Continental split in political theory stems from an unarticulated disagreement about human nature, with analytics believing we have an innate set of mostly compatible moral and political inclinations, and Continentals seeing such things as alterable products of historical contingency. Second, that we would do better to talk of Continental-political-theory versus Rawlsian-political-philosophy, given that the former avoids arguments over principles, whilst the latter leaves genuine analytic philosophy behind. Third, that Continentals suffer from a (...) lack of such arguments, even by their own lights, whilst Rawlsians suffer from inconsistencies within the thought-patterns on which their principles depend. Fourth, that there is an alternative method – ‘normative behaviourism’ – that at least tries to move beyond the problems of both approaches, whilst sharing an idea of ‘praxis’ with the first, and an idea of deriving-principles-from-existing-judgements with the second. (shrink)

Many commentators have expressed concern that large investments in biomedical research over the past two decades have not been translated effectively into clinical applications. In its Critical Path Report, the Food and Drug Administration characterized the problem as a “technological disconnect between discovery and the product development process,” and documented that the number of investigational new drugs submitted to the agency had declined “significantly” since 2000. Along a similar vein, another study found that only five of 101 basic science studies (...) showing significant therapeutic promise were successfully translated into clinical applications.This perceived translational lag is stimulating a shift toward human testing of study interventions earlier in the drug development process. One indication of this trend is a recent guidance encouraging sponsors to pursue human “exploratory” studies before embarking on phase I trials. (shrink)

In this paper I lay out, argue for, and defend ethical Mooreanism. In essence, the view says that some moral propositions are Moorean propositions and thus are epistemically superior to the conjunctions of the premises of skeptical arguments to the contrary. In Sect. 1 I explain Mooreanism and then ethical Mooreanism. In Sect. 2 I argue for ethical Mooreanism by noting a number of important epistemic parities that hold between certain moral truths and standard Moorean facts. In Sect. 3 I (...) defend ethical Mooreanism against the objection that moral propositions are too epistemically dissimilar to standard Moorean facts to count as Moorean truths. (shrink)

Jonathan Dancy; I *—The Presidential Address: Why there is really No Such Thing as the Theory of Motivation, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Volume 95.

Simple extrapolation is the orthodox approach to extrapolating from clinical trials in evidence-based medicine: extrapolate the relative effect size from the trial unless there is a compelling reason not to do so. I argue that this method relies on a myth and a fallacy. The myth of simple extrapolation is the idea that the relative risk is a ‘golden ratio’ that is usually transportable due to some special mathematical or theoretical property. The fallacy of simple extrapolation is an unjustified argument (...) from ignorance: we conclude that the relative effect size is transportable in the absence of evidence to the contrary. In short, simple extrapolation is a deeply problematic solution to the problem of extrapolation. (shrink)

The Food and Drug Administration and the European Agency for the Evaluation of Medicinal Products recently issued documents encouraging sponsors to consider microdose testing before launching Phase I trials, and many commentators predict that such methodologies will be applied more routinely in drug development. However, exploratory testing has provoked several ethical criticisms. Skeptics question the value and validity of microdose trials, and whether they present a reasonable balance of risks and benefits for subjects. Another major criticism is that such studies (...) serve mainly commercial ends. The present article explores these and other ethical concerns for studies conducted in the oncology setting. It concludes that microdosing is not inconsistent with prevailing practices in Phase I research, and that in principle, such studies could strengthen the ethical basis for Phase I trials by providing them better evidentiary justification. (shrink)

This article examines the factors that influence the propensity of corporations to engage with NGOs. Drawing from resource dependency theory and related theories of social networks and the resource-based view of the firm, the authors develop a series of hypotheses that draw from this conceptual foundation to predict a range of factors that influence firms to collaborate with NGOs. These factors include the level of commitment of the firm to CSR, the strategic fit between the firm’s and the NGO’s resources, (...) the level of trust the firm has in NGOs, the frequency of contact with NGOs, prior level and perception of experience with NGOs, and the level of pressure exerted by NGOs. The authors report on results of a survey of the Top 500 firms in the Netherlands on their interactions with NGOs, finding general support for our hypotheses, and suggest that understanding the motives for firm–NGO interactions can teach us more about firms’ corporate social activities and the way such activities are shaped in the dynamic interplay between firms and their stakeholders. Our findings are relevant for future research on cross-sectoral interactions, for corporations considering future relationships with NGO cohorts, and for broader questions about the role of stakeholders and the role of business in society. (shrink)

This book provides the first systematic, book-length defence of natural law ideas in ethics, politics and jurisprudence since John Finnis's influential Natural Law and Natural Rights. Incorporating insights from recent work in ethical, legal and social theory, it presents a robust and original account of the natural law tradition, challenging common perceptions of natural law as a set of timeless standards imposed on humans from above. Natural law, Jonathan Crowe argues, is objective and normative, but nonetheless historically extended, socially (...) embodied and dependent on contingent facts about human nature. It reflects the ongoing human quest to work out how best to live flourishing lives, given the natures we have and the social environments we inhabit. The nature and purpose of law can only be adequately understood within this wider context of value. Timely, wide-ranging and clearly written, this volume will appeal to those working in law, philosophy and religious studies. (shrink)

: "Therapeutic misconception" has been misconstrued, and some of the newer, mistaken interpretations are troublesome. They exaggerate the distinction between research and treatment, revealing problems in the foundations of research ethics and possibly weakening informed consent.

Truth, etc. is a wide-ranging study of ancient logic based upon the John Locke lectures given by the eminent philosopher Jonathan Barnes in Oxford. The book presupposes no knowledge of logic and no skill in ancient languages: all ancient texts are cited in English translation; and logical symbols and logical jargon are avoided so far as possible. Anyone interested in ancient philosophy, or in logic and its history, will find much to learn and enjoy here.

With the ascent of modern epidemiology in the Twentieth Century came a new standard model of prediction in public health and clinical medicine. In this article, we describe the structure of the model. The standard model uses epidemiological measures-most commonly, risk measures-to predict outcomes (prognosis) and effect sizes (treatment) in a patient population that can then be transformed into probabilities for individual patients. In the first step, a risk measure in a study population is generalized or extrapolated to a target (...) population. In the second step, the risk measure is particularized or transformed to yield probabilistic information relevant to a patient from the target population. Hence, we call the approach the Risk Generalization-Particularization (Risk GP) Model. There are serious problems at both stages, especially with the extent to which the required assumptions will hold and the extent to which we have evidence for the assumptions. Given that there are other models of prediction that use different assumptions, we should not inflexibly commit ourselves to one standard model. Instead, model pluralism should be standard in medical prediction. (shrink)

Prior research shows taxpayers’ perceptions of fairness leads to greater cooperation and compliance with tax authorities. Yet our understanding of tax fairness has been hampered by its general reliance upon models and measures of fairness developed by organizational fairness research, even though fairness is a perception subject to contextual influences. Accordingly, we attempt to gain insight into the influence of contextual factors on fairness through the development of a theoretically based and empirically derived model of tax fairness, grounded in organizational (...) literature, but empirically tested in the tax context. Our analysis shows the extent to which items and dimensions found in the organizational fairness literature reflect taxpayers’ perceptions of tax fairness. Most importantly, our findings contribute to fairness research by identifying the role of relevant comparison groups in affecting perceptions of fairness, and thereby extends our understanding of the role of context in affecting fairness perceptions. Furthermore, by identifying the dimensions and items incorporated in perceptions of tax fairness, our study provides a foundation for tax researchers and policy makers to determine how best to promote voluntary taxpayers’ compliance and in so doing, mitigate tax avoidance and tax evasion. (shrink)

Devotion is the defining religious practice and central theological concept of the Gauḍīya Vaiṣṇava tradition, and this article is about the catalytic event that is said to instigate bhakti in the non-devoted. I examine how Jīva Gosvāmin and Viśvanātha Cakravartin, two important theologians in this tradition, argue that the cause of bhakti in the non-devoted is a meeting with a devotee. In this meeting, the non-devoted may develop conviction, which in turn gives him or her the motivation to continue along (...) the path of bhakti, the steps of which were charted in the Bhaktirasāmṛtasindhu of Rūpa Gosvāmin. Based on a few key passages from the Gauḍīya’s primary scriptural source, the Bhāgavata Purāṇa, Jīva and Viśvanātha argue that this conviction for bhakti is developed spontaneously. Since the spontaneous conviction to practice bhakti can only occur in sādhu-saṅga, or a meeting with a devotee, what causes that meeting? The devotee always acts freely and independently ; thus his or her motivation to meet and inspire conviction in the non-devoted is not reducible to a divine plan, divine grace, the piety of the receiver, special features of the receiver’s soul, high birth, or any other designation. Rather, the cause of sādhu-saṅga is the bhakti “living in the heart” of a devotee. This bhakti makes the devotee feel compassion toward the non-devoted, which leads him or her to provide sādhu-saṅga, which then creates conviction, which eventually leads to bhakti. (shrink)

In Perfection and Disharmony in the Thought of Jean-Jacques Rousseau, Jonathan Marks offers an interpretation of the philosopher's thought and its place in the contemporary debate between liberals and communitarians. Against prevailing views, he argues that Rousseau's thought revolves around the natural perfection of a naturally disharmonious being. At the foundation of Rousseau's thought he finds a natural teleology that takes account of and seeks to harmonize conflicting ends. The Rousseau who emerges from this interpretation is a radical critic (...) of liberalism who is nonetheless more cautious about protecting individual freedom than his milder communitarian successors. Marks elaborates on the challenge that Rousseau poses to liberals and communitarians alike by setting up a dialogue between him and Charles Taylor, one of the most distinguished ethical and political theorists at work today. (shrink)

A unique response to the challenging questions raised in the science and religion dialogue by drawing on Hindu theology. Edelmann replies to the sciences through close reading of an important Hindu text, the Bhāgavata Puraṇa, as well engaging with Hindu philosophical disciplines such as Saṁkhya-Yoga.

Alan Millar's paper involves two parts, which I address in order, first taking up the issues concerning the goal of inquiry, and then the issues surrounding the appeal to reflective knowledge. I argue that the upshot of the considerations Millar raises count in favour of a more important role in value-driven epistemology for the notion of understanding and for the notion of epistemic justification, rather than for the notions of knowledge and reflective knowledge.

“Busyness” plainly relates to externally observable work or leisure activities, but nevertheless the state itself is entirely subjective. I will argue in what follows, that there may have been fundamental changes in the connection between the external circumstances of work and leisure and internal feelings of “busyness”. Through the last century there have been fundamental shifts in the relationship between the pattern of daily activities, and patterns of societal sub- and superordination. “Are you busy?” may have had a quite different (...) meaning as addressed to an upwardly mobile member of the Victorian English or American middle classes, as compared to an office worker at the turn of the third millennium. Individuals’ representations of their states of “busyness” play an important, and changing, role in establishing their positions in the order of social stratification. A leisure class at the end of the 19th century perhaps, but the dominant groups in the early 21st are in the most straightforward sense of the word, workers. I will suggest that, reflecting this fundamental shift in social structure, the social construction of “busyness” has also changed. (shrink)

Matching bias in conditional reasoning consists of a tendency to select as relevant cases whose lexical content matches that referred to in the conditional statement, regardless of the presence of negatives. Evans demonstrated that use of explicit rather than implicit negative cases markedly reduced the matching bias effect on the conditional truth table task. In apparent contrast, recent studies of explicit negation on the Wason selection task have failed to find evidence of logical facilitation. Experiment 1 of the present study (...) strongly replicated the Evans findings and extended them to three forms of conditional statement. Experiments 2 and 3 showed further that the use of explicit negatives removed completely the matching bias effect on the Wason selection task. However, consistent with other recent studies, this elimination of bias didnotlead to facilitation of correct responding. The findings are interpreted as providing evidence that matching bias reflects a linguistically cued relevance effect. (shrink)

Because emotion regulation processes operate over time, they potentially change the context in which subsequent ER processes occur. To test this proposal, fifty-two healthy participants completed the ER choice task. Thirty standardized low- and high-intensity negative images were used to generate different emotional contexts in which participants selected between distraction or reappraisal strategies to decrease the intensity of their negative emotion. Participants then implemented their selected strategy and rated their negative emotion. Using a dynamic perspective, we examined as predictors of (...) ER strategy choice, in addition to current stimulus intensity, several contextual factors from the immediately preceding trial: preceding stimulus intensity and strategy choice, and the intensity of negative affect following the previous strategy implementation and thus preceding the current trial. Results replicated earlier findings that participants are more likely to choose distraction for high-intensity images. Extending earlier findings, selecting reappraisal in the preceding trial and greater negative affect preceding the current trial were associated with lower odds of choosing distraction. The lack of significant interactions among the current and preceding trial factors suggests that these effects on ER choice were direct and not through moderating the effect of current stimulus intensity. These findings support dynamic theories of ER. (shrink)

I start by examining Robert Audi's positive suggestions about moral perception, and then attempt to point out some challengeable assumptions that he seems to make, and to consider how things might look if those assumptions are abandoned.