Aristotle assesses as valid three first figure syllogisms, each of which contains at least one premiss expressing a de re contingency. In fact, all three of these moods (namely, Barbara-QQQ, Barbara-XQM, and Barbara-LQM) are invalid. Utilizing the concept of ampliation, this paper shows how the mood Barbara-QQQ must be refined if it is to be deemed valid. It can then become clear as to how Barbara-XQM and Barbara-LQM can be disambiguated and ultimately validated. In treating all three moods, some theses (...) from S4 will be exploited in the context of distinguishing de dicto and de re modes of attributing possibility and necessity. Various Aristotelian propositional forms and rules of inference, including argumentation by ecthesis, will shape the presentation. The viability of Aristotle’s views on the convertibility of universal negative apodeictic propositions will emerge as decisive in evaluating the success of his modal syllogistic. (shrink)

Aristotle assesses as valid three first figure syllogisms, each of which contains at least one premiss expressing a de re contingency. In fact, all three of these moods (namely, Barbara-QQQ, Barbara-XQM, and Barbara-LQM) are invalid. Utilizing the concept of ampliation, this paper shows how the mood Barbara-QQQ must be refined if it is to be deemed valid. It can then become clear as to how Barbara-XQM and Barbara-LQM can be disambiguated and ultimately validated. In treating all three moods, some theses (...) from S4 will be exploited in the context of distinguishing de dicto and de re modes of attributing possibility and necessity. Various Aristotelian propositional forms and rules of inference, including argumentation by ecthesis, will shape the presentation. The viability of Aristotle’s views on the convertibility of universal negative apodeictic propositions will emerge as decisive in evaluating the success of his modal syllogistic. (shrink)

We show, first, that the normalization procedure for S4 modal logic presented by Dag Prawitz in [5] does not work. We then develop a new natural deduction system for S4 classical modal logic that is logically equivalent to that of Prawitz, and we show that every derivation in this new system can be transformed into a normal derivation.

Ideas of previous constructions are combined into a short proof of topological completeness of modal logic S4 first for rational numbers and after that for real numbers in the interval.

We show, first, that the normalization procedure for S4 modal logic presented by Dag Prawitz in [5] does not work. We then develop a new natural deduction system for S4 classical modal logic that is logically equivalent to that of Prawitz, and we show that every derivation in this new system can be transformed into a normal derivation.

In this paper the propositional logic LTop is introduced, as an extension of classical propositional logic by adding a paraconsistent negation. This logic has a very natural interpretation in terms of topological models. The logic LTop is nothing more than an alternative presentation of modal logic S4, but in the language of a paraconsistent logic. Moreover, LTop is a logic of formal inconsistency in which the consistency and inconsistency operators have a nice topological interpretation. This constitutes a new proof of (...) S4 as being "the logic of topological spaces", but now under the perspective of paraconsistency. (shrink)

The numerous modal systems between S4 and S5 are investigated from an epistemological point of view by interpreting necessity either as knowledge or as (strong) belief. It is shown that-granted some assumptions about epistemic logic for which the author has argued elsewhere-the system S4.4 may be interpreted as the logic of true belief, while S4.3.2 and S4.2 may be taken to represent epistemic logic systems for individuals who accept the scheme knowledge = true belief only for certain special instances. There (...) is strong evidence in favor of the assumption that S4.2 is the logic of knowledge. (shrink)

In the topological semantics for modal logic, S4 is well-known to be complete for the rational line, for the real line, and for Cantor space: these are special cases of S4’s completeness for any dense-in-itself metric space. The construction used to prove completeness can be slightly amended to show that S4 is not only complete, but also strongly complete, for the rational line. But no similarly easy amendment is available for the real line or for Cantor space and the question (...) of strong completeness for these spaces has remained open, together with the more general question of strong completeness for any dense-in-itself metric space. In this paper, we prove that S4 is strongly complete for any dense-in-itself metric space. (shrink)

We prove that S4 is complete with respect to Boolean combinations of countable unions of convex subsets of the real line, thus strengthening a 1944 result of McKinsey and Tarski 45 141). We also prove that the same result holds for the bimodal system S4+S5+C, which is a strengthening of a 1999 result of Shehtman 369).

N. B. Prof Williamson is now based at the Faculty of Philosophy, University of Oxford.

We characterize all finitary consequence relations over S4.3, both syntactically, by exhibiting so-called passive rules that extend the given logic, and semantically, by providing suitable strongly adequate classes of algebras. This is achieved by applying an earlier result stating that a modal logic L extending S4 has projective unification if and only if L contains S4.3. In particular, we show that these consequence relations enjoy the strong finite model property, and are finitely based. In this way, we extend the known (...) results by Bull and Fine, from logics, to consequence relations. We also show that the lattice of consequence relations over S4.3 is countable and distributive and it forms a Heyting algebra. (shrink)

Here, we provide a detailed description of the mutual relation of formulas with finite propositional variables p1, …, pm in modal logic S4. Our description contains more information on S4 than those given in Shehtman (1978) and Moss (2007); however, Shehtman (1978) also treated Grzegorczyk logic and Moss (2007) treated many other normal modal logics. Specifically, we construct normal forms, which behave like the principal conjunctive normal forms in the classical propositional logic. The results include finite and effective methods to (...) find a normal form equivalent to a given formula A by clarifying the behavior of connectives and giving a finite method to list all exact models. (shrink)

Shehtman introduced bimodal logics of the products of Kripke frames, thereby introducing frame products of unimodal logics. Van Benthem, Bezhanishvili, ten Cate and Sarenac generalize this idea to the bimodal logics of the products of topological spaces, thereby introducing topological products of unimodal logics. In particular, they show that the topological product of S4 and S4 is S4 ⊕ S4, i.e., the fusion of S4 and S4: this logic is strictly weaker than the frame product S4 × S4. Indeed, van (...) Benthem et al show that S4 ⊕ S4 is the bimodal logic of the particular product space Q × Q, leaving open the question of whether S4 ⊕ S4 is also complete for the product space R × R. We answer this question in the negative. (shrink)

Shehtman introduced bimodal logics of the products of Kripke frames, thereby introducing frame products of unimodal logics. Van Benthem, Bezhanishvili, ten Cate and Sarenac generalize this idea to the bimodal logics of the products of topological spaces, thereby introducing topological products of unimodal logics. In particular, they show that the topological product of S4 and S4 is S4 ⊗ S4, i.e., the fusion of S4 and S4: this logic is strictly weaker than the frame product S4 × S4. In this (...) paper, we axiomatize the topological product of S4 and S5, which is strictly between S4 ⊗ S5 and S4 × S5. We also apply our techniques to (1) proving a conjecture of van Benthem et al concerning the logic of products of Alexandrov spaces with arbitrary topological spaces; and (2) solving a problem in quantified modal logic: in particular, it is known that standard quantified S4 without identity, QS4, is complete in Kripke semantics with expanding domains; we show that QS4 is complete not only in topological semantics with constant domains (which was already shown by Rasiowa and Sikorski), but wrt the topological space Q with a constant countable domain. (shrink)

We prove completeness of the propositional modal logic S 4 for the measure algebra based on the Lebesgue-measurable subsets of the unit interval, [0, 1]. In recent talks, Dana Scott introduced a new measure-based semantics for the standard propositional modal language with Boolean connectives and necessity and possibility operators, and . Propositional modal formulae are assigned to Lebesgue-measurable subsets of the real interval [0, 1], modulo sets of measure zero. Equivalence classes of Lebesgue-measurable subsets form a measure algebra, , and (...) we add to this a non-trivial interior operator constructed from the frame of ‘open’ elements—elements in with an open representative. We prove completeness of the modal logic S 4 for the algebra . A corollary to the main result is that non-theorems of S 4 can be falsified at each point in a subset of the real interval [0, 1] of measure arbitrarily close to 1. A second corollary is that Intuitionistic propositional logic (IPC) is complete for the frame of open elements in. (shrink)

Our concern here is with the extent to which the expressive equivalence of Wehmeier’s Subjunctive Modal Language and the Actuality Modal Language is sensitive to the choice of background modal logic. In particular we will show that, when we are enriching quantified modal logics weaker than S5, AML is strictly expressively stronger than SML, this result following from general considerations regarding the relationship between operators and predicate markers. This would seem to complicate arguments given in favour of SML which rely (...) upon its being expressively equivalent to AML. (shrink)

Shehtman introduced bimodal logics of the products of Kripke frames, thereby introducing frame products of unimodal logics. Van Benthem, Bezhanishvili, ten Cate and Sarenac generalize this idea to the bimodal logics of the products of topological spaces, thereby introducing topological products of unimodal logics. In particular, they show that the topological product of S4 and S4 is S4 \ S4, i.e., the fusion of S4 and S4: this logic is strictly weaker than the frame product S4 × S4. Indeed, van (...) Benthem et al. show that S4 \ S4 is the bimodal logic of the particular product space , leaving open the question of whether S4 \ S4 is also complete for the product space . We answer this question in the negative. (shrink)

This paper is a sequel to [2]. We extend Anderson and Belnap’s list with the characteristic axioms of S3→ and S4→ . Then we exhaustively axiomatize these systems with the list thus extended.

S3o and S4o are the restrictions with the Converse Ackermann Property of the implicative fragments of Lewis' S3 and S4 respectively. The aim of this paper is to provide all possible axiomatizations with independent axioms of S3o and S4o that can be formulated with a modification of Anderson and Belnap's list of valid entailments.

Shortest possible axiomatizations for the implicational fragments of the modal logics S4 and S5 are reported. Among these axiomatizations is included a shortest single axiom for implicational S4—which to our knowledge is the first reported single axiom for that system—and several new shortest single axioms for implicational S5. A variety of automated reasoning strategies were essential to our discoveries.

This paper gives a characterization of those quasi-normal extensions of the modal system S4 into which intuitionistic propositional logic Int is embeddable by the Gödel translation. It is shown that, as in the normal case, the set of quasi-normal modal companions of Int contains the greatest logic, M*, for which, however, the analog of the Blok-Esakia theorem does not hold. M* is proved to be decidable and Halldén-complete; it has the disjunction property but does not have the finite model property.

In the topological semantics for modal logic, S4 is well known to be complete for the rational line and for the real line: these are special cases of S4’s completeness for any dense-in-itself metric space. The construction used to prove completeness can be slightly amended to show that S4 is not only complete but strongly complete, for the rational line. But no similarly easy amendment is available for the real line. In an earlier paper, we proved a general theorem: S4 (...) is strongly complete for any dense-in-itself metric space. Strong completeness for the real line is a special case. In the current paper, we give a proof of strong completeness tailored to the special case of the real line: the current proof is simpler and more accessible than the proof of the more general result and involves slightly different techniques. We proceed in two steps: first, we show that S4 is strongly complete for the space of finite and infinite binary sequences, equipped with a natural topology; and then we show that there is an interior map from the real line onto this space. (shrink)

The purpose of this paper is to challenge some widespread assumptions about the role of the modal axiom 4 in a theory of vagueness. In the context of vagueness, axiom 4 usually appears as the principle ‘If it is clear (determinate, definite) that A, then it is clear (determinate, definite) that it is clear (determinate, definite) that A’, or, more formally, CA → CCA. We show how in the debate over axiom 4 two different notions of clarity are in play (...) (Williamson-style "luminosity" or self-revealing clarity and concealeable clarity) and what their respective functions are in accounts of higher-order vagueness. On this basis, we argue first that, contrary to common opinion, higher-order vagueness and S4 are perfectly compatible. This is in response to claims like that by Williamson that, if vagueness is defined with the help of a clarity operator that obeys axiom 4, higher-order vagueness disappears. Second, we argue that, contrary to common opinion, (i) bivalence-preservers (e.g. epistemicists) can without contradiction condone axiom 4 (by adopting what elsewhere we call columnar higher-order vagueness), and (ii) bivalence-discarders (e.g. open-texture theorists, supervaluationists) can without contradiction reject axiom 4. Third, we rebut a number of arguments that have been produced by opponents of axiom 4, in particular those by Williamson. (The paper is pitched towards graduate students with basic knowledge of modal logic.). (shrink)