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Saba Bazargan-Forward
University of California, San Diego
  1. Killing Minimally Responsible Threats.Saba Bazargan - 2014 - Ethics 125 (1):114-136.
    Minimal responsibility threateners are epistemically justified but mistaken in thinking that imposing a nonnegligible risk on others is permissible. On standard accounts, an MRT forfeits her right not to be defensively killed. I propose an alternative account: an MRT is liable only to the degree of harm equivalent to what she risks causing multiplied by her degree of responsibility. Harm imposed on the MRT above that amount is justified as a lesser evil, relative to allowing the MRT to kill her (...)
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  2. Complicitous Liability in War.Saba Bazargan - 2013 - Philosophical Studies 165 (1):177-195.
    Jeff McMahan has argued against the moral equivalence of combatants (MEC) by developing a liability-based account of killing in warfare. On this account, a combatant is morally liable to be killed only if doing so is an effective means of reducing or eliminating an unjust threat to which that combatant is contributing. Since combatants fighting for a just cause generally do not contribute to unjust threats, they are not morally liable to be killed; thus MEC is mistaken. The problem, however, (...)
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  3. Non-Combatant Immunity and War-Profiteering.Saba Bazargan - 2017 - In Helen Frowe & Lazar Seth (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of Ethics and War. Oxford University Press.
    The principle of noncombatant immunity prohibits warring parties from intentionally targeting noncombatants. I explicate the moral version of this view and its criticisms by reductive individualists; they argue that certain civilians on the unjust side are morally liable to be lethally targeted to forestall substantial contributions to that war. I then argue that reductivists are mistaken in thinking that causally contributing to an unjust war is a necessary condition for moral liability. Certain noncontributing civilians—notably, war-profiteers—can be morally liable to be (...)
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  4. Moral Coercion.Saba Bazargan - 2014 - Philosophers' Imprint 14.
    The practices of using hostages to obtain concessions and using human shields to deter aggression share an important characteristic which warrants a univocal reference to both sorts of conduct: they both involve manipulating our commitment to morality, as a means to achieving wrongful ends. I call this type of conduct “moral coercion”. In this paper I (a) present an account of moral coercion by linking it to coercion more generally, (b) determine whether and to what degree the coerced agent is (...)
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  5. Proportionality, Territorial Occupation, and Enabled Terrorism.Saba Bazargan - 2013 - Law and Philosophy 32 (4):435-457.
    Some collateral harms affecting enemy civilians during a war are agentially mediated – for example, the US-led invasion of Iraq in 2003 sparked an insurgency which killed thousands of Iraqi civilians. I call these ‘collaterally enabled harms.’ Intuitively, we ought to discount the weight that these harms receive in the ‘costs’ column of our ad bellum proportionality calculation. But I argue that an occupying military force with de facto political authority has a special obligation to provide minimal protection to the (...)
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  6. The Permissibility of Aiding and Abetting Unjust Wars.Saba Bazargan - 2011 - Journal of Moral Philosophy 8 (4):513-529.
    Common sense suggests that if a war is unjust, then there is a strong moral reason not to contribute to it. I argue that this presumption is mistaken. It can be permissible to contribute to an unjust war because, in general, whether it is permissible to perform an act often depends on the alternatives available to the actor. The relevant alternatives available to a government waging a war differ systematically from the relevant alternatives available to individuals in a position to (...)
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  7. Defensive Wars and the Reprisal Dilemma.Saba Bazargan - 2015 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 93 (3):583-601.
    I address a foundational problem with accounts of the morality of war that are derived from the Just War Tradition. Such accounts problematically focus on ‘the moment of crisis’: i.e. when a state is considering a resort to war. This is problematic because sometimes the state considering the resort to war is partly responsible for wrongly creating the conditions in which the resort to war becomes necessary. By ignoring this possibility, JWT effectively ignores, in its moral evaluation of wars, certain (...)
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  8.  72
    Book ReviewsDavid Rodin,, and Henry Shue,, Eds. Just and Unjust Warriors: The Moral and Legal Status of Soldiers.New York: Oxford University Press, 2008. Pp. 320. $100.00. [REVIEW]Saba Bazargan - 2009 - Ethics 119 (3):602-606.
    Book Reviews:Just and Unjust Warriors: The Moral and Legal Status of Soldiers.
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  9.  41
    Defensive Killing, by Frowe, Helen: Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015, Pp. Xii + 227, £30. [REVIEW]Saba Bazargan - 2016 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 94 (3):608-611.
  10.  26
    Moral Equality of Combatants.Saba Bazargan - 2013 - In Hugh LaFollette (ed.), The International Encyclopedia of Ethics. Wiley-Blackwell.
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  11.  65
    Morally Heterogeneous Wars.Saba Bazargan - 2013 - Philosophia 41 (4):959-975.
    According to “epistemic-based contingent pacifism” a) there are virtually no wars which we know to be just, and b) it is morally impermissible to wage a war unless we know that the war is just. Thus it follows that there is no war which we are morally permitted to wage. The first claim (a) seems to follow from widespread disagreement among just war theorists over which wars, historically, have been just. I will argue, however, that a source of our inability (...)
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  12.  38
    Peter A. French, War and Moral Dissonance. [REVIEW]Saba Bazargan - 2013 - Journal of Moral Philosophy 10 (1):116-119.
  13.  10
    Accountability for Killing: Moral Responsibility for Collateral Damage in America's Post-9/11 Wars, Neta C. Crawford , 512 Pp., $39.95 Cloth. [REVIEW]Saba Bazargan - 2015 - Ethics and International Affairs 29 (1):116-119.
    Review of Neta C. Crawford's "Accountability for Killing: Moral Responsibility for Collateral Damage in America's Post-9/11 Wars".
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  14.  39
    Cosmopolitan War, by Cecile Fabre. [REVIEW]Saba Bazargan - 2014 - Mind 123 (490):588-592.
    Book review for Cecile Fabre's 'Cosmopolitan War'.
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