In "Two sorts of Naturalism" John McDowell is sketching his own sort of naturalism in ethics as an alternative to "bald naturalism". In this paper I distinguish materialist, idealist and absolute conceptions of nature and of naturalism in order to provide a framework for a clearer understanding of what McDowell’s own naturalism amounts to. I argue that nothing short of an absolute naturalism will do for a number of McDowell's own purposes, but that it is far from obvious that this (...) is his position. If he directly denies that it is, he seems to be left with some rather awkward choices. (shrink)

This collection of essays by leading international philosophers considers central themes in the ethics of Danish philosopher Knud Ejler Løgstrup (1905–1981). Løgstrup was a Lutheran theologian much influenced by phenomenology and by strong currents in Danish culture, to which he himself made important contributions. The essays in What Is Ethically Demanded? K. E. Løgstrup’s Philosophy of Moral Life are divided into four sections. The first section deals predominantly with Løgstrup’s relation to Kant and, through Kant, the system of morality in (...) general. The second section focuses on how Løgstrup stands in connection with Kierkegaard, Heidegger, and Levinas. The third section considers issues in the development of Løgstrup’s ethics and how it relates to other aspects of his thought. The final section covers certain central themes in Løgstrup’s position, particularly his claims about trust and the unfulfillability of the ethical demand. The volume includes a previously untranslated early essay by Løgstrup, “The Anthropology of Kant’s Ethics,” which defines some of his basic ethical ideas in opposition to Kant’s. The book will appeal to philosophers and theologians with an interest in ethics and the history of philosophy. (shrink)

This chapter contains sections titled: 1. 2. 3. 4. Notes References.

In this paper, I aim to support contextual ethics as a broad and open understanding of ethics and the ethical by commenting on the origin of the words ‘ethics’ and ‘ethical’ in Greek philosophy and on the ambiguities built into them from the beginning. I further list some complexities that arose when the Latinate words ‘morals’ and ‘moral’ began to be used in Roman, medieval and modern philosophy, sometimes as synonyms of and sometimes in contrast to ‘ethics’ and ‘ethical’. Finally, (...) I return to discuss the prospects of contextual ethics in the context of developments in moral philosophy in the twentieth century, adding some pragmatist arguments in its favour. (shrink)

Introduction All of us have experienced quite dramatic social changes in our lifetimes. Our families differ greatly from those of our parents, ...

As is well known, answer-set programs do not satisfy the replacement property in general, i.e., programs and that are equivalent may cease to be so when they are put in the context of some other program, i.e., and may have different answer sets. Lifschitz, Pearce, and Valverde thus introduced strong equivalence for context-independent equivalence, and proved that such equivalence holds between given programs and iff and are equivalent theories in the monotonic logic of here-and-there. In this article, we consider a (...) related question: given a program, does there exist some program from a certain class of programs such that and are equivalent under a given notion of equivalence? Furthermore, if the answer to this question is positive, how can we recast as an equivalent program from? In particular, we consider classes of programs that emerge by allowing disjunction and/or negation, and as equivalence notions we consider strong, uniform, and ordinary equivalence. Based on general model-theoretic properties and a novel form of canonical programs, we develop semantic characterisations for the existence of such a program, determine the computational complexity of checking existence, and provide rewriting rules for recasting. (shrink)

This article takes its point of departure from the second (embodied) linguistic turn represented by the enactivist notion of humans as linguistic bodies, using resources from Hans Georg Gadamer in order to propose a view of the relation between art and everyday experience as one of symbolic transformation. Conceiving art as a form of linguistic phenomenon wherein one can engage in original situations of communication, this view rejects both autonomist and direct continuity views of the art-everyday relation. We start (...) by situating the idea of linguistic bodies within the enactive approach, spelling out relevant aspects concerning the significance of language for human life and perception (Sect. 2). Then we embark on a discussion of aspects of Shaun Gallagher’s and Alva Noë’s enactivist perspectives on art experience, highlighting places where their views align with and depart from ours (Sect. 3). The last two sections aim to lay out the transformative view in more detail, proposing a pluralistic understanding of art media and a view of art and art experience as modes of ideational, embodied thought (Sects. 4 and 5). (shrink)

Das Kernanliegen Eugen Finks gilt dem Weltverhältnis des Menschen. Obgleich für ihn zunächst die Ansätze von Husserl und Heidegger richtungsweisend sind, legt Fink bereits in seiner bei Husserl angefertigten Dissertation den Grund zu seiner eigenständigen philosophischen Position. Sein späteres "kosmologisches" Denken erschließt dem Weltbegriff durch Rückgriff auf die philosophische Tradition neue Dimensionen und konkretisiert ihn zugleich im Rahmen einer Philosophischen Anthropologie, Sozialphilosophie und einer Philosophie des Pädagogischen. Mit dieser Verschränkung von Mensch und Kosmos bietet Finks Werk bedeutsame Ansatzpunkte für (...) die interdisziplinäre geistes- und naturwissenschaftliche Forschung. Der erste Teil des Buches verortet Finks kosmologisches Denken im Kontext der philosophischen Tradition. Im zweiten Teil wird Finks Konzept sowohl bezüglich seines Gesamtentwurfs wie seiner philosophisch-anthropologischen, sozialtheoretischen und religionsphilosophischen Implikationen befragt. Der Band wird durch Finks Studie "Nietzsches Metaphysik des Spiels" eröffnet. Diese aus dem Jahr 1946 stammende und bislang unveröffentlichte Arbeit belegt die wichtige Rolle, die Nietzsche bei der Ausbildung von Finks Denken von Welt gespielt hat. (shrink)

Controverting Kierkegaard is the fourth and final volume in the series Selected Works of K. E. Løgstrup. The other books are Kierkegaard’s and Heidegger’s Analysis of Existence and Its Relation to...

On continue encore largement, en France, à rapporter la pensée d’Eugen Fink aux textes et concepts qu’il élabore dans le cadre de son étroite collaboration avec Husserl, limitant ainsi son originalité à une radicalisation de la pensée du dernier Husserl (à travers des thèmes comme celui du spectateur désintéressé, du méontique ou de l’Entmenschung). Des études récentes, en Italie et surtout en Allemagne, se penchent quant à elles avec une attention soutenue sur les écrits du second Fink, écri...

From the contents: La fenetre sur l'absolu selon Fink (Laszlo Tengelyi).- Temps, espace et monde chez le jeune Fink (Marc Richir).- L'auto-reference de la phenomenologie (Bernhard Waldenfels).- Phenomenologie et critique chez Fink et Husserl (Ronald Bruzina).- Le spectateur phenomenologisant: au seuil du non-agir et du non-etre (Natalie Depraz).- Nouvelle determination de l'ideal (Hans Rainer Sepp).

Written in the 1960s, TRUTH AND METHOD is Gadamer's magnum opus.

The period from Plato's birth to Aristotle's death (427-322 BC) is one of the most influential and formative in the history of Western philosophy. The developments of logic, metaphysics, epistemology, ethics and science in this period have been investigated, controversies have arisen and many new theories have been produced. But this is the first book to give detailed scholarly attention to the development of dialectic during this decisive period. It includes chapters on topics such as: dialectic as interpersonal debate between (...) a questioner and a respondent; dialectic and the dialogue form; dialectical methodology; the dialectical context of certain forms of arguments; the role of the respondent in guaranteeing good argument; dialectic and presentation of knowledge; the interrelations between written dialogues and spoken dialectic; and definition, induction and refutation from Plato to Aristotle. The book contributes to the history of philosophy and also to the contemporary debate about what philosophy is. (shrink)

Émile Durkheim remains one of the most controversial, and deeply misunderstood, classics of social theory. His work differs from the dominant version of sociology that has essentially accepted the modernist self-description of contemporary societies; and it contradicts the individualism that has come to dominate the social sciences. For everybody who is interested in constructing theoretical alternatives to this individualism, Durkheim's sociology can be a useful inspiration - not only because of the solutions it suggests, but already because of the questions (...) it asks. Making use of the theoretical possibilities offered by the Durkheimian tradition, however, requires going beyond the familiar appropriations. The Oxford Handbook of Émile Durkheim takes stock of the different recent debates on Durkheimian sociology, and makes them accessible to a wide audience spanning various disciplines; this includes crucial debates that, due to language barriers, are not easily accessible for an English-reading public. The handbook's chapters elucidate the controversial key concepts of Durkheimian sociology; situate them within the contemporary political and theoretical debates they were originally responding to; offer surveys of empirical research that uses Durkheimian concepts (on topics that were already central for Durkheim's own work as well as on topics that Durkheim hardly touched upon), thus demonstrating the possibilities of a Durkheimian sociology; bring out the divergent, and competing, ways in which Durkheim's ideas have been appropriated and reformulated within more recent theoretical developments in the social sciences. In doing so, this volume is an important resource for all scholars and students looking to understand Durkheimian sociology. (shrink)

Eugen Fink is considered one of the clearest interpreters of phenomenology and was the preferred conversational partner of Edmund Husserl and Martin Heidegger. In Play as Symbol of the World, Fink offers an original phenomenology of play as he attempts to understand the world through the experience of play. He affirms the philosophical significance of play, why it is more than idle amusement, and reflects on the movement from "child's play" to "cosmic play." Well-known for its non-technical, literary (...) style, this skillful translation by Ian Alexander Moore and Christopher Turner invites engagement with Fink's philosophy of play and related writings on sports, festivals, and ancient cult practices. (shrink)

Die schnell anwachsende Hinneigung zur Existentialanalytik, zur Lebensphilosophie und zur Ontologie am Anfang der 30er Jahre zwang Edmund Husserl dazu, die ursprungliche, als transzendentale ausgereifte Phanomenologie in methodischer und systematischer Hinsicht von diesen neuen Tendenzen scharf abzugrenzen. In den Jahren 1930 bis 1932 entwarf Eugen Fink im Auftrag seines Lehrers eine Reihe von Texten zur Phanomenologie, die grundlegende Bedeutung haben sollten fur ein Systematisches Werk der Phanomenologie bzw. als neue Meditations cartesiennes fur das deutsche Publikum gedacht waren. Diese Entwurfe (...) Eugen Finks kulminierten in der VI. Cartesianischen Meditation (1932), die u. a. von Gaston Berger, Maurice Merleau-Ponty und Tran Duc Thao in Frankreich rezipiert wurde, bevor Fink sie im Jahre 1946 als Habilitationsschrift an der Freiburger Universitat einreichte. Der vorliegende Band, der in chronologischer Reihenfolge die im Auftrag Husserls verfassten Entwurfe Finks aus den Jahren 1930-32 veroffentlicht, schliesst unmittelbar an die Bande 1 (Studien zur Phanomenologie) und 3 (Phanomenologische Werkstatt) der Eugen Fink Gesamtausgabe an. In diesen Texten gewinnt Finks origineller Beitrag zur Phanomenologie Husserls in der Freiburger Zeit eine Konturenscharfe, die von Sartre und Merleau- Ponty fruh erkannt wurde. (shrink)

Unter einigenWissenschaftlern ist die Vorstellung verbreitet, dass Paradoxien Anzeichen von Fortschritt sein können. Es ist jedoch unklar, wie dies zu deuten ist. Dieser Essay stellt ein subjekt-relatives Verständnis von Paradoxikalität vor, das Paradoxien als »Dissonanzen der Zustimmung« (Rescher 2001) charakterisiert und dadurch erlaubt, sie als Katalysator wissenschaftlichen Fortschritts zu rekonstruieren: Durch ihre Struktur haben Problemstellungen in Form von Paradoxien wenigstens fünf fortschrittsfördernde Eigenschaften, die sie Problemstellungen in Form von Fragen voraushaben. Dadurch können Paradoxien als Angelpunkte theoretischen Fortschritts gesehen werden. Dies (...) legt eine Forderung nahe: Wenn wir theoretischen Fortschritt in den Wissenschaften fördern wollen, so sollten wir den Bau von Paradoxien aktiv verfolgen, gemäß dem Credo: Progress by Paradox! (shrink)

So called “shapes of opposition”—like the classical square of opposition and its extensions—can be seen as graphical representations of the ways in which types of statements constrain each other in their possible truth values. As such, they can be used as a novel way of analysing the subject matter of disputes. While there have been great refinements and extensions of this logico-topological tool in the last years, the broad range of shapes of opposition are not widely known outside of a (...) circle of specialists. This ignorance may lead to the presumption that the classical square of opposition fits all disputes. A broader view, which takes expanded shapes of opposition into account, may come to a more nuanced appraisal of possible disputes. Once we take other shapes of opposition into account, some alleged disputes may turn out to be Scheindisputes. In order to do the wide range of linguistic expressions justice and to differentiate Scheindisputes from real ones, a broader view is advised. To illustrate this point, I discuss the notion of “introspective disputes”. These are commonly reconstructed as obeying the square, but are more aptly reconstructed with a more complex octagon. If we reconstruct these disputes based on Buridan’s octagon, it becomes obvious that “introspective disputes” are likely Scheindisputes. (shrink)

In 1890 C. S. Peirce wrote a review of A. C. Fraser’s recent book on Locke, published to coincide with the bicentennial of Locke’s Essay. Peirce remarked that “Locke’s grand work was substantially this: Men must think for themselves, and genuine thought is an act of perception…. We cannot fail to acknowledge a superior element of truth in the practicality of Locke’s thought, which on the whole should place him nearly upon a level with Descartes.” This estimate of Locke was (...) not the common opinion in England during the nineteenth century. This opinion was reflected in Fraser’s book which, Peirce remarked, could not “be said to be a sympathetic account of [Locke]. The biographer seems to see no charm in his hero, and is perpetually speaking of his want of imagination; which only means he was not given to unpractical dreaming.” Locke had his knowledgeable critics and defenders—for instance Dugald Stewart and John Stuart Mill—but the common opinion ranged from extreme hostility and contempt to condescending criticism of isolated minor points. His style was deplored, his philosophy was called unoriginal and a mere unacknowledged plagiarism of Gassendi and Hobbes; he was said to have so thoroughly misunderstood Descartes that he had merely repeated him with new errors; he was said to owe his philosophical reputation entirely to his advocacy of the popular argument for political freedom or merely to the intellectual circumstances of his time; he was held accountable for Condillac’s rejection of reflection and reason; he was knocked down with a few bare sentences loosely drawn from Leibniz; he was said to have made the mind a puny, passive, mechanical thing. He was called a sensualist, a materialist, a sceptic, an atheist, and a utilitarian though at the same time—and not without contradiction—he was generally, especially by his critics, styled a “great lover of truth,” a plain and simple, well-meaning and religious man. To the nineteenth century Locke meant the Essay, and the history of the Essay was in large measure the history of modern thought, of the eighteenth century. Precisely for this reason there was something nearly sinister about him, in spite of his good personal character. “Locke, himself a clear, humble-minded, patient, reverent, nay, religious man,” said Carlyle, “had paved the way for banishing religion from the world.”. (shrink)