First published in 1914, this volume by F. B. Jevons was designed as a response to the simple question: What is philosophy? Consisting of five separate lectures, the work throws light on the themes of philosophy and science, materialism and idealism, scepticism, practical philosophy, and the notion of the whole and its parts. The aim of the study was not simply to provide an answer to the question in the title, but to bring out the meaning of the question (...) itself and to demonstrate the inherent utilitarian significance of philosophy to everyone. As Jevons notes in the preface, 'Philosophy is a concern of the average man and of practical life, and should not be the monopoly of the professed student.'. (shrink)

First published in 1900, this philosophical essay on Evolution questions how the acceptance of Evolution as scientific should influence the thoughts and actions of humankind from the perspective of morality and moral conduct. In his discussion, Frank B. Jevons deals with such subjects as pessimism and optimism towards evolutionary theory, the laws of motion and matter, and the importance of scientific evidence.

First published in 1900, this philosophical essay on Evolution questions how the acceptance of Evolution as scientific should influence the thoughts and actions of humankind from the perspective of morality and moral conduct. In his discussion, Frank B. Jevons deals with such subjects as pessimism and optimism towards evolutionary theory, the laws of motion and matter, and the importance of scientific evidence.

First published in 1900, this philosophical essay on Evolution questions how the acceptance of Evolution as scientific should influence the thoughts and actions of humankind from the perspective of morality and moral conduct. In his discussion, Frank B. Jevons deals with such subjects as pessimism and optimism towards evolutionary theory, the laws of motion and matter, and the importance of scientific evidence.

First published in 1913, Jevons’ _Personality_ marries the disciplines of philosophy and psychology in order to question the existence of personality and the arguments surrounding it. Intriguingly, Jevons suggests that if a person can question their own personality and existence, by extension they can also question the personality and existence of God. The book is arranged into four chapters based on a series of lectures delivered in Oxford in 1912: these discuss such areas as the relationship between science, (...) psychology, and personality; the argument that "there are changes, but no things which change", and consequently there are changes, but no persons who change; and, the concepts of individualism and unity. (shrink)

First published in 1913, Jevons’ Personality marries the disciplines of philosophy and psychology in order to question the existence of personality and the arguments surrounding it. Intriguingly, Jevons suggests that if a person can question their own personality and existence, by extension they can also question the personality and existence of God. The book is arranged into four chapters based on a series of lectures delivered in Oxford in 1912: these discuss such areas as the relationship between science, (...) psychology, and personality; the argument that "there are changes, but no things which change", and consequently there are changes, but no persons who change; and, the concepts of individualism and unity. (shrink)

Die Grieckischen Culten und Mythen in ihren Beziehungen zu den Orientalischen Religionen. Von O. Gruppe. Erster Band: Einleitung. Leipzig: Teubner. 1887. 14 Mk.

Plato, in one of his dialogues, says: “ The feeling of wonder is the genuine mark of the philosopher; for philosophy has its origin in wonder.” What Plato here says may be accepted as true: the philosopher does wonder. But the philosopher is not the only man who wonders about things. It might perhaps be going too far to say that all men experience the feeling, for some men seem to plod on their weary round without curiosity enough to wonder (...) at anything, whilst others, being comfortable, are satisfied to take things for granted, and never think of wondering at them. (shrink)

This work has been selected by scholars as being culturally important, and is part of the knowledge base of civilization as we know it. This work was reproduced from the original artifact, and remains as true to the original work as possible. Therefore, you will see the original copyright references, library stamps (as most of these works have been housed in our most important libraries around the world), and other notations in the work. This work is in the public domain (...) in the United States of America, and possibly other nations. Within the United States, you may freely copy and distribute this work, as no entity (individual or corporate) has a copyright on the body of the work. As a reproduction of a historical artifact, this work may contain missing or blurred pages, poor pictures, errant marks, etc. Scholars believe, and we concur, that this work is important enough to be preserved, reproduced, and made generally available to the public. We appreciate your support of the preservation process, and thank you for being an important part of keeping this knowledge alive and relevant. (shrink)

Hypotheticals, conditionals, and their connecting relation, implication, dramatically changed their meanings during the nineteenth and early part of the twentieth century. Modern logicians ordinarily do not distinguish between the terms hypothetical and conditional. Yet in the late nineteenth century their meanings were quite different, their ties to the implication relation either were unclear, or the implication relation was used exclusively as a logical operator. I will trace the development of implication as an inference operator from these earlier notions into the (...) first third of the twentieth century using as the starting point the ideas primarily of R. Whately and W. Hamilton before discussing the work of the transitional logicians, A. De Morgan and G. Boole on these topics. Then we discuss the relevant views of four prominent but relatively unknown nineteenth century British logicians, W.E. Johnson, J.N. Keynes, E.E.C. Jones, and H. MacColl, as well as those of the more influential logicians, W.S. Jevons and J. Venn, closing with a section on ‘implication as inference’ where we explore some key ideas of B. Russell and sketch the work of D. Hilbert, P. Hertz, and G. Gentzen who together are responsible for the development of the modern ideas related to the subjects of this paper. (shrink)

Augustine’s metaphysics is a subject little studied, but often much criticized. Among the recent studies of Augustine’s metaphysics, Scott MacDonald’s interpretation of Augustine’s notion of goodness claims that Augustine’s account is incoherent. This suggests a reading of Augustine that is somewhat problematic. This article argues that much of the difficulty that MacDonald claims rests on a misunderstanding of Augustine’s views about the goodness of creation and existence and the corruptibility of created things. Augustine’s position takes for granted an understanding of (...) existence as a good and the participation of all things in the pre–eminent good, that is God. (shrink)

Nicholas Wolterstorff's Divine Discourse attempts to give philosophical warrant to the claim that ‘God speaks’. While Wolterstorff's argument depends largely on his appropriation of J.L. Austin's speech act theory, he also uses two narratives that for him demonstrate how ‘God speaks’. The first is the story of Augustine's conversion in the Confessions and the second is a story that Wolterstorff recounts about a certain ‘Virginia’. This study argues that what Wolterstorff claims to derive from Augustine's narrative for his view of (...) divine discourse is not fully supported by the Confessions, and that Augustine's interpretation of the words ‘tolle lege, tolle lege’, can be construed as a useful interpretation of an ambiguous sign. This is consistent with Augustine's understanding of the interpretation of texts in both the De doctrina christiana and the Confessions. In short, Augustine is far more open to the ambiguity of signs than Wolterstorffs's account suggests. (shrink)

Iris Murdoch’s Metaphysics as a Guide to Morals ranges wide over the field of Western philosophical thought. Throughout the work, Murdoch proposes and enacts a form of philosophical inquiry that she believes supports a moral philosophy based on the idea of the good. One of her attempts, partly inspired by Paul Tillich and J. N. Findlay, centers on her critique and appropriation of the structure of the so-called “ontological argument” in Anselm’s Proslogion. This study assesses Murdoch’s accomplishment and the tenability (...) of the kind of Platonism she proposes against Anselm’s argument about the good in both the Monologion and the Proslogion. My claim is that Anselm’s conception of the good simply does not permit the kind of interpretation that Murdoch puts on the “ontological argument.”. (shrink)