GS 341 is one of the most familiar of Nietzsche’s writings. This article proposes a new reading that stands in contrast with most English-language Nietzsche scholarship. The text presents a communication and its reception. A ‘demon’ makes an announcement, and a hearer responds in one way or another. But there is also another narrative altogether, whose conceptual vocabulary comes from a dynamic world-view. In this an interaction of forces leads to a new situation. If the hearer is not crushed by (...) the ‘greatest weight’, there must be an inner force that counteracts its impact. I argue that what Nietzsche calls amor fati is a state that allows our drives to achieve full expression, and so makes possible a collective strength able to withstand the greatest impact. The final sentence refers to a “confirmation and sealing”. What happens is that the demon’s message makes an impression on the receptive hearer. For Nietzsche this is a working metaphor, not a turn of phrase. In a draft from this period he writes: “Let us stamp the image of eternity on our life!” That sudden and forceful act, embodying an evaluative judgement, is the event that GS 341 is all about. (shrink)

There is good news, and there is bad news. The good news is that in my experience, younger physicians generally are much more concerned about the cost of clinical tests and treatments, and about justly distributing finite medical resources, than were those who practiced medicine in the fee-for-service era. The bad news has at least three components. First, with respect to medically nonbeneficial treatment in the ICU, managed care has not yet given evidence of wanting to put the brakes on (...) unrealistic family demands for aggressive medical interventions. Second, managed care is frustrating many healthcare professionals as well as patients. And third, managed care has no apparent interest in addressing, and may even have contributed to, the problem of medical indigence. Let me develop these propositions more fully. (shrink)

The use of traditional ethical methodologies is inadequate in addressing a constructed maternal–fetal rights conflict in a multicultural obstetrical setting. The use of caring ethics and a relational approach is better suited to address multicultural conceptualizations of autonomy and moral distress. The way power differentials, authoritative knowledge, and informed consent are intertwined in this dilemma will be illuminated by contrasting traditional bioethics and a caring ethics approach. Cultural safety is suggested as a way to develop a relational ontology. Using caring (...) ethics and a relational approach can alleviate moral distress in health-care providers, while promoting collaboration and trust between providers and their patients and ultimately decreasing reproductive disparities. This article examines how a relational approach can be applied to a cross-cultural reproductive dilemma. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Reviewed by:Nietzsche on Morality and the Affirmation of Life ed. by Daniel CameJames A. MollisonDaniel Came, ed., Nietzsche on Morality and the Affirmation of Life Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2022. 220 pp. isbn: 978-0-198-72889-4. Hardback, $70.00Daniel Came's most recent edited collection features original essays from leading figures in the field. As most of its chapters are well-written and well-argued, it will interest Nietzsche scholars generally. It's difficult to narrow (...) the volume's intended audience much further than this, however. The source of this difficulty is not merely titular, though one wonders what aspects of Nietzsche's philosophy could not plausibly be yoked under the dual headings of "morality" and "life affirmation." Rather, the difficulty stems from a shortcoming of Nietzsche's. As Came puts the point in his introduction, "Nietzsche is greatly more forthcoming in his diagnosis of the life-denying nature of morality than he is about what should replace morality and in particular the type of life-affirming attitude which might then ensue" (7). The underdeveloped character of Nietzsche's positive [End Page 110] pronouncements about life affirmation leaves many questions unanswered, the most basic of which might be, "What exactly is it to affirm life?" (7). This collection admirably attempts to tackle such questions head-on by foregrounding Nietzsche's "practical-existential concern with the value of existence" (4)—even if, in resisting the temptation to delve ever deeper into the complexities of Nietzsche's critical enterprise, this approach risks leaving some specialist concerns aside.In light of the inchoate nature of Nietzsche's remedy for life denial, a volume taking life affirmation as its starting point can be forgiven if its contributions are somewhat scattered. Four chapters in this collection—authored by Gemes, Hassan, Huddleston, and Janaway—identify distinct obstacles to Nietzsche's project of life affirmation and explain how Nietzsche might overcome them. Three others—written by Came, Stern, and Kanterian—overlap in arguing that Nietzsche's notion of life affirmation is deeply confused at best and fatally flawed at worst. Two remaining chapters, by Reginster and Clark, are functionally close readings of GM. Below, I discuss the standout essays by Gemes, Came, Huddleston, and Stern, which straightforwardly interact with one another. I then comment on the volume's remaining essays.In his chapter, Gemes suggests that Nietzsche's concern with nihilism emerges after HH, whereas his earlier works express a Romantic preoccupation with cultural renewal. While Reginster analyzes nihilism as a cognitive state of disorientation or despair (The Affirmation of Life [Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2006]) and Pippin analyzes nihilism as a waning of erotic desire (Nietzsche, Psychology, and First Philosophy [Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2010]), Gemes contends that these forms of nihilism are downstream from a more fundamental condition of affective nihilism that becomes fully manifest with the advent of Christian morality. (Kaitlyn Creasy's work on affective nihilism goes unmentioned.) Gemes then rightly observes that nihilism does not merely subtend overt expressions of life denial, as Nietzsche also "characterizes the need to ask reflective questions about the value of existence as a pathological symptom" of nihilism (29, emphasis added; see also GS P:2; TI "Socrates" 2; TI "Morality" 5). This presents a problem for Nietzsche's life-affirming ambitions. For, even if the ancient Greeks and GM's nobles can accomplish "naïve affirmation," which is "more an affective state than a consciously avowed cognitive belief" (28–29), it is unclear whether we late moderns can do the same. Moreover, Nietzsche's [End Page 111] challenge of affirming the eternal recurrence (GS 341) seems to require the sort of reflective, cognitive assessment of life that Nietzsche diagnoses as nihilistic. I would have liked for Gemes to have examined Nietzsche's indictment of judgments about life in more detail, as this seems crucial for delimiting Nietzsche's project of life affirmation. In any case, Gemes concludes by suggesting that Z might strive to incite "deep poetic inspiration […] among those who [can] hear rightly" (35), thereby helping these select few overcome affective nihilism. This might be Nietzsche's best strategy for facilitating life affirmation.Came is less confident... (shrink)

Name der Zeitschrift: Semiotica Jahrgang: 2016 Heft: 208 Seiten: 35-47.

Buddist literature; explanatory commentaries on Tantra philosophy, and commentary on the Mañjuśrīnāmasaṅgīti (Praise to Manjushri).

Comparative analytical study on two truths according to interpretation of eminent masters Gautama Buddha and Mi-bo Gśen-rab of Bon-po sect; includes their brief biographies.

Animal Studies Journal 2021 10: [Review] Felice Cimatti and Carlo Salzani, editors. Animality in Contemporary Italian Philosophy. Palgrave Macmillan Animal Ethics Series. Cham: Palgrave Macmillan, 2020. 341 pp.

This passage is discussed in AJPb 97 , 252, by D. R. Shackleton Bailey, who rightly draws attention to the ‘absurdity’’ of exilii specie sepositos and observes that ‘Ausonius must be saying that the brothers were banished in fact, though not in name’’. Shackleton Bailey's solution is to replace exilii with bospitii, which gives excellent sense, but, even on the assumption of psychological error by a scribe, which is how Shackleton Bailey explains the corruption, may seem rather hard to credit. (...) An easier solution might be to write auxilii for exilii: in appearance Constantine's brothers were being helped and protected, in reality confined in exile. (shrink)

This passage is discussed in AJPb 97, 252, by D. R. Shackleton Bailey, who rightly draws attention to the ‘absurdity’’ of exilii specie sepositos and observes that ‘Ausonius must be saying that the brothers were banished in fact, though not in name’’. Shackleton Bailey's solution is to replace exilii with bospitii, which gives excellent sense, but, even on the assumption of psychological error by a scribe, which is how Shackleton Bailey explains the corruption, may seem rather hard to credit. An (...) easier solution might be to write auxilii for exilii: in appearance Constantine's brothers were being helped and protected, in reality confined in exile. (shrink)