Este artigo tem por objetivo mostrar que o naturalismo que apregoa a necessidade das ciências sociais imitarem os procedimentos metodológicos empregados pelas ciências naturais se revela contraproducente por não levar em conta que as teorias sociais, em muitos casos, lidam com fatos pré-interpretados. E que esse tipo de “material empírico” demanda a elaboração de uma metodologia capaz, indo além das meras intenções programáticas, de efetivamente apreender a significatividade presente nos fatos da vida societária. Para tanto, desponta como imperioso construir teorias (...) sobre “teorias” que possam ser avaliadas em termos de seu poder de compreender, de modo elucidativo ou crítico, a natureza do significado inerente aos “objetos” estudados.This article aims at demonstrating that naturalism, in so far as it defends the thesis that social sciences must imitate the methodological procedures employed by natural sciences in order to produce well-grounded explanations, turns out to be useless. The main reason for naturalism’s failure is that social theories deal with preinterpreted facts. And such a kind of “empirical stuff” demands the creation of a methodology able to capture, beyond mere programmatic intentions, the intrinsic meaning exhibited by several kinds of social facts. In order to attain this aim social research has to construct theories about “theories”, that is, explanations capable of being evaluated by their power of clarifying, through an analytical or a critical approach, the kind of meaning embeded in the “objects” investigated. (shrink)

Résumé La récente installation du siège principal de la Commission Léonine à Paris, en juin 2003, a été saluée par une série de conférences données à l’Université de Paris IV, au mois de décembre de la même année. Ces conférences ont donné lieu aux quatre articles ici présentés.

Este artigo se ocupa de questões metafilosóficas. Nele, discutiremos as razões que fazem com que a filosofia, diferentemente da ciência, problematize a si mesma como empreendimento cognitivo. Em particular, procuraremos identificar como e por que a filosofia acaba se constituindo em problema para si mesma. À exceção das ciências sociais onde há estudos críticos do tipo sociologia da sociologia, a ciência em geral não põe em discussão a si mesma. Raros são os casos em que a ciência chega ao extremo (...) de questionar a própria cognitividade. A filosofia, em alguns de seus mais lúcidos e profícuos exercícios, não se furta a se avaliar como projeto cognitivo. Com esse tipo de preocupação metafilosófica, nosso artigo questionará a pretensão das grandes filosofias de protagonizar revoluções. Defenderemos a tese de que inexistem as revoluções postuladas pelos filósofos, destacando que a incomensurabilidade subsistente entre as filosofias não é provocada por rupturas conceituais ou explicativas e sim pela adoção de diferentes pressuposições absolutas, conforme definidas por Collingwood. (shrink)

Metalogic is an open-ended cognitive, formal methodology pertaining to semantics and information processing. The language that mathematizes metalogic is known as metalanguage and deals with metafunctions purely by extension on patterns. A metalogical process involves an effective enrichment in knowledge as logical statements, and, since human cognition is an inherently logic–based representation of knowledge, a metalogical process will always be aimed at developing the scope of cognition by exploring possible cognitive implications reflected on successive levels of abstraction. Indeed, it is (...) basically impracticable to maintain logic–and–metalogic without paying heed to cognitive theorizing. For it is cognitively irrelevant whether possible conclusions are deduced from some premises before the premises are determined to be true or whether the premises themselves are determined to be true first and, then, the conclusions are deduced from them. In this paper we consider the term metalogic as inherently embodied under the framework referred to as cognitive science and mathematics. We propose a metalogical interpretation of Arrow’s impossibility theorem and, to that end, choice theory is understood as a mental course of action dealing with logic and metalogic issues, in which a possible mathematical approach to model a mental course of action is adopted as a systematic operating method. Nevertheless, if we look closely at the core of Arrow’s impossibility theorem in terms of metalogic, a second fundamental contribution to this framework is represented by the Nash equilibrium. As a result of the foregoing, therefore, we prove the metalogical equivalence between Arrow’s impossibility theorem and the existence of the Nash equilibrium. More specifically, Arrow’s requirements correspond to the Nash equilibrium for finite mixed strategies with no symmetry conditions. To demonstrate this proof, we first verify that Arrow’s set and Nash’s set are isomorphic to each other, both sets being under stated conditions of non–symmetry. Then, the proof is completed by virtue of category theory. Indeed, the two sets are categories that correspond biuniquely to one another and, thus, it is possible to define a covariant functor that preserves their mutual structures. According to this, we show the proof–dedicated metalanguage as a precursor to a special equivalence theorem. (shrink)

We intend to put into question two fundamental principles adopted by critical rationalism. One of them, explicitly proposed by Popper, argues that what is valid in logic is also in psychology. And the other, tacitly espoused, implies that epistemological verdicts have metascientific authority and validity. Regarding the second, we hold the view that to the conclusions arrived at by epistemology should not automatically be conferred metascientific authority and validity. To acquire metascientific import such conclusions also need to be derived from (...) the observation of the actual ways of producing scientific knowledge. The Hume-dependent manner with which Popper rejects induction exemplifies with emblematic strength the tendency to extend the conclusions of epistemology to philosophy of science. On one hand Popper endorses Hume’s argument about the lack of epistemic justification for induction, on the other, disagrees with the humean view that induction is routinely employed and should, therefore, be seen as a human or animal fact. Popper departs from Hume to argue that induction is not even a way of thinking; therefore, it can be employed neither by the layman nor by the scientist. Also in defense of the thesis that induction does not exist, Popper gives primacy to epistemology. More than an epistemological thesis, the theory that decrees that induction is not even a psychological fact requires empirical confirmation. For Popper being right, it is necessary to verify the theory that our minds always operate according to the model from the top down. And psychology not even provides the corroboration of Popper’s thesis. (shrink)

L’étude de ce qui constitue la perfection première du mariage, c’est-à-dire son essence ou son constitutif formel, qui est l’union indissoluble des esprits et des cœurs des conjoints, porte une lumière nouvelle sur les fins du mariage. Cette union indissoluble, en tant qu’elle est la fin propre et prochaine du mariage, en constitue l’objet, qui spécifie formellement l’acte du mariage. La génération et l’éducation des enfants, qui n’est pas une partie intégrante de l’essence du mariage, est sa fin éloignée et (...) appartient à la perfection seconde du mariage, à savoir l’agir des époux. Cette doctrine thomiste des fins du mariage apparaît à différentes époques de l’histoire de la théologie et est adoptée par le Catéchisme du Concile de Trente. Avec le Code de droit canonique de 1917, elle disparaît totalement de l’enseignement catholique. Réapparue en 1930 dans l’encyclique Casti connubii, elle ne retrouve toute sa place dans l’enseignement du Magistère qu’à partir de Vatican II. La doctrine thomiste des sacrements, et du mariage en particulier, permet d’interpréter la position du Magistère actuel sur l’accès à la communion de divorcés remariés, en régime de dérogation à la séparation, et de conclure à la nécessité de manifester publiquement leur réconciliation avec Dieu et avec l’Église. (shrink)

Starting from the epistemic requirements stated by the standard view of knowledge, according to which knowledge is ‘justified true belief’, this article aims to identify the reasons why substantive philosophical theories have failed to satisfy them. Accepted this view of knowledge, philosophy will hardly be able to assign cognitive status to its theories. This article also intends to show that philosophy has its cognitive credibility put in check when it constructs abstruse rhetorical exercises that speciously seek to legitimize themselves as (...) knowledge. Besides forging philosophical theories deprived of cognitive value, philosophy creates theories composed by propositions clearly meaningless. In developing theories devoid of any cognitive potential and theories whose propositions lack meaning, philosophy is liable to have its cognitivity seriously questioned. However, the final assessment of philosophy cannot be confined to its cognitive dimension since its theories have the power of providing ways of seeing reality even when they fail in their attempts to explain objects. (shrink)

Francis Bacon foi considerado por alguns pensadores o pai do método experimental. Outros filósofos o acusaram de advogar um empi-rismo naif. Em nosso artigo pretendemos identificar as peculiaridades do tipo de empirismo abraçado por Bacon. Os mais duros críticos de Bacon têm destacado sua retórica fatualista e têm dispensado pouca atenção à complexidade de um sistema metodológico que atribui papel crucial à evidência negativa. Negligenciam principalmente o real significado epis-temológico de sua proposta de uma indução eliminatória. Associando Bacon rigidamente a (...) uma espécie de empirismo justificacionista deixam de detectar importantes ingredientes falibilistas em sua obra. Por aspirar a identificar o que pode haver de falibilismo na obra de Bacon este artigo questionará a avaliação que Popper faz de Bacon ao apresentá-lo como o grande representante do empirismo ingênuo e dogmático. Por mais que sejam procedentes algumas das críticas que Popper dirige a Bacon, mos-traremos que sua leitura repete velhos clichês sobre o autor do Novum Organum.Some philosophers regard Francis Bacon as the father of ex-perimental method. Others accuse Bacon of defending a naïf empiricist theory of knowledge. In this article I try to identify the peculiarities of the empiricism supported by Bacon. Bacon’s most severe critics emphasize his factualist rhetoric, paying no sufficient attention to the complexity of a methodological system that attributes a crucial role to negative evidence. They neglect the real epistemological meaning of Bacon’s proposal of an eliminative induction. As a rule, such critics are unable to detect the important fallibilist features present in Bacon’s work because they tend to, uncritically, identify him with a kind of em-piricist justificationism. The purpose of this article is to investigate the possible fallibilist elements in Bacon’s writings. By so doing, I shall challenge Popper’s evaluation of Bacon’s philosophy of science. I dis-agree with Popper when he describes Bacon as a dogmatic and naïf empiricist. Although some of the criticisms Popper addresses to Bacon are well-founded, I will argue that the general reconstruction of Ba-con’s inductivism carried out by Popper is not fully defensible. (shrink)

Résumé Le livre de Philippe Büttgen, Luther et la philosophie, montre « comment une question de la philosophie a pu se constituer en mobile d’une réforme religieuse ». Fondé sur une analyse minutieuse des textes et des faits, cet ouvrage renouvelle entièrement la question de la philosophie chez Luther et la compréhension de sa critique de la scolastique. En évitant toute solution facile à des problèmes que cette question comporte, il fait ressortir de façon critique la cohérence du propos de (...) Luther, grâce à une méthode d’analyse élaborée par l’auteur à partir de concepts historiographiques puisés chez Marie-Dominique Chenu et Paul Vignaux. (shrink)

After a brief biography of Thomas Aquinas, the article follows up the work of Leonard Boyle to show how the Summa serves to meet the requirements of a pedagogical project in the Dominican Order and more generally in the medieval Church. Intended for the initial and continuing formation of Dominican friars and students of conventual schools, the Summa is composed in a literary genre perfectly suited to this purpose, which governs its structure. The detailed presentation of the notion of sacra (...) doctrina elaborated in q. 1 provides the occasion to show how this notion itself determines the organization of the material. Finally, the presentation of the contents of the Summa’s three parts brings out the internal organization of the work and stimulates the reading of it. (shrink)

After a brief biography of Thomas Aquinas, the article follows up the work of Leonard Boyle to show how the Summa serves to meet the requirements of a pedagogical project in the Dominican Order and more generally in the medieval Church. Intended for the initial and continuing formation of Dominican friars and students of conventual schools, the Summa is composed in a literary genre perfectly suited to this purpose, which governs its structure. The detailed presentation of the notion of sacra (...) doctrina elaborated in q. 1 provides the occasion to show how this notion itself determines the organization of the material. Finally, the presentation of the contents of the Summa’s three parts brings out the internal organization of the work and stimulates the reading of it. (shrink)

Natureza e Cultura: será que o humano nos deixará de ser tão estranho?

Com o objetivo de criticar a defesa do Princípio da Proliferação feita por Feyerabend, avaliaremos em que medida as ciências sociais se beneficiam do fato de abrigarem uma considerável diversidade de teorias e metodologias. A despeito de ser uma realidade nas disciplinas sociais, a proliferação nunca é vista como capaz de incrementar a testagemde uma teoria contrastando-a com alternativas. Os cientistas sociais descreem que existam falsificadores potenciais de uma teoria que só teorias diferentes se revelam aptas a localizar. Tendo de (...) conviver com a diversidade explicativa, as ciências sociais contrariam a tese feyerabendiana de que, em virtude de cada teoria ter acesso apenasa determinados fatos, a desconsideração de alteridades deixa na penumbra fatos localizados por elas. A multiplicação de ópticas tem sido combatida recorrendo-se ao argumento da eliminação por meio do qual as teorias sociais já formuladas são escrutinadas com o objetivo de se demonstrar suas falhas e apontar uma alternativa como a única aceitável por ser a sobrevivente aos crivos empíricos. Apontaremos as razões pelas quais se tem recorrido ao argumento da eliminação contra a duplicação e a proliferação de teorias nas disciplinas sociais. A proliferação carece das vantagens epistêmicas que lhe atribui Feyerabend tendo em vista que as teorias sociais não testam umas às outras. Mesmo que possível, a testagem recíproca revela-se inútil porque se há fatos só localizáveis por uma teoria não se prestam a aferir outras teorias. (shrink)