Name der Zeitschrift: Kant-Studien Jahrgang: 106 Heft: 4 Seiten: 547-560.

L'idea di relazionare la dimensionalità dello spazio ad una legge fisica, contenuta nel primo scritto di Kant "Pensieri sulla veridica estima delle forze vive", svela un modo di guardare i rapporti tra Fisica e Matematica così nuovo ed originale che potè essere sviluppato e compreso nella sua plenitudine soltanto nel secolo XX. Ci riferiamo qui ala prospettiva aperta da Ehrenfest nel suo "In what way does it become manifest in the fundamental laws of physics that space has three dimensions?". In (...) questo saggio si cerca di comprendere alcune delle radici fisiche, filosofiche e teologiche dell’approccio di Kant a questo problema, e la sua inserzione nel dibattito delle idee che sostengono la concezione meccanicista del Mondo. In primo luogo, si sottolinea che da una lettura attenta del suo Gedanken von der wahren Schätzung der lebendigen Kräfte si può concludere che - al contrario di quanto viene normalmente creduto - Kant non riuscì a dimostrare la sua congettura che la tridimensionalità dello spazio possa essere fondata sulla legge di gravitazione di Newton, secondo la quale la forza tra due corpi va come l'inverso del quadrato della distanza che li separa; in realtà, egli si limitò a giustificare la tridimensionalità della estensione. Dopo aver considerato la distinzione fra estensione e spazio, si fa notare che la catena logica della congettura del giovane Kant, presuppone la forza come concetto basilare, intrinseco alle sostanze. È mediante questa forza che si stabiliscono le relazioni tra le sostanze, le quali, a sua volta, creano l'ordine su cui viene basato il concetto di spazio. Si deve badare che la coerenza del suo argomento richiede, in ultima analisi, concepire la percezione, cioè, l'interazione fra le sostanze e l'anima, come risultato della medesima forza di lunga portata. Inoltre, si dimostra che l'argomento di Kant non poteva essere costrutto su una intelaiatura puramente newtoniana nel 1747. Infatti, egli costruì sua dimostrazione a partire da una concezione del mondo basata sul legato di Cartesio (soprattutto l'idea di um ordine cosmico) e Leibniz (l'esistenza di una forza che precede l'estensione e l'idea di spazio relativo) alla quale sovrappone, in modo ibrido, la legge di gravitazione di Newton. Si argomenta che questa scelta fu fortemente influenzata da alcune idee teologiche del Giovane Kant che divergono da quelle di Cartesio, Newton e Leibniz. Fu questo carattere ibrido del suo approccio che permise a Kant di trattare la questione della dimensionalità dello spazio come un problema di fisica, ma, che, allo stesso tempo, a causa delle sue limitazioni intrinsiche, portò Kant a provare appena la tridimensionalità della estensione. (shrink)

Resumen Vivimos en un mundo cada vez más polarizado entre ricos y pobres. Entre un pequeño grupo de personas que concentra y controla la riqueza mundial, y la gran mayoría de la población que no cuenta con las condiciones indispensables para poder vivir. Por otra parte, la globalización económica promueve un modelo de humanidad basado en el consumismo. El ser humano ha identificado la búsqueda de la felicidad con el comprar y adquirir los nuevos modelos que la publicidad impone. Nos (...) estamos acabando al planeta -incluyendo a la humanidad- y las consecuencias son evidentes: calentamiento global, contaminación, extinción de especies, violencia, migración, etc. Por otra parte, la acumulación de recursos en manos de unos cuantos es algo que también destruye a los ricos, los deshumaniza. Consideramos por tanto que si bien la pobreza, como carencia de lo indispensable para poder vivir dignamente, es un problema que debemos solucionar; por otra parte, hay otro tipo de “pobreza” entendida como virtud, que nos ayuda a vivir más plenamente, y es aquella que nos proporciona libertad para centrarnos en lo esencial: la familia, la humanidad, el mundo y Dios. El objetivo del presente trabajo es pasar de la pobreza como problema a la pobreza como virtud.We live in a world where the gap between the rich and the poor is increasing. In a world where a small group of people concentrates and controls the wealth, and the rest of the population is lacking the indispensable conditions for living. On another hand, economic globalization promotes a model of humanity based on consumerism. Human beings have related search of happiness with acquiring commodities and models imposed by advertising. We are destroying the planet -including humanity- and the consequences are evident: global warming, pollution, endangered species, violence, migration, etc. In addition, accumulating resources is dehumanizing and destroying the wealthy societies. We consider, that poverty understood as lacking financial resources is a problem that needs a resolution; but also, poverty, understood as virtue, help us to live fully and provides freedom, so we can focus on the essentials: family, humanity, the world and God. The objective of this work is to pass from poverty as a problem, to poverty as a virtue. (shrink)

In this paper, linguistic-analytic philosophy has been identified as the dominant methodology in the philosophy of sport. The hermeneutics of sport is contrasted with linguistic-analytic philosophy by analyzing Heidegger’s view of Truth. In doing so, two views of philosophy are compared: ontology or description. Sport hermeneutics’ task has to do with description. Hermeneutical explanations of sport attempt to describe the facticity of sport. Such a facticity is formed by three moments: embodiment, capabilities, and tradition. They are not components of sport (...) that can be identified as essential components but rather, they are identifiable only for analytic purposes. These three above-mentioned elements cannot be identified as elements, because they are intrinsically intertwined forming a unitary network of meaning. The task of sport hermeneutics is to describe the different relationships that compose such a network of meaning. In doing so, sport is a humane activity linked to the constitutive human task of making sense of reality by projecting meaning into it. (shrink)

Why is space 3-dimensional? The fi rst answer to this question, entirely based on Physics, was given by Ehrenfest, in 1917, who showed that the stability requirement for n-dimensional two-body planetary system very strongly constrains space dimensionality, favouring 3-d. This kind of approach will be generically called "stability postulate" throughout this paper and was shown by Tangherlini, in 1963, to be still valid in the framework of general relativity as well as for quantum mechanical hydrogen atom, giving the same constraint (...) for space{dimensionality. In the present work, before criticizing this methodology, a brief discussion has been introduced, aimed at stressing and clarifying some general physical aspects of the problem of how to determine the number of space dimensions. Then, the epistemological consequences of Ehrenfest's methodology are critically reviewed. An alternative procedure to get at the proper number of dimensions, in which the stability postulate - and the implicit singularities in three-dimensional physics - are not an essential part of the argument, is proposed. In this way, the main epistemological problems contained in Ehrenfest's original idea are avoided. The alternative methodology proposed in this paper is realized by obtaining and discussing the n-dimensional quantum theory as expressed in Planck's law, de Broglie relation and the Heisenberg uncertainty relation. As a consequence, it is possible to propose an experiment, based on thermal neutron di raction by crystals, to directly measure space dimensionality. Finally the distinguished role of Maxwell's electromagnetic theory in the determination of space dimensionality is stressed. (shrink)

Metascientific criteria used for explaining or constraining physical space dimensionality and their historical relationship to prevailing causal systems are discussed. The important contributions by Aristotle, Kant and Ehrenfest to the dimensionality of space problem are considered and shown to be grounded on different causal explanations: causa materialis for Aristotle, causa efficiens for young Kant and an ingenious combination of causa efficiens and causa formalis for Ehrenfest. The prominent and growing rôle played by causa formalis in modern physical approaches to this (...) problem is emphasized. (shrink)

En este texto analizamos el estudio que Bernard Suits hace del uso instrumental de la razón en The Grasshopper a través de su utopía. Para ello, analizamos el papel que juega la razón instrumental en la teoría del juego y en la utopía de Suits. Luego, comparamos el uso instrumental de la razón con lo que denominamos «actitud lúdica». Esta última encarna la racionalidad lúdica que los jugadores han de adoptar para jugar al juego y vivir en el mundo utópico (...) de Suits. Para concluir, defendemos que la actitud lúdica ofrece una alternativa a la predominancia del uso instrumental de la razón en nuestra sociedad. (shrink)

En este artículo, la filosofía analítico-lingüística es identificada como la metodología predominante en la filosofía del deporte. Según esta propuesta metodológica, la búsqueda de la definición del deporte es la meta principal de la filosofía. La hermenéutica del deporte es opuesta a la de tipo analítico-lingüístico. Analizando el concepto de verdad de Heidegger, se comparan dos concepciones de la tarea de la filosofía: ontología y descrip-ción. La tarea de la hermenéutica del deporte tiene que ver con la descripción. Las expli-caciones (...) hermenéuticas del deporte son un intento de describir la facticidad del deporte, que está compuesta por tres momentos diferentes: corporalidad, capacidades, y tradici. (shrink)

En este artículo se analiza el concepto de imperativo metanoético que Peter Sloterdijk presenta en ¡Has de cambiar tu vida! Nuestro objetivo es iluminar la naturaleza de lo que, en trabajos anteriores, hemos denominado -a raíz de la obra de Bernard Suits-: razón lúdica. Para ello, primero, expondremos y analizaremos el sentido del imperativo metanoético en Sloterdijk, así como los elementos principales de su razón ascética. Segundo, mostraremos cómo ambos son consecuencia del análisis ontológico de corte heideggeriano en la que (...) Sloterdijk basa su propuesta de filosofía moral. Tercero, presentaremos en términos sloterdijkianos tanto el análisis ontológico de Suits, como el posible imperativo metanoético que se desprendería de su razón lúdica. Por último, centrándonos en el papel que Sloterdijk otorga a la figura del «ocioso», mostraremos las posibles conexiones entre Suits y Sloterdijk. Mostraremos la relación que existe entre los imperativos lúdicos y ascéticos donde, además, el acto «jugar» recibe un papel central en la «respuesta a la pregunta por el ser». In this article, we analyze Peter Sloterdijk’s concept of “metanoethical imperative” in You Must Change Your Life. Our goal is to shed light on what, by drawing on Bernard Suits, we call “ludic reason.” To do so, we will present and examine in depth the meaning of Sloterdijk’s metanoethical imperative, as well as the main features of his concept of “askesis.” Second, we will argue that both concepts are the result of the Heideggerian ontological principles underlying Sloterdijk’s moral philosophy. Third, we will provide a “Sloterdijkean” interpretation of Suits’ account of games by focusing on the metanoethical imperative that could be derived from the notion of the ludic reason. To conclude, we will focus on the role that the figure of the “Good-for-Nothing” plays in Sloterdijk’s account, showing connections between Suits’ and Sloterdijk’s approaches. We will argue that, in the philosophical approaches of both philosophers, the idea of game playing is closely tied to the “question on Being.”. (shrink)

Presentamos, a modo de introducción al número, algunos aspectos que ayuden a enmarcar la aproximación al estudio comparado de las propuestas filosóficas de Xavier Zubiri y Polo. Mostramos la influencia que tuvieron en ambos las corrientes renovadoras del primer tercio del siglo XX y el interés de ambos en continuar y, a la vez, renovar, el pensamiento filosófico anterior, siempre en continuo diálogo con la tradición clásica. Hacemos también mención a las particularidades de la recepción de sus filosofías y (...) a las inquietudes intelectuales comunes ante el problema de Dios, la creación y la persona y su trascendencia. (shrink)

In _Ecological Ethics and the Human Soul: Aquinas, Whitehead, and the Metaphysics of Value_, Francisco J. Benzoni addresses the pervasive and destructive view that there is a moral gulf between human beings and other creatures. Thomas Aquinas, whose metaphysics entails such a moral gulf, holds that human beings are ultimately separate from nature. Alfred North Whitehead, in contrast, maintains that human beings are continuous with the rest of nature. These different metaphysical systems demand different ethical stances toward creation. Benzoni (...) analyzes and challenges Thomas's understanding of the human soul, his primary justification for the moral separation, arguing that it is finally philosophically untenable. The author finds promising the alternative metaphysics of Whitehead, for whom human beings are a part of nature—even if the highest part; all creatures have a degree of subjectivity and creativity, and thus all have intrinsic value and moral worth, independent of subjective human valuation. Further, though there is difference, there is no moral gulf between God and the world. God is truly affected by the experience of creatures. Benzoni argues that if this vision of moral worth is articulated with sufficient force and clarity, it could help heal the human relation to our planet. “Eminently clear in concept and analysis, profound in insight, and precise in reasoning, this book not only contributes a distinguished study of Aquinas but also reshapes contemporary ecological ethics by relating it to basic issues of metaphysics. Both subsequent moral theory attentive to Aquinas and subsequent formulations of ecological ethics will be incomplete without taking account of Benzoni's argument.” —_Franklin I. Gamwell, Shailer Mathews Distinguished Service Professor of Religious Ethics, the Philosophy of Religion, and Theology, The University of Chicago Divinity School_ “In the introduction and conclusion, Francisco Benzoni makes clear the broader significance of this work for the field of ecological ethics and the future well-being of the human species on this earth. One can learn a great deal about the philosophy of both Aquinas and Whitehead in working through these pages.” —_Joseph Bracken, Xavier University _. (shrink)

In line with the book On the Essence by Xavier Zubiri, this paper examines his metaphysical approach to the essence. The project explaines what is meant by the essence being unfounded, founding the rest of the notes, needing the non-essential or being closed. This reflection is carried out from two perspectives: the first considers the essence in itself and the second considers the relation of the essence with the rest of the notes. The analysis reaches its height with the (...) characterization of the essential unity and the description of its function in the construct state. On the one hand, this project proves that the theory of substantivity must be crowned and sustained by the essential unity; on the other hand, it shows that the characterization of the essential subsystem and the constitutional system are not contradictory if we keep in mind the criteria used to assert their closure. (shrink)

Realizamos un recorrido por la ontología de Xavier Zubiri propuesta en Sobre la esencia para descubrir cómo aborda el problema de la esencia quidditativa. Tras consideraciones previas, se analiza la tradicional concepción de esencia específica desmigajando paulatinamente la relación esencia-especie-individuo. Con el phylum entendido como esquema constitutivo transmitido genéticamente y la especie como lo que constituye la pertenencia del engendrado a su phylum, la esencia quidditativa es mostrada como momento de la esencia constitutiva individual.

Revision of the main intellectual referents of Ángel Álvarez de Miranda who was professor of History of Religions at the University of Madrid from 1954 until his death in 1957. A more detailed study is made of Mircea Eliade and Raffaele Pettazzoni, but also are revised Santiago Montero Díaz, Pedro Laín Entralgo, Marcelino Menéndez Pelayo, José Ortega y Gasset, Karl Kerenyi, Angelo Brelich, Xavier Zubiri, José Luis López Aranguren, Julio Caro Baroja, Wilhelm Schmidt and Gerardus van der Leeuw.

The father of guerrilla warfare in Northern Spain during the Napoleonic Wars, Mina astounded his enemies and won the respect and love of his own people.

En enero de 1974 Zubiri dio un breve curso en la Sociedad de Estudios y Publicaciones de Madrid sobre el tema Tres dimensiones del ser humano: individual, social e histórica. Meses después publicó la última de esas lecciones bajo el título de La dimensión histórica del ser humano. El presente volumen recoge el texto de las tres conferencias, más la versión escrita de la última de ellas. La tesis que Zubiri desarrolla en estas lecciones es que el ser humano es (...) a la vez y necesariamente individual, social e histórico, y que estas dimensiones vienen exigidas por su propia realidad específica, que es pluralizante, continuante y prospectiva. (shrink)

This article attempts to elucidate the Deleuzian philosophy of the event between The Logic of Sense and A Thousand Plateaus, where it acquires clearly political nuances. With regard to The Logic of Sense, I show that (i) it takes up the definition of the event of Difference and Repetition, identifying it with that redistribution of pre-individual singularities or individuating differences at the level of the univocal being which defines the conditions of problems; (ii) the event is henceforth also the instance (...) that makes possible the “communication” of the heterogeneous series of bodies and propositions from which the production of sense in language follows; and (iii) the counter-effectuation should be understood in this book as an ethics of the event. With regard to A Thousand Plateaus, I emphasize (i) the “return” to The Logic of Sense that the concept of assemblage entails, (ii) the reformulation of the notion of event that takes place in the new theoretical framework, and (iii) that of the counter-effectuation, which must henceforth be understood as a politics of the event. (shrink)

It is shown that axiomatic extensions of intuitionistic propositional calculus defining univocally new connectives, including those proposed by Gabbay, are strongly complete with respect to valuations in Heyting algebras with additional operations. In all cases, the double negation of such a connective is equivalent to a formula of intuitionistic calculus. Thus, under the excluded third law it collapses to a classical formula, showing that this condition in Gabbay's definition is redundant. Moreover, such connectives can not be interpreted in all Heyting (...) algebras, unless they are already equivalent to a formula of intuitionistic calculus. These facts relativize to connectives over intermediate logics. In particular, the intermediate logic with values in the chain of length n may be "completed" conservatively by adding a single unary connective, so that the expanded system does not allow further axiomatic extensions by new connectives. (shrink)

En un diálogo continuo con la tradición filosófica, Zubiri va página a página describiendo el acto de la intelección humana y desmontando el cúmulo de hipótesis y teorías que subyacen al llamado «problema del conocimiento». Zubiri consigue descubrir, mediante el recurso a un procedimiento puramente descriptivo, en qué consiste el acto humano por excelencia, la intelección. La intelección humana, dice Zubiri, no es una síntesis trascendental, sino algo más simple a la vez que más radical, la mera actualización de lo (...) real en la inteligencia sentiente. (shrink)

It is shown that axiomatic extensions of intuitionistic propositional calculus defining univocally new connectives, including those proposed by Gabbay, are strongly complete with respect to valuations in Heyting algebras with additional operations. In all cases, the double negation of such a connective is equivalent to a formula of intuitionistic calculus. Thus, under the excluded third law it collapses to a classical formula, showing that this condition in Gabbay's definition is redundant. Moreover, such connectives can not be interpreted in all Heyting (...) algebras, unless they are already equivalent to a formula of intuitionistic calculus. These facts relativize to connectives over intermediate logics. In particular, the intermediate logic with values in the chain of length n may be "completed" conservatively by adding a single unary connective, so that the expanded system does not allow further axiomatic extensions by new connectives. (shrink)

. Introductory Remarks THEODOSIUS DOBZHANSKY The problems of reduction in biology are currently of considerable theoretical interest and practical ...

An extensions by new axioms and rules of an algebraizable logic in the sense of Blok and Pigozzi is not necessarily algebraizable if it involves new connective symbols, or it may be algebraizable in an essentially different way than the original logic. However, extension whose axioms and rules define implicitly the new connectives are algebraizable, via the same equivalence formulas and defining equations of the original logic, by enriched algebras of its equivalente quasivariety semantics. For certain strongly algebraizable logics, all (...) connectives defined implicitly by axiomatic extensions of the logic are explicitly definable. (shrink)

An extensions by new axioms and rules of an algebraizable logic in the sense of Blok and Pigozzi is not necessarily algebraizable if it involves new connective symbols, or it may be algebraizable in an essentially different way than the original logic. However, extension whose axioms and rules define implicitly the new connectives are algebraizable, via the same equivalence formulas and defining equations of the original logic, by enriched algebras of its equivalente quasivariety semantics. For certain strongly algebraizable logics, all (...) connectives defined implicitly by axiomatic extensions of the logic are explicitly definable. (shrink)

The Statesman is a difficult and puzzling Platonic dialogue. In A Stranger's Knowledge Marquez argues that Plato abandons here the classic idea, prominent in the Republic, that the philosopher, qua philosopher, is qualified to rule. Instead, the dialogue presents the statesman as different from the philosopher, the possessor of a specialist expertise that cannot be reduced to philosophy. The expertise is of how to make a city resilient against internal and external conflict in light of the imperfect sociality of human (...) beings and the poverty of their reason. This expertise, however, cannot be produced on demand: one cannot train statesmen like one might train carpenters. Worse, it cannot be made acceptable to the citizens, or operate in ways that are not deeply destructive to the city's stability. Even as the political community requires his knowledge for its preservation, the genuine statesman must remain a stranger to the city. Marquez shows how this impasse is the key to understanding the ambiguous reevaluation of the rule of law that is the most striking feature of the political philosophy of the Statesman. The law appears here as a mere approximation of the expertise of the inevitably absent statesman, dim images and static snapshots of the clear and dynamic expertise required to steer the ship of state across the storms of the political world. Yet such laws, even when they are not created by genuine statesmen, can often provide the city with a limited form of cognitive capital that enables it to preserve itself in the long run, so long as citizens, and especially leaders, retain a “philosophical” attitude towards them. It is only when rulers know that they do not know better than the laws what is just or good (and yet want to know what is just and good) that the city can be preserved. The dialogue is thus, in a sense, the vindication of the philosopher-king in the absence of genuine political knowledge. (shrink)

De façon très allusive dans quelques textes de Signes et dans une note de travail du Visible et l’invisible, Merleau-Ponty a indiqué qu’élucider la question d’une « chair du social » exigeait un approfondissement préalable des notions de Gestalt, d’institution et de symbolisme. L’objet de cet article est de montrer comment Simondon a repris la question au point où Merleau-Ponty l’a laissée, en décrivant l’activité ou l’invention technique comme l’inscription matérielle d’un collectif en genèse, non partagé par la dualité du (...) psychique et du social . La pensée technique, loin d’être anecdotique ou spécialisée, apparaît donc comme un moment essentiel dans l’élaboration d’une théorie générale du lien social et de la socialisation des individus. (shrink)

¿Puede Tomás de Aquino, pensador del siglo XIII, decirnos algo a nuestra realidad política latinoamericana actual? Un texto entre dos contextos es el pretexto para generar una reflexión en torno al derecho a la rebelión, desde la perspectiva de la no-violencia y el derecho a la desobediencia civil. Un camino desde la justicia y el buen gobierno en el Aquinate, seguido del bien común político y las virtudes políticas en el Angélico para desembocar en el derecho a la rebelión, es (...) la ruta que se traza para esta exposición. Una lectura desde la propuesta exegética hermenéutica del Dr. René Padilla, es decir, una comprensión intuitiva, una comprensión gramático-histórica y una comprensión contextualizadora son el cómo y modo del presente trabajo. (shrink)