In [6] I tried to show how an objection to “the nominalist's” analysis of “This is red” and “That is red” on the basis of “the doctrine of common names” might be overcome. The objection is that “the nominalist,” attempting to analyze and by construing the pronouns in these sentences as two different proper names and “red” as a common name, is forced thereby to construe the copula in both sentences as the “is” of identity, and hence this and that (...) are identical, i.e., that there is only one red spot and not two. I attempted to show that by using Leśniewski's original axiom of ontology “the nominalist” could construe the pronouns in and as proper names, and “red” as a common name without taking the copula to express identity; he would not be forced to identify this with that. (shrink)

In [6] I tried to show how an objection to “the nominalist's” analysis of (a) “This is red” and (b) “That is red” on the basis of “the doctrine of common names” might be overcome. The objection is that “the nominalist,” attempting to analyze (a) and (b) by construing the pronouns in these sentences as two different proper names and “red” as a common name, is forced thereby to construe the copula in both sentences as the “is” of identity, and (...) hence (it is claimed)thisandthatare identical, i.e., that there is only one red spot and not two. I attempted to show that by using Leśniewski's original axiom ofontology“the nominalist” could construe the pronouns in (a) and (b) as proper names, and “red” as a common name without taking the copula to express identity; he would not be forced to identifythiswiththat. (shrink)

Hence, the title The Heritage of Kazimierz Ajdukiewicz seems to reflect the general idea of this collection. Most papers collected here were specially ...

This article presents for the first time in english lesniewski's analysis of russell's antinomy as the analysis is given in lesniewski's 1914 paper "czy klasa klas, nie podporzadkowanych sobie, jest podporzadkowana sobie?" is the class of classes which are not subordinate to themselves subordinate to itself? it is shown how the concepts appearing in this paper, written in colloquial polish, were later incorporated and expressed as fundamental axioms and theorems of his theory of collective classes, mereology. in the 1914 paper (...) he asserted: i call any object p an object subordinate to a class k if in some sense of the expression "a" the following two conditions hold: 1) k is a class (of objects) "a", 2) p is an "a". using this explication of "p is subordinate to a class k," he showed that both of the following statements are false: a) the class of classes which are not subordinate to themselves is subordinate to itself, b) the class of classes which are not subordinate to themselves is not subordinate to itself; thus showing that russell's antinomy cannot be generated since its initial assumptions are false. (shrink)

Mimesis as Make-Believe is important reading for everyone interested in the workings of representational art.

Applied Logic presents logic as a relevant tool for interpreting arguments, not simply as an abstract discipline such as mathematics or physics. Through English-language arguments that are debated today—health care, economic problems, AIDS, and so on—the author strives to give students an appreciation of logic's applicability. An appendix provides answers to selected exercises. Applied Logic and the Instructor's Manual will be of great value to those teaching elementary logic.

In [6] I tried to show how an objection to “the nominalist's” analysis of “This is red” and “That is red” on the basis of “the doctrine of common names” might be overcome. The objection is that “the nominalist,” attempting to analyze and by construing the pronouns in these sentences as two different proper names and “red” as a common name, is forced thereby to construe the copula in both sentences as the “is” of identity, and hence this and that (...) are identical, i.e., that there is only one red spot and not two. I attempted to show that by using Leśniewski's original axiom of ontology “the nominalist” could construe the pronouns in and as proper names, and “red” as a common name without taking the copula to express identity; he would not be forced to identify this with that. (shrink)

This instructor's manual, to accompany Applied Logic, contains answers to the exercises found in the text and a workbook useful for preparing students for exams. The text itself presents logic as a relevant tool for interpreting arguments, not simply as an abstract discipline such as mathematics or physics. Through English-language arguments that are debated today—health care, economic problems, AIDS, and so on—the author strives to give students an appreciation of logic's applicability. This book will be of interest to those teaching (...) elementary logic. (shrink)

During 1927-1931 Leśniewski published a series of articles (169 pages) entitled 'O podstawach matematyki' [On the Foundations of Mathematics] in the journal Przeglad Filozoficzny [Philosophical Review], and an abridged English translation of this series is presented here. With the exception of this work, all of Leśniewski's publications appearing after the first World War were written in German, and hence accessible to scholars and logicians in the West. This work, however, since written in Polish, has heretofore not been accessible to most (...) Western readers, and it is hoped that this translation will encourage both the study of Leśniewski's works as well as the further development of his theories. (shrink)

Drawing on work of the past decade, this volume brings together articles from the philosophy, history, and sociology of science, and many other branches of the biological sciences. The volume delves into the latest theoretical controversies as well as burning questions of contemporary social importance. The issues considered include the nature of evolutionary theory, biology and ethics, the challenge from religion, and the social implications of biology today (in particular the Human Genome Project).

In Working Virtue: Virtue Ethics and Contemporary Moral Problems, leading figures in the fields of virtue ethics and ethics come together to present the first ...

This chapter defends the property dualism argument. The term “semantic premise” mentioned is used to refers to an assumption identified by Brian Loar that antiphysicalist arguments, such as the property dualism argument, tacitly assume that a statement of property identity that links conceptually independent concepts is true only if at least one concept picks out the property it refers to by connoting a contingent property of that property. It is argued that, the property that does the work in explaining the (...) possibility of a posteriori identities need not be a first-order property of the referent in question. On his view, the property dualism argument requires only a weaker semantic premise, which allows that the property in question be a higher order property. A refined version of the property dualism argument is formulated, which uses the weaker premise, and defends the argument against various objections. (shrink)

Two problems are considered here. One relates to who has moral status, and the other relates to who has moral responsibility. The criteria for mattering morally have long been disputed, and many humans and nonhuman animals have been considered “marginal cases,” on the contested edges of moral considerability and concern. The marginalization of humans and other species is frequently the pretext for denying their rights, including the rights to health care, to reproductive freedom, and to bodily autonomy. There is broad (...) agreement across cultural and philosophical traditions about the capacities and responsibilities of moral agents. I propose an inclusive and expansive way of thinking about moral status, situating it not in the characteristics or capacities of individuals, but in the responsibilities and obligations of moral agents. Moral agents, under this view, are not privileged or entitled to special treatment but rather have responsibilities. I approach this by considering some African communitarian conceptions of moral status and moral agency. I propose that moral agency can also be more expansive and include not just individual moral agents but collective entities that have some of the traits of moral agents: power, freedom, and the capacity to recognize and act on the demands of morality and acknowledge and respect the rights of others. Expanding who and what is a moral agent correspondingly extends moral responsibility for respecting rights and fostering the conditions for the health and well-being of humans and animals onto the collective entities who uniquely have the capacity to attend to global-scale health threats such as pandemics and human-caused climate change. (shrink)

This chapter presents an opinionated account of how to understand the contributions of experience, especially with respect to the role of cognitive science, in developing and assessing metaphysical theories of reality. I develop a methodological basis for the idea that, independently of work in experimental philosophy focused on explications of concepts, contemporary metaphysical theories with a role for experiential evidence can be fruitfully connected to empirical work in psychology, especially cognitive science. My argument is not that cognitive science should replace (...) the metaphysician’s use of a priori theorizing and ordinary experience as a guide to metaphysical reality. Rather, we should enrich our perspective on a priori theorizing and ordinary experience as a guide to metaphysical reality by drawing on any relevant work in cognitive science. (shrink)