The place of evidence regarding joint commitment and plural action is mostly reserved for documents and explicit linguistic expressions. This paper considers the problem of evidence in cases of engaged (jointly committed) social acts where there is no explicit expression or binding document, yet can still be ascribed to a plural subject. The argument rests on the double meaning of the term factum as fact (factum brutum) and deed (factum practica), as well as contemporary debates about the topic of fact (...) of reason in Kant. The text seeks to show that in certain cases, the execution of an act or the obligation produced by it can be considered evidence of a plural subject. Thus, these facts deserve a special position in relation to scientific evidence. (shrink)

In this article, our focus is on the topic of engagement and possibility of empathy with future generations. We acknowledge that empathy for future generations is practically unattainable in its strictest sense due to the lack of access to their potential mental states and the absence of direct interaction. Additionally, we will draw upon the arguments presented by Goldie and Slaby to address concerns regarding the potential paternalization that may arise in empathic relations towards future generations. However, despite these limitations, (...) it is important to emphasize that we are still engaged with future generations. Instead of adopting a paternalizing approach where we impose expectations on how they should feel, our engagement exposes us to the anticipated but unknown judgments of future generations. Throughout this article, we will argue that engagement with future generations brings out our own social self-consciousness and provides a basis of our connectedness and responsibility towards future generations. (shrink)

I am interested in the epistemological status of «project(ion)», that is, the «act» or «strategy» of project(ion) in relation to various didactic protocols usually associated with an «author» and her intention or production. What is a plan, program, plot, platform, concept, conception, or even «meta-project»? Is a project or projection necessarily an «architectural matter»? Is it a prototypically Western or European procedure of specific use of time and space (literally, throwing forth into space/time)? I will attempt to explain some passages (...) from Eisenman, Cacciari, as well as a theory recently put forth by Armando and Durbiano (Teoria del progetto architettonico). (shrink)

This paper is structured in three sections. The first discusses the institutional framework pertaining to bioethics in Serbia. The functioning of this framework is critically assessed and a number of recommendations for its improvement presented. It is also emphasized that philosophers are underrepresented in public debate on bioethics in Serbia. Second, this underrepresentation will be related to two issues that figure prominently in Serbian society but are not accompanied by corresponding bioethical discourses: the first is abortion and the second is (...) the largely unrestricted use of neuropharmacology since the 1990s, both for therapeutic and for cosmetic/recreational purposes. Finally, the perspective of bioethics in Serbia is addressed. It is asserted that this perspective can be based on the enhancement of public philosophical debate on bioethical issues, especially those with notable features in Serbian society . Such enhancement would also strengthen the corresponding institutional and legal frameworks. (shrink)

Our intention is to construct the conditions for a new position that more closely explains the reality of the object (its location, concreteness, possibility of being seen, extension, instantaneousness, etc.), but also the object’s movement, the “situation” in which it is or becomes a potential agent that “works,” influences us and incites us to _movement _towards us, indeed gives us a _turn_ towards an ideal object and its realization. Using a variety of texts that thematize the object, a few passages (...) from Hegel, we attempt to reveal connections between key architectural (and not only architectural) concepts, form a given epistemological order, and differentiate amongst basic acts and operations that could be ascribed to the object. (shrink)

My intention in this text is to present the most significant contribution of some French philosophers and anthropologists to the notion of reconstruction and advancement of institutions. The paradox of change, reform or transformation of the institution – is an entirely new institution possible? How do institutions die? – lies in the difficulty or even impossibility to change something that manifests what we are as a group. If institutions really present or represent the relations among all of us, how can (...) they be changed in the first place? Whence the capacity for change? What allows for the idea of the “new”? (shrink)

Our main goal is to describe the structure of engaged acts and compassion and their constitutive interrelation to explicate the key role of engaged and compassionate acts for group constitution. In the first part of the paper, we formulate our guiding idea: the key to understanding compassion lies in understanding engagement and vice versa. We then consider the problematic nature of engaged acts: On the one hand, they do not meet the conditions to be attributed to the plural subject; on (...) the other hand, they cannot be understood without presupposing the plural subject. To understand this, we rely primarily on Helm’s theory of emotions and the classical phenomenological analyses of the constitution of the plural subject, but we also point out the limitations of the latter. In the last two sections, we build on Nussbaum’s theory of compassion to describe the parallelism in the structure of compassion and engagement and to show their constitutive connection. Finally, we examine the specific way in which engaged acts “place burden” and transform a group into an institution. (shrink)

This paper is a reconstruction of Levinas’ reading of Hegel and his understanding of violence. Combining Franz Rosenzweig’s reflections which concem the sick philosopher and Hegel’s State, as well as Derrida’s interpretation of the different attributes of violence, our aim is also to give full evidence of Derrida’s critical reading of Levinas. The first part illustrates the various classifications of the figures of violence from the different periods of Hegel’s life and the traces that these figures have left in Levinas’ (...) texts beginning with „Liberté et commandement” in 1953. In the second part we discuss Hegel’s well-known analogy from his Rechtsphilosophie on sovereignty and the organism - that is to say the parallel reading of some paragraphs of Naturphilosophie too - and the relation between totality and violence, in Levinas’ “ontology as allergy” and in Derrida’s autoimmunology. (shrink)

This paper is a reconstruction of Levinas’ reading of Hegel and his understanding of violence. Combining Franz Rosenzweig’s reflections which concern the sick philosopher and Hegel’s state, as well as Derrida’s interpretation of the different attributes of violence, our aim is also to give full evidence of Derrida’s critical reading of Levinas. The first part illustrates the various classifications of the figures of violence from the different periods of Hegel’s life and the traces that these figures have left in Levinas’ (...) texts beginning with ‘Liberté et commandement’ in 1953. In the second part we discuss Hegel’s well-known analogy from his Rechtsphilosophie on sovereignty and the organism—that is to say the parallel reading of some paragraphs of Naturphilosophie too—and the relation between totality and violence, in Levinas’ ‘ontology as allergy’ and in Derrida’s autoimmunology. (shrink)

Pokusacu da objasnim vezu izmedju nasilja, potom mog ili Levinasovog ili drzavnog nasilja kao odgovora na ovo prvo nasilje i na kraju, nasilja koje preostaje u ustima, u grlu, u ukusu [gout] ili u gadjenju [degout]. 'Cet arri?re-go?t de violence' ili 'un quelconque arri?re-go?t de degout' [neki zaostali ukus gadjenja; a sort of aftertaste of disgust].

Pokusacu da objasnim vezu izmedju nasilja, potom mog ili Levinasovog ili drzavnog nasilja kao odgovora na ovo prvo nasilje i na kraju, nasilja koje preostaje u ustima, u grlu, u ukusu [gout] ili u gadjenju [degout]. 'Cet arri?re-go?t de violence' ili 'un quelconque arri?re-go?t de degout' [neki zaostali ukus gadjenja; a sort of aftertaste of disgust].

This paper addresses the nature of the Charter as the basic document of the Institution, that is, the most important document that lends the institution its force. The “and” between Charter and Institution or the conjoining of Charter with Institution has two tasks to perform. Firstly, the Institution needs to be structured and incorporated as a Charter (and conversely, the Charter is the Institution embodied). In this sense, my question is: can the institute of the Charter be the starting point (...) of a potential theory of the institution? Secondly, it is the Charter – and not law, contract, norm, not Searle’s declaration, not Husserl’s Ausweiss – that could improve the theory of documentality and its connection with institutionalism. (shrink)

Referring to Ferraris’ “Fenomenologia dell’istituzionale (Phenomenology of the Institutional)” is very appropriate to insist on some difficulties with the notion of “institution”. My intent is twofold: on the one hand, I would like to claim, against Ferraris and with Searle, that a theory (or phenomenology) of the institution is always the most important task in the construction of social ontology. Along the way, I would like to point to the importance of violence (and power) and violent strategies in the creation (...) and maintaining of institutions. By answering the question in the sub-heading of this paper, my intention is to understand Ferraris’ project, firstly, as a necessary addition to the ontology of John Searle. But, also, I would like to argue that this project could “incorporate” this same theoretical attempt that precedes it. The future of Ferraris’ project is in political and legal theory, in the understanding of the great and truly “ultimate institutional structures”. Ferraris, as inheritor of and contributor to the great project of Paul Otlet (Mundaneum), surpasses “the government as ultimate institutional structure”, and puts it in the place of the State-Europe and la Cité mondiale. (shrink)

If we attempt to find signs of messianism within the rebellion as such, if, for example Korah, "contrary to" but always "together with" Benjamin, is the "first left oppositionist in the history of radical politics," then the final and divine violence carried out by God would, in fact, be Benjamin's pure revolutionary violence perpetrated precisely against this first revolutionary. The circulation of the alternative title of this text ("Benjamin's 'Divine Violence' and the case of Korah") within the subtitle ("The Rebellion (...) against Moses as the First Scene of Messianism [Numbers, 16]"), and conversely, is an accurate description of the "misunderstanding" in connection to the understanding of revolution in Benjamin, because the one who carries out revolutionary violence is not found where we, all this time, had expected him to be. Is it precisely this betrayed expectation that constantly brings us back to Benjamin's "Critique of Violence"? But what exactly do we expect? Do we expect a final violence of catastrophic proportions negating every future violence and time of expectation? Do we expect the subject of this positive violence – the noble [edle] subject of the revolution? (shrink)

The text examines different assumptions of Hegel?s understanding of the corporation across various versions of his Lectures of the Philosophy of Right, given recent contemporary reflections on?the end of capitalism.? My intention is to take Hegel?s thematization of the poor and poverty, as well as the significance Hegel ascribes to common work and the constitution of a working group as the foundation of civil society, and formulate these as real conditions of a potential reconstruction of the corporative model and new (...) common action. nema. (shrink)

The main aim of this article is to analyze a recent text by Nenad Miščević dealing with social epistemology in the context of Foucault's theory of knowledge. In the first part, we briefly note Miščević's thoughts on the difference between analytic and continental philosophy and his thoughts on the latter. In the second part, we analyze both Miščević’s thesis about Foucault's dual understanding of knowledge and his placement of social epistemology as a proper framework for Foucault’s concept of “new” knowledge. (...) In opposition to Miščević's dualistic view, we are more inclined to accept Goldman’s characterization of Foucault’s position as a revisionist project in the context of standard analytical epistemology that legitimately embraces even very serious expansions of epistemological themes. Finally, we propose that Miščević’s dualistic interpretation reflects his general dualistic position concerning the previously described distinction between “continental” and “analytic” philosophy. (shrink)

»Protiinstitucija« je »francoska stvar« in je del tistega, kar bi sam poimenoval francoski institucionalizem. Moj namen je tematizirati ta contre ali »proti«, to upiranje instituciji, a hkrati želim rekonstruirati nekaj več kot zgolj upiranje samo. Prvič, contre vedno implicira penser autrement, ki je na neki način povezno z utopijo. Drugič, zdi se mi, da je Saint Simon naš večni sodobnik in da je njegovo razglabljanje o Evropi še vedno aktualno – tako kot včasih je tudi danes Evropa autre chose in (...) contre-institution. Tretjič, sledeč Humu in nato Deleuzu, bi lahko zatrdil, da gre pri contre-institution ali upiranju instituciji v resnici za poskus zmanjšanja neizbrisne sledi nasilja znotraj institucij. (shrink)

Znano je, da so negativne velikosti svojo legitimnost od svojega nastanka dalje dobile skozi to, da so bile interpretirane kot dolg. S pretvorbo matematike v prirodoslovje pa je ta interpretacija postala nezadostna. Kantov spis iz leta 1763 o negativnih velikosti predstavlja poskus, da se po vzoru na Eulerjev argument o neizogibnosti iz dela Réflexions sur l'espace et le temps pokaže realnost negativnih velikosti izhajajoč iz tretjega Newtonovega zakona akcije in reakcije. Kantov pojem realne zoperstavljenosti skuša dotedanjo interpretacijo – dolg, spraviti (...) z novo – silo. V tekstu nas zanima težava, ki pri tem nastopi: potlačitev paradoksa negativnih velikosti, ki ga je lahko interpretativno zadovoljil le dolg. Drugače rečeno, paradoksna lastnost negativnih velikosti, ki jo je lahko za realno naredil dolg kot družbeni objekt, postane glavna prepreka za njihovo fizikalno intepretacijo. (shrink)

In this paper I would like to reflect on discipline as a category, and explain the quotation marks in the title, as they can always follow and amend the word discipline. my intention is to reconstruct a decades-long resistance to discipline, and to uncover the origin of praise for self-discipline, un-discipline or interdisciplinarity. Further, I would like to offer a few arguments in favor of discipline as one of the most important protocols of social ontology, and the unconditioned condition of (...) cooperation, life and group work. Discipline is joint learning, as well as production and a nurturing of knowledge that constitutes and sustains an institution. the question is whether individuals’ discipline indeed makes an institution necessarily better or more just. (shrink)

Gli autori intendono proporre le premesse necessarie al chiarimento del rapporto, incerto e da sempre dibattuto, che lega architettura e filosofia attraverso il riferimento al concetto di “Filosofia architettonica” proposto da Peter Eisenman. Una prima premessa riguarda le varie tipologie di approccio alla filosofia riscontrabili nel campo dell’architettura, fino a delineare una forma di consapevolezza filosofica nell’architettura contemporanea. La seconda premessa riguarda la possibilità di spiegare il rapporto tra filosofia e architettura attraverso i casi di collaborazione concreta tra architetti e (...) filosofi. (shrink)

On pourrait pointer la difficulté rencontrée face aux archives de Benjamin et aux différentes interprétations de ses fragments simplement en intervertissant certains termes du titre et du sous-titre de ce texte. On aurait ainsi : les figures du « Messie » et du « messianisme » doivent conduire à la victoire. Le mot « victoire » pourra toujours être prioritaire parce qu’il détermine le caractère révolutionnaire du « Messie » chez Benjamin, et inversement, l’emploi du mot « messianisme » impliq...

Chez Rosenzweig, les politiques de l’usage des guillemets – qui sont certainement une conséquence de sa lecture répétée de Hegel, « le maître des guillemets » – peuvent probablement déterminer une possible « éthique de la guerre » (Ethics of War), dont l’importance a été majeure ces dernières années. Mes propres guillemets au syntagme « éthique de la guerre » expriment une hésitation quant aux interprétations rosenzweigiennes de la guerre et du pacifisme et à leur influence sur la théorie de...

Paraphrased within the title of this text is a note Hannah Arendt made in August 1952. After reading Carl Schmitt?s Nomos der Erde, Arendt tries to confront Schmitt?s idea of a just war. In the text I attempt to reconstruct Arendt?s readings of differing political philosophy texts within the context of her thinking concerning the relationship between violence and power, force and law. Arendt?s refusal to accept the existence of violence which can "conquer" freedom and "create" right and democracy, brings (...) contradiction to the great tradition of the followers of Marx, to whom Arendt undoubtedly belongs: how is and is revolutionary violence even possible and does violence as resistance to injustice bring justice?. Naslov ovoga teksta je parafraza jedne beleske Hannah Arendt koja je napisana avgusta 1952. godine. Posle citanja Schmittove knjige Nomos der Erde, Arendt pokusava da se suprotstavi njegovom razumevanju pravednog rata. U tekstu rekonstruisem njena razlicita citanja mnostva tekstova politicke filozofije, u kontekstu Arendtovog razlikovanja izmedju nasilja i vlasti, snage i zakona. Arendtovo odbijanje da prihvati postojanje nasilja koje moze "osvojiti" slobodu i "stvoriti" pravo i demokratiju, suprotstavlja je velikoj tradiciji sledbenika Marxa, kojoj ona nesumnjivo pripada: da li je i na koji nacin moguce revolucionarno nasilje i da li nasilje kao otpor nepravdi donosi pravdu?. (shrink)

Interesuje nas, prednost koju Delez daje sintagmi?revolucionarna institucija? u odnosu na manje originalnu sintagmu?institucionalna revolucija?. Delez nekoliko puta upotrebljava u svojim tekstovima?revolucionarna institucija?, sigurno sasvim svestan da ova sintagma ima jednu prilicno haoticnu i nejasnu istoriju tokom post-revolucionarnog perioda, ali i da je ona savrseno u duhu Sanzistovih namera. Treba da proverimo da li ova sintagma najbolje opisuje jednu Delezovu imaginarnu teoriju institucije, ali i njegov angazman u teoriji uopste. Preeliminarna teskoca, koja automatski dovodi u pitanje i devalvira nasu intervenciju, (...) jeste Delezovo odbijanje da on s?m zaista tematizuje instituciju i svoj napor, te da zaista odgovori na pitanja koja s?m postavlja pedesetih godina proslog veka:?sta je to sto objasnjava instituciju?? i?koje bi to trebalo da budu savrsene institucije, to jest one koje se suprotstavljaju svakom ugovoru i pretpostavljaju tek najmanji broj zakona??. (shrink)

In his poems, Paul Celan does not use words such as territory, border, border crossing, and only very rarely the word space. I would like to reconstruct the traces of?Heimat? in Celan, and perhaps try to describe what Heimat might have meant for the young Paul Antschel. That is to say, I would like to understand whether?Heimat? is synonymous with what Celan speaks about, many years after his name change, in the address given on the occasion of the Georg-Buechner-Preis:?Ich suche (...) auch, denn ich bin ja wieder da, wo ich begonnen habe, den Ort meiner eigenen Herkunft.? In the poems written at the time when Antschel is learning Hebrew as well as reading Martin Buber for the first time, I look for some basic figures Celan ties to his life in Bukovina at the time, in the environment of Czernowitzer Judentums. Aside from the works by Israel Chalfen, Else Keren and Elke Guenzel, I would like to make use of a book published some ten years ago, a detailed listing of Celan?s Paris library. I would like to consult this archive in the coming period, since Celan punctuated the margins of many of those books with evocations of his early creative period. (shrink)

It is my intention to attempt to define pacifism, in its engagement and concept, as a necessary requisite of war and military action, following a phrase used over a hundred years ago by Franz Rosenzweig when speaking of pacifism as “necessary equipment of war.” I will try to defend the importance of pacifism as an integral part of war (as such, pacifism as a requisite of war ought to shorten the period of war and mitigate destruction) and oppose this concept (...) of pacifism to Jan Narveson’s old attempt at constructing pacifism as a position and then designating it as “untenable and unreasonable,” and then further oppose this to his later attempt to find in pacifism the cause of further (and more) violence for ever more vicious wars. (shrink)

U ovom radu pokusavam da rekonstruisem Levinasovo citanje Hegela i njegovo razumevanje nasilja, sluzeci se tekstovima Franza Rosenzweiga o Hegelovoj drzavi i Derridinom interpretacijom razlicitih atributa nasilja kod Emmanuel Levinasa. Interesovace me klasifikacija nekih figura nasilja iz razlicitih perioda Hegelovog zivota i njihovi tragovi u Levinasovim tekstovima pocevsi od teksta 'Libert? et commandement' iz 1953. godine. Analiza slavne Hegelove analogije iz njegove Rechtsphilosophie o suverenosti i organizmu, odnosno citanje nekih paragrafa njegove Naturphilosophie, treba da objasne vezu izmedju totaliteta i nasilja, (...) kao i Levinasovu 'ontologiju kao alergologiju' odnosno Derridinu autoimunologiju. PR Projekat Ministarstva nauke Republike Srbije, br. 149031: Regionalni i evropski aspekti integrativnih procesa u Srbiji: civilizacijske pretpostavke, stvarnost i izgledi za buducnost. (shrink)

In this text, I analyze the most important topics of one of the most complex portions of Rosenzweig’s Star of Redemption. The chapter “The Fire or the Eternal Life” deals with the community and communal life of the eternal people, and it reconstructs the basic elements and conditions of communal living. A presentation of all key protocols of life and work of a group of people ought to show the plurality of heterogeneous practices that have helped maintain a people scattered (...) and always on the verge of extinction. (shrink)

Der Text erforscht den Ursprung und die Geschichte der "Fundamentierung" des Kriegs und seiner "?bertragung" in Frieden auf dem Weg der Gewalt. In einer Analyse des bekannten Syntagmas "Gleiches mit Gleichem vergelten" in einigen Schl?sseltexten, die versuchen, den Frieden zu "institutionalisieren", sucht der Autor nach einer anderen Relation zur Gewalt. Die Interpretation von Jehuda Halevis Gedicht Feindesliebe in der?bersetzung von Franz Rosenzweig ist der wichtigste Orientierungspunkt auf dem Weg zu einem neuen und anderen Frieden.. Tekst istrazuje poreklo i istorije "utemeljenja" (...) i "prevodjenja" rata u mir putem nasilja. Analizom poznate sintagme "vratiti milo za drago" unutar nekoliko kljucnih tekstova koji pokusavaju da "institucionalizuju" mir, autor pokusava da pronadje mogucnost jednog drugacijeg odnosa prema nasilju. Interpretacija pesme Jehude Halevija "Ljubav prema neprijatelju" u prevodu Franza Rosenzweiga treba da bude osnovni orijentir na putu ka novom i drugacijem miru. (shrink)

Regardless of the fact that I am using certain texts by Searle, Ferraris, Smith and De Soto, my intention is not at all to reiterate someone else?s position in my own words, nor is it to question or modify some such position. My intention for now is to, using Ferraris? theory of the document, affirm the existence of a paradox - one rejected by Searle, but unconvincingly so, I think - regarding the institution. In order to do that, it seems (...) to me that I am forced to slightly disturb both Searle?s and Ferraris? conception, in attempting to offer my own contribution to a new future theory of the institution. (shrink)

Notre intérêt se centrera sur quelques textes que Franz Rosenzweig, soldat autrichien combattant dans la défense anti-aérienne, a écrit au cours des dernières années de la Première Guerre mondiale sur le front des Balkans. Nous nous proposons deux tâches : examiner dans le contexte des différents penseurs de la politique de ce siècle la tentative rosenzweigienne de comprendre la guerre, les découpages territoriaux dans la guerre, l’appropriation de la terre, sa compréhension de la frontière, de l’espace, du peuple, de la (...) géopolitique, du rapport entre la mer et la terre, du monde et de l’État mondial. La seconde direction consiste à tenter de déterminer le statut de ces textes politiques de Rosenzweig à l’égard de la totalité de son œuvre, de même que l’influence implicite et explicite de sa judéité sur sa compréhension de la guerre et du monde. (shrink)

Pre nego se 'teorija o radikalnom' Franza Rosencvajga prepozna kao mesijanizam i mozda kao jedna komplikovana i sistematska zurba ka novom vremenu, cini mi se da je vazno da lociramo 'registar zrtvovanja' u ovom sistemu spoznaje. Uostalom, to je prva Rozencvajgova novina u odnosu na tradiciju. Rozencvajg nije ni pokusao niti je imao vremena da detaljno tematizuje figuru 'zrtvovanja' ili korban kao najopstije ime za ovu delatnost. Sve sto imamo jeste nekoliko fragmenata iz razlicitih godina u pismima prijateljima koje Rozencvajg (...) poducava o granicama i smislu zrtvovanja, i nekoliko njegovih zabelezaka o teskoci prevodjenja i brisanja nemacke reci Opfer. Ipak, od samog pocetka, i kada on 'prevodi' i 'misli' zrtvovanje kao 'poklon' ili 'prinos', njegov napor je sasvim transparentan. Sve sto Rozencvajg ispituje jeste priblizavanje Bogu ili drugom. (shrink)

Was ist vom Begriff der "Souver?nit?t" geblieben, mit anderen Worten: ist es nach der Schaffung einer Vielzahl kleiner souver?ner Staaten in Osteuropa noch m?glich,?ber die Figur des Souver?ns zu sprechen? Was ist ein Staat sofern er kein Souver?n ist bzw. sofern er nur teilweise ein Souver?n ist? Wieviel Souver?nit?t bedarf es damit ein Staat wirklich souver?n ist? Verhandelt der Internationale Gerichtshof f?r Kriegsverbrechen, die innerhalb des ehemaligen Jugoslawien begangen wurden, de facto die Folgen jener Verbrechen, die die Grundlage der Souver?nit?t (...) und der Unabh?ngigkeit aller dieser neuen kleinen Staaten liegen, w?hrend er de iure auf einer rein pers?nlichen Verantwortlichkeit insistiert? Die Ausf?hrungen versuchen, eine der grundlegenden Aporien der internationalen Rechts zu problematisieren, die - von Kant bis heute - die Unverletzlichkeit der Souver?nit?t eines Staates und, im selben Moment, das Recht auf humanit?re Intervention und auf pr?ventive Gewalt betrifft. Sta je preostalo od pojma "suverenosti", drugim recima, da li je moguce i dalje govoriti o figuri "suverena" posle stvaranja mnostva malih "suverenih" "drzava" istocne Evrope? Sta je to drzava ukoliko nije suverena, ukoliko je samo delimicno suverena? Kolika je to nuzna kolicina suverenosti, da bi jedna drzava zaista bila suverena? Da li Medjunarodni sud za ratne zlocine, za zlocine pocinjene na teritorijama bivse Jugoslavije, de jure insistirajuci samo na pojedinacnoj odgovornosti, de facto prihvata posledice istih tih zlocina koji se nalaze u osnovama suverenosti i nezavisnosti svih tih novih malih drzava? Nase izlaganje pokusava da problematizuje jednu od osnovnih aporija medjunarodnog prava koja se tice nepovredivosti suverenosti jedne drzave i, u isti mah, prava na humanitarnu intervenciju i preventivno nasilje od Kanta do danas. (shrink)

The main cause of Schmitt?s and Koj?ve?s friendship, and consequently, their correspondence, lies in their common affinity for philosophy of Hegel. When they began corresponding in 1955, Schmitt was something of an academic pariah; in 1933, the legal scholar had joined the Nazi Party, publicly declared his anti-Semitism, was later interrogated at Nuremberg, and retired from his post at the University of Berlin in 1946. After his famous lectures on Hegel?s Phenomenology ended in 1939, Koj?ve joined the Resistance. At the (...) end of the World II War, he wound up in the French ministry of economic affairs, where he worked until his death in 1968. This text is written on the margins of two letters, one written on 14.XII.1955. by Schmitt and the other, Koj?ve?s answer, dated on 4.I.1956. The subject of those two letters is the interpretation of the enemy in philosophy of Hegel.. Ljubav prema Hegelovoj filozofiji nalazi se u osnovi prijateljstva i prepiske Koj?va i Schmitta. Kada su 1955. poceli svoju prepisku, Schmitt je bio u potpunoj nemilosti. Ispitivan u Nirnbergu, 1946 godine bio je udaljen sa Univerziteta u Berlinu. Posle cuvenih predavanja o Hegelu koja su se okoncala 1939. godine, Koj?ve se prikljucio Otporu. Od 1946 godine radio je u francuskom Ministarstvu za privredu. Ovaj tekst je inspirisan Schmittovim pismom od 14. XII 1955. i odgovorom Koj?va u vezi sa Hegelovim razumevanjem pojma?neprijatelj?. (shrink)

My intention is to demonstrate how Hobbes’ attempts to adapt two ancient institutions from Roman Law to his own time and knowledge of theology and philosophy. Treason could be quite significant within the context of Hobbes’ understanding of the figure of the sovereign and sovereignty. The central part of the text is an endeavor to ascertain the source and unconditional condition for treason as such, within the framework of Hobbes’ theory of representation which he writes about in Chapter 16 of (...) the Leviathan. The act or performance in which we could perhaps recognize a traitorous gesture could be found in the so-called paradox of representation. The “traitor” breaks the chain of the transfer of power and empowerment, thus stops representation, and puts an end to speaking in the name of the other. If it is possible to discover whether this is possible and whether speaking and acting in one’s own name always carries elements of treason, then we can conclude that differing forms of “direct” speech and action are “acts of treason.” In that case, what interests me is whether “treason” is found within the heart of representative democracy, and thus if it is de facto an integral part of a democratic order and society. (shrink)