Late antique political Platonism was not unoriginal in its thought. The paper takes as an example the Justinianic dialogue On Political Science (ca. 550), which creatively engages with Plato’s political works. It shows that the dialogue tries – and manages, as I argue – to combine two apparently inconsistent Platonic models: what I call the “divine” model, in which a philosopher-king endowed with divine knowledge rules unhindered by civic laws; and the “human” model, characterized by the rule of law. The (...) divine model comes mostly from Plato’s Republic and Statesman; the human one, from the Laws. On Political Science demonstrates that its (anonymous) author was acquainted with these three Platonic texts, in addition to other texts. That is philologically noteworthy, but also philosophically interesting: the dialogue manages to integrate the two models into a common framework. It puts forward an original political model, in which a philosopher-king, although endowed with divine knowledge, still has to be bound by civic laws because of his human frailty. The article concludes by discussing the polemical import the dialogue could have had in its Justinianic context. (shrink)

Plato’s pronouncements about political freedom in the Laws have sparked renewed interest in the literature. The present paper takes a new angle on that vexed question. It focusses on Plato’s account of the birth of unlawful freedom, or ‘theatrocracy’, at the end of book 3. By studying the transition from moderate to excessive freedom, it wishes to shed light on what sets the two apart. The paper provides a causal analysis of the key passage, suggesting four compatible and complementary explanations (...) for the process it describes. The first is presented as the main one, but it is made more likely by the addition of the three others. (shrink)

_ Source: _Volume 7, Issue 2, pp 69 - 90 It is often claimed that, as a result of scientific progress, we now _know_ that the natural world displays no design. Although we have no interest in defending design hypotheses, we will argue that establishing claims to the effect that we know the denials of design hypotheses is more difficult than it seems. We do so by issuing two skeptical challenges to design-deniers. The first challenge draws inspiration from radical skepticism (...) and shows how design claims are at least as compelling as radical skeptical scenarios in undermining knowledge claims, and in fact probably more so. The second challenge takes its cue from skeptical theism and shows how we are typically not in an epistemic position to rule out design. (shrink)

Parte do reconhecimento do filósofo alemão Jürgen Habermas, pertencente à segunda geração de Escola de Frankfurt, participante da tradição da teoria crítica e do pragmatismo, considerando sua importância não só nos estudos de informação, como em outros domínios. Tem como objetivo assinalar sua presença material via base de dados BRAPCI a fim de mapear em uma série de pesquisas, as influências das reflexões deste filósofo. Para este fim, nesta fase, utiliza a metodologia dos Estudos Métricos da Informação com análises dos (...) textos completos dos artigos indexados na Brapci. O resultado recupera os primeiros trabalhos indexados na BRAPCI produzidos no Brasil e fora dele; diagnostica a maior concentração de frequência em razão de um congresso (?) publicado na Revista “Comunicação & Informação” e na Revista Logeion; apresenta uma prevalência de pesquisadores no núcleo do IBICT/UFRJ e UNIRIO que mais foram influenciados por Habermas, estabelecendo uma reflexão sobre a rede de influências derivadas de orientações de Maria Nélida González de Gómez e identifica a obra mais citada “Mudança estrutural da esfera pública” a qual deverá ser o ponto de partida para a continuidade das reflexões sobre a presença do autor na literatura em CI no Brasil. Conclui apresentando uma série de questões desdobradas a partir desses resultados iniciais. (shrink)

For most of its career philosophy of religion has been a controversial dis cipline: it has usually ended up becoming a substitute for what it set out to explain. Born out of the religious scepticism of the late seventeenth century it remained for many years what it was to Hume and Lessing: an instrument for criticizing rather than for interpreting faith. Gradually the hostility subsided, but not the tendency to reduce. Nearly each one of the great names in this area (...) represents a theory that goes "beyond" faith. Phenomenology changed that situation. Conceived for accurate under standing of acts and meanings rather than for the building of vast synthe ses, its method was more apt to yield understanding than criticism. Moreover, by distinguishing the ideal meanings from the psychic realities of the act, it chased its followers from the quagmire of psychic genesis, causal justification and rational "proof" of the religious object, and forced them to concentrate on the intentional terminus of the experience. (shrink)

Como casi todos los conceptos fi losófi cos, el de «validez normativa» tiene altos grados de ambigüedad y de vaguedad. En este trabajo me encargo de analizar la postura de distintos autores que han tratado de dar respuesta a la pregunta ¿qué significa que una norma sea «válida»? Para ello, tomo como hilo conductor la obra de Ernesto Garzón Valdés. Esto se debe a que los trabajos de Ernesto Garzón dedicados a este tema, le ofrecen al lector un análisis crítico (...) y comprensivo de algunas de las posturas teóricas más relevantes sobre el concepto de validez normativa. Asimismo, trabajar a través de su obra tiene un doble benefi cio: por un lado, no sólo nos permite conocer a fondo la postura teórica de autores que pertenecen a distintas corrientes del pensamiento, como Hans Kelsen, H.L.A. Hart, Francisco Suárez o von Wright por ejemplo, sino que, por el otro, nos permite conocer la postura del mismo Garzón y sus críticas a los diferentes modelos conceptuales. (shrink)

Responsible research and innovation imposes normative requirements on research and innovation processes resembling three successive steps, each more ambitious than its predecessor, with distinct features. For the research dimension the distinct features reflect the normative requirements of, first, credible research ; second, responsive research ; and third, responsible research. Equally distinct features reflect the requirements of credible innovation, responsive innovation, and responsible innovation.

The precautionary principle in public decision making concerns situations where following an assessment of the available scientific information, there are reasonable grounds for concern for the possibility of adverse effects on the environment or human health, but scientific uncertainty persists. In such cases provisional risk management measures may be adopted, without having to wait until the reality and seriousness of those adverse effects become fully apparent. This is the definition of the precautionary principle as operationalized under EU law. The precautionary (...) principle is a deliberative principle. Its application involves deliberation on a range of normative dimensions which need to be taken into account while making the principle operational in the public policy context. Under EU law, any risk management measures to be adopted while implementing the precautionary principle, have to be proportionate to ensure the chosen high level of protection in the European Community. This articlewill illustrate the established practice concerning the release of genetically modified organisms into the environment and how the principle is implemented under hard law. The article also provides an outlook on what this may imply for the relative new case of nanotechnology and the use of precautionary principle within the context of soft law (use of codes of conduct). (shrink)

In prosecuting the war on terror, the Bush Administration asserts that the protections inherent in state sovereignty do not apply to state sponsors of terrorism. I examine three elements of normative arguments to assess the administration's policies. The administration sought to delegitmize terrorism by underscoring the uncivilized nature of terrorist acts. It sought to link the war on terror to efforts to prohibit the spread of weapons of mass destruction (WMD), and to frame the invasion of Iraq as central to (...) this war. Finally, the administration proposed new international standards of behavior by arguing that state sponsors of terrorism should be held accountable for terrorist acts planned on their territory, and by seeking to link the protections against intervention inherent in the sovereignty norm to this behavior. Despite initial support for delegitmizing terrorism, the US attempt to frame the war on terror as linked to WMD and Iraq met with skepticism, and it faced fierce competition from alternate frames with regard to Iraq. Finally, the invasion of Iraq stimulated resistance to US policy on normative grounds, with particular concern about the consequences for the sovereignty norm. (shrink)

We present a Reformed view on the relation between Christianity and non-Christian religions. We then explore what this view entails for the question whether Christians and non-Christian religious believers refer to, believe in, and worship the same God. We first analyze the concepts of worship, belief-in, and reference, as well as their interrelations. We then argue that adherents of the Abrahamic religions plausibly refer to the same God, whereas adherents of non-Abrahamic religions do not refer to this God. Nonetheless, it (...) would be wrong to say that adherents of all Abrahamic religions believe in and worship the same God. (shrink)

In dem gegenwärtig erwünschten Übergang zu einer offenen Wissenschaft ist es nicht mehr angebracht, Wissenschaftler auf ihre quantitative publizistische Produktivität zu reduzieren. Dieser Artikel macht den Vorschlag, die Wissenschaftler qualitativ auf der Grundlage ihres Forschungsverhaltens im Sinne eines frühzeitigen Teilens von Daten und Wissen und ihres qualitativen Beitrags für eine Forschungsmission zu bewerten. Dies kann dazu beitragen, die Wissenschaft im Ganzen produktiver zu gestalten.

A dual-language edition presenting Descartes's original Latin text of his greatest work, with a facing-page authoritative English translation.

In 1974 werd voor het eerst op een Nederlandse school het eindexamen filosofie afgenomen. 13 VWO leerlingen namen daaraan deel. Deze Gideonsbende is sindsdien gestaag gegroeid, de laatste jaren zelfs zo sterk, dat van een kleine bende geen sprake meer kan zijn. In 2007 werd op 158 VWO scholen het eindexamen filosofie afgenomen, waaraan 2861 leerlingen deelnamen. Bovendien is het sinds 2000 ook mogelijk om op de HAVO eindexamen filosofie te doen. In 2007 gebeurde dat op 57 scholen, waaraan 801 (...) leerlingen deelnamen.1 Dit zijn voor een ieder die liefde voor filosofie heeft natuurlijk spectaculaire gebeurtenissen. (shrink)

Hoewel misschien minder dan vroeger, zijn velen van ons op zoek naar waarheid, of ‘de’ waarheid . We beseffen dat het ‘hebben’ van waarheid een groot goed is. We beseffen ook dat waarheid, of ‘de’ waarheid, soms of vaak, moeilijk te achterhalen is: het is een soms of vaak ongrijpbaar goed. Wie echter geen volslagen scepticus is kan in beginsel lijsten aanleggen van beweringen waarvan hij weet dat ze waar zijn, beweringen waarvan hij weet dat ze onwaar zijn, maar ook (...) van beweringen waarvan hij niet weet of ze waar dan wel onwaar zijn. (shrink)

In the following, I will discuss the current social reaction to the ecological crisis and the ways in which society reacts to technological risks, which can be understood primarily as a reaction to scientific and moral or ethical uncertainty. In the first section, I will clarify what is meant by scientific and moral or ethical uncertainty. In the second section, I will contrast Max Weber's differentiation of science, law [Recht) and morality in the modern world with the process of de-differentiation (...) of these value spheres, a trend which can be observed in the present-day context of the ecological crisis and technological risks. We shall see that social contradictions emerge in the functional relationships between these value spheres, and that such contradictions go hand in hand with these value spheres or contexts of discourse either losing their original function or becoming transformed. Science forfeits its role as a functional authority and becomes a strategic resource for politics. Law becomes a basic constituent of an amoral form of negotiation, which can no longer be properly grasped in terms of legal categories. Morality is transformed into fear, and economics yields unprofitable practices. In the third section, I will in attempt to open up the moral and ethical dimension of how to deal with uncertainty with the help of discourse theory, as well as outline a possible solution. (shrink)

Can only science deliver genuine knowledge about the world and ourselves? Is science our only guide to what exists? Scientism answers both questions with yes. Scientism is increasingly influential in popular scientific literature and intellectual life in general, but philosophers have hitherto largely ignored it. This collection is one of the first to develop and assess scientism as a serious philosophical position. It features twelve new essays by both proponents and critics of scientism. Before scientism can be evaluated, it needs (...) to be clear what it is. Hence, the collection opens with essays that provide an overview of the many different versions of scientism and their mutual interrelations. Next, several card-carrying proponents of scientism make their case, either by developing and arguing directly for their preferred version of scientism or by responding to objections. Then, the floor is given to critics of scientism. It is examined whether scientism is epistemically vicious, whether scientism presents a plausible general epistemological outlook and whether science has limits. The final four essays zoom out and connect scientism to ongoing debates elsewhere in philosophy. What does scientism mean for religious epistemology? What can science tell us about morality and is a scientistic moral epistemology plausible? How is scientism related to physicalism? And is experimental philosophy really a form of scientism tailored to philosophy? (shrink)