It will be argued that the basic theoretical assumptions of logical empiricism do not destroy the possibility of practical reasoning, because the noncognitivity of normative or evaluative statements still guarantees rational argument over practical questions and problems. Therefore, no logical inconsistency exists between logical empiricism, its noncognitivist meta-ethics and socialist politics. In particular, logical empiricism is not committed to indifference concerning reactionary political programmes, although it itself entails no individual political programme.

The following article is only in part a review of Rorty’s “Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature”. First I sketch the development of the two leading metaphors, which Rorty considers as being central for epistemology, namely the mirror of nature and the eye of the mind. Then I try to bring out the antirealist implications of Rorty’s socalled “epistemological behaviorism” and to make sense of his slogan that truth is merely warranted assertability which in my view seems not to be (...) in line with his favouring truth-conditional semantics. Thirdly I point to some possible consequences for the social sciences of using the antirealist “criteria!” semantics of the later Wittgen stein, one of Rorty’s heroes. (shrink)

ls it possible to understand not only linguistic expressions and actions but also persons? According to common sense it surely is. Here it is argued that to understand a person a fourfold knowledge is required, although this knowledge is not identical with the understanding of a person. The understanding of a person is cognitive, but neither complete nor scientific.

Logical Empiricism, i.e. its noncognitivism, does not destroy practical rationality because it is compatible with a rational decision on normative questions by way of consequentialist reasoning according to decision theory. It is argued that the contention that Logical Empiricism destroys practical rationality is based on a confusion of a rational decision on normative questions with the interpretation of the meaning of the answers to these questions. It is further argued that a rational decision on normative questions is only possible as (...) far as the normative status of actions is concerned. It is not possible as far as the evaluative premises about basic values are concerned. Finally it is said that a rational decision on normative questions is principally deductive. Good-reason’ s-approach and practical syllogism are therefore only enthymematic and transformable into logical deduction. Of course, proving basic values or moral principles by way of logical deduction is both as impossible as needless. (shrink)

This article investigates how subjects determine minimum selling prices for lotteries. We design an experiment where subjects have at every moment an incentive to state their minimum selling price and to adjust the price, if they believe that the price that they stated initially was not optimal. We observe frequent and sizeable price adjustments. We find that random pricing models cannot explain the observed price patterns. We show that earlier prices contain information about future price adjustments. We propose a model (...) of Stochastic Pricing that offers an intuitive explanation for these price adjustment patterns. (shrink)

La percezione musicale ha avuto un ruolo significativo nella storia della psicologia della Gestalt. Muovendo dalle critiche di Mach ed Ehrenfels alla dottrina elaborata da Helmholtz e dall’elaborazione teorica di Stumpf, destinata a fungere da ponte concettuale, il lavoro analizza la riflessione svoltasi in seno alla psicologia della Gestalt. Sorprendentemente, Köhler non si concentra sulle Gestalten musicali complesse, ma sulle qualità tonali più elementari, mostrandone la totale irriducibilità a fattori fisico-fisiologici. Sulla stessa linea è anche Hornbostel, il quale amplia (...) tuttavia il discorso mediante il richiamo al complesso antropologico dei vissuti umani, musicali ed extramusicali, che rimandano a un determinato contesto culturale, saldando così il nesso tra psicologia della Gestalt e ricerca nel campo etnomusicologico. (shrink)

Wolfgang Köhler (1887-1967) was one of the founders of Gestalt psychology, the influential school that argues that perception is best understood as an organized pattern rather than as separate parts. Penetrating in its insights and lucid in presentation, Gestalt Psychology (1947) is Köhler's definitive statement of Gestalt theory.

Gibt es Elemente, Bestandteile, Strukturen, die in allen Wissenschaftsbereichen, Disziplinen und Theorien fast gleich sind? Dieses Buch stellt ein neues und originelles Modell für Theorien, Theoriennetze und dynamische Entwicklungen vor, das für empirische Untersuchungen in den Sozialwissenschaften, für Computersimulationen, aber auch für praktisch-politische Anwendungen geeignet ist. Die Grundelemente in diesem Modell sind Ereignisse, Fakten, Modelle, Netze und Wahrscheinlichkeit.