The Socio-Cultural pluralism and its fabrics in our society have been under the threat of religious fundamentalism and ideological extremism, which firmly believe that there can only one way of true expression and all other forms, are either substandard or false. This attitude has torn away the world into different isolated islands of human settlements. This state of affair is the outcome of multidimensional causes and one among them, no doubt, is related to one of the central issues of Philosophy, (...) i.e., the relation between ‘one and many’. The ontological dimension of the problem of ‘one and many’ cannot be solved withouthaving the proper understanding of epistemological solutions. The epistemic tools of the Advaita Vedanta are powerful enough to suggest pragmatic solutions to the good old problem of ‘one and many’ that attains new relevance in the era of Globalization. The logic of identity in difference and the logic of difference are the two types of logical systems, which are instrumental for the formulation of various types of claims to know of the western tradition. The logic of identity in difference has been clearly designed and defined by the classical logic or the Aristotelian logic. The symbolic logic encarves the various nuances of the logic of difference. The Advaita System has envisaged a new logic i.e., the logic of identity, which is implicit in the Upanisdic mahavakyya ‘Ayam Āthmam Brahma’. The paper intents to explore the possibility of application of the logic of identity in socio-cultural issues of the present day world. (shrink)

The main objective of my dissertation is twofold: (i) to investigate how the problem of moral motivation occurs in Kant’s texts, and (ii) to examine how Kant’s account of moral feeling serves as an appropriate solution to it. First, I argue that the problem of moral motivation occurs in Kant’s texts as a skeptical problem concerning the motivational efficacy of practical reason. My view that this problem is integral to Kant’s main ethical project goes against a scholarly trend that dismisses (...) the philosophical significance of motivational skepticism in Kant’s moral theory. Second, I argue that Kant develops a peculiar notion of moral feeling in his Critique of Practical Reason primarily to resolve the problem of motivational skepticism about pure practical reason. In doing so, I regard the notion of moral feeling as an essential component of both Kant’s moral motivational structure and his justification of the moral law. This inclusion of moral feeling makes my interpretation a better alternative not only to standard transcendental interpretations of Kant’s account of moral motivation, but also to other kinds of interpretations proposed in the recent literature. (shrink)

A challenge to Kant’s less known duty of self-knowledge comes from his own firm view that it is impossible to know oneself. This paper resolves this problem by considering the duty of self-knowledge as involving the pursuit of knowledge of oneself as one appears in the empirical world. First, I argue that, although Kant places severe restrictions on the possibility of knowing oneself as one is, he admits the possibility of knowing oneself as one appears using methods from empirical anthropology. (...) Second, I show that empirical knowledge of oneself is fairly reliable and is, in fact, considered as morally significant from Kant’s moral anthropological perspective. Taking these points together, I conclude that Kant’s duty of self-knowledge exclusively entails the pursuit of empirical self-knowledge. (shrink)

A stable classification of practical principles into mutually exclusive types is foundational to Kant’s moral theory. Yet, other than a few brief hints on the distinction between maxims and laws, he does not provide any elaborate discussion on the classification and the types of practical principles in his works. This has led Onora O’Neill and Lewis Beck to reinterpret Kant’s classification of practical principles in a way that would clarify the conceptual connection between maxims and laws. In this paper I (...) argue that the revised interpretations of O’Neill and Beck stem from a mistaken reading of the fundamental basis of the classification of practical principles. To show this, I first argue that Kant distinguishes between maxims and laws on the bases of validity and reality. I then argue that although a practical principle necessarily has the feature of validity, its reality in actually moving the agents to action sufficiently makes a principle a practical principle. If this is so, I argue that the classification of practical principles must be based on the extent to which they are effective in human agents. Such a classification yields us three exhaustive and mutually exclusive types namely, “maxims that are not potential laws”, “maxims that are potential laws” and “laws that are not maxims”. (shrink)

In this paper, I aim to resolve the Frierson-Grenberg debate on the nature of Kant’s account of moral motivation that took place in the third issue of Con-textos Kantianos. In their respective interpretations, Frierson and Grenberg fail to accommodate the a priori status of moral feeling when incorporating it into Kant’s moral motivational structure. In response, I provide a novel transcendental interpretation – one that takes the a priori moral feeling both as an incentive of morality and as that which (...) conditions the possibility of morality in human agents. I argue that Kant developed the notion of moral feeling solely in order to resolve the problem of motivational skepticism concerning the moral law. Since this problem occurs as a part of Kant’s search for the supreme principle of morality, the notion of moral feeling becomes a part of both Kant’s moral motivational structure and his argument to justify the moral law. (shrink)

Kant’s theory of moral action faces a serious difficulty concerning motivation: how do commands of pure practical reason solely move human agents to perform moral actions? In his response, Kant claims that human agents perform moral actions out of a feeling of respect for the moral law. However, attempts to accommodate a feeling of respect into Kant’s rigorously rationalist ethical theory have led to two diverging strands of interpretation in the secondary literature: intellectualism and affectivism. Against this context, this paper (...) proposes an interpretation of Kantian moral motivation with an appropriate place for the notion of respect within it to resolve the motivational problem concerning moral actions. According to the model of Kantian moral motivation that this paper develops, motivation to act morally takes place in two sequential stages, each involving the positive role of respect as a motive. By arguing for a positive role of the feeling of respect in the process of moral motivation, this model aligns with the affectivist school of interpretation. (shrink)

Classical and modern figures in numerous religious traditions—including Judaism, Christianity, Sufism, Hinduism, Mahāyāna Buddhism, and the Baha’i faith—have championed the doctrine of universal salvation, the view that everyone without exception will be saved.1 However, recent scholarly work on the topic has made clear that universal salvation is not a monolithic concept. Rather, the doctrine of universal salvation takes a wide variety of forms, depending on the broader theological or metaphysical framework within which it is embedded.Within Hinduism, for instance, figures as (...) diverse as Appayya Dīkṣita, Sri Ramakrishna, Sri Aurobindo, and Sarvepalli Radhakrishnan have all advocated the general doctrine of... (shrink)

This paper tries to show that there is a shift in the meaning of toleration. The traditional meaning of toleration, understood as endurance, is giving way to a more positive understanding of the concept. This is because the traditional meaning of toleration ill-fits with values like the intrinsic worth of human beings, universal rights, etc. Especially in pluralistic societies, endurance of the Other is becoming increasingly unacceptable; minorities and their defendants demand respect, acceptance, and appreciation of the Other. The first (...) section delivers a framework of the general meaning of liberal toleration. Here, the shift in meaning will be highlighted. In the second section, I will try to situate Radhakrishnan’s views within this debate. (shrink)

This book presents a critical and comprehensive biography of Radhakrishnan. The authors explain how Radhakrishnan, who had a British knighthood and an Oxford Professorship, and who did not participate in India’s struggle for freedom, became important in the political life of Independent India. They show how this philosophy professor and vice chancellor often expressed radical views, developed rapport with national leaders, and became President of Indian under Nehru without losing the goodwill and regard of either the British intellectuals or the (...) colonial government of India. It is the thought of Sarvepalli Radhakrishnan that is most often presented in the West as “Hinduism.” Through an analysis of his autobiographical sketches, writings of those who knew him and worked with him, and documents, the authors come to grips with Radhakrishnan’s complex personality which, in spite of his greatness and varied achievements, is all too human. (shrink)

Sir Sarvepalli Radhakrishnan, clearly one of the early modern doyens of Indian Philosophy, remained much enamored of Western thought—of which he took the ancient to classical tradition as his model—and he spent a good part of his speculative life attempting to reconfigure Indian thought to fit the vesture, maybe the toga, of his Greek heroes, namely Plato and Plotinus, and to an extent of Hegelianism that came across via F. H. Bradley: Occidental in form, and Indian in content. It was (...) as if this ‘fusion’ or ‘harmonization’ was easy of making without compromising what since Max Müller has come to be called ‘Indian Philosophy’. The paper intends to demonstrate this worrisome yet compelling motif by advancing an analysis of certain representative texts and arguments from Radhakrishnan’s prolific writing on Indian Philosophy and East-West Thinking; particularly as these relate to the question of the ‘appearances’, their alignment with Platonic ‘shadows,’ while finding their redemption in the realism propelled by modern empirical science. The paper traces the justification for Radhakrishnan’s variegated moves to ‘save the appearances’ through his strained reading of the Upaniṣadic texts and under-standing of Śaṅkara’s nondualism, leading to the argument that although the world is brought about by māyā, it is not an illusion or nonexistent, or unhinged from the Absolute, but rather naïvely real. There may have been a supplementary political motivation as well inspired by the burgeoning nationalist spirit, after Gandhi, and the need for India to become culturally and morally strong in its own terms. (shrink)

On the life and works of Sarvepalli Radhakrishnan, 1888-1975, Indian philosopher and statesman.

Seventy six papers collected together to honor Dr. S. Radhakrishnan, the philosopher-statesman of India. The selection of papers reflects Radhakrishnan's life long task of encouraging a genuine encounter between the thought of the east and the west.—R. J. B.

About the Book :Sarvepalli Radhakrishnan, former president of India, is regarded as one of the representative of its rich philosophic tradition and its leading ...

We shall examine some conceptual tensions in Hick’s ‘pluralism’ in the light of S. Radhakrishnan’s reformulation of classical Advaita. Hick himself often quoted Radhakrishnan’s translations from the Hindu scriptures in support of his own claims about divine ineffability, transformative experience and religious pluralism. However, while Hick developed these themes partly through an adaptation of Kantian epistemology, Radhakrishnan derived them ultimately from Śaṁkara, and these two distinctive points of origin lead to somewhat different types of reconstruction of the diversity of world (...) religions. Our argument will highlight the point that Radhakrishnan is not a ‘pluralist’ in terms of Hick’s understanding of the Real. The Advaitin ultimate, while it too like Hick’s Real cannot be encapsulated by human categories, is, however, not strongly ineffable, because some substantive descriptions, according to the Advaitic tradition, are more accurate than others. Our comparative analysis will reveal that they differ because they are located in two somewhat divergent metaphysical schemes. In turn, we will be able to revisit, through this dialogue between Hick and Radhakrishnan, the intensely vexed question of whether Hick’s version of pluralism is in fact a form of covert exclusivism. (shrink)