In this paper we define the concept of a system function language which is a language generated by a system function. We identify system function languages with recursively enumerable sets which are non-simple and co-infinite. We then define restricted system function languages and identify them with recursive sets which are co-infinite. Finally we state and prove some independence and dependence relationships between system function languages and some of the more well-known decision problems. MSC: 03D05, 03D20, 03D25.

(1979). A Comparison of Item‐ Total Point Biserial Correlation, Rasch and Alpha‐Beater Item Analysis Procedures. Educational Studies: Vol. 5, No. 3, pp. 265-273.

The study of actions is of major importance in social science regardless of whether the investigator is or isn’t a behaviorist. Actions constitute much if not all of an observational substratum which both prompts explanation and confirms prediction. Actions are of interest both as samples of what an animal can do and as symptoms of underlying structures, either psychic or physical. Doubtless, actions as symptoms of underlying structures are, in the long run, of greater importance in social science than actions (...) as samples of capacities, for to be able to predict an organism’s further performance on the basis of knowledge of capacities is not necessarily to understand the organism. Understanding actions, if it is indeed the desideratum of social science—as I take it to be—involves more, however, than the viewing of actions as symptomatic of underlying structures. Actions are obviously bearers of meaning in and for a given social context, and this meaning is for both the agent and actual or imagined spectators. Spectators can be said to do their viewing both at the time the action takes place and also, in a sense, at later times when recalling or reading reports of a now past action. (shrink)

Sometimes metaphysicians appeal to simplicity as a reason to prefer one metaphysical theory to another, especially when a philosophical dispute has otherwise reached a state of equilibrium. In this paper, I show that given a Quinean conception of metaphysics, several initially plausible justifications for simplicity as a metaphysical criterion do not succeed. If philosophers wish to preserve simplicity as a metaphysical criterion, therefore, they must radically reconceive the project of metaphysics.

The study of actions is of major importance in social science regardless of whether the investigator is or isn’t a behaviorist. Actions constitute much if not all of an observational substratum which both prompts explanation and confirms prediction. Actions are of interest both as samples of what an animal can do and as symptoms of underlying structures, either psychic or physical. Doubtless, actions as symptoms of underlying structures are, in the long run, of greater importance in social science than actions (...) as samples of capacities, for to be able to predict an organism’s further performance on the basis of knowledge of capacities is not necessarily to understand the organism. Understanding actions, if it is indeed the desideratum of social science—as I take it to be—involves more, however, than the viewing of actions as symptomatic of underlying structures. Actions are obviously bearers of meaning in and for a given social context, and this meaning is for both the agent and actual or imagined spectators. Spectators can be said to do their viewing both at the time the action takes place and also, in a sense, at later times when recalling or reading reports of a now past action. (shrink)

I argue that Metz's undertaking, in seeking a ‘comprehensive basic norm' to underpin African ethics, is similar to Hans Kelsen's postulation of the Grundnorm in his Pure Theory of Law. But African ethics does not need to be underpinned by an approach such as Kelsen's. In my view, Metz's preference for seeking to develop a Grundnorm rests upon a failure to attend carefully to the distinctness of African ethical thinking from Western ethical thinking. This failure is manifest in a spurious (...) distinction between ‘moral anthropology' / ‘cultural studies' and ‘normative theory'. It is also manifest in Metz's failure to attend carefully to the work of Wiredu and Bujo, both of whom present systematic, critical analyses of African ethical thinking while implicitly rejecting the quest for a Grund norm as being unAfrican. South African Journal of Philosophy Vol. 26 2007: pp. 347-355. (shrink)

Is arguing over ontology a mistake? A recent proposal by Karen Bennett suggests that some metaphysical disputes, such as those over constitution and composition, can be dismissed on epistemic grounds. Given that both sides in a dispute try to minimize the differences between them, there are no good metaphysical grounds for choosing between them. In this paper, I expand on her epistemic dismissivism, arguing that given the Quinean conception of the task and method of metaphysics, we are warranted in believing (...) that all ontological disputes will end in a draw, even if they have not yet done so. By a draw, I mean that while both sides in a dispute are genuinely disagreeing about what there is and there are still moves open to them, there are no moves remaining that will advance the discourse further. (shrink)

One of the processes that Zaydism, as a sect that has survived to the present day, went through in the Yemen region is the period that began with Mansûr-Billâh Qasim b. Muhammad, who declared his imamate in the 16th century and continued by the descendants of the ruling class until the declaration of the Republic. However, there is not enough information in the literature about this period, which is known as the Kasimi’s era. Mansûr-Billâh Qasim b. Muhammad has many works (...) on akaid, tafsir, method, islamic law, and in addition, there is a small pamphlet (risalah) written by him. This study aims to introduce the translation of the will written by Mansûr-Billâh Qasim b. Muhammad, who is known as the founder of the Kasimi dynasty, for his son Muayyad-Billâh Muhammad b. Kasım into the literature. (shrink)

In Book VII, p. 520, Socrates describes the arguments by which the philosophers must be induced to “return to the cave,” that is to say, to resume the practical business of politics from which they have escaped into the better life of contemplation. They must be shown that this sacrifice is a debt which they owe to the city in return for the opportunity which it has afforded them of becoming philosophers. “Will our pupils,"1 he continues, “when they hear this, (...) refuse to share in turn the toils of state, when they are allowed to spend the greater part of their time with one another in the heaven of ideas?” “Impossible,” Glaucon replies; “for they are just men, and the commands which we impose on them are just; there can be no doubt that every one of them will take office as a stern necessity, and not like our present ministers of state’. (shrink)