Re-Engineering Philosophy for Limited Beings is about new approaches to many of the big topics in philosophy of science today, but with a very different take. To begin with, we are urged to reject the received Cartesian-Laplacean myths: Descartes’ certainty and Laplace’s computational omniscience. Instead, Wimsatt re-engineers a philosophy for human beings with all their cognitive limitations. His approaches find their starting point in the actual practices of scientists themselves, which he strongly identifies with engineering practices as the source of (...) researchers’ solutions for dealing with a complex world. He aims to construct an understanding of scientific methodology around the central role of reduction. But he dismisses eliminative reductionism in favor of a heuristic-based realist view. Wimsatt’s world is a complex one, and this means that science needs to do away with all the absolute and simple answers, because they do not reflect the world we are living in. A complex world requires the mindset and tinkering of an engineer to uncover its reality. The appropriate response must be heuristics all the way down as we constantly seek out reliable inferences on often shifting ground. To this end, we aim for models and theories that are robust, just as engineers aim to build robust machines. And although errors occur and approaches are fallible, they allow us to continually adapt the heuristics applied and sharpen our perceptions so as to develop more refined tools for investigating and understanding the world. (shrink)

One important challenge for contingentists is that they seem to be unable to account for the meaning of some apparently meaningful modal discourse that is perfectly intelligible for necessitists. This worry is particularly pressing for higher-order contingentists, contingentists who hold that it is not only contingent which objects there are, but also contingent which semantic values there are for higher-order variables to quantify over. Objections against higher-order contingentism along these lines have been presented in Williamson (Mind 119(475):657–748, 2010; Modal logic (...) as metaphysics, Oxford University Press, 2013, ch. 7), and Fritz and Goodman (Mind 126(504):1063–1108, 2017). This paper presents a way for contingentists to respond to these challenges. The upshot is that the contingentist can account for the meaningfulness of the problematic modal claims by pretending necessitism to be true, but in some cases it turns out to be indeterminate whether they are true. I defend this strategy against the objections against pretence-strategies presented in Fritz and Goodman (Mind 126(504):1063–1108, 2017, §4). Furthermore, I defend the plausibility of the resulting indeterminacy from the contingentist’s perspective. (shrink)

In the twentieth century, Nietzsche became famous but remained infamous. No matter how popular his catchwords became, his thinking never acquired the status of a common philosophical ground like that of Aristotle, Descartes, or Kant. Most of our academic colleagues outside of Nietzsche research still hesitate to accept his ideas, not to mention adopting them. Our philosophical colleagues are primarily—and now more than ever—looking for secure logical and ontological, sometimes even metaphysical reasons, which Nietzsche impedes, if not entirely refuses. As (...) far as he was philosophically adopted and further developed—which happened primarily in France for a long time—such attempts were again reduced to narrow “-isms,”... (shrink)

Bezüglich Lehre und Praxis der Kirche empfindet man vielfach einen Mangel an Barmherzigkeit, vor allem da, wo ein Handeln gemäss der traditionellen Lehre für die Betroffenen eine erhebliche Belastung bedeutet. Im Brennpunkt stehen dabei besonders wiederverheiratete und homosexuelle Menschen, denen sexuelle Enthaltsamkeit zugemutet wird. Da es für solche Zumutung aber starke Argumente geben müsste, sind die vor allem mit Rekurs auf die Bibel vorgebrachten Gründe zu überprüfen. Falls diese aber der Überprüfung nicht standhalten, geht es nicht um Barmherzigkeit, sondern um (...) Gerechtigkeit für die Betroffenen. In anderem Kontext kann der Ruf nach Barmherzigkeit der Bagatellisierung von Unrecht und Schuld dienen. Im Fall der kalabrischen Mafiosi hat Papst Franziskus diese für exkommuniziert erklärt, gegen Plädoyers für Barmherzigkeit von anderer Seite. Dabei umfasst die Rede von der Barmherzigkeit durchaus unterschiedliche Handlungsweisen, die jeweils einer gesonderten ethischen Beurteilung bedürfen. Auch das neuerdings vielfach bemühte Gesetz der Gradualität versucht, ethischen Rigorismus abzumildern und so auf diese Weise eine Art Barmherzigkeit zu ermöglichen, ohne eine 'Gradualität des Gesetzes' zu proklamieren. Sollte dieser Versuch freilich misslingen, ginge es auch hier eher um Gerechtigkeit"--Page 4 of cover. (shrink)

„Spiritualität heute“ – Unter diesem Titel hatte der Hildesheimer Literaturwissenschaftler Toni Tholen 2016 in einem Vortrag zum Nachdenken über Spiritualität angeregt und eingeladen. Er selbst verknüpfte dabei das Konzept der Selbstsorge mit dem Verständnis von literarischer Praxis als (eine zeitgemäße Form von) Spiritualität. Die in diesem Band versammelten Beiträge von Wissenschaftlerinnen und Wissenschaftlern aus ganz unterschiedlichen Fachrichtungen der Universität Hildesheim haben die Einladung Tholens auf sehr verschiedene Weise angenommen. Sie verbindet die Haltung, offen für eine argumentative Auseinandersetzung mit dem Thema (...) Spiritualität zu sein. Zugleich wählen sie in Inhalt und Form unterschiedliche Zugänge – so ist die Einladung zum Gespräch in doppeltem Sinne vielfältig aufgenommen. Einige Beiträge diskutieren die von Tholen vorlegte Konturierung von Spiritualität aus der Perspektive ihrer eigenen Disziplin. Andere fragen nach möglichen Einordnungen der Diskurse über Spiritualität. Wieder andere Beiträge erwägen die Frage, wie man die geistliche Suche mit wissenschaftlicher Suche verbinden kann. Mit der Antwort Tholens auf diese Texte entwickelt sich ein transdisziplinärer Dialog über das Thema Spiritualität. (shrink)

In a recent paper in this journal, Jonathan Barker argues against the claim that grounded entities are ontologically innocent. In this paper I defend the ontological innocence of grounded entities against Barker's argument. I tease out an assumption that is crucial for the success of Barker's argument and I show that the defender of ontological innocence can deny this assumption in a motivated way.

According to an optimistic view, affective empathy is a route to knowledge of what it is like to be in the target person’s state (“phenomenal knowledge”). Roughly, the idea is that the empathizer gains this knowledge by means of empathically experiencing the target’s emotional state. The literature on affective empathy, however, often draws a simplified picture according to which the target feels only a single emotion at a time. Co-occurring emotions (“concurrent emotions”) are rarely considered. This is problematic, because concurring (...) emotions seem to support a sceptical view according to which we cannot gain phenomenal knowledge of the target person’s state by means of affective empathy. The sceptic concludes that attaining the epistemic goal of affective empathy is difficult, in practice often impossible. I accept the sceptic’s premises, but reject the conclusion, because of the argument’s unjustified, hidden premise: that the epistemic goal of affective empathy is phenomenal knowledge. I argue that the epistemic goal of affective empathy is phenomenal understanding, not knowledge. Attention to the under-explored phenomenon of concurring emotions clarifies why this is important. I argue that this is the decisive epistemic progress in everyday cases of phenomenal understanding of another person. (shrink)

Ivan Efimovič Orlov’s paper “The calculus of the compatibility of propositions”, published in Russian in 1928, is fascinating for anyone interested in the early history of relevance, modal or intuitionistic logic. This is a guide that outlines Orlov's life and work, analyses the content of the paper, and relates it to work of his contemporaries and successors.

Le philosophe russe Nicolai Vasiliev est connu en tant que précurseur des logiques essentiellement non-classiques, c'est-à-dire de logiques qui diffèrent de la logique classique par l'abandon de principes qui sont corrects en logique classique. La gamme de telles logiques couvre la logique intuitionniste, la logique plurivalente, la logique paraconsistante et les logiques de la pertinence. Dans la première partie de ce texte, j'analyse brièvement les vues de Vasiliev, à savoir sa « logique imaginaire », qu'il présente comme une nouvelle logique (...) non-aristotélicienne. Dans les sections suivantes je discute l'impact des approches de Vasiliev sur la logique du consentement. Ici, les idées essentiellement non-classiques de Vasiliev seront reliées à des logiques non- essentiellement non-classiques, qui ne constituent pas une révision de la logique classique, mais étendent sa puissance expressive. (shrink)

Cet article présente et discute la méthodologie de construction d’un corpus plurilingue en diachronie longue (1681-1914). Puisqu’il n’existait pas de corpus alsacien significatif, un important travail de construction d’un corpus significatif a été mené afin de constituer un corpus documentant les contacts linguistiques dans les écrits des locuteurs-scripteurs alsaciens. Cette tâche a présenté un certain nombre de défis méthodologiques causés par le contact des langues, la variation sociolinguistique et diachronique, le manque de sources primaires et de documents numérisés. Parmi ces (...) défis entrent aussi en compte la complexité du contexte historico-politico-sociolinguistique et les rapports entre oralité et scripturalité. (shrink)

This paper concerns the question of which properties figure in the contents of perceptual experience. According to conservatives, only low-level properties figure in the contents of perceptual experience. Liberals, on the other hand, claim that high-level properties, such as natural kind properties, artifacts, and even moral properties, can figure in the contents of perceptual experience. I defend a novel argument in favor of liberalism, the Epistemic Argument, which hinges on two crucial claims. The first is that many perceptual experiences of (...) even neurotypical human beings can justify beliefs in high-level properties without providing justification for their low-level constituents. The second claim, roughly, is that any experience that alone provides (defeasible) justification for beliefs about some property p, other things being equal, has p as part of its content. In short, certain perceptual experiences represent high-level but not low-level properties, which entails that liberalism is true. (shrink)

Name der Zeitschrift: Byzantinische Zeitschrift Jahrgang: 110 Heft: 3 Seiten: 749-754.